Scott v. Annucci

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided October 6, 2023·No. 7:23-cv-06911·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CLAYTON SCOTT, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-6911 (LTS) ANTHONY ANNUCCI, Commissioner, NYS ORDER TO AMEND DOCCS; JOSEPH SERGEANT; JOHN DOE, Officer in Charge; JOHN DOE, Escorting Officer, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Clayton Scott, who is currently incarcerated at Franklin Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that Defendants denied him the right to attend a Jumah prayer service at Sing Sing Correctional Facility during Ramadan, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. By order dated October 4, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to

state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND This complaint was originally filed by thirty individuals incarcerated in Sing Sing Correctional Facility, who asked to proceed as a class and applied for pro bono counsel. See Brown v. Annucci, No. 7:23-CV-06056, 1 (CS) (“Brown”).2 By order dated August 7, 2023, the Court severed each plaintiff’s claims, opening each as a new case, noting that:

each Plaintiff will ultimately need to allege his own set of facts detailing when the denial occurred, how he was affected, and what steps, if any, he took to challenge the denial. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which is written from the perspective of Byron K. Brown, the lead plaintiff. On April 14, 2023, during Ramadan, Brown and other individuals in Housing Block A were not allowed to attend the 1:00 p.m. Jumah prayer service, because Sing Sing was operating on a “holiday schedule” to accommodate a former staff member’s memorial service. (Id. at 7.) According to the complaint, Sergeant Joseph and the two John Doe officers failed to follow New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) protocol; and Acting Commissioner Annucci failed to take action to curb known patterns of officers denying prisoners the right to exercise their religion. (Id. at 4.) Brown alleges that he: (1) “registered” as a Muslim with DOCCS in 1995 and 1997, during prior periods of incarceration; (2) requested to attend the Jumah service on April 14, 2023; (3) filed a grievance when he was not allowed to attend that service;3 (4) “actively

2 Judge Cathy Seibel of this court issued an order of service in Brown on August 18, 2023. ECF 7:23-CV-6056, 11. 3 According to Brown: (1) he filed a grievance asserting that he “and other prisoners” had been denied the right to attend the Jumah service; (2) his “complaint was consolidated along with other plaintiffs’ grievances”; (3) he appealed to the superintendent of the facility and to the Central Office Review Committee (“CORC”); and (4) he “exhausted his administrative remedies.” (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 23, IV(F)(2).) participated in every religious fast during the ‘Holy Month of Ramadan”; and (5) has attended Jumah services weekly, and Islamic classes regularly, during his incarceration. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 16, 17.) Brown brings this action seeking monetary damages and declaratory relief. The complaint does not contain facts specific to the other prisoners who signed it,

including Plaintiff Scott. DISCUSSION A. Religious freedom claim The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause protects individuals from “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion [by government officials], not just outright prohibitions.” Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’ n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988). For a Free Exercise claim, the question at the pleading stage is whether the plaintiff has alleged facts showing that the “defendant[] significantly interfered with [the plaintiff’s] religious beliefs.” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir.

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