Schierholz v. Goldman Financial Group, Incorporated, Retirement Plan

875 F. Supp. 595, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1966, 1995 WL 61169
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 14, 1995
DocketNo. 4:94CV00319 GFG
StatusPublished

This text of 875 F. Supp. 595 (Schierholz v. Goldman Financial Group, Incorporated, Retirement Plan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schierholz v. Goldman Financial Group, Incorporated, Retirement Plan, 875 F. Supp. 595, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1966, 1995 WL 61169 (E.D. Mo. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GUNN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. William F. Schierholz and his wife filed this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), challenging the decision of a pension plan administrator to deny him certain retirement benefits.

The record establishes the following. Schierholz was employed by Chemtech Industries, Inc. (Chemtech) as President and CEO since 1956. On October 14, 1986, he turned 65. His “Normal Retirement Date” under the Chemtech Retirement Income Plan (Chemtech Plan) in which he was a participant was November 1, 1987. Schierholz retired on June 30, 1987, and began receiving a monthly pension benefit of $7,263.60 to be paid monthly to Schierholz for his life, and then to his spouse, should she survive him, for her life, pursuant to Section 4.2 of the Chemtech Plan which provided:

Each participant who retires from the employ of the Employer on his Normal Retirement Date will receive a normal retirement income commencing on such date. Each Participant who is in the employ of the employer on his Normal Retirement Date who is eligible to receive a normal retirement income may elect to receive a normal retirement income commencing on or after such date in accordance with rules prescribed by the Plan Administration.

On March 17, 1989, Goldman Financial Corporation, Inc. acquired ownership of Chemtech and on December 31, 1990, the Chemtech Plan merged into the Goldman Retirement Plan which continued to pay Schierholz his monthly benefit.

On April 15, 1991, Schierholz was rehired by Chemtech as its CEO. On January 22, 1992, the Goldman Plan Administrator advised Schierholz that his pension benefits would be suspended effective February 1, 1992, in light of his re-employment. Under Article 6.1(b) & (c) of the Goldman Plan, a Participant would not receive retirement benefits until he separated from service or attained age 70% Article 6.4 of the Goldman Plan provides that if a participant is reemployed after his benefit commencement date and before attaining age 70% monthly pension benefits would be permanently withheld during such employment.1

Appendix A to the Goldman Plan provides that “the Accrued Benefit of each Chemtech Participant shall not be less than the benefits, if any, accrued by the Chemtech Participant under the terms of the Chemtech Plan as of the Merger Date.” The Chemtech Plan had no provision dealing with the pension rights of a rehired employee who was receiving pension benefits. Section 5.3 provided that a “Participant whose employment with the Employer continues after his Normal Retirement Date, and who has not elected to receive a normal retirement income commencing on or after his Normal Retirement Date, will receive a late retirement income [upon retirement].”

Upon Schierholz’s administrative appeal, the Goldman Plan Administrator issued a final determination that Schierholz was not entitled to pension benefits while re-employed, until April 1, 1993 (the April of the year after he turned 70%. The Administrator first concluded that such benefits were not available under the Chemtech Plan because there was no indication of rules prescribed by the Chemtech Plan Administration for such benefits as required by Section 4.2 of the Chemtech Plan. Thus Appendix A [597]*597of the Goldman Plan did not apply, and under Article 6.4 of the Goldman Plan the benefits were not available.

The Plan Administrator’s second rationale for denying the claim was that, even assuming the benefits in question were protected under Appendix A, granting Schierholz’s claim would violate the nondiscrimination requirement of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4), for plan qualification,2 and could thus result in disqualification of the Goldman Plan.

Upon recommencement of Schierholz’s pension benefit on April 1,1993, the Goldman Plan Administrator determined that the correct amount of the monthly benefit to which Schierholz was entitled was $5,754.68 and not $7,263.60. This amount was further reduced to collect the amounts the Administrator claimed were owed to the Plan as a result of (1) payment of benefits from May 1991 through January 1992 while Schierholz was re-employed, and (2) the payment of benefits from July 1987 through January 1992 in the wrong amount ($7,263.60 rather than $5,754.68 per month).

The Schierholzes filed this action challenging both the decision to suspend his benefits (Counts I and II) and the decision to reduce them (Count III).3

I. Suspension of Benefits

Schierholz first argues that the Plan Administrator’s decision to suspend his pension benefits should be reviewed de novo; the Administrator argues that the decision must be affirmed unless it is arbitrary and capricious. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), the Supreme Court held that in an ERISA action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), challenging the denial of benefits based on plan interpretation, the plan administrator’s decision “is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator ... discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Id. at 115, 109 S.Ct. at 956-57.

The Court need not resolve this matter because the Court believes that even under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the Schierholzes are entitled to summary judgment on this issue.4 This standard is analogous to the abuse of discretion standard: a decision by a plan administrator to deny benefits is an abuse of discretion if it is “extremely unreasonable.” Lutheran Med. Center v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engineers Health & Welfare Plan, 25 F.3d 616 (8th Cir.1994); See also Finley v. Special Agents Mutual Benefits Ass’n, Inc., 957 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir.1992) [598]*598(setting forth factors to consider in determining reasonableness of plan administrator’s interpretation).

The Court concludes that in the present case the Plan Administrator’s interpretation of the Chemtech Plan renders §§ 4.2 and 5.3 of the Plan meaningless and is contrary to the clear language of the Plan, two key Finley. factors. The Plan Administrator’s reasoning that the benefits Schierholz seeks were not available under the Chemtech Plan because rules may not have been prescribed is not reasonable; the absence of procedural rules cannot deprive participants of substantive benefits granted by the terms of the Plan.

Furthermore, the second rationale of the Plan Administrator’s final determination is also unreasonable.

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875 F. Supp. 595, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1966, 1995 WL 61169, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schierholz-v-goldman-financial-group-incorporated-retirement-plan-moed-1995.