COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Beales, Chaney and Senior Judge Annunziata UNPUBLISHED
Argued by videoconference
SCHOOL BOARD FOR THE CITY OF RICHMOND MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 1474-22-2 JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY DECEMBER 12, 2023 MARK EMERICK LEE, JR.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Jacqueline S. McClenney, Judge
Stephen B. Moncrieffe (Harrell & Chambliss, LLP, on brief), for appellant.
No brief or argument for appellee.
The School Board for the City of Richmond (School Board) appeals the trial court’s order
granting the warrant in debt of its former employee, Mark Emerick Lee, Jr. The School Board
argues that the trial court erred in (1) asserting jurisdiction over Lee’s appeal from the City of
Richmond General District Court (GDC) because Lee did not serve the School Board with the
notice of appeal and did not timely pay the writ tax, costs, and other fees; (2) denying the School
Board’s motion to strike and granting Lee relief he did not seek when it resolved a contractual
ambiguity in Lee’s favor; (3) concluding that the contract between the parties was ambiguous;
(4) concluding that the School Board drafted the contract; (5) applying an incorrect standard of
review when construing the contract in Lee’s favor; and (6) denying the School Board’s motion to
(a) modify the effective date of the final order to a date reflecting when the School Board received
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). the trial court’s order in the mail or, alternatively, (b) suspend the final order to provide the School
Board with additional time to file a motion for reconsideration.
The issues on appeal were addressed in three trial court hearings held on June 8, 2022, June
28, 2022, and August 19, 2022. But the School Board did not make a transcript or written statement
in lieu of transcript part of the record for any of those hearings. Consequently, this Court’s review
of the School Board’s assignments of error is limited to those issues for which the omitted
transcripts are not indispensable.
For the following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on appeal, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.” Nielsen v.
Nielsen, 73 Va. App. 370, 377 (2021) (quoting Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258 (2003)).
In December 2020, Lee entered an employment contract with the School Board, providing
Lee with a salary of $35,284 “prorated for the duration of the contract.” The contract, entitled
“Annual Contract With Professional Personnel,” stated that it “cover[ed] the period” of January 5,
2021 through June 30, 2021. In May 2021, the School Board dismissed Lee from his employment.
Lee filed a warrant in debt in the GDC on August 24, 2021, seeking $15,154.03.
Subsequently, on October 12, 2021, Lee filed a bill of particulars alleging that the School Board
failed to pay him $35,284 as specified in his contract. The School Board filed grounds of defense,
arguing that Lee’s “allegation as to his ‘pay [being] different from the agreement’ lacks the requisite
level of specificity to warrant a response.” (Alteration in original). In response, Lee filed another
bill of particulars on November 9, 2021, asserting that his contract—provided to him by the School
Board—required the School Board to pay him $35,284 over the six-month term of his employment
-2- and further asserting that the School Board failed to pay him in accordance with the terms of the
contract.
The GDC hearing on Lee’s warrant in debt was originally scheduled for January 4, 2022,
but the School Board requested a continuance. However, due to inclement weather, the courthouse
was closed on January 4. Upon being contacted by the clerk’s office on January 5, the School
Board “agreed to continue [the] case to March 24, 2022.” The School Board subsequently noticed a
hearing on Lee’s warrant in debt for March 24, 2022. The GDC form recording the warrant in debt
shows both the original January 4, 2022 hearing date and the March 24, 2022 hearing date.
After the GDC found in favor of the School Board on March 24, 2022, Lee noticed his
appeal to the circuit court that same day. Lee subsequently paid the required writ tax, costs, and
other fees on April 25, 2022.1
On June 21, 2022, the School Board filed a motion to dismiss. The School Board argued
that although Lee timely noted his appeal, he failed to timely remit the writ tax. The School Board
alleged that Lee paid the writ tax 32 days after the GDC judgment dated March 24, 2022, and,
therefore, the GDC had no authority to transmit the case to the circuit court. The School Board
claimed that because Lee failed to timely perfect his appeal, the trial court did not have jurisdiction
to hear the appeal.
The School Board also filed a motion for a continuance, alleging that Lee “failed to
effectuate service of his appeal notice” on the School Board before June 8, 2022, the date on which
the parties were supposed to appear before the trial court. The School Board stated that it was not
notified of the hearing until the court clerk’s office called to ask why it missed the June 8, 2022
hearing. The School Board agreed at that time to a June 28, 2022 hearing on its motion to dismiss,
1 As explained in Analysis Section II.B of this opinion, the “March 23, 2022” date-stamp next to the judge’s signature on the GDC final order is an obvious clerical mistake. -3- but requested a further continuance for additional time to prepare for trial should the trial court deny
its motion to dismiss.
The parties convened for a hearing on the School Board’s motions on June 28, 2022.2 As
stated in the trial court’s August 29, 2022 opinion and order, the trial court denied the School
Board’s motion to dismiss and granted the School Board’s motion for a continuance. The trial court
found that Lee timely perfected his appeal because the 30-day deadline fell on a day that, under
Code § 1-210, extended the 30-day filing period. The trial court continued the matter to August 19,
2022.
On August 19, 2022, the parties appeared for trial.3 The court heard evidence from Lee and
examined the exhibits, including the contract. The School Board presented no evidence. Lee
“requested $15,154.03 as the difference between the salary he received and the salary he was
entitled to receive for the hours he worked under the contract.” Lee argued that he was entitled to a
total salary of $35,284, prorated over the six-month period of his contract. The School Board
argued that the contract provided for an annual salary of $35,284, prorated and reduced by half to
reflect Lee’s six-month employment term. The trial court held that the contract did not “contain the
word ‘annual’ in reference to the salary amount,” but rather stated that the salary was $35,284
“prorated for the duration of the contract.” The trial court found that there were “two ways to look
at this failure to use the word ‘annual’ in the contract: it is either an absence that renders the
meaning of the contract clear that the agreement was for $35,284 distributed over the period of
January 5 through June 30, 2021, or the contract is ambiguous.” The trial court held that if the
2 The record does not include a transcript, or a written statement in lieu of transcript, of this hearing. 3 The record does not include a transcript, or a written statement in lieu of transcript, of this hearing. However, the trial court’s August 29, 2022 opinion and order includes a detailed account of the arguments made and evidence considered at the August 19, 2022 hearing. The facts recited here are based on that order and other record documents. -4- contract is ambiguous, because the School Board “drafted the contract and as the contract fails to
state that the $35,284 is an annual salary to be prorated,” the court could not construe the ambiguity
against Lee. The trial court granted Lee’s warrant in debt in the amount of $15,154.03, and entered
an order memorializing its ruling on August 29, 2022.
The School Board filed a motion to modify the August 29, 2022 order on September 15,
2022. The School Board alleged it did not receive the final order in the mail until September 12,
2022. The School Board asked the trial court to modify the effective date of the order to September
12, 2022, to reflect the date the order was received so that the School Board would have sufficient
time to file a “Motion to Reconsider the Court’s ruling in favor of Plaintiff” within the 21-day
jurisdictional limit of Rule 1:1. Alternatively, the School Board asked the trial court to suspend the
effective date of the final order “indefinitely pending the scheduling of a hearing” on its motion.
The School Board’s motion to modify did not proffer any ground for reconsideration or include the
motion for reconsideration. On September 16, 2022, the trial court denied the School Board’s
motion to modify its order. The trial court stated that it had informed the parties it would enter its
order by August 31, 2022, and had actually entered the order on August 29, 2022. The trial court
noted it did not receive another filing in the case until the School Board’s motion to modify the
order was filed on September 15, 2022. The trial court stated that granting the motion would create
“legal fiction” and that the School Board’s “sole reason for requesting the Court create a legal
fiction as to the date of entry of the [circuit court’s] August 29, 2022 [o]rder is to extend the
applicable deadlines, allowing the [School Board] extra time for filings.”
The School Board never filed a motion to reconsider. The School Board timely appealed to
this Court.
-5- ANALYSIS
I. The record does not include a transcript or written statement in lieu of transcript.
The record does not include a transcript for the June 28, 2022 hearing on the School Board’s
“Motion to Dismiss,” the August 19, 2022 trial, or the September 16, 2022 hearing on the School
Board’s “Motion to Modify Court Order.” Although the School Board filed a written statement in
lieu of transcript in the trial court, that statement is not part of the record because it was not filed in
accordance with the requirements of Rule 5A:8(c). Rule 5A:8(c) provides:
A written statement of facts, testimony, and other incidents of the case becomes a part of the record when: (1) within 60 days after entry of judgment a copy of such statement is filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court. . . . ; and (2) the statement is signed by the trial judge and filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court.
The trial court entered judgment on August 29, 2022. The School Board’s written statement was
filed on November 10, 2022, more than 60 days later. See Rule 5A:8(c)(1). Moreover, the School
Board did not move for an extension of time to file its written statement. Although Rule 5A:8(c),
unlike the rule for filing transcripts under Rule 5A:8(a), does not provide for any extension to the
60-day deadline, Rule 5A:3(b) provides that “the times prescribed in these Rules for filing papers,
except transcripts (Rule 5A:8(a)), may be extended by a judge of the court in which the papers are
to be filed on motion for good cause shown.” A motion for such an extension would only have
been timely if filed within 90 days of the trial court’s judgment. See Rule 5A:3(c)(2) (for rules not
providing a specific deadline for requesting an extension, a motion for an extension filed within 30
days of the deadline is timely). However, even if the School Board’s November 10, 2022 filing of
its written statement—less than 90 days after the trial court’s August 29, 2022 judgment—is taken
to include an implicit motion for an extension, an extension would not be authorized absent “good
cause shown.” See Rule 5A:3(b). The School Board’s written statement in lieu of transcript does
not state any cause for extending the 60-day filing deadline. Moreover, unlike extensions for filing -6- transcripts under Rule 5A:8(a)—which can be granted “by a judge of this Court”—extensions under
Rule 5A:3 may be granted only by a judge of the circuit court. See Rule 5A:3(b) (authorizing
extensions granted by “a judge of the court in which the papers are to be filed”). Because the
School Board’s written statement in lieu of transcript was not timely filed, the School Board did not
establish prima facie compliance with the first two elements of Rule 5A:8(c), and the trial court was
not obligated to consider it.4 See Clary v. Clary, 15 Va. App. 598, 600 (1993) (remand for
consideration of a written statement is inappropriate where party has not established prima facie
compliance with Rule 5A:8(c)). Thus, the School Board’s written statement in lieu of transcript is
not part of the record. See id.
II. The trial court had jurisdiction over Lee’s de novo appeal of the GDC judgment.
The School Board asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Lee’s de novo appeal
of the GDC judgment because it was not served with Lee’s notice of appeal and Lee failed to pay
the writ tax, costs, and fees within 30 days of the GDC judgment.
A. The School Board had sufficient notice of Lee’s appeal.
The School Board first argues that the trial court erred in asserting jurisdiction over the
School Board because of Lee’s alleged failure to serve the notice of appeal on the School Board.
The School Board asserts that it was not served with the notice of appeal and that the record does
not reflect any proof of service of the notice of appeal. However, the record does not reflect that the
School Board made any jurisdictional objection in the trial court based on Lee’s failure to serve the
notice of appeal. The School Board filed a “Motion to Dismiss” on June 21, but that motion did not
4 The two elements required to establish prima facie compliance with Rule 5A:8(c) are stated in Rule 5A:8(c)(1). First, a copy of the written statement in lieu of transcript must be filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court within 60 days of the judgment. See Rule 5A:8(c)(1). Second, a copy of the written statement must be mailed or delivered to opposing counsel on the same day that it is filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court, accompanied by notice that such statement will be presented to the trial judge no earlier than 15 days nor later than 20 days after such filing. See Clary v. Clary, 15 Va. App 598, 600 (1993); Rule 5A:8(c)(1). -7- contain any jurisdictional objection based on Lee’s failure to serve the notice of appeal. The School
Board’s only objection to the alleged failure to serve the notice of appeal appears in its “Motion for
a Continuance,” filed contemporaneously with its “Motion to Dismiss.” The School Board’s
“Motion for a Continuance” requested that the June 28 hearing date be continued based on the
School Board’s allegation that it did not receive the notice of Lee’s appeal before June 8 and,
consequently, it needed more time to “meet with key personnel” and prepare a defense. The trial
court granted the requested continuance. The trial court’s final order states that the School Board’s
motions were heard on June 28, 2022, but no transcript or written statement in lieu of transcript for
that hearing is part of the record.
Moreover, unlike the deadline for filing a timely notice of appeal, other mandatory
procedural requirements, such as service, have not been held to be jurisdictional. Considering Rule
5A:6(d), relating to the procedural requirement for perfecting a notice of appeal to this Court, the
Supreme Court has held that “a failure to strictly adhere to the certification of notice to other parties
requirement of Rule 5A:6(d) would not bar the Court from obtaining jurisdiction over the appeal
where other aspects of the record showed that the party was advised that a timely notice of appeal
had been filed.” Ghameshlouy v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 379, 392 (2010).
The requirements for perfecting a notice of appeal from the general district court to circuit
court are stated in Code § 16.1-106. Code § 16.1-106(B) requires a party to satisfy the requirements
for appeal stated in Code § 16.1-107. Code § 16.1-107(E) requires that the appellant:
[S]hall[] within 30 days from the date of the judgment[] pay to the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken the amount of the writ tax of the court to which the appeal is taken and costs as required by subdivision A 13 of § 17.1-275, including all fees for service of process of the notice of appeal in the circuit court pursuant to § 16.1-112.
(Emphasis added). Code § 16.1-112 provides that upon payment of the writ tax and other fees and
costs: -8- The judge or clerk of any court from which an appeal is taken under this article shall promptly transmit to the clerk of the appellate court the case papers, which shall include the original warrant or warrants or other notices or pleadings with the judgment endorsed thereon, together with all pleadings, exhibits, and other papers filed in the trial of the case. The required bond, and, if applicable, the money deposited to secure such bond and the writ tax and costs paid pursuant to § 16.1-107 shall also be submitted, along with the fees for service of process of the notice of appeal in the circuit court. . . .
When such case has been docketed, the clerk of such appellate court shall by writing to be served . . . by regular mail to [the appellee’s] attorney, that such an appeal has been docketed in his office[.] . . . No such appeal shall be heard unless it appears that the [appellee’s attorney] has had such notice, . . . 10 days before the date fixed for trial, or has in person or by attorney waived such notice.
(Emphases added).
Code § 16.1-112 plainly authorizes the service of the School Board’s attorney by regular
mail. Moreover, Code § 16.1-112 provides that the circuit court clerk is responsible for serving the
notice. Judicial officers, including clerks of court, are entitled to a presumption of regularity that,
here, supports a finding that the notice of appeal was sent to the School Board’s counsel by regular
mail in accordance with Code § 16.1-112. See Gilmore v. Landsidle, 252 Va. 388, 396 (1996) (“In
the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, this Court must presume that a public officer has
properly discharged his official duties.”); Seaton v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 739, 757 (2004)
(applying the presumption of regularity to the operations of a judicial clerk’s office). Additionally,
postal workers are accorded a presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties. Branham v.
Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 282 (2012) (“In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, postal
workers are entitled to a presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.”). On this
record, there is no evidence rebutting the presumption that the trial court clerk mailed Lee’s notice
of appeal to the School Board’s attorney by regular mail. Nor is there any evidence rebutting the
presumption that the postal service delivered the notice of appeal to the School Board’s attorney.
-9- Moreover, even if the School Board did not receive the notice of appeal 10 days before the
June 8 scheduled trial date, that defect was cured by the notice provided to the School Board on
June 8 and the subsequent continuances. The prescribed time for serving the notice to the School
Board’s attorney is “10 days before the date fixed for trial.” See Code § 16.1-112. Under Code
§ 8.01-288, the notice that the School Board—by its own admission—received on June 8 satisfies
the service requirements of Code § 16.1-106. See Code § 8.01-288. Code § 8.01-288 provides that
“process which has reached the person to whom it is directed within the time prescribed by law, if
any, shall be sufficient although not served or accepted as provided in this chapter.” Since the
School Board had notice of Lee’s appeal on June 8, 2022, well more than 10 days before the August
19, 2022 trial, the School Board received sufficient notice of Lee’s appeal under Code § 16.1-112.
Under these circumstances, any alleged defect in the manner of serving the School Board with
notice of Lee’s appeal did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. See Ghameshlouy, 279 Va. at
392.
B. Lee’s payment of the writ tax and other appeal-related fees was timely.
The School Board also contends that Lee’s failure to pay the required writ tax, costs, and
fees within 30 days of the GDC judgment barred the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Lee’s
appeal. It is undisputed that Lee paid the required writ tax, costs, and fees on Monday, April 25,
2022. The School Board, however, asserts that Lee failed to perfect his appeal because he paid the
writ tax, costs, and fees “32 days after the entry of the Richmond GDC judgment.” Op. Br. 15.
The requirements for perfecting an appeal to a circuit court from a general district court are
set forth in Code § 16.1-107. See Code § 16.1-107 (stating mandatory bond and fee requirements
for perfecting an appeal). Code § 16.1-107(E) provides that:
In addition to the foregoing [bond requirements], any party applying for appeal shall, within 30 days from the date of the judgment, pay to the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken the amount of the writ tax of the court to which the appeal is taken and costs as - 10 - required by subdivision A 13 of § 17.1-275, including all fees for service of process of the notice of appeal in the circuit court pursuant to § 16.1-112.
(Emphasis added). The Supreme Court has held that this requirement to pay the writ tax, costs, and
fees “within 30 days of the judgment” is jurisdictional. See Hurst v. Ballard, 230 Va. 365, 367
(1985). As explained in Hurst:
Unless the writ tax is paid to the district court clerk within 30 days from the judgment date, the district court has no authority to transmit the case to the circuit court . . . [,] the intended appeal is not perfected[,] and the circuit court does not obtain jurisdiction.
Id. The School Board’s reliance on Hurst is misplaced because, as explained further below, Lee
timely paid the required writ tax, costs, and fees for service of process of the notice of appeal.
1. The general district court entered final judgment on March 24, 2022.
Although, before the GDC and the trial court, the School Board repeatedly asserted that the
date of the GDC trial was March 24, 2022, the School Board now, for the first time on appeal,
asserts that the GDC entered final judgment on March 23, 2022—the day before the March 24,
2022 GDC trial. If the GDC judgment was entered on March 23, 2022, then Lee’s failure to pay the
required writ tax, costs, and fees by Friday, April 22, 2022—30 days later—would indeed have
barred the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over Lee’s appeal. See id. But the GDC did not
enter judgment the day before the March 24, 2022 GDC trial, and the School Board’s contrary
contention relies on an obvious clerical mistake.
Although there appears to be a conflict in the record regarding the date of the GDC’s
judgment, the record—as a whole—clearly demonstrates that the correct date is March 24, 2022.
The GDC final order states that the hearing was held on March 24, 2022, but “March 23, 2022” is
date-stamped next to the GDC judge’s signature. The stated “DATE OF FINAL ORDER” on Lee’s
notice of appeal is March 24, 2022, but the stated “JUDGMENT DATE” on the notice of appeal is
March 23, 2022. The GDC deputy clerk’s notes relating to a continuance of the originally - 11 - scheduled January 4, 2022 GDC trial date state that the School Board agreed to a March 24, 2022
hearing date, and “3/24 @ 1 p.m. SD” is handwritten and initialed on two pages of the School
Board’s request for a continuance. The School Board subsequently filed a “Notice of Hearing” for
March 24, 2022, at 1:00 p.m.
Before the trial court, the School Board filed a motion to dismiss stating “This matter comes
before the City of Richmond Circuit Court on appeal from a March 24, 2022 judgment from the
[GDC] in favor of Defendant.” The School Board’s motion to dismiss further stated that Lee paid
the writ tax, costs, and fees on “April 25, 2022; 32 days after the entry of judgment by the GDC.”
April 25, 2022, is 32 days from March 24, 2022. The trial court’s final “Opinion and Order”
entered August 29, 2022, denies the School Board’s motion to dismiss based on an express finding
that the day that is 30 days from the date of the GDC judgment fell on a weekend, consistent with a
March 24, 2022 judgment date, and inconsistent with a March 23, 2022 judgment date. Thirty days
from March 23, 2022, is Friday, April 22, 2022.
As amply demonstrated by the foregoing record facts, before the GDC and the trial court,
the School Board consistently represented that the GDC hearing and judgment occurred on March
24, 2022. The School Board’s contention on appeal that April 25, 2022, the date on which Lee paid
the writ tax, fees, and other costs, is 32 days after the GDC judgment further supports a March 24,
2022 judgment date. On this record, there can be no doubt that the “March 23, 2022” date stamp
adjacent to the GDC judge’s signature on the GDC final judgment is a clerical mistake. See Code
§ 8.01-428(b) (authorizing the correction of clerical mistakes in judgments on the court’s own
initiative at any time); see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 710, 721 n.3 (2012) (Rule 3.3
of the Rules of Professional Conduct imposes on all counsel a professional duty of candor to
accurately represent the record to this Court).
- 12 - 2. Lee’s April 25 payment of the writ tax, costs, and fees was timely.
Lee’s April 25, 2022 payment of the required writ tax, costs, and fees was timely because
the 30-day payment deadline fell on a Saturday and was extended two days by statute to the
following Monday. The GDC entered final judgment on March 24, 2022. Lee timely filed his
notice of appeal that day. As stated on the notice of appeal, Lee was required to pay $143 for the
writ tax, costs, and fees within 30 days of March 24, 2022, the GDC judgment date. See Code
§ 16.1-107(E). Thirty days from March 24, 2022, is Saturday, April 23, 2022.5 Lee paid the $143
fee due on Monday, April 25, 2022. Although Monday, April 25, 2022 is 32 days from March 24,
2022, the 30-day April 23, 2022 deadline is extended two days to Monday, April 25, 2022 by Code
§ 1-210. See Code § 1-210 (computation of time). Code § 1-210, in relevant part, provides:
When the last day for performing an act during the course of a judicial proceeding falls on a Saturday, . . . the act may be performed on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day or part of a day on which the clerk’s office is closed as authorized by an act of the General Assembly.
Code § 1-210(B). Since April 23, 2022—the last day for Lee to timely pay the fees—fell on a
Saturday, Code § 1-210 authorized Lee to pay on Monday, April 25, 2022. Thus, Lee’s payment on
April 25, 2022, was timely and the School Board’s contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to hear Lee’s appeal is incorrect.
5 In accordance with Code § 1-210(A), days are counted starting with the day after the March 24, 2022 judgment. - 13 - III. The trial court did not err in awarding Lee damages for unpaid wages.
The trial court did not err in awarding Lee damages for unpaid wages based on Lee’s
employment contract (Contract).6 As stated in the trial court’s opinion and order, Lee argued that
the School Board was obligated to pay $35,284 prorated over the six-month Contract term. The
School Board contended that $35,284 was Lee’s annual salary to be prorated to half that amount
because of Lee’s six-month employment term. The critical contractual payment terms are provided
in section 11 of the contract. Contract § 11 provides:
11. The School Board agrees to pay Employee $35,284 (Grade-109 Step-11) prorated for the duration of the contract: (a) in School Board established installments for services rendered, payable in accordance with established payroll schedules. (b) This contract covers the period (01/05/2021 thru 06/30/2021) prorated and is in compliance with and subject to the school calendar . . . .
Construing this provision, the trial court concluded that the School Board’s promise to pay $35,284
“prorated for the duration of the contract” required the School Board to pay Lee $35,284 for the
six-month duration of his term, prorated based on services rendered and the School Board’s payroll
schedules. In response to the School Board’s argument that $35,284 is an annual salary, and thus
corresponding to the amount due for 12, not 6, months of service, the trial court observed that the
School Board had not qualified the Contract salary with the word “annual.” Without the word
“annual,” the trial court concluded that “the plain reading of the Contract is that the $35,284 to be
paid for [Lee’s labor] is to be paid over the period of the contract and not by lump sum payment.”
6 Although the lack of a transcript or written statement in lieu of transcript precludes this Court’s review of any issues that depend on arguments made or evidence orally presented at the August 19, 2022 trial, the trial court’s August 29, 2021 opinion and order is sufficiently detailed to permit this Court to review the trial court’s outcome-determinative contractual rulings. See Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99 (1986) (“If the record on appeal is sufficient in the absence of the transcript to determine the merits of the appellant’s allegations, we are free to proceed to hear the case.”). - 14 - The trial court further reasoned that even if the School Board’s omission of the word “annual”
created a contractual ambiguity, the ambiguity would have to be resolved against the School Board
because the School Board drafted the contract.
“The interpretation of a contract is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.”
Bolton v. McKinney, 299 Va. 550, 554 (2021) (citing Schuiling v. Harris, 286 Va. 187, 192 (2013)).
“The guiding light in the construction of a contract is the intention of the parties as expressed by
them in the words they have used, and courts are bound to say that the parties intended what the
written instrument plainly declares.” Id. (quoting Schuiling, 286 Va. at 192).
“The question whether the language of a contract is ambiguous is a question of law which
we review de novo.” Robinson-Huntley v. George Washington Carver Mut. Homes Ass’n, Inc., 287
Va. 425, 429 (2014) (quoting Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631
(2002)). “Contract language is ambiguous when it may be understood in more than one way or
when it refers to two or more things at the same time. However, a contract is not ambiguous merely
because the parties disagree as to the meaning of the terms used.” Id. (quoting Eure, 263 Va. at
632).
“When an agreement is plain and unambiguous on its face, the Court will not look for
meaning beyond the instrument itself.” Id. (quoting Eure, 263 Va. at 632). However, when a
contract is ambiguous, the Court can consider parol evidence in order to determine the intent of the
parties. See id.; Shevel’s, Inc.-Chesterfield v. Se. Assocs., Inc., 228 Va. 175, 182 (1984) (parol
evidence exclusion applies to unambiguous contracts). “The plaintiff then bears the burden of
proving that the parties intended the meaning that results in a breach of contract by the defendant.”
Robinson-Huntley, 287 Va. at 429 (citing Eure, 263 Va. at 631). “Whether the plaintiff has met that
burden is a question of fact, and ‘we will only reverse the finding of the trial court if it is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 429-30 (quoting Eure, 263 Va. at 631).
- 15 - The School Board contends that the trial court’s interpretation—that section 11 of the
Contract provides for the payment of $35,284 for six months of work—impermissibly renders the
contractual term “prorated” meaningless. This Court disagrees with the School Board. The word
“prorate” generally means “to divide, distribute or assess proportionally.” See Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 997 (11th ed. 2004). As explained by the trial court, the contractual
requirement that the total wages be “prorated for the duration of this contract” means that the
amount owed to Lee is paid in prorated installments instead of a lump sum. This interpretation
accords with Contract § 11(a) providing that payments are to be made in “School Board established
installments for services rendered, payable in accordance with established payroll schedules.”
Determining the amount of each such installment requires prorating $35,284 over the part of the
six-month contract period covered by each installment.
Moreover, Contract § 11(b) provides that the Contract “covers the period (01/05/2021
[through] 06/30/2021) prorated.” Adopting the same meaning of the word “prorated” as in the
phrase “$35,284 . . . prorated,” Contract § 11(b) means that the contractual terms stated for the
six-month duration of the contract are “prorated” to determine how those terms apply to each part of
the six-month term. The School Board contends that “$35,284 prorated” means that the stated
salary requires some adjustment to determine Lee’s actual compensation. Uniformly applying that
interpretation to Contract § 11(b) suggests that prorating the employment term “01/5/2021 to
06/30/2021” means adjusting that date range to determine Lee’s actual employment term. But the
only Contract terms relating to adjusting the term of employment depend on indefinite
contingencies arising from early termination. For example, Contract § 7 authorizes the School
Board to dismiss an employee upon recommendation of the division superintendent, Contract § 9
authorizes discontinuance of employment, and Contract § 10 authorizes the employee to request
release from the Contract after giving notice. None of these provisions provide any principled way
- 16 - to adjust the stated term of employment. Thus, interpreting the term “prorated” to require an
adjustment of the term of employment would render an important term of the contract indefinite.
See Reid v. Boyle, 259 Va. 356, 367 (2000) (the law disfavors a contract construction that has a
tendency to render a contract indefinite).
Contract § 11(e) provides additional support to the trial court’s interpretation. Contract
§ 11(e) provides:
In the event this contract is terminated by mutual consent prior to the end of the contract period, payment will be made for services rendered for days worked on a daily rate basis to be determined by dividing the salary stipulated in this contract by the number of days covered under the provisions of this contract.
(Emphasis added). Contract § 11(b) states that the Contract covers days in the range “01/05/2021
[through] 06/30/2021.” The only salary stipulated in the Contract is $35,284. Thus, in accordance
with Contract § 11(e), termination on June 30, 2021, would fix Lee’s daily compensation rate at
$35,284 divided by the number of covered work-days in the period January 5, 2021, through June
30, 2021. This calculation accords with the interpretation that “$35,284 . . . prorated” means that
the stated salary is earned and payable over the six-month duration of the Contract.
Having determined that the plain reading of the Contract supports interpreting $35,284 to be
the stipulated salary for six months, the Contract would have to be impermissibly amended to
support the School Board’s contrary construction. The School Board’s contention that $35,284 is
an annual salary for a full one-year employment term would require modifying Contract § 11 to
read “The School Board agrees to pay Employee an annual salary of $35,284 . . . prorated for the
duration of the contract.” Even then, to support the School Board’s construction of “prorated,” the
Contract’s salary term “$35,284 . . . prorated for the duration of the contract” would have to be
further interpreted to mean “$35,284 . . . to be prorated for the duration of the contract.” Otherwise,
even if the School Board is correct that “prorated” implies a reduction in an annual salary amount to
- 17 - reflect Lee’s six-month employment term, the plain use of “prorated” in the past tense suggests that
the reduction of Lee’s salary to account for his six-month term was already performed to determine
the stated $35,284 amount. But contracts are “construed as written, without adding terms that were
not included by the parties.” See PMA Cap. Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., 271 Va. 352, 358 (2006)
(emphasis added).
To support its contention that the stated contract salary is an annual salary, the School Board
relies on the Contract title “Annual Contract With Professional Personnel,” and Contract § 11(c)
which specifies that “the minimum length of this contract shall be 260 days.” While we agree with
the School Board that the minimum 260-day duration specified in Contract § 11(c) is longer than six
months, and we also agree that the title of the Contract is consistent with an annual contract, those
general contract terms do not override the plain meaning of either the specific six-month duration
term or the specific salary term at issue. Specific provisions of a contract govern over provisions
that are more general in nature. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 558 (1904) (“where
there are two clauses in any respect conflicting, that which is specially directed to a particular matter
controls in respect thereto over one which is general in its terms”); see also Condo. Servs., Inc. v.
First Owners’ Ass’n of Forty Six Hundred Condo., Inc., 281 Va. 561, 573 (2011); Asphalt Roads &
Materials Co. v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 452, 460 (1999) (Lacy, J., concurring) (“specific section
of the contract overrides the more general contract provisions”). Moreover, the full text of Contract
§ 11(c) makes clear that this section of the School Board’s Contract does not apply to Lee’s
employment. Contract § 11(c), in full, provides:
(c) The minimum length of this contract shall be 260 days as follows: (1) 180 teaching days; and (2) up to 80 days for activities such as teaching, participating in professional development, planning, evaluating, completing records and reports, participating in committees and conferences, or other such activities as may be assigned or approved by the School Board or the division superintendent. - 18 - (Emphasis added). Plainly, this contract provision applies to teaching positions, not Lee’s
“Automotive Mechanic Technician I” position.
Assuming, without deciding, that the School Board’s proposed construction—that $35,284
is an annual salary to be prorated or reduced based on Lee’s six-month contract duration—is a
reasonable alternative interpretation of the Contract, that interpretation would at most render the
Contract ambiguous. See Robinson-Huntley, 287 Va. at 429 (Contract language is ambiguous when
it can be understood in more than one way.). An ambiguous contract “must be construed against
the drafter of the agreement.” Martin & Martin, Inc. v. Bradley Enterprises, Inc., 256 Va. 288, 291
(1998) (emphasis added); Mahoney v. NationsBank of Virginia, 249 Va. 216, 222 (1995); Winn v.
Aleda Constr. Co., 227 Va. 304, 307 (1984). Moreover, the rule construing an ambiguous contract
against the drafter is applied before considering whether extrinsic parol evidence resolves the
ambiguity. See Martin & Martin, 256 Va. at 291 (affirming trial court decision to exclude extrinsic
parol evidence after resolving a contractual ambiguity against the drafter).
For the purpose of resolving any ambiguity in the Contract salary term, the School Board is
the drafter. Although the School Board contends in its opening brief that there is no evidence “that
[the School Board] was the drafter of the [Contract],” Op. Br. 21, at oral argument the School Board
conceded that the Contract is the School Board’s form employment contract. Determining the
drafter of a contract resolves a question of fact. See Online Res. Corp. v. Lawlor, 285 Va. 40, 57
(2013) (determining who drafted a contract is a question of fact). Therefore, the trial court’s factual
finding that the School Board drafted the Contract is a factual finding that will not be disturbed
unless unsupported by evidence or clearly erroneous. See Palmer v. R.A. Yancey Lumber Corp.,
294 Va. 140, 158 (2017). Moreover, where a contract is a form contract, the contract is construed
against the party who supplied the forms. Blue Cross of Sw. Virginia & Blue Shield of Sw. Virginia
v. McDevitt & St. Co., 234 Va. 191, 195 (1987).
- 19 - Consequently, as concluded by the trial court, even if the Contract salary term is ambiguous,
that term must be construed in favor of Lee. So construed, the School Board breached the Contract
when it failed to compensate Lee in accordance with the stipulated salary for his six-month term.
The remedy for a breach of contract “is intended to put the injured party in the same position in
which it would have been had the contract been performed.” Bolton, 299 Va. at 554 (quoting
Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 245 Va. 255, 261 (1993)). Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in awarding Lee unpaid wages to accurately compensate Lee for services rendered to the School
Board.
IV. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to modify or suspend the final order.
Finally, the School Board argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to modify
the effective date of the final order, or, in the alternative, to suspend the final order indefinitely. We
review a trial court’s denial of a motion to modify or suspend its final order for abuse of discretion.
In its motion to modify the trial court’s order, the School Board asked the court to modify
the effective date of the August 29, 2022 order to afford the School Board sufficient time to file and
present argument in support of a motion for reconsideration. The School Board acknowledged that
the trial court entered the final order on August 29, 2022, and directed the clerk to forward a
certified copy of the order to the parties, but claimed that the School Board did not receive the order.
The School Board further alleged that when it contacted the clerk’s office on September 7, 2022, the
clerk’s office confirmed the final order’s entry, but refused the School Board’s request to expedite
providing a copy of the order, instead sending the order by regular mail. The School Board argued
that because it did not receive a copy of the order until September 12, 2022, it needed more time to
prepare a motion for reconsideration that could be filed and heard within the 21-day jurisdictional
limit of Rule 1:1, that would otherwise expire on September 19, 2022. The School Board concluded
that the trial court should modify the effective date of the August 29, 2022 final order to September
- 20 - 7, 2022—the day the School Board first learned that the order was entered—to provide the School
Board with an opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration.
In denying the motion to modify, the trial court stated that it had informed the parties it
would enter its order no later than August 31, 2022, and noted that the School Board did not check
on the status of the order on August 31, 2022, rather waiting until September 7, 2022. The trial
court found that the School Board then waited for the order to arrive in the mail, and upon receiving
the order on September 12, 2022, waited three more days to file its motion to modify. The trial
court concluded that the School Board was asking the court to create a “legal fiction” by asking it to
modify the effective date of the final order and that the School Board’s sole reason for asking the
court to alter the date of entry of the final order was to extend the applicable deadlines and allow the
School Board extra time for filings.
On appeal, the School Board acknowledges that the trial court issued an order requiring the
clerk to forward a certified copy of its August 29, 2022 order to the parties, but argues that the
record contains no proof that the order was sent to the parties on August 29, 2022. The School
Board alleges that there was no envelope or document or indication that the order was mailed or
forwarded on August 29, 2022. The School Board further alleges that the trial court’s August 29,
2022 order was “secret” and “unissued,” until the School Board actually received the order on
September 12, 2022. In making these allegations, the School Board does not identify any
supporting record evidence that would rebut, as previously explained, the heavy presumption that
clerk’s office personnel performed their duty by mailing the order and that the postal service
performed its duty by delivering the order that was sent. See Gilmore, 252 Va. at 396; Seaton, 42
Va. App. at 757; Branham, 283 Va. at 282.
Although the School Board moved the trial court to modify the effective date of the final
order or, alternatively, suspend the final order “indefinitely,” so that the court would retain
- 21 - jurisdiction under Rule 1:1 to hear and consider the School Board’s motion for reconsideration, the
School Board’s written motion did not proffer a motion for reconsideration or state any grounds on
which a motion for reconsideration would be based. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the School Board’s motion to modify.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
- 22 -