Scott v. GEO Corporation

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided October 11, 2022·No. 3:22-cv-08129·Unknown

Opinion

WO Bobby Scott, No. CV 22-08129-PCT-JAT (JFM) Plaintiff, v. ORDER The GEO Corp., et al., Defendants.

Pro se Plaintiff Bobby Scott is confined in the Arizona State Prison-Kingman and is proceeding in forma pauperis. In a July 29, 2022 Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s civil rights Complaint because he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s motions for counsel and a preliminary injunction, and gave Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. On August 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) and a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 12).1 The Court will order Defendants to answer the First Amended Complaint and will deny without prejudice the Motion for Appointment of Counsel. . . . .

1 Plaintiff also filed a Request for the Court to Issue a Preliminary Injunction Order. After Defendant GEO responded to the request, Plaintiff withdrew his request, noting that the doctor and Health Services Administrator had “ordered [Plaintiff] a visit to a dermatology clinic to test and treat the skin cancer and a[n] MRI to test the lymph nodes.” I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). . . . . II. First Amended Complaint In his two-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendants GEO, Health Service Administrator Amber Puckett, Assistant Director of Nursing Kimberly Grassi, Doctor Richardson, and Nurse Practitioner Lucero. Plaintiff raises Eighth Amendment medical care claims regarding his skin cancer (Count One) and swollen lymph nodes (Count Two) and seeks injunctive relief, monetary damages, and his costs of suit. In Count One, Plaintiff makes the following allegations. Two-and-a-half years ago, he was sent to a skin cancer clinic where skin cancer on the upper left side of his neck was frozen off. The skin cancer returned. Six months after his first visit to the clinic, he went back to the clinic and the skin cancer again was frozen off. The clinic scheduled Plaintiff for a follow-up appointment in six months “to surgically remove and biopsy the skin cancer if it came back again.” Although the skin cancer returned, Plaintiff was never taken to the follow-up appointment. Approximately a year-and-a-half ago, during an examination by Defendant Richardson, Plaintiff told Defendant Richardson that the skin cancer had returned and requested the follow-up appointment. Defendant Richardson “denied” the follow-up appointment, but told Plaintiff he was going to schedule a biopsy. Plaintiff never received the biopsy. On May 3, 2022, after Plaintiff’s skin cancer “began swelling,” he submitted a health needs request form, requesting the medical department reschedule the follow-up appointment with the clinic. On May 12, he submitted an informal resolution because “[n]othing was being done.” On May 19, Plaintiff saw Defendant Lucero, who examined Plaintiff, “found the missed clinic visit” in Plaintiff’s medical file, and told Plaintiff that she would “get with [Defendant] Richardson” and call Plaintiff back. Plaintiff was never called back. Later in May 2022, Plaintiff saw Defendant Lucero for a different issue and asked her if she had checked with Defendant Richardson about the clinic visit. Defendant Lucero told Plaintiff, “we are waiting on the results.” Plaintiff contends this indicates Defendant Lucero had not checked with Defendant Richardson because Plaintiff’s skin cancer was never tested and, therefore, there could not have been any results. In addition, Plaintiff and Defendant Lucero discussed the results of Plaintiff’s blood test, which indicated his white blood cell count was high. Defendant Lucero told him, “it doesn’t mean anything,” and did nothing, even though having a high white blood cell count “does mean something.” Plaintiff filed a formal grievance on June 3, 2022, because he never received a response to his May 12 informal resolution. Three days later, two case managers told him that “medical assured them that if [Plaintiff] refiled the [informal resolution, the medical department] would promptly address the issue.” On June 6, Plaintiff refiled his informal resolution. He did not receive a response to it. Because Plaintiff had not received a response to his May 12 informal resolution or the June 6 refiled informal resolution, he filed a June 27, 2022 formal grievance, requesting “the appointment (late) and ‘a full cancer screening to [e]nsure it hasn’t spread elsewhere.’” On July 13, he submitted another health needs request form, asking if his skin cancer had been scheduled for removal and requesting ointment. Plaintiff saw a nurse who told him ointments are “specific to a type of skin cancer” and they would not know what ointment to give Plaintiff until a biopsy was done to determine the type of skin cancer Plaintiff had. On July 18, 2022, Plaintiff received a response to his formal grievance from Defendant Grassi, who stated that Plaintiff was “scheduled to see the provider.” Plaintiff contends this response “did not resolve the issue,” so he filed a July 19 grievance appeal requesting an appointment to remove and test his skin cancer “to see if it spread.” He also submitted a July 19 health needs request form complaining about “left ear and n

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Scott v. GEO Corporation, (D. Ariz. 2022).

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