People ex rel. Raoul v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n

2025 IL App (4th) 230491

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 230491 FILED NO. 4-23-0491 June 5, 2025 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. ) Petition for review of order KWAME RAOUL, Attorney General of the State of ) of Illinois Commerce Illinois, ) Commission Petitioner, ) v. ) Nos. 22-0431 THE ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION; ) 22-0443 AMEREN ILLINOIS COMPANY, d/b/a Ameren ) Illinois; CITIZENS UTILITY BOARD; NATURAL ) RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL; ) ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND; ) ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY CENTER; ) EVGO SERVICES, LLC; WALMART INC.; ) RESPIRATORY HEALTH ASSOCIATION; ) ELECTRIFY AMERICA, LLC; FREEWIRE ) TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; ILLINOIS COMPETITIVE ) ENERGY ASSOCIATION; SIERRA CLUB; ILLINOIS ) INDUSTRIAL ENERGY CONSUMERS; and THE ) ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ) Respondents. )

JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Petitioner, the People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Kwame Raoul, Attorney

General of the State of Illinois, appeals the decision of the Illinois Commerce Commission

(Commission) approving respondent Ameren Illinois Company’s (Ameren) beneficial

electrification plan (BEP) under section 45 of the Electric Vehicle Act (20 ILCS 627/45 (West

2022)). In June 2022, Ameren filed its petition for approval of its BEP with the Commission. Respondents—Citizens Utility Board; Natural Resources Defense Council; Environmental

Defense Fund; Environmental Law & Policy Center; EVGO Services, LLC; Walmart Inc.;

Respiratory Health Association; Electrify America, LLC; Freewire Technologies, Inc.; Illinois

Competitive Energy Association; Sierra Club; Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers; and the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA)—intervened.

¶2 After extensive briefing and proceedings, the Commission filed a final order

approving the BEP with modifications, requiring Ameren to increase its budget, and ordering

Ameren to file a compliance report. In its final order, the Commission approved electric vehicle

charging station rebates and interpreted section 45(g) of the Electric Vehicle Act to apply a 1%

retail rate cap to all BEP revenue requirements. See id. § 45(g). The Commission also interpreted

section 45(g) to apply solely to costs directly related to electric vehicle infrastructure, excluding

bill and delivery credits to customers from the calculation of the BEP budget.

¶3 The Attorney General filed an application for rehearing, which the Commission

denied, and appealed the Commission’s final order approving the BEP with modifications. The

Attorney General also filed a motion to reject Ameren’s compliance filing, which the Commission

denied.

¶4 On appeal, the Attorney General contends (1) the Commission lacked the authority

to approve charging station rebates because section 55 of the Electric Vehicle Act gave exclusive

authority to IEPA to issue such rebates, which could also lead to duplicate rebates (see id. § 55),

(2) the rate cap in section 45(g) of Electric Vehicle Act must be narrowly calculated to include

only Ameren’s delivery service revenue requirement, (3) the rate cap should apply to all costs

incurred under the BEP, (4) bill and delivery credits should be included in determining the BEP

budget, and (5) the Commission improperly abdicated its administrative responsibilities and

-2- delegated its ratemaking authority to Ameren when it approved the final order with modifications

and required a compliance filing.

¶5 We affirm.

¶6 I. BACKGROUND

¶7 In June 2022, Ameren submitted its BEP to the Commission docketed as case No.

22-0431. In July 2022, the Commission opened an investigation into Ameren’s BEP, docketed as

case No. 22-0443, and consolidated the two cases. The staff of the Commission and the Attorney

General, in his role as the ratepayer advocate, participated in the proceeding, as did the intervenors.

Because this appeal involves primarily matters of statutory application and interpretation, we first

provide the primary statutory provisions underlying the proceedings.

¶8 A. The Electric Vehicle Act and Related Statutory Provisions

¶9 In September 2021, the General Assembly passed Public Act 102-662 (eff. Sept.

15, 2021), also known as the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act, with the goal to put the state on a

path toward 100% clean energy, invest in training a diverse workforce for the jobs of the future,

institute key ratepayer and residential customer protections, and prioritize meaningful ethics and

transparency reforms. See People ex rel. Raoul v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2025 IL App (2d)

230020, ¶ 3 (describing the legislation); compare Pub. Act 102-662 (eff. Sept. 15, 2021) (enacted

into law with no official name), with Pub. Act 103-580 (eff. Dec. 8, 2023) (adding 20 ILCS 3855/1-

129, which refers to Public Act 102-662 as the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act). Relevant here,

the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act amended the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.

(West 2022)) and the Electric Vehicle Act (20 ILCS 627/1 et seq. (West 2022)) in furtherance of

those goals.

¶ 10 In particular, the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act added section 45 to the Electric

-3- Vehicle Act, which created requirements regarding “beneficial electrification programs” (BE

programs). Id. § 45. In adding those requirements, the General Assembly intended to “decrease

reliance on fossil fuels, reduce pollution from the transportation sector, increase access to

electrification for all consumers, and ensure that electric vehicle adoption and increased electricity

usage and demand do not place significant additional burdens on the electric system and [do] create

benefits for Illinois residents.” Id. § 45(a). The Electric Vehicle Act lists 10 policy considerations

or goals:

“(1) Illinois should increase the adoption of electric vehicles in the State to

1,000,000 by 2030.

(2) Illinois should strive to be the best state in the nation in which to drive

and manufacture electric vehicles.

(3) Widespread adoption of electric vehicles is necessary to electrify the

transportation sector, diversify the transportation fuel mix, drive economic

development, and protect air quality.

(4) Accelerating the adoption of electric vehicles will drive the

decarbonization of Illinois’ transportation sector.

(5) Expanded infrastructure investment will help Illinois more rapidly

decarbonize the transportation sector.

(6) Statewide adoption of electric vehicles requires increasing access to

electrification for all consumers.

(7) Widespread adoption of electric vehicles requires increasing public

access to charging equipment throughout Illinois, especially in low-income and

environmental justice communities, where levels of air pollution burden tend to be

-4- higher.

(8) Widespread adoption of electric vehicles and charging equipment has

the potential to provide customers with fuel cost savings and electric utility

customers with cost-saving benefits.

(9) Widespread adoption of electric vehicles can improve an electric

utility’s electric system efficiency and operational flexibility, including the ability

of the electric utility to integrate renewable energy resources and make use of off-

peak generation resources that support the operation of charging equipment.

(10) Widespread adoption of electric vehicles should stimulate innovation,

competition, and increased choices in charging equipment and networks and should

also attract private capital investments and create high-quality jobs in Illinois.” Id.

§ 45(a)(1)-(10).

¶ 11 The Electric Vehicle Act defines BE programs as “programs that lower carbon

dioxide emissions, replace fossil fuel use, create cost savings, improve electric grid operations,

reduce increases to peak demand, improve electric usage load shape, and align electric usage with

times of renewable generation.” Id. § 45(b). As part of that definition, it also provides, “All [BE

programs] shall provide for incentives such that customers are induced to use electricity at times

of low overall system usage or at times when generation from renewable energy sources is high.”

Id. It then provides that BE programs “include a portfolio of the following”:

“(1) time-of-use electric rates;

(2) hourly pricing electric rates;

(3) optimized charging programs or programs that encourage charging at

times beneficial to the electric grid;

-5- (4) optional demand-response programs specifically related to

electrification efforts;

(5) incentives for electrification and associated infrastructure tied to using

electricity at off-peak times;

(6) incentives for electrification and associated infrastructure targeted to

medium-duty and heavy-duty vehicles used by transit agencies;

(7) incentives for electrification and associated infrastructure targeted to

school buses;

(8) incentives for electrification and associated infrastructure for medium-

duty and heavy-duty government and private fleet vehicles;

(9) low-income programs that provide access to electric vehicles for

communities where car ownership or new car ownership is not common;

(10) incentives for electrification in eligible communities;

(11) incentives or programs to enable quicker adoption of electric vehicles

by developing public charging stations in dense areas, workplaces, and low-income

communities;

(12) incentives or programs to develop electric vehicle infrastructure that

minimizes range anxiety, filling the gaps in deployment, particularly in rural areas

and along highway corridors;

(13) incentives to encourage the development of electrification and

renewable energy generation in close proximity in order to reduce grid congestion;

(14) offer support to low-income communities who are experiencing

financial and accessibility barriers such that electric vehicle ownership is not an

-6- option; and

(15) other such programs as defined by the Commission.” Id. § 45(b).

¶ 12 The Electric Vehicle Act requires utilities serving more than 500,000 customers to

file with the Commission a BEP that outlines the utility’s BE programs. Id. § 45(d). The process

begins with a workshop between Commission staff and each utility for the purpose of “soliciting

input on the design of [BE] programs that the utility shall offer.” Id. § 45(c).

¶ 13 Each utility’s BE plan must take into consideration the recommendations from the

workshop with the staff. Id. § 45(d). After the plan is filed, the Commission must investigate the

plan “to consider whether the plan meets the objectives and contains the information required by

this Section.” Id. Referring to IEPA as the “Agency” (see id. § 45(b)), the proposed plan must

address, “at a minimum, the following”:

“(i) make-ready investments to facilitate the rapid deployment of charging

equipment throughout the State, facilitate the electrification of public transit and

other vehicle fleets in the light-duty, medium-duty, and heavy-duty sectors, and

align with Agency-issued rebates for charging equipment;

(ii) the development and implementation of [BE programs], including time-

of-use rates and their benefit for electric vehicle users and for all customers,

optimized charging programs to achieve savings identified, and new contracts and

compensation for services in those programs, through signals that allow electric

vehicle charging to respond to local system conditions, manage critical peak

periods, serve as a demand response or peak resource, and maximize renewable

energy use and integration into the grid;

(iii) optional commercial tariffs utilizing alternatives to traditional demand-

-7- based rate structures to facilitate charging for light-duty, heavy-duty, and fleet

electric vehicles;

(iv) financial and other challenges to electric vehicle usage in low-income

communities, and strategies for overcoming those challenges, particularly in

communities and for people for whom car ownership is not an option;

(v) methods of minimizing ratepayer impacts and exempting or minimizing,

to the extent possible, low-income ratepayers from the costs associated with

facilitating the expansion of electric vehicle charging;

(vi) plans to increase access to Level 3 Public Electric Vehicle Charging

Infrastructure to serve vehicles that need quicker charging times and vehicles of

persons who have no other access to charging infrastructure, regardless of whether

those projects participate in optimized charging programs;

(vii) whether to establish charging standards for type of plugs eligible for

investment or incentive programs, and if so, what standards;

(viii) opportunities for coordination and cohesion with electric vehicle and

electric vehicle charging equipment incentives established by any agency,

department, board, or commission of the State, any other unit of government in the

State, any national programs, or any unit of the federal government;

(ix) ideas for the development of online tools, applications, and data sharing

that provide essential information to those charging electric vehicles, and enable an

automated charging response to price signals, emission signals, real-time renewable

generation production, and other Commission-approved or customer-desired

indicators of beneficial charging times; and

-8- (x) customer education, outreach, and incentive programs that increase

awareness of the programs and the benefits of transportation electrification,

including direct outreach to eligible communities.” Id. § 45(d)(i)-(x).

“ ‘Make-ready infrastructure’ means the electrical and construction work necessary between the

distribution circuit to the connection point of charging equipment.” Id. § 45(b).

¶ 14 Further, the “Commission shall determine if the proposed plan is cost-beneficial

and in the public interest.” Id. § 45(d). Section 45(d) provides:

“The plan shall be determined to be cost-beneficial if the total cost of

beneficial electrification expenditures is less than the net present value of increased

electricity costs (defined as marginal avoided energy, avoided capacity, and

avoided transmission and distribution system costs) avoided by programs under the

plan, the net present value of reductions in other customer energy costs, net revenue

from all electric charging in the service territory, and the societal value of reduced

carbon emissions and surface-level pollutants, particularly in environmental justice

communities. The calculation of costs and benefits should be based on net impacts,

including the impact on customer rates.” Id.

Section 45(d) specifies eight public-interest criteria for the Commission to consider:

“(1) maximize total energy cost savings and rate reductions so that

nonparticipants can benefit;

(2) address environmental justice interests by ensuring there are significant

opportunities for residents and businesses in eligible communities to directly

participate in and benefit from [BE] programs;

(3) support at least a 40% investment of make-ready infrastructure

-9- incentives to facilitate the rapid deployment of charging equipment in or serving

environmental justice, low-income, and eligible communities; however, nothing in

this subsection is intended to require a specific amount of spending in a particular

geographic area;

(4) support at least a 5% investment target in electrifying medium-duty and

heavy-duty school bus and diesel public transportation vehicles located in or

serving environmental justice, low-income, and eligible communities in order to

provide those communities and businesses with greater economic investment,

transportation opportunities, and a cleaner environment so they can directly benefit

from transportation electrification efforts; however, nothing in this subsection is

intended to require a specific amount of spending in a particular geographic area;

(5) stimulate innovation, competition, private investment, and increased

consumer choices in electric vehicle charging equipment and networks;

(6) contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions and meeting air quality

standards, including improving air quality in eligible communities who

disproportionately suffer from emissions from the medium-duty and heavy-duty

transportation sector;

(7) support the efficient and cost-effective use of the electric grid in a

manner that supports electric vehicle charging operations; and

(8) provide resources to support private investment in charging equipment

for uses in public and private charging applications, including residential, multi-

family, fleet, transit, community, and corridor applications.” Id. § 45(d)(1)-(8)

¶ 15 Section 45 further provides that “[t]he retail rate impact from the development of

- 10 - electric vehicle infrastructure shall not exceed 1% per year of the total annual revenue requirements

of the utility.” Id. § 45(g).

¶ 16 Meanwhile, section 55 of the Electric Vehicle Act requires IEPA to issue charging

station rebates, providing:

“(a) In order to substantially offset the installation costs of electric vehicle

charging infrastructure, beginning July 1, 2022, and continuing as long as funds are

available, the Agency shall issue rebates, consistent with the Commission-approved

Beneficial Electrification Plans in accordance with Section 45, to public and private

organizations and companies to install and maintain Level 2 or Level 3 charging

stations.

(b) The Agency shall award rebates or grants that fund up to 80% of the cost

of the installation of charging stations. The Agency shall award additional

incentives per port for every charging station installed in an eligible community

and every charging station located to support eligible persons. In order to be eligible

to receive a rebate or grant, the organization or company must submit an application

to the Agency and commit to paying the prevailing wage for the installation project.

The Agency shall by rule provide application and other programmatic details and

requirements, including additional incentives for eligible communities. The

Agency may determine per port or project caps based on a review of best practices

and stakeholder engagement. The Agency shall accept applications on a rolling

basis and shall award rebates or grants within 60 days of each application. The

Agency must require that any grant or rebate applicant comply with the

requirements of the Prevailing Wage Act for any installation of a charging station

- 11 - for which it seeks a rebate or grant.” Id. § 55.

Section 15 of the Electric Vehicle Act provides for an “Electric-Vehicle Coordinator,” who shall

act as a point person for electric-vehicle-related and electric-vehicle-charging-related policies and

activities in Illinois, including the issuance of rebates for consumers and electric vehicle charging

rebates for organizations and companies. Id. § 15.

¶ 17 B. Ameren’s BEP

¶ 18 Before Ameren submitted its BEP, the relevant parties took part in the workshop

process, with 10 workshops held between the initiation of the process and February 29, 2022. After

Ameren filed its BEP, the parties engaged in extensive briefing and provided written direct expert

testimony.

¶ 19 Ameren’s BEP described existing costs, programs, spending, and rates (often

referred to as “tariffs” in the documents) designed to address the requirements of section 45 of

Electric Vehicle Act, including programs Ameren already had in place to incentivize electric

vehicle charging at off-peak hours by providing certain credits on customers’ electric bills. Ameren

also included additional programs and modifications to existing programs it proposed to

implement in accordance with section 45. Those programs included additional customer education

and outreach, incentives for electric vehicle adoption and charging, and programs focused on

ensuring the benefits of electrification in equity investment eligible communities and/or low-

income areas.

¶ 20 Three of Ameren’s BE programs are at issue on appeal. Those programs, which the

parties generally refer to as “rebate programs,” pertain to (1) educational facilities, (2) transit

facilities, and (3) driver’s education. The programs include various incentives, including bill

credits to encourage electric vehicle adoption, delivery credits for grid-beneficial charging

- 12 - behavior, supplemental line extension allowances to defray the cost of grid upgrades to connect

chargers, and charger installation credits to defray the costs of chargers for education and transit

facilities.

¶ 21 The BEP provided the charger programs for education and transit facilities would

increase the line extension allowance in equity investment eligible and/or low-income areas and

introduce rebates for level 2 or level 3 charging equipment and installation in such areas. The

driver’s education program would provide financial assistance to high schools in equity investment

eligible and/or low-income communities to purchase electric vehicles and install charging

equipment.

¶ 22 In December 2022, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hearing,

during which the parties submitted evidence, including the written direct testimony of witnesses.

The ALJ issued a proposed written order for the Commission’s review. The parties filed various

exceptions to the ALJ’s order.

¶ 23 In his briefs to the Commission, the Attorney General raised four issues relevant to

this appeal, arguing (1) the Commission lacked authority to approve charging station rebates

because section 55 of Electric Vehicle Act gave exclusive authority to IEPA to issue such rebates

and there was a possibility of duplicate rebates, (2) the rate cap in section 45(g) of Electric Vehicle

Act must be narrowly calculated to include only Ameren’s delivery service revenue requirement,

(3) the rate cap should apply to all costs incurred under the BEP, and (4) bill and delivery credits

should be included in determining the cost of the BEP.

¶ 24 Regarding bill and delivery credits, Victoria Kilhoffer, a regulatory specialist for

Ameren, had provided written direct surrebuttal testimony where she was asked whether she

agreed with a suggestion by Commission staff and the Attorney General that Ameren’s BEP

- 13 - budget include bill and delivery credits. Kilhoffer testified she did not agree and stated:

“No, I do not. [A staff member] says ‘[a]lthough the bill/delivery credits represent

a reduction in the Company’s delivery service revenue, rather than an outlay for

cost, the bill/delivery credits will ultimately be recovered from

ratepayers.’ [Citation]. I agree with the first half of this statement and disagree with

the second. Reducing the revenue does not add a cost to be collected in Ameren’s

revenue requirement, so there is nothing to be recovered from customers. While I

agree that the bill credits ultimately lower revenue in the short term, to state it in

this way ignores the fact that were it not for the [electric vehicles] added to the

system, this additional [electric vehicle charging program] revenue would not exist

and thus not need to be lowered. There is far more added revenue than is represented

by the bill credits and this revenue is also not appropriate to add to the retail rate

impact. In the same manner that [a staff witness] and I both reject [an intervenor’s]

argument to include this increased revenue, I also reject the argument to include the

bill credits. The revenue from [electric vehicle] charging and the bill credits to

[electric vehicle charging program] customers are two sides to the same coin and

both should be rejected.”

¶ 25 C. The Commission’s Final Order

¶ 26 On March 23, 2023, the Commission issued a final order approving the BEP with

modifications and ordered Ameren to submit a compliance filing consisting of a revised BEP that

incorporated the modifications. In its order, the Commission rejected the Attorney General’s

arguments concerning rebates, the retail cap, and the inclusion of bill and delivery credits in the

BEP budget.

- 14 - ¶ 27 Regarding rebates, the Commission found the rebates did not conflict with IEPA’s

authority. It further found none of the proposed rebates duplicated rebates available through IEPA

programs. The Commission stated it would not opine whether the rebates could conflict in the

future because it would be improper to make that decision prospectively. The Commission wrote

that whether any proposed rebates should or should not be included in a future BEP would require

an examination of the specific rebates proposed.

¶ 28 As to the rate cap, the Commission applied a plain language interpretation of

section 45(g) of the Electric Vehicle Act that “[t]he retail rate impact from the development of

electric vehicle infrastructure shall not exceed 1% per year of the total annual revenue requirements

of the utility.” 20 ILCS 627/45(g) (West 2022). Applying its reasoning from another BEP

proceeding involving a different utility, Commonwealth Edison (see Commonwealth Edison Co.,

Ill. Comm. Comm’n, No. 22-0432 (Order-Interim Nov. 10, 2022)) (ComEd order), the

Commission found the cap applied narrowly to the “development of [electric vehicle]

infrastructure.” Thus, the Commission found the amount of spending subject to the cap was not

that of the entire BEP, but only the amount of programs approved for electric vehicle infrastructure.

The Commission stated it was sympathetic to the Attorney General’s goal of protecting ratepayers,

but it could not overlook the plain language of the statute. The Commission also found the required

cost-benefit analysis applicable to the spending amount of the overall plan under section 45(d) of

the Electric Vehicle Act served as an additional restraint on the amount of spending.

¶ 29 Also applying its reasoning from the ComEd order, the Commission further

rejected the Attorney General’s argument the rate cap should be restricted to 1% of the utility’s

“delivery services rate requirement.” Applying the plain language of section 45(g) of the Electric

Vehicle Act, the Commission found the phrase “total annual revenue requirements” did not limit

- 15 - the cap to only the revenue requirement for delivery services. The Commission found the Attorney

General’s interpretation would require the Commission to read into the statute a limitation that did

not exist in its plain language and thus would violate principles of statutory interpretation.

¶ 30 Finally, the Commission found bill and delivery credits should not be factored into

the BEP budget. The Commission noted Kilhoffer’s testimony and found the credits were an

element of Ameren’s overall rate design and a function of the revenues collected from ratepayers,

rather than an increase in cost.

¶ 31 When the Commission ordered modifications, it specifically found the budget

should be increased to accommodate the modifications. The modifications ordered by the

Commission included requirements for Ameren to expand subsidies for certain electric line

extensions and account for differences in cost between different electric vehicle chargers. The

Commission also adopted a proposal that customers be allowed to use electric line extension funds

for electrification expenses “on the customer side of the meter” to the extent the budget allowed,

the BEP remained under the rate cap, and the BEP remained cost-beneficial. The Commission

further ordered Ameren to adopt programs advanced by other parties. When discussing the details

of the modifications, the Commission referred to the positions of various parties on the matters.

¶ 32 Regarding the BEP budget, when discussing supplemental line extensions, the

Commission noted Ameren’s proposed budget was “quite small compared to the rate cap.” The

Commission directed Ameren to seek Commission authorization if it intended to spend more than

its entire approved BEP budget. The Commission also provided Ameren could file a petition with

the Commission if it anticipated its spending would exceed the approved BEP budget. The order

included a detailed cost-benefit analysis.

¶ 33 In its overall findings, the Commission specifically determined Ameren’s BEP as

- 16 - modified met the statutory and policy requirements of the Electric Vehicle Act and was reasonable,

cost-beneficial, and in the public interest. The Commission required Ameren to share a draft

compliance BEP with Commission staff and intervenors, who would provide feedback regarding

whether the compliance BEP accurately reflected the Commission’s final order.

¶ 34 The order stated, “[Ameren] shall implement the [BEP] as approved by this Order.”

It also stated “any motions, petitions, objections, or other matters in this proceeding that remain

outstanding are hereby disposed of consistent with the conclusions herein.” It further stated,

“[T]his Order is final; it is not subject to the Administrative Review Law.” The order provided any

motion for rehearing must be filed within 30 days.

¶ 35 On April 24, 2023, the Attorney General filed an application for rehearing. On May

4, 2023, the Commission denied the application.

¶ 36 On May 31, 2023, Ameren filed its compliance filing with a revised BEP. Ameren

provided a three-year budget total of approximately $64.52 million. Ameren defined “electric

vehicle infrastructure” to include “supplemental allowances for line and service extensions,

customer owned make-ready infrastructure, and rebate programs for charging equipment and

wiring.” In later briefing, Ameren noted that definition was consistent with its prior BEP as

approved by the Commission’s final order. Under the revised BEP, $47,486 of approximately

$6.73 million total spending for 2023 counted toward the rate cap. For 2024, approximately $10.69

million of $21.49 million counted toward the cap. In 2025, approximately $21.28 million of $36.31

million counted toward the cap.

¶ 37 On June 7, 2023, the Attorney General timely filed his notice of appeal. On June 9,

2023, the Attorney General filed a motion for clarification and to reject Ameren’s compliance

filing. An intervenor also filed a motion for clarification. In his motion, the Attorney General

- 17 - argued Ameren’s compliance filing was inconsistent with the final order in several respects,

including the amount of increase to Ameren’s budget needed to accommodate the additional

programs and Ameren’s interpretation of the rate cap. The Attorney General also argued the BEP

was no longer cost-beneficial.

¶ 38 On July 13, 2023, the Commission denied the Attorney General’s motion and

granted the intervenor’s motion. In its order, the Commission stated the matter was reopened for

the limited purpose of granting the intervenor’s motion for clarification. The Commission ordered

Ameren to submit an amended compliance filing within five days addressing its grant of the

intervenor’s motion, which required Ameren to adopt certain program standards. Ameren filed its

amended BEP on July 18, 2023.

¶ 39 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 40 On appeal, the Attorney General contends (1) the Commission lacked authority to

approve charging station rebates because section 55 of the Electric Vehicle Act gave exclusive

authority to IEPA to issue such rebates, which could also lead to duplicate rebates, (2) the rate cap

in section 45(g) of the Electric Vehicle Act must be narrowly calculated to include only Ameren’s

delivery service revenue requirement, (3) the rate cap should apply to all costs incurred under the

BEP, (4) bill and delivery credits should be included in determining the BEP budget, and (5) the

Commission improperly abdicated its administrative responsibilities and delegated its ratemaking

authority to Ameren when it approved the final order with modifications and required a compliance

filing.

¶ 41 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 42 We first address our jurisdiction over this appeal. Before addressing the merits of

an appeal, we have an obligation to determine whether we have jurisdiction, even though the

- 18 - parties did not raise the issue. Erickson v. Knox County Wind Farm LLC, 2024 IL App (4th)

230726, ¶ 61.

¶ 43 “ ‘The jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to the review of appeals from

final judgments, subject to statutory or supreme court exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Estate of

Devey, 239 Ill. App. 3d 630, 632 (1993)). Here, the Attorney General appeals from a decision of

the Commission, an administrative body. “This court has jurisdiction to review administrative

decisions only as provided by law, and we must exercise special statutory jurisdiction to review

such administrative action.” People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 407 Ill. App.

3d 207, 211 (2010) (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois

Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103, 121 (2007)). “Accordingly, the statute that confers

special statutory jurisdiction to an appellate court to review an administrative decision also limits

it.” Id. Direct appeals to the appellate court from Commission decisions are governed by the Public

Utilities Act. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(a) (West 2022); Quality Saw & Seal, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce

Comm’n, 374 Ill. App. 3d 776, 780 (2007). However, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335(h),

(i)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017), addressing direct review of administrative orders by the appellate court,

insofar as appropriate, the provisions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)

through Illinois Supreme Court Rule 373 (eff. July 1, 2017), which include rules pertaining to

final-order requirements, are applicable to such appeals. See Madigan, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 222

(applying Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (eff. May 30, 2008) to an appeal of the

Commission’s decision).

¶ 44 A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it determines the litigation on the

merits or some definite part thereof so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with

the execution of the judgment. In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 553 (1989). A final

- 19 - order disposing of fewer than all claims is not an appealable order and does not become appealable

until all of the claims are resolved. Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill.

2d 458, 464 (1990).

¶ 45 Under section 10-201(a) of the Public Utilities Act:

“Within 35 days from the date that a copy of the order or decision sought to be

reviewed was served upon the party affected by any order or decision of the

Commission refusing an application for a rehearing of any rule, regulation, order

or decision of the Commission, including any order granting or denying interim

rate relief, or within 35 days from the date that a copy of the order or decision

sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by any final order or

decision of the Commission upon and after a rehearing of any rule, regulation, order

or decision of the Commission, including any order granting or denying interim

rate relief, any person or corporation affected by such rule, regulation, order or

decision, may appeal to the appellate court of the judicial district in which the

subject matter of the hearing is situated, or if the subject matter of the hearing is

situated in more than one district, then of any one of such districts, for the purpose

of having the reasonableness or lawfulness of the rule, regulation, order or decision

inquired into and determined.” 220 ILCS 5/10-201(a) (West 2022).

In an appeal from a Commission order, “[t]he court first acquiring jurisdiction of any appeal from

any rule, regulation, order or decision shall have and retain jurisdiction of such appeal and of all

further appeals from the same rule, regulation, order or decision until such appeal is disposed of

in such appellate court.” Id.

¶ 46 Here, the Attorney General was authorized to file a motion for rehearing within 30

- 20 - days of the final order. The Commission filed its final order on March 23, 2023, and the Attorney

General filed his motion for rehearing on April 24, 2023. While the motion here was filed on day

32, it was nevertheless effective because day 30 in 2023 fell on a Saturday. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11

(West 2022). Then, the Attorney General timely filed his notice of appeal within 35 days from the

denial of the motion for rehearing.

¶ 47 After the Attorney General filed his appeal, he filed a motion for clarification and

to reject Ameren’s compliance filing, which the Commission denied. Meanwhile, the court granted

an intervenor’s motion for clarification and ordered Ameren to file a new compliance filing, which

it did. To the extent those actions could be viewed to render the Commission’s initial order

nonfinal, first note section 10-201(a) of the Public Utilities Act confers jurisdiction to hear an

appeal of any order or decision of the Commission refusing an application for a rehearing of any

rule, regulation, order, or decision of the Commission. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(a) (West 2022). Then,

the appellate court shall have and retain jurisdiction of the appeal and of all further appeals from

the same rule, regulation, order, or decision until such appeal is disposed of in the appellate court.

Id. Thus, this court gained jurisdiction and retained it when the Attorney General timely appealed

from the denial of his motion for rehearing.

¶ 48 Further, the March 23, 2023, final order of the Commission approved the BEP as

modified. Thus, at that time, as also specifically stated by the order, the Commission decided the

issues presented and the order was actually “final.” At that point, the compliance filing was merely

an ancillary matter to ensure the BEP was consistent with that final order. Generally, collateral or

incidental matters do not affect or alter the issue from which a notice of appeal was filed. See

General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 174 (2011). “[A]n order is final where matters

left for future determination are merely incidental to the ultimate rights which have been

- 21 - adjudicated by the order.” In re Petition to Incorporate the Village of Greenwood, 275 Ill. App. 3d

465, 470 (1995). Here, the compliance filing was merely incidental to the rights adjudicated by the

Commission’s final order. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the appeal.

¶ 49 B. Statutory Interpretation and Standards of Review

¶ 50 The issues in this appeal primarily present issues of statutory interpretation. “The

primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the

legislature.” Raoul, 2025 IL App (2d) 230020, ¶ 27. “The best evidence of the legislature’s intent

is the language of the statute itself.” Id. “Statutes must not be read in isolation, but as a whole; all

relevant parts of the statute must be considered when courts attempt to define the legislative intent

underlying the statute.” Id. “Moreover, when an act defines its terms, those terms must be

construed according to the definitions contained in the act.” Id.

¶ 51 “When statutory language is unambiguous, we must apply the language as written,

without looking to other statutory-interpretation tools.” Merritt v. Department of State Police, 2016

IL App (4th) 150661, ¶ 20. “We read the statutory provisions in concert and harmonize them,

avoiding an interpretation rendering part of the statute superfluous.” Id. We also must give clear

and unambiguous statutory language its effect as written, without reading into it exceptions,

limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Maxit, Inc. v. Van Cleve, 231 Ill. 2d

229, 239 (2008).

¶ 52 A court need not interpret a statute literally if it would lead to absurd results. Scott

v. American Alliance Casualty Co., 2024 IL App (4th) 231305, ¶ 21. However, we may not, under

the guise of statutory interpretation, correct a legislative oversight by rewriting a statute in a

manner inconsistent with its clear and unambiguous language. Id. Nor may we ignore or rewrite

statutory language on the basis that, as written, it produces an undesirable policy result. Id. Thus,

- 22 - “ ‘[w]here the words employed in a legislative enactment are free from ambiguity or doubt, they

must be given effect by the courts even though the consequences may be harsh, unjust, absurd or

unwise.’ ” Id. (quoting County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 557

(1999)). Such consequences can only be remedied by a change in the law. Id.

¶ 53 “Courts are not bound by the Commission’s rulings on questions of law, which we

review de novo.” Raoul, 2025 IL App (2d) 230020, ¶ 28 (citing Illinois Landowners Alliance, NFP

v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2017 IL 121302, ¶ 29). However, courts consistently afford

substantial weight and deference to the Commission’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged

with administering and enforcing. Id. “ ‘A significant reason for this deference is that courts

appreciate that agencies can make informed judgments upon the issues, based upon their

experience and expertise.’ ” Id. (quoting Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce

Comm’n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (1983)). This court has described the deference given as “extreme.”

Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 343 Ill. App. 3d 517, 523 (2003),

aff’d, 212 Ill. 2d 237 (2004). However, we are not necessarily bound by the Commission’s

statutory interpretation. Id. “A court may overturn the Commission’s interpretation of its own rules

if its construction is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or unreasonable.” Ameren Illinois Co. v. Illinois

Commerce Comm’n, 2012 IL App (4th) 100962, ¶ 61. In addition, less deference will be afforded

when the Commission’s decision is a departure from past practice. Id.

¶ 54 When considering the propriety of a Commission decision, we take the findings

and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact as prima facie true and consider any rule,

regulation, order, or decision of the Commission prima facie reasonable. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(d)

(West 2022). Such factual determinations will be disturbed on review only if not supported by

substantial evidence. Citizens Utility Board v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL App (1st)

- 23 - 152936, ¶ 16 (citing 220 ILCS 5/10-201(e)(iv)(A) (West 2014)). This court has held the

substantial-evidence standard is the same as the manifest-weight standard. Save Our Illinois Land

v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2022 IL App (4th) 210008, ¶ 37 (citing Kaloo v. Zoning Board of

Appeals, 274 Ill. App. 3d 927, 934 (1995)). “ ‘[A] finding is against the manifest weight of the

evidence if all reasonable persons would agree that the finding is erroneous and that the opposite

conclusion is evident.’ ” Id. (quoting Kaloo, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 934). The person or corporation

appealing from Commission rules, regulations, orders, or decisions has the burden of proof for all

issues raised on appeal. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(d) (West 2022).

¶ 55 This case involves precisely the type of complex statute where the Commission’s

experience and expertise is valuable. Thus, as we discuss further below, where applicable, we

afford substantial weight and deference to the Commission’s interpretation of the Electric Vehicle

Act. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2019 IL App (2d) 180504,

¶ 56.

¶ 56 C. Commission’s Authority to Authorize Charger Installation Rebates

¶ 57 The Attorney General first contends the Commission lacked authority to authorize

Ameren to include charger installation rebates in its BEP. The Attorney General argues the Electric

Vehicle Act’s sections 40, 45, and 55 grant exclusive authority to IEPA to issue such rebates.

¶ 58 Section 55 of the Electric Vehicle Act provides, in part:

“(a) In order to substantially offset the installation costs of electric vehicle

charging infrastructure, beginning July 1, 2022, and continuing as long as funds are

available, the Agency shall issue rebates, consistent with the Commission-approved

Beneficial Electrification Plans in accordance with Section 45, to public and private

organizations and companies to install and maintain Level 2 or Level 3 charging

- 24 - stations.” 20 ILCS 627/55 (West 2022).

Section 55(b) provides further details concerning the rebates. See id. § 55(b). Section 40 allows

IEPA rulemaking authority. See id. § 40.

¶ 59 Meanwhile, in its definition of BE programs, the Electric Vehicle Act provides

“[BE] programs shall provide for incentives such that customers are induced to use electricity at

times of low overall system usage or at times when generation from renewable energy sources is

high.” Id. § 45(b). Section 45 then further states 15 examples of programs included in a BEP

portfolio, including a number of incentives, such as incentives for (1) electrification and associated

infrastructure tied to using electricity at off-peak times; (2) electrification and associated

infrastructure targeted to school buses; (3) low-income programs that provide access to electric

vehicles for communities where car ownership or new car ownership is not common;

(4) electrification in eligible communities; and (5) incentives to enable quicker adoption of electric

vehicles by developing public charging stations in dense areas, workplaces, and low-income

communities. Id.

¶ 60 The BEP must also include, “at a minimum,” 10 items, including (1) “make-ready

investments to facilitate the rapid deployment of charging equipment throughout the State,

facilitate the electrification of public transit and other vehicle fleets in the light-duty, medium-

duty, and heavy-duty sectors, and align with Agency-issued rebates for charging equipment” (id.

§ 45(d)(i) and (2) “opportunities for coordination and cohesion with electric vehicle and electric

vehicle charging equipment incentives established by any agency, department, board, or

commission of the State, any other unit of government in the State, any national programs, or any

unit of the federal government” (id. § 45(d)(viii)).

¶ 61 When considering whether a BEP is in the public interest, the Commission must

- 25 - consider eight items, including, in part, whether the investments and other expenditures are

reasonably expected to “support at least a 40% investment of make-ready infrastructure incentives

to facilitate the rapid deployment of charging equipment in or serving environmental justice, low-

income, and eligible communities.” Id. § 45(d)(3). “Make-ready infrastructure” means the

electrical and construction work necessary between the distribution circuit to the connection point

of charging equipment. Id. § 45(b).

¶ 62 Section 15 of the Electric Vehicle Act provides for an “Electric Vehicle

Coordinator,” who shall act as a point person for electric-vehicle-related and electric-vehicle-

charging-related policies and activities in Illinois, including the issuance of rebates for consumers

and electric vehicle charging rebates for organizations and companies. Id. § 15.

¶ 63 Here, the Attorney General argues the provisions providing for IEPA rebates for

level 2 or level 3 charging stations grant excusive authority over such rebates to IEPA. But nothing

in section 55 mentions exclusivity. To the contrary, when read together, the provisions of the

Electric Vehicle Act envision coordination between IEPA and utility providers. Indeed, section 15

of the Electric Vehicle Act provides for a person to coordinate rebates. Id. Then, section 55

provides that any agency-issued rebates be “consistent with the Commission-approved [BEPs] in

accordance with Section 45.” Id. § 55(a). Meanwhile, section 45 requires the BEP to “align with

Agency-issued rebates for charging equipment.” Id. § 45(d)(i). While section 55 requires IEPA to

issue rebates, none of the provisions provide that only IEPA may do so or that a utility may not

also issue rebates when IEPA has done so. The Attorney General’s argument would have this court

impermissibly read such a provision into the plain language of the Electric Vehicle Act.

¶ 64 Nevertheless, the Attorney General argues section 45 specifically focuses on

“make-ready infrastructure” to “facilitate” the rapid deployment of charging equipment. The

- 26 - Attorney General points to such provisions as evidence the legislature intended incentives or

rebates to apply only to infrastructure incentives and not to the chargers themselves and that it

meant for IEPA to have exclusive authority over charger installation rebates. But while the

legislature required the BEP “at a minimum” to address incentives for charging infrastructure, it

did not limit it. The provisions concerning make-ready investments or infrastructure are merely a

small part of the overall statutory scheme, which, for example, in the description of a BEP, also

includes items as broad as “incentives for electrification in eligible communities” and incentives

both for electrification and associated infrastructure targeted to school buses. Id. § 45(b). Nothing

limits such provisions solely to make-ready infrastructure. Meanwhile, the statutory scheme

includes no provisions specifically providing the interpretation the Attorney General asks us to

adopt.

¶ 65 Further, among the minimum required items, the BEP must include, not only make-

ready investments to facilitate the rapid deployment of charging equipment and align with Agency-

issued rebates for charging equipment, but also “opportunities for coordination and cohesion with

electric vehicle and electric vehicle charging equipment incentives established by any agency,

department, board, or commission of the State, any other unit of government in the State, any

national programs, or any unit of the federal government.” Id. § 45(d)(viii). Thus, the Electric

Vehicle Act not only envisions a variety of incentives, including incentives related to charging; it

also recognizes that other entities, not just limited to a utility or IEPA, might also issue related

incentives. Those provisions do not show an intent to limit the extent of incentives that may be

provided by the utility. To accept the Attorney General’s argument, this court would be required

to read the words “at a minimum” out of the statute while simultaneously reading various

limitations into it. Accepting the Attorney General’s argument would also be at odds with the

- 27 - Electric Vehicle Act’s broad and ambitious policy goals.

¶ 66 The Attorney General also argues that an interpretation allowing both IEPA and a

utility provider to issue rebates would enable the Commission to establish identical rebate

programs as IEPA. But by providing for an electric vehicle coordinator and requiring rebates to be

consistent with BEPs and then requiring BEPs to align with IEPA-issued rebates, the statutory

provisions address that concern. Nor does the Electric Vehicle Act state any limit on duplicate

incentives. Further, the Attorney General’s argument is speculative. Nothing indicates duplicate

rebates have occurred or that they will. Had the legislature intended to limit the authority to issue

rebates to only IEPA, it could have easily included such a provision in the Electric Vehicle Act. It

did not, and we may not read such a provision into the Electric Vehicle Act. Under the Electric

Vehicle Act, IEPA does not have exclusive authority to issue rebates, so Ameren can include them

in its BEP.

¶ 67 Finally, the Attorney General notes the Commission removed similar rebates from

the BEP in the ComEd order in that separate proceeding. See Commonwealth Edison Co., Ill.

Comm. Comm’n No. 22-0432. There, the Commission found it did not have authority to approve

the rebates because they were the same rebates IEPA had the authority to grant. Thus, the Attorney

General argues we should grant less deference to the Commission’s differing interpretation here

because it departed from past practice. However, as previously discussed, we are not faced here

with ambiguous statutory language. Under the plain language of the statutes, the Electric Vehicle

Act did not grant exclusive authority to IEPA to issue the rebates. We do not need to defer to the

agency to reach this decision. Further, Commission orders are not precedent, and the Commission,

as a regulatory body, has the “ ‘power to deal freely with each situation as it comes before it,

regardless of how it may have dealt with a similar or even the same situation in a previous

- 28 - proceeding.’ ” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 24

(quoting Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 1 Ill. 2d 509, 513 (1953)).

¶ 68 D. Application of the Electric Vehicle Act Rate Cap

¶ 69 The Attorney General next contends the Commission erred in its interpretation of

the rate cap in section 45(g) of the Electric Vehicle Act. The Attorney General argues the

Commission erroneously (1) read the cap to cover only direct spending on electric vehicle

infrastructure rather than all spending, (2) applied the cap to the sum of the utility’s multiple

revenue requirements and not merely the delivery service revenue requirement, and (3) determined

bill and delivery credits were not BEP spending.

¶ 70 At issue is the provision of the Electric Vehicle Act providing “[t]he retail rate

impact from the development of electric vehicle infrastructure shall not exceed 1% per year of the

total annual revenue requirements of the utility.” 20 ILCS 627/45(g) (West 2022).

¶ 71 1. Limiting the Cap to Spending on Electric Vehicle Infrastructure

¶ 72 The Attorney General argues the inclusion of the word “development” requires the

rate cap to encompass all spending contained in a BEP because all of the programs in the BEP

“contribute to” or are “intertwined with” the development, implementation, and expansion of

electric vehicle infrastructure.

¶ 73 We initially note the Appellate Court, Second District, recently rejected the

Attorney General’s position. See Raoul, 2025 IL App (2d) 230020, ¶ 39. There, the appellate court

noted section 45(g) of the Electric Vehicle Act states the rate cap applies to “the development of

electric vehicle infrastructure” and agreed with the Commission it did not apply to the total cost

of a BEP. Id. The court held that to find otherwise would require it to read additional language into

the statute, which it would not do. Id. The Second District further rejected the argument the

- 29 - Commission’s interpretation led to an absurd result. See id. ¶ 40. The Attorney General asks us to

disregard the Second District’s holding and focuses at length on definitions of the term

“development” to suggest that “development” of the “electric vehicle infrastructure” involves all

of the BEP spending because additional spending “contributes to” or is “intertwined with” the

development of infrastructure. We disagree.

¶ 74 As the Commission and the Second District determined, under the plain language

of section 45(g), the cap applies to a narrower definition of “the development of electric vehicle

infrastructure” and not the total cost of a BEP. While section 45(g) uses the term “development,”

that language is plainly limited to development of “electric vehicle infrastructure” and not

additional and more amorphous items that might also “contribute to” or be “intertwined with” the

development of electric vehicle infrastructure. If the legislature intended the cap to apply broadly,

it would have said so.

¶ 75 Further, under the Electric Vehicle Act, BEPs involve provisions such as education

programs or rate programs to encourage charging at off-peak times that do not mention or directly

relate to electric vehicle infrastructure. See, e.g., 20 ILCS 627/45(b), (d)(x) (West 2022). Instead,

such programs apply to programs affecting how existing infrastructure is used. Other than

surmising other programs “contribute to” or are “intertwined with” the development of electric

vehicle infrastructure, the Attorney General has not pointed a concrete link between all BEP

spending and the narrower term “electric vehicle infrastructure.” Thus, while we hold the cap does

not apply to all BEP spending under the plain language of the Electric Vehicle Act, to the extent

any ambiguity is raised by the Attorney General’s argument, we also defer to the Commission’s

interpretation, as the Commission is best suited to determine the spending that applies to the

“development of electric vehicle infrastructure.”

- 30 - ¶ 76 The Attorney General also argues the Commission’s interpretation leads to an

absurd result because it effectively leaves no meaningful limit on the BEP’s infrastructure

spending. We first note we generally need not address whether the interpretation is absurd when

the statute is not ambiguous. Scott, 2024 IL App (4th) 231305, ¶ 21. Regardless, to the extent an

ambiguity may be found here, we note the Electric Vehicle Act encompasses broad and ambitious

policy goals. Thus, it does not reflect an intent of the legislature to implement the cap to apply to

all BEP spending.

“[T]he absurd results doctrine merely permits a court to favor an otherwise

reasonable construction of the statutory text over a more literal interpretation where

the latter would produce a result demonstrably at odds with any conceivable

legislative purpose. [Citation.] It does not, however, license a court to simply ignore

or rewrite statutory language on the basis that, as written, it produces an undesirable

policy result.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We are not persuaded the Commission’s interpretation produces a result demonstrably at odds with

any conceivable legislative purpose. As such, the result is not absurd.

¶ 77 Moreover, the Second District also rejected the Attorney General’s argument.

Raoul, 2025 IL App (2d) 230020, ¶ 40. The Second District found the Attorney General’s

argument minimized the Commission’s obligations under the statute to ensure all programs are

cost-beneficial. Id. (“ ‘The Commission shall determine if the proposed plan is cost-beneficial and

in the public interest.’ ” (quoting 20 ILCS 627/45(d) (West 2022))). That obligation is reflective

of the Commission’s duty to also ensure utility rates are just and reasonable. Id.; see 220 ILCS

5/9-101 (West 2022). We agree. Accordingly, the Electric Vehicle Act is not rendered devoid of

meaningful spending limits by the Commission’s interpretation limiting the cap to spending of less

- 31 - than all BEP spending.

¶ 78 2. Application of the Cap to Multiple Revenue Requirements

¶ 79 The Attorney General next contends the Commission erroneously interpreted

section 45(g) to apply the rate cap to the sum of Ameren’s multiple revenue requirements and not

merely to its delivery service revenue requirement. The Attorney General argues Ameren is a

distribution-only utility, resulting in revenue requirements established during general rate cases

only for distribution services. The Attorney General recognizes other charges and rates exist, such

as riders, adjustments, and pass-through charges, but argues those are established in separate

proceedings outside of a utility’s general rate case. Thus, the Attorney General sought an

interpretation limiting application of the rate cap to only the delivery service revenue requirement.

As with the Attorney General’s first argument, the Second District has rejected this argument as

well. See Raoul, 2025 IL App (2d) 230020, ¶¶ 41-43.

¶ 80 At issue is the phrase “total annual revenue requirements” in section 45(g). The

Second District held, under the plain language of the Electric Vehicle Act, “total annual revenue

requirements” refers to the sum of multiple revenue requirements the utility charges. The court

found that, had the General Assembly intended to refer to a narrow, singular “revenue

requirement,” it could have easily done so but it did not. Id. ¶ 42. The court also specifically noted

the following:

“For example, in article IX of the Public Utilities Act, the General Assembly

utilizes a more limited utility revenue benchmark in the context of natural gas

surcharges for public utilities. There, the General Assembly limited the cumulative

amount of increases billed under the surcharge to an annual average of 4% of the

utility’s ‘delivery base rate revenues.’ 220 ILCS 5/9-220.3(g) (West 2022). Thus,

- 32 - the Public Utilities Act demonstrates that if the General Assembly had wanted to

limit ComEd’s ‘total annual revenue requirements’ to just ‘delivery service revenue

requirements,’ it knew exactly how to do so.” Id.

The court also rejected the Attorney’s General’s argument concerning the requirements being

established in separate proceedings, stating that, while other revenue may be recovered outside of

a utility’s rate case, that is not evidence the General Assembly intended for “total annual revenue

requirements” in the Electric Vehicle Act to be read as “delivery services revenue requirement.”

Id. ¶ 43. We agree with the Second District’s analysis.

¶ 81 Nothing in the Electric Vehicle Act limits the plural “total annual revenue

requirements” to the singular “delivery services revenue requirement.” Indeed, the inclusion of the

word “total” and the use of the plural “requirements” plainly show the opposite.

¶ 82 The Attorney General also argues the Commission’s interpretation leads to an

absurd result. However, having found the language of section 45(g) is clear and unambiguous, we

need not consider that argument. See id. ¶ 44. Regardless, we also note that, as discussed in regard

to the Attorney General’s previous arguments, given the broad and ambitious policy goals of the

Electric Vehicle Act, we are not persuaded the Commission’s interpretation produces a result

demonstrably at odds with any conceivable legislative purpose.

¶ 83 3. Exclusion of Bill and Delivery Credits

¶ 84 The Attorney General next contends the Commission erred in excluding bill and

delivery credits from Ameren’s total revenue requirements. The Attorney General argues such

credits cannot constitute spending subject to the cap and should not be considered in determining

the BEP budget. In doing so the Attorney General takes issue with the Commission’s factual

finding that, although bill and delivery credits reduce Ameren’s service delivery revenue, the

- 33 - reduction does not add a cost to be collected in its revenue requirement because there is no

additional cost to be recovered from customers. The Attorney General submits that finding is in

error because Ameren is entitled to recover all of its reasonable costs of service from customers,

so it will eventually be able to recoup the bill and delivery credits through its rates.

¶ 85 The Electric Vehicle Act does not specifically address bill and delivery credits and

merely states, “[t]he Commission shall consider revenues from electric vehicles in the utility’s

service territory in evaluating the retail rate impact. The retail rate impact from the development

of electric vehicle infrastructure shall not exceed 1% per year of the total annual revenue

requirements of the utility.” 20 ILCS 627/45(g) (West 2022).

¶ 86 The Commission first found the credits were not applicable because they were not

related to the development of electric vehicle infrastructure. Then, addressing the issue in regard

to the BEP budget, the Commission noted the testimony of Kilhoffer that the revenue from

charging and the bill credits to customers were “two sides to the same coin.” Thus, the Commission

found, “Although the bill/delivery credits at issue may impact the overall bill for participating

customers, those credits are an element of Ameren’s overall rate design, and thus a function of the

revenues collected from ratepayers rather than an increase in costs.” The Commission further

found “the bill/delivery credits have no impact on the revenue requirement” and, “although the

bill/delivery credits reduce the Company’s delivery service revenue, this reduction does not add a

cost to be collected in Ameren’s revenue requirement, so there is no additional cost to be recovered

from customers.” Accordingly, the Commission declined to include the bill and delivery credits in

the determination of the BEP budget.

¶ 87 Here, we take the findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact

as prima facie true and consider any rule, regulation, order, or decision of the Commission to be

- 34 - prima facie reasonable. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(d) (West 2022). The Attorney General speculates

Ameren will recoup bill and delivery credits through its rates. But Kilhoffer testified the credits

are part of the rate design. The Attorney General has not pointed to testimony or facts to convince

us all reasonable persons would agree the Commission’s finding based on that testimony is

erroneous and that the opposite conclusion is evident.

¶ 88 4. Total Effect of the Commission’s Application of Section 45(g)

¶ 89 We note the Attorney General also argues the cumulative effect of the

Commission’s application of section 45(g) “thwarts the legislature’s intent to balance the need for

transportation electrification with controlling the costs of those upgrades for ratepayers.” However,

as previously discussed, most of our determinations of those issues have been made based on the

plain language of the Electric Vehicle Act. Further, as also as previously discussed, the Electric

Vehicle Act sets forth broad and ambitious policy goals and contains provisions requiring a

determination that the BEP is cost-beneficial before approval. Accordingly, we do not find the

cumulative effect of the Commission’s interpretation and application of section 45(g) requires

reversal.

¶ 90 E. Administrative Authority to Order a Compliance Filing

¶ 91 Finally, the Attorney General contends the Commission abdicated its

administrative responsibilities by delegating authority to Ameren when it ordered Ameren to

submit a compliance filing. The Attorney General generally frames or analogizes the issue as an

abdication of the Commission’s ratemaking authority and cites cases applicable to ratemaking.

The Attorney General does so to argue the Commission improperly allowed Ameren discretion to

set its BEP spending without guidance or restriction and without determining whether that

spending was just, reasonable, cost-beneficial, and in the public interest. We disagree.

- 35 - ¶ 92 We first note the Electric Vehicle Act contemplates the approval of a BEP with

modifications. See 20 ILCS 627/45(d) (West 2022) (“The Commission shall approve, approve

with modifications, or reject the plan within 270 days from the date of filing.”). When the

Commission ordered modifications, it specifically found the budget should be increased to

accommodate the modifications.

¶ 93 The Commission was also specific regarding the modifications. The modifications

ordered by the Commission included requirements for Ameren to expand subsidies for certain

electric line extensions and account for differences in cost between different electric vehicle

chargers. The Commission also adopted a proposal that customers be allowed to use electric line

extension funds for electrification expenses “on the customer side of the meter” to the extent the

budget allowed, the BEP budget remained under the rate cap, and the BEP remained cost-

beneficial. The Commission further ordered expanded rebates and ordered Ameren to propose a

budget for programs advanced by other parties. In its order, the Commission referred to the

positions of the parties on various issues and noted the amount of spending available under the

cap. The Commission then ordered Ameren to work with Commission staff and intervenors when

formulating the compliance filing to ensure it complied with the final order.

¶ 94 Here, given (1) the authority of the Commission to enter an order with

modifications, (2) the details it provided regarding the modifications it ordered, (3) the

requirement of Ameren to work with staff and intervenors, and (4) the requirement of a compliance

filing to ensure the modifications were incorporated into the already approved as modified BEP,

we do not agree Ameren was given discretion to set its budget without guidance or restriction.

¶ 95 We also disagree with the Attorney General’s position that the Commission

abdicated its role in determining whether the BEP was just and reasonable, cost-effective, and in

- 36 - the public interest. In its overall findings, the Commission specifically stated the proposed BEP as

modified (1) was reasonable, (2) met the statutory requirements and policy goals of the Electric

Vehicle Act, (3) was cost-beneficial, and (4) was in the public interest. The order itself noted the

BEP could be modified only to the extent it remained cost-beneficial. As previously noted, the

Commission required Ameren to share a draft compliance BEP with Commission staff and the

intervenors, who would provide feedback regarding whether the compliance BEP accurately

reflected the Commission’s final order. Then, Ameren was required to submit a filing of

compliance. Under those provisions, Ameren could not unilaterally set its BEP budget. Indeed,

when Ameren submitted its compliance filing as ordered, the Attorney General then challenged

that filing, arguing the budget was no longer cost-beneficial; the Commission considered the issue

and denied the Attorney General’s challenge. Thus, the Commission fully exercised its authority

over the matter and did not abdicate its role in setting the BEP budget to Ameren.

¶ 96 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 97 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 98 Affirmed.

- 37 - People ex rel. Raoul v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2025 IL App (4th) 230491

Decision Under Review: Petition for review of order of Illinois Commerce Commission, Nos. 22-0431, 22-0443.

Attorneys Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, for Solicitor General, and Benjamin F. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney Appellant: General, of counsel), for appellant.

Attorneys Brian J. Dodds, Robert W. Funk, and Thomas R. Stanton, for Special Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, for appellee Appellee: Illinois Commerce Commission.

Albert D. Sturtevant, Mark W. DeMonte, and Christine Prorok, of Whitt Sturtevant LLP, of Chicago, for appellee Ameren Illinois Company.

William M. Shay, of Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, LLC, of Peoria, and Robert A. Weinstock, of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Environmental Advocacy Center, of Chicago, for appellees Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club, and Respiratory Health Association.

No brief filed for other appellees.

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