Scott v. GEO Corporation

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided July 29, 2022·No. 3:22-cv-08129·Unknown

Opinion

MDR WO Bobby Scott, No. CV 22-08129-PCT-JAT (JFM) Plaintiff, v. ORDER The GEO Corp., et al., Defendants.

On July 15, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Bobby Scott, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison-Kingman, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1), an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2), a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 4), a Request for the Court to Issue a Preliminary Injunction Order (Doc. 5), and a Memorandum of Law and Declaration in support of the request for a preliminary injunction. The Court will grant the Application to Proceed, dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend, and deny without prejudice the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for the Court to Issue a Preliminary Injunction Order. I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee A prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis if: the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The imminent danger exception applies “if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that his twenty-first lawsuit, Scott v. Stewart, CV 05-00714-TUC-FRZ, was dismissed because he has three strikes. He claims the current action “meets the 3 strikes exemption because it [concerns Plaintiff] being denied medical care which places [Plaintiff] in imminent danger.” Plaintiff alleges a skin cancer clinic twice froze off his skin cancer and, at the last visit, scheduled him for a follow-up visit and indicated that they would “utilize other removal methods if [the cancer] came back again.” He contends the follow-up visit was supposed to occur two years ago, but he has not been taken back to the clinic or otherwise treated, and the skin cancer is “swelling up and hurting,” which “is what skin cancer does when it’s at spreading stages.” Liberally construed, these allegations are sufficient to meet the imminent danger requirement. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. . . . . III. Complaint In his two-count Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants the GEO Corporation, Dr. Richardson, Nurse Practitioner Lucero, Director of Nursing Taylor, Facility Health Administrator/Health Services Administrator/Registered Nurse Michelle Voigt, Complex Warden Rigley, Deputy Warden Moorish, Sergeant Gleason,1 Corrections Officer (CO) IV Cole, CO III Thacker, “MNI” Pluckett, Administrative Assistant B. Curtis, and Arizona Department of Corrections Director Shinn. In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. In Count One, Plaintiff raises a claim under the Eighth Amendment regarding his medical care. Plaintiff alleges he did not know that the cluster of bumps on his neck were skin cancer until four years ago, when he was first sent to a skin cancer clinic and they “froze it off.” He contends the bumps returned, and he returned to the clinic, where the clinic “froze it off again,” scheduled him for follow-up appointment in six months, and told him they would “utilize other removal methods if [the skin cancer] came back again.” Plaintiff alleges it has been more than two years and he still has not returned to the clinic. He claims the bumps on his neck returned and he has “continually told this to medical.” Plaintiff asserts that over a year ago, he aske

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Scott v. GEO Corporation, (D. Ariz. 2022).

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