Schaefer v. United States

251 U.S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 360, 1920 U.S. LEXIS 1631
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 1, 1920
Docket270-274
StatusPublished
Cited by95 cases

This text of 251 U.S. 466 (Schaefer v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 360, 1920 U.S. LEXIS 1631 (1920).

Opinions

[468]*468Mr. Justice McKenna

delivered the opinion of the court.

Indictment in nine counts under the Espionage Act. Preliminary to indicating the special offenses we may say that the indictment charges that at the dates mentioned therein the Philadelphia Tageblatt and the Philadelphia Sonntagsblatt were newspapers printed and published in the German language in Philadelphia by the Philadelphia Tageblatt Association, a Pennsylvania corporation of which defendants were officers; Peter Schaefer being president, Vogel treasurer, Werner chief editor, Darkow managing editor, and Lemke business manager.

That on the dates mentioned in the indictment the United States was at war with the Imperial German Government and the defendants “knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully” “caused to be printed, published and circulated in and through” one or other of those newspapers, false reports and statements of certain news items or despatches purporting to be from foreign places, or otherwise violated the Espionage Act through editorials or other published matter.

In count one the charge is that the intent was “to promote the success of the enemies of the United States, to wit, the said Imperial German Government.”

In counts two, three and four the charge is the-obstruction of the “recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the United States.” .

In count five the purpose of publication is charged to be the making of false reports and statements with intent to promote the success of the enemies of the United States.

In counts six, seven and eight there are charges of intent to like purpose.

Count nine charges a conspiracy entered into by defendants to be executed through the agency of the two [469]*469newspapers for the purpose (a) to make false reports and statements with intent to interfere with the military and naval operations and success of the United States and to promote the success of its enemies; (b) to cause insubordination, disloyalty and mutiny in the military and naval forces of the United States; (c) to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States. And there were specifications in support of the charges.

Demurrers were opposed to the indictment which stated in detail the insufficiency of the indictment to constitute offenses. The demurrers were overruled, the court considering that the grounds of attack upon the indictment could be raised at the trial.

The defendants were then arraigned and pleaded not guilty and when called for trial moved for a severance urging as the reason that the courts had ruled that defendants when tried jointly must join in “their challenge to jurors.” Counsel in effect said they contested the ruling and considered the statute upon which it was based to be “in derogation of the individual’s rights, guaranteed to him by the Constitution.”

Other grounds for severance were urged but the court denied the motion and to the ruling each of the defendants excepted. In fortification of the motion for severance, at the selection of the jury, counsel, in succession for each defendant, challenged particular jurors peremptorily, expressing at the same time the acceptance by the other defendants of the challenged jurors. After ten such challenges had been made counsel interposed a peremptory challenge to other jurors in behalf of all of the defendants, stating as reasons that they “collectively” were not. “bound by what their co-defendants may have done with respect to any particular juror, and that, therefore, they are still within their rights.” The court denied the challenge, ruling that under the provisions of the act of Congress “all the defendants will be deemed a single party, [470]*470and tén challenges having been exercised in the aggregate, the right of challenge is exhausted.”

Defendants, excepted and the trial proceeded resulting in a verdict as follows: Schaefer and Vogel guilty on count nine only; Werner on counts one, two, four, and nine; Darkow on one, three, five, six and nine; Lemke on count nine only.

Motions for arrest of judgment and for a new trial were made and overruled and defendants were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

The case is here upon writ of error directly to the District Court as involving constitutional questions.

It is conceded that the constitutionality of the Espionage Act has been sustained (Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182), but the constitutionality of the Act of March 3,1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1166, § 287, by which several defendants may be treated as one party for the purpose of peremptory challenges, is attacked. Its con- • stitutionality is established by Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583.

The other assignments of error are: (1) The Government failed to prove the charge of making false statements as the saíne was made in the indictment and'that therefore the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to acquit upon the counts charging the offense. (2) “In passing upon the question of falsity of the despatches as published by the appellants and in passing upon any other questions which are a matter .of public knowledge and general information” the court erred in instructing the jury that they had “the right to call upon the fund of general information which” was in their “keeping.” (3) The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to render a verdict of not guilty upon all of the counts in case of each of the defendants.

Assignments one and three may be considered together. They both depend upon an pppreciation of. the evidence [471]*471although assignment one is more particular as to the offense charged. But neither can be discussed without a review of the evidence and a detailed estimation of its strength, direct and inferential. That, however, is impossible as the evidence occupies over three hundred pages of the record and counsel have not given us an analysis or compendium of it, but have thrust upon us a transcript of the stenographer’s notes of the trial which, counsel for the Government aptly says “presents” of the case “a picture of a certain sort, but it is a picture which is constantly out of focus, being either larger than the reality or smaller.” However, we have accepted the labor it imposed and have considered the parts of the evidence in their proper proportions and relation and brought them to an intelligible focus, and are of opinion that the court rightfully refused the requested instructions except as to the defendants Schaefer and Vogel. As to them we do not think that there was substantial evidence to sustain the conviction. They were acquitted, we have seen, of all the individual and active offenses, and found guilty only on the ninth count — the charge of conspiracy.

The second assignment of error is somewhat confusedly expressed. It, however, presents an exception to the charge of the court as to what the jurors were entitled to consider as matters of public knowledge and general information. Counsel apparently urge against the charge that it submitted all the accusations of the indictment to the proof of the public knowledge and general information that the jurors possessed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Rosen
445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Virginia, 2006)
Williams v. Dulaney
480 A.2d 1080 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1984)
United States v. William Allen Jones, Jr.
580 F.2d 219 (Sixth Circuit, 1978)
Commonwealth v. McKetta
364 A.2d 1350 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1976)
Silverman v. Laird
339 F. Supp. 876 (D. Massachusetts, 1972)
United States v. Daniels
19 C.M.A. 529 (United States Court of Military Appeals, 1970)
Browning v. Laird
323 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. California, 1969)
Brandenburg v. Ohio
395 U.S. 444 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Sheldon v. Fannin
221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Arizona, 1963)
State v. Persinger
382 P.2d 497 (Washington Supreme Court, 1963)
MATTER OF KINGSLEY CORP. v. Regents
4 N.Y.2d 349 (New York Court of Appeals, 1958)
MacK Appeal
126 A.2d 679 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1956)
Beauharnais v. Illinois
343 U.S. 250 (Supreme Court, 1952)
Tomoya Kawakita v. United States
190 F.2d 506 (Ninth Circuit, 1951)
Dennis v. United States
341 U.S. 494 (Supreme Court, 1951)
United States v. Dennis
183 F.2d 201 (Second Circuit, 1950)
American Communications Assn. v. Douds
339 U.S. 382 (Supreme Court, 1950)
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy
90 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. New York, 1950)
Craig v. Harney
331 U.S. 367 (Supreme Court, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
251 U.S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 360, 1920 U.S. LEXIS 1631, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schaefer-v-united-states-scotus-1920.