Scott v. Leavenworth Unified School District No. 453

78 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19947, 1999 WL 1273289
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedDecember 21, 1999
Docket99-2098-GTV
StatusPublished

This text of 78 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (Scott v. Leavenworth Unified School District No. 453) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scott v. Leavenworth Unified School District No. 453, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19947, 1999 WL 1273289 (D. Kan. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WAXSE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon defendant’s Unopposed Motion for Order of Waiver of Privileged Information (doc. 37), which seeks an order compelling the Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEOC”) and the Kansas Human Rights Commission (“KHRC”) to release and/or make available for examination and reproduction certain records relating to plaintiff.

I. REQUEST FOR EEOC RECORDS

Defendant indicates that a copy of its Motion was served on the EEOC; however, no response or objections were filed by the EEOC. Defendant does indicate that the EEOC objected to the subpoena and defendant has provided the Court with a copy of those objections; however, the EEOC did not file those objections with the Court. In it objections, the EEOC objects to producing the documents primarily because of confidentiality provisions found in Title VII.

Defendant does not identify in its Motion the records it seeks from the EEOC, except to refer to them as records “regarding plaintiffs charge of discrimination against a former employer, who is not the defendant.” In its subpoena to the EEOC, defendant requested all documents “of whatever kind or nature which you may have relating to Mary Scott, with the exception of material related to Charge Number 281980972 which was previously provided by your office.” In its proposed order, defendant narrows its request to seek all records “concerning Mary Scott’s charge of discrimination against Kansas City Kansas Unified School District No. 500 ... EEOC Charge No. Unknown.” The Court will therefore treat defendant’s Motion as seeking the records relating to plaintiffs charge against Kansas City, Kansas Unified School District No. 500 (“School District No. 500”). School District No. 500 is not a party to this action.

The Court will deny defendant’s Motion as it applies to said EEOC records. Section 709(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for any officer or employee of the EEOC “to make public in any manner” information obtained by the EEOC “prior to the institution of any proceeding ... involving such information.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e). Disclosure in violation of this statute is a *1200 misdemeanor punishable by a fíne of up to one thousand dollars or imprisonment up to one year. Id. The Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~8(e) does not apply to the charging party or the respondent, since neither is a member of “the public” as far as the particular charge is considered. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 599-600, 603, 101 S.Ct. 817, 66 L.Ed.2d 762 (1981).

An EEOC regulation contains similar non-disclosure rules. It provides that a charge and any information obtained during the investigation of a Title VII charge may not be made “matters of public information by the Commission prior to the institution of any proceeding under ... Title VII involving such charge or information.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22. An exception is made, however, for pre-litigation disclosures to the charging parties and respondents and their attorneys “where disclosure is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief.” Id. 1

In this case, defendant is seeking information about a charge to which it was not a party. Any disclosure by the EEOC to defendant would therefore be in violation of both 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22. The fact that plaintiff has agreed to waive this “privilege” and has communicated his willingness to do so to the EEOC, as defendant states in its Motion, would not render the disclosure proper. One of the purposes behind the non-disclosure provisions is to protect the employer/respondent who has an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its records. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Milwaukee, 54 F.Supp.2d 885, 892-93 (E.D.Wis.1999). 2 Here, only the charging party has consented to waive his rights to confidentiality; the respondent, i.e., School District No. 500, has not done so. Disclosure in these circumstances would be improper and in violation of both Title VII and the EEOC’s regulations. It would also be in violation of the various rules set forth in § 83 of the EEOC Compliance Manual. 3 The Court will therefore deny defendant’s Motion to the extent it seeks records from the *1201 EEOC relating to the charge plaintiff filed against School District No. 500.

II. REQUEST FOR KHRC RECORDS

Defendants’ Motion only briefly refers to records of the KHRC. In its proposed order, however,

it indicates that it is seeking all records relating to KHRC Charge No. 281941254, which is the KHRC charge plaintiff apparently filed against School District No. 500. No subpoena was ever served on the KHRC for these documents.

The Court notes that in the typical case, where the parties are involved in litigation relating to the underlying charge filed with the KHRC, the KHRC will not require that a subpoena be served for the records. Rather, pursuant to an informal agreement between the KHRC and this Court, the parties may simply file a joint motion requesting that the Court direct the KHRC to make available for inspection and/or copying all records relating to the charge, except those that are “deliberative” or “conciliatory” in nature 4 and those that constitute the work product of a KHRC attorney.

This is not the typical case where the parties to the litigation are the same parties involved in the KHRC charge of which the parties are seeking the KHRC records. As noted above, the documents requested relate to the charge that plaintiff filed against another employer, School District No. 500. Plaintiff, however, has agreed to waive any “privilege” he may have with respect to the requested documents and has therefore consented to the KHRC releasing the records. Unlike the EEOC, the KHRC is not prohibited from disclosing documents relating to a charge filed against another employer as long as the charging party has consented to the disclosure. See K.A.R. 21-43-6 (“Ño officer, agent or employee of the commission shall make public with respect to a particular person without his consent information from reports obtained by the commission except as necessary to the conduct of further commission proceedings.”) (emphasis added).

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Bluebook (online)
78 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19947, 1999 WL 1273289, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scott-v-leavenworth-unified-school-district-no-453-ksd-1999.