2024 IL App (4th) 231305 FILED NO. 4-23-1305 June 21, 2024 Carla Bender IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4 th District Appellate Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
HERMAN SCOTT and ARIANNE JONES, ) Appeal from the Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County AMERICAN ALLIANCE CASUALTY COMPANY and ) No. 22LA247 TIARA LLOYD, ) Defendants ) Honorable (American Alliance Casualty Company, Defendant- ) Stewart James Umholtz, Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Doherty and DeArmond concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiffs, Herman Scott and Arianne Jones, brought the present action against
defendants, American Alliance Casualty Company (American Alliance) and Tiara Lloyd,
alleging claims for violating the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Act)
(815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2020)), bad faith pursuant to section 155 of the Illinois Insurance
Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2020)), declaratory judgment, and promissory estoppel. American
Alliance filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint, which the trial court denied. It then
requested the court find that the order involved a disputed question of law and certify the
question under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).
¶2 The trial court certified the following question pursuant to Rule 308(a): “Pursuant to [section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4)
(West 2020))], is underinsured motorist coverage automatically required to be
included in a policy insuring liability for bodily injury where the policy provides
uninsured motorist coverage at the minimum limits required by [section 7-203 of
the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-203 (West 2020))]?”
¶3 We answer the certified question in the negative.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On November 23, 2022, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against defendants.
On March 29, 2023, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, which set forth six counts: one
count of violating the Act, two counts of bad faith pursuant to section 155 of the Insurance Code
(215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2020)), two counts seeking a declaratory judgment, and one count of
promissory estoppel.
¶6 The first amended complaint alleged that American Alliance issued an automobile
insurance policy to Scott providing the statutory minimum bodily injury liability coverage of
$25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. The policy also provided uninsured motorist
coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. While the policy was in
effect, plaintiffs were injured in a multi-vehicle crash for which Lloyd was at fault. Scott was
driving the vehicle at the time of the crash, and Jones was his passenger. Eleven people were
injured as a result of the crash, and Lloyd had an insurance policy that provided aggregate
liability coverage of $50,000 to be split among the injured parties. Though plaintiffs incurred
medical expenses exceeding $40,000 due to their injuries from the crash, Scott received only
$4060.24 from Lloyd’s policy, and Jones received only $8410.54 as a result of the split.
American Alliance initially confirmed that Scott’s policy included underinsured motorist
-2- coverage. However, it later reversed its position and refused to pay plaintiffs for their
underinsured motorist claims related to the crash, claiming Scott’s policy did not include
underinsured motorist coverage.
¶7 The first amended complaint alleged Scott’s policy was vague and ambiguous
regarding underinsured motorist coverage. It also alleged that selling an automobile insurance
policy without underinsured motorist coverage with minimum limits of $25,000 per person and
$50,000 per accident violated section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4)
(West 2020)) and section 7-203 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-203 (West 2020)). The first
amended complaint asserted that selling a policy without underinsured motorist coverage, as
American Alliance purported to do, was a deceptive and illegal act in violation of the Act such
that Scott was entitled to compensatory and punitive damages under the Act.
¶8 The first amended complaint also alleged that plaintiffs were entitled to damages
under section 155 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2020)) because American
Alliance acted in bad faith in refusing to pay plaintiffs’ underinsured motorist claims based on its
position that Scott’s policy did not provide underinsured motorist coverage, which plaintiffs
claimed was legally required to be included in the policy. Plaintiffs also sought a declaratory
judgment determining that underinsured motorist coverage existed under Scott’s policy at the
statutory minimum limits or that the court order the policy to be reformed to include
underinsured motorist coverage at the statutory minimum limits pursuant to section 143a-2(4) of
the Insurance Code (id. § 143a-2(4)) and section 7-203 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-203
(West 2020)). The first amended complaint also set forth a claim of promissory estoppel based
on American Alliance’s alleged prior representation to Scott that his policy contained
-3- ¶9 On March 30, 2023, American Alliance filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
complaint, pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1
(West 2022)), which the trial court subsequently construed as a motion to dismiss the first
amended complaint. The motion to dismiss asserted several bases for dismissal. Relevant to this
appeal, the motion asserted that the declaratory judgment counts should be dismissed, pursuant
to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (id. § 2-615), because Illinois law did not require
that Scott’s policy include underinsured motorist coverage. Specifically, the motion to dismiss
claimed that section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2020))
mandated underinsured motorist coverage only where a policy’s uninsured motorist coverage
exceeded the statutory minimum amount of liability coverage, and Scott’s policy contained
uninsured motorist coverage at the statutory minimum limits.
¶ 10 On July 12, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on American Alliance’s motion to
dismiss. The court denied the motion, finding, inter alia, that it was not clear whether
underinsured motorist coverage was required by law to be included in Scott’s policy.
¶ 11 On September 27, 2023, American Alliance filed in the trial court a “Motion for
Leave to Appeal,” in which it requested that the court certify a question of law pursuant to Rule
308(a).
¶ 12 On October 26, 2023, the trial court granted American Alliance’s motion, finding
its prior order, denying American Alliance’s motion to dismiss, involved a question of law
concerning whether, under section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4)
(West 2020)), underinsured motorist coverage was statutorily required to be included in an
automobile liability policy providing bodily injury liability and uninsured motorist coverage at
the minimum statutory limits. The court found there was substantial ground for a difference of
-4- opinion on this issue and that an immediate appeal might materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation. The court certified the following question pursuant to Rule 308(a):
“Pursuant to [section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4)
(West 2020))], is underinsured motorist coverage automatically required to be
included in a policy insuring liability for bodily injury where the policy provides
uninsured motorist coverage at the minimum limits required by [section 7-203 of
the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-203 (West 2020))]?”
¶ 13 On November 16, 2023, defendant filed in this court an application for leave to
appeal pursuant to Rule 308, which we allowed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Rule 308(a) provides a procedure for obtaining review of an interlocutory order
not otherwise appealable when the trial court finds the order “involves a question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Appellate review under
Rule 308 is limited to the certified question of law presented, and the propriety of any particular
order of the trial court is not before the appellate court. Thompson v. Whalen, 2023 IL App (4th)
220668, ¶ 18; Combs v. Schmidt, 2015 IL App (2d) 131053, ¶ 6. Certified questions are, by
definition, questions of law subject to de novo review. Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL
121048, ¶ 21.
¶ 16 In this case, we address the following question certified by the trial court:
“Pursuant to [section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4)
(West 2020))], is underinsured motorist coverage automatically required to be
included in a policy insuring liability for bodily injury where the policy provides
-5- uninsured motorist coverage at the minimum limits required by [section 7-203 of
¶ 17 Section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2020))
provides, in relevant part:
“On or after July 1, 1983, no policy insuring against loss resulting
from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any
person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
shall be renewed or delivered or issued for delivery in this State with
respect to any motor vehicle designed for use on public highways and
required to be registered in this State unless underinsured motorist
coverage is included in such policy in an amount equal to the total amount
of uninsured motorist coverage provided in that policy where such
uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the limits set forth in Section 7-203
of the Illinois Vehicle Code.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 18 Section 7-203 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-203 (West 2020)) provides, in
relevant part, that motor vehicle crash policies shall be subject to a minimum liability limit of
$25,000 for bodily injury or death of one individual and $50,000 for bodily injury or death of
two or more persons in any one motor vehicle crash. All policies must also include uninsured
motorist coverage in an amount at least equal to the minimum amounts set forth in section 7-203
of the Vehicle Code. 215 ILCS 5/143a (West 2020). If a policyholder has bodily injury liability
limits that exceed the required statutory minimum, the policy must also include uninsured
motorist coverage in an equal amount unless the insured specifically rejects uninsured motorist
coverage in excess of the minimum statutory limits. Id. § 143a-2(1)-(2).
-6- ¶ 19 American Alliance argues that, by its plain language, section 143a-2(4) of the
Insurance Code (id. § 143a-2(4)) does not require the automatic inclusion of underinsured
motorist coverage when a policy’s liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage do not
exceed the minimum limits set forth in section 7-203 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-203
(West 2020)). Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that underinsured motorist coverage is required
to be included with minimum-limits liabilities policies “due to public policy, court interpretation
of the statute and the legislative history of amendments to the statute in order to maintain
consistency and eliminate absurd results.”
¶ 20 Our goal in construing any statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature. Cassidy v. China Vitamins, LLC, 2018 IL 122873, ¶ 17. The plain and ordinary
meaning of the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent
(id.), and “[w]hen the language of an enactment is clear, it will be given effect without resort to
other interpretative aids” (Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 445 (2002)). However, “a literal
reading must fail if it yields absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.” Cassidy, 2018 IL 122873,
¶ 17; see In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 230 (2003) (“A court *** is not bound by the literal
language of a statute that produces a result inconsistent with clearly expressed legislative intent,
or that yields absurd or unjust consequences not contemplated by the legislature.”).
¶ 21 While we need not interpret a statute literally if it would lead to absurd results, we
may not, under the guise of statutory interpretation, “ ‘correct’ an apparent legislative oversight
by rewriting a statute in a manner inconsistent with its clear and unambiguous language.” People
v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000).
“ ‘[T]he absurd results doctrine merely permits a court to favor an otherwise
reasonable construction of the statutory text over a more literal interpretation
-7- where the latter would produce a result demonstrably at odds with any
conceivable legislative purpose. [Citation.] It does not, however, license a court to
simply ignore or rewrite statutory language on the basis that, as written, it
produces an undesirable policy result.’ ” D.F., 208 Ill. 2d at 249-50 (Freeman, J.,
specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, C.J.) (quoting Taylor-Hurley v.
Mingo County Board of Education, 551 S.E.2d 702, 710 (W. Va. 2001)).
“[A] reviewing court must not rewrite statutes to make them consistent with the court’s idea of
orderliness and public policy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kloeppel v. Champaign
County Board, 2021 IL App (4th) 210091, ¶ 17. “Where the words employed in a legislative
enactment are free from ambiguity or doubt, they must be given effect by the courts even though
the consequences may be harsh, unjust, absurd or unwise.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 557 (1999). Such
consequences can only be remedied by a change in the law. Id. Interpreting a statute is a question
of law subject to de novo review. Petersen, 198 Ill. 2d at 444.
¶ 22 We find, by its plain language, section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215
ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2020)) requires underinsured motorist coverage to be included in a
liability policy in an amount equal to the amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided in the
policy only “where such uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the limits set forth in Section
7-203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.” Accordingly, when a policy provides uninsured motorist
coverage with the statutory minimum limits, automatic inclusion of underinsured motorist
coverage in an equal amount is not required under section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (id.).
¶ 23 Our interpretation of section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code is consistent with
that of other courts. In Eipert v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d
-8- 630, 633-35 (1989), the court interpreted a statutory provision identical in all relevant respects to
what is now section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code. The Eipert court considered the question
of whether the statute required insurance companies to provide underinsured motorist coverage
when uninsured motorist coverage was purchased at the statutory minimum level, and the court
held it did not. Id. The court stated:
“The language of the statute clearly states that when an insured
purchases uninsured motorist coverage over the statutory minimum
amount, the insurance company must provide underinsured motorist
coverage in at least the same amount. There is no language in the statute to
indicate that when uninsured motorist coverage is purchased at the
statutory minimum amount, underinsured motorist coverage must be
provided. *** The language of the statute indicates the legislature
intended that an insurance company is only required to provide
underinsured motorist coverage when uninsured motorist coverage is
purchased above the statutory minimum amount.” Id. at 635.
See Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Rosen, 242 Ill. 2d 48, 57 (2011) (“If the uninsured-motorist
coverage limit exceeds the minimum liability limit required by the Financial Responsibility Law,
the policy must also include underinsured-motorist coverage in an amount equal to the
uninsured-motorist coverage.” (Emphasis added.)); Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d
38, 44-45 (2003) (“[U]nderinsured coverage is mandatory where uninsured coverage in excess of
the minimum statutory limits exists ***.” (Emphasis added.)); see also DeGrand v. Motors
Insurance Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 521, 529-30 (1992).
-9- ¶ 24 In their brief, plaintiffs argue, essentially, that the legislature’s limitation of the
automatic inclusion of underinsured motorist coverage to policies providing uninsured motorist
coverage in excess of the statutory minimum limits was due to a legislative oversight. Plaintiffs
note that the provision in section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West
2020)), mandating the provision of underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to
uninsured motorist coverage “where such uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the limits set
forth in Section 7-203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,” was enacted in the early 1980s. Plaintiffs
assert that, at that time, it was “generally concludable” that an underinsured motorist policy at
the minimum limits would be worthless. They discuss the history of legislative amendments to
section 143a-2(4) and related case law and assert the law “evolve[d] to recognize” situations
where multiple claimants first exhaust a tortfeasor’s liability coverage and then turn to their own
underinsured motorist coverage to obtain an additional recovery. See Cummins v. Country
Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474 (1997). Plaintiffs contend that, in multi-claimant
situations, such as the case here, where minimum liability limits are involved, underinsured
motorist coverage has value.
¶ 25 Plaintiffs claim that, despite these changes, “no one thought to remove” the
portion of section 143a-2(4) limiting the mandatory inclusion underinsured motorist coverage to
policies where the uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the statutory minimum liability limits.
Plaintiffs describe this portion of the statute as a “vestigial tail.” Plaintiffs contend that our
interpretation of section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code leads to the unjust and absurd result
that they would have been able to make a larger recovery if Lloyd had been uninsured and they
could have tapped Scott’s uninsured motorist coverage with $50,000 aggregate limits, which is
statutorily required to be included in all policies. See Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,
- 10 - 147 Ill. 2d 548, 557-58 (1992) (recognizing “the absurdity of a situation where a policyholder
would receive fewer benefits in the fortuitous event of being injured by an underinsured rather
than by an uninsured motorist”).
¶ 26 Even if we were to accept plaintiffs’ legislative oversight argument, we cannot
ignore the plain and unambiguous language of section 143a-2(4) of the Insurance Code (215
ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2020)), which limits the requirement that underinsured motorist
coverage be automatically included in an amount equal to the uninsured motorist coverage to
policies providing uninsured motorist coverage in excess of the statutory minimum limits. While
this limitation may lead to situations where multiple claimants exhaust a tortfeasor’s liability
coverage and ultimately receive less compensation than they would have received under their
own minimum-limits policies had the tortfeasor been uninsured, we cannot omit this clear
limitation in the statute under the guise of statutory interpretation. See Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42;
Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 351 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894 (2004) (“Language free
from ambiguity and doubt will be given effect even if the consequences are harsh, absurd, or
unwise.”).
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we answer the trial court’s certified question in the
negative and remand the matter for further proceedings.
¶ 29 Certified question answered; cause remanded.
- 11 - Scott v. American Alliance Casualty Co., 2024 IL App (4th) 231305
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 22-LA- 247; the Hon. Stewart James Umholtz, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Donald Patrick Eckler and Glenn A. Klinger, of Freeman Mathis for & Gary, LLP, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Jeff Green, of Peoria Heights, for appellees. for Appellee:
- 12 -