Opinion by
Mr. Justice Arnold,
The seven defendants severally appeal from judgment and sentence by the court below finding each of them guilty of contempt, and imposing upon each a fine and five days imprisonment in the county jail. The appeals were argued together and will be disposed of in one opinion.
The respective judgments and sentences were sustained by the court below upon findings that defendants violated Westmoreland County rule of court No. 6084. The rule provides:
“(a) No pictures or photographs shall be taken, immediately, preceding or during sessions of this court or recesses between sessions, in any of the. court rooms [254]*254or at any place in the court house within forty feet of the entrance to any court room.
“.(b) No court proceeding shall be broadcast or televised.
“(c) No pictures or photographs of any party to a civil or criminal action, juror or witness, shall be taken in the Law Library or in any office or other room of the court house, except with the knowledge and consent of the person or persons photographed.
“(d) No prisoner or inmate of the county jail shall be photographed in the jail or on his way to or from a session of court.”1
As set forth in the facts hereunder, we are concerned only with subsections (a) and (d) of the rule, and our decision will be limited to these.
By a verdict of the jury J. Wesley Wable, known as the “Turnpike Killer,” had been found guilty of first degree murder with a recommendation of the death penalty. On December 28, 1954, he had been called for sentence by Judge Bauer of the court below, in court room No. 5 on the fourth floor of the court house. This was a matter ef common knowledge to the defendants.
The fourth floor consists of an octagonal shaped court room, flanked by the judge’s chambers and a 50 foot corridor. The corridor is reached by means of a public elevator and a stairway. Entrance to the court room is from the corridor. Near this court room door the defendants surreptitiously took photographs of Wable and deputy sheriffs as he was being escorted to the court room. Wable, who was manacled to the sheriff, had been conveyed from the county jail to the first floor of the court house, and thence by elevator to the fourth floor.. While he and the. officers were app.roacli[255]*255ing the entrance to the court room, and within 40 feet thereof, the defendants, by prearrangement each with the others, took the photographs in question.2 These were procured without Wable’s or the court’s consent or knowledge. In fact, the attention of the sheriff and his deputies was distracted by a decoy photographer. The photographs were taken by means of infra red rays not requiring the use of flash bulbs and causing no commotion or noise. The following day these photographs were published by the defendants.
The defendants admit that they committed all of the acts hereinbefore described, and also that these acts were performed by agreement among them. Their plea is in the nature of “confession and avoidance.”
The first contention is that the rule of court is in conflict with the federal and state constitutions involving the right of free press. However, as pointed out by Erwin D. Canham, Editor of the Christian Science Monitor, “freedom of the press is not a right of the press. It is a right of the people.”3 By the instant rule the court was attempting to preserve the dignity of the court and the decorum of trial, thereby insuring the orderly administration of justice. To be valid, such rule must be reasonable. Thus in American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399, it was held: “When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results [256]*256in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of [freedom of the press] . . ., the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.” In Fitzgerald v. Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 379, 387, 102 A. 2d 887, this Court held: “'Of course, it is accepted constitutional doctrine that these fundamental human rights are not absolute . . . The essential rights of the First Amendment in some instances are subject to the elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others would be a mockery.’ ”
Therefore, whether or not freedom of the press is here involved is immaterial, since such freedom is subject to reasonable rules seeking maintenance of the court’s dignity and the orderly administration of justice.
The defendants repeatedly assert that they do not contend for the right to take pictures Avithin the court room, even by the infra red ray method which is accompanied by no display or disorder. But it must be conceded that if we sustain their contention that this rule of court infringes upon their rights of freedom of the press, the court likewise would have no power to forbid the taking of pictures in the court room which were accompanied by no disorder or disturbance. Yet this Court has adopted Rule 223 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which has the effect of a statute,4 and which provides: “During the trial of actions the court shall prohibit the taking of photographs and motion pictures in the court room and the transmission of communications by telegraph, telephone, or radio in or from the court room.” In addition, Canon [257]*25735 of the American Bar Association reads as follows: “Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, . . . degrade the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.”5
The Westmoreland County rule incorporates the provisions of Pa. E. C. P. 223 (b), and then proceeds to state further restrictions and limitations by it deemed proper and necessary to preserve the dignity of the court and the decorum of trial. The taking of a picture of a person called for sentence certainly does not inform the public as to any material facts, and serves no purpose except to pander to the lower tastes of some individuals. Court rooms and court houses are not places of entertainment, and trials are not had for the purpose of satisfying any sadistic instinct of the public seeking sensationalism.
The fact that the contempt in this case did not occur in the court room, but in the precincts of the court, does not make the rule unreasonable. “. . . the Court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set apart for its own use, and for the use of its [258]*258officers, jurors and witnesses; and misbehavior anywhere in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the court”: Ex Parte Savin, 131 U.S. 280. As stated in Ex parte Sturm, 136 A. 312 (Md) : “It is essential to the integrity and independence of judicial tribunals that they shall have the power to enforce their own judgment as to.
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Opinion by
Mr. Justice Arnold,
The seven defendants severally appeal from judgment and sentence by the court below finding each of them guilty of contempt, and imposing upon each a fine and five days imprisonment in the county jail. The appeals were argued together and will be disposed of in one opinion.
The respective judgments and sentences were sustained by the court below upon findings that defendants violated Westmoreland County rule of court No. 6084. The rule provides:
“(a) No pictures or photographs shall be taken, immediately, preceding or during sessions of this court or recesses between sessions, in any of the. court rooms [254]*254or at any place in the court house within forty feet of the entrance to any court room.
“.(b) No court proceeding shall be broadcast or televised.
“(c) No pictures or photographs of any party to a civil or criminal action, juror or witness, shall be taken in the Law Library or in any office or other room of the court house, except with the knowledge and consent of the person or persons photographed.
“(d) No prisoner or inmate of the county jail shall be photographed in the jail or on his way to or from a session of court.”1
As set forth in the facts hereunder, we are concerned only with subsections (a) and (d) of the rule, and our decision will be limited to these.
By a verdict of the jury J. Wesley Wable, known as the “Turnpike Killer,” had been found guilty of first degree murder with a recommendation of the death penalty. On December 28, 1954, he had been called for sentence by Judge Bauer of the court below, in court room No. 5 on the fourth floor of the court house. This was a matter ef common knowledge to the defendants.
The fourth floor consists of an octagonal shaped court room, flanked by the judge’s chambers and a 50 foot corridor. The corridor is reached by means of a public elevator and a stairway. Entrance to the court room is from the corridor. Near this court room door the defendants surreptitiously took photographs of Wable and deputy sheriffs as he was being escorted to the court room. Wable, who was manacled to the sheriff, had been conveyed from the county jail to the first floor of the court house, and thence by elevator to the fourth floor.. While he and the. officers were app.roacli[255]*255ing the entrance to the court room, and within 40 feet thereof, the defendants, by prearrangement each with the others, took the photographs in question.2 These were procured without Wable’s or the court’s consent or knowledge. In fact, the attention of the sheriff and his deputies was distracted by a decoy photographer. The photographs were taken by means of infra red rays not requiring the use of flash bulbs and causing no commotion or noise. The following day these photographs were published by the defendants.
The defendants admit that they committed all of the acts hereinbefore described, and also that these acts were performed by agreement among them. Their plea is in the nature of “confession and avoidance.”
The first contention is that the rule of court is in conflict with the federal and state constitutions involving the right of free press. However, as pointed out by Erwin D. Canham, Editor of the Christian Science Monitor, “freedom of the press is not a right of the press. It is a right of the people.”3 By the instant rule the court was attempting to preserve the dignity of the court and the decorum of trial, thereby insuring the orderly administration of justice. To be valid, such rule must be reasonable. Thus in American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399, it was held: “When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results [256]*256in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of [freedom of the press] . . ., the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.” In Fitzgerald v. Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 379, 387, 102 A. 2d 887, this Court held: “'Of course, it is accepted constitutional doctrine that these fundamental human rights are not absolute . . . The essential rights of the First Amendment in some instances are subject to the elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others would be a mockery.’ ”
Therefore, whether or not freedom of the press is here involved is immaterial, since such freedom is subject to reasonable rules seeking maintenance of the court’s dignity and the orderly administration of justice.
The defendants repeatedly assert that they do not contend for the right to take pictures Avithin the court room, even by the infra red ray method which is accompanied by no display or disorder. But it must be conceded that if we sustain their contention that this rule of court infringes upon their rights of freedom of the press, the court likewise would have no power to forbid the taking of pictures in the court room which were accompanied by no disorder or disturbance. Yet this Court has adopted Rule 223 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which has the effect of a statute,4 and which provides: “During the trial of actions the court shall prohibit the taking of photographs and motion pictures in the court room and the transmission of communications by telegraph, telephone, or radio in or from the court room.” In addition, Canon [257]*25735 of the American Bar Association reads as follows: “Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, . . . degrade the court, and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.”5
The Westmoreland County rule incorporates the provisions of Pa. E. C. P. 223 (b), and then proceeds to state further restrictions and limitations by it deemed proper and necessary to preserve the dignity of the court and the decorum of trial. The taking of a picture of a person called for sentence certainly does not inform the public as to any material facts, and serves no purpose except to pander to the lower tastes of some individuals. Court rooms and court houses are not places of entertainment, and trials are not had for the purpose of satisfying any sadistic instinct of the public seeking sensationalism.
The fact that the contempt in this case did not occur in the court room, but in the precincts of the court, does not make the rule unreasonable. “. . . the Court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set apart for its own use, and for the use of its [258]*258officers, jurors and witnesses; and misbehavior anywhere in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the court”: Ex Parte Savin, 131 U.S. 280. As stated in Ex parte Sturm, 136 A. 312 (Md) : “It is essential to the integrity and independence of judicial tribunals that they shall have the power to enforce their own judgment as to. what conduct is incompatible with the proper and orderly course of their procedure.” The Westmoreland County rule is proper so long as it bears a reasonable relation to the aim sought: maintenance of the dignity of the court and the orderly administration of justice. Certainly in this case the area affected is reasonable, as are the limitations of action, and the rule prohibiting the taking of pictures within the stated limits is well within the power of the court. See also Robinson v. City Court for City of Ogden, 185 P. 2d 256 (Utah); People v. Ulrich, 34 N.E. 2d 393 (Ill.)
Amicus Curiae cites the case of People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E. 2d 769, in which conviction was reversed where the public and representatives of the press were excluded from the court room during the taking of testimony. But the court stated that the reason for the reversal in that case was that such exclusion deprived the defendant of an impartial and public trial. That case has no bearing on the instant case. Here the defendants were freely entitled to enter the court room and its precincts, and the press was accorded full coverage. Moreover, in an opinion written by the same judge who wrote the opinion in the cited case, the New York Court of Appeals denied the right of the Press Associations and Newspaper Publishers to be present at the trial of Jelke, and to report the proceedings, and further the court held: “. . . this is not a case of ... . freedom of the press . . . and . . . the right asserted by • petitioners is not embraced within the constitutional provision guaranteeing those freedoms .... [259]*259But freedom of the press is in no way abridged by an exclusionary ruling which denies newspapermen the opportunity to ‘see and hear what transpired.’ . . . The fact that petitioners are in the business of disseminating news gives them no special right or privilege, not possessed by other members of the public . . .”6 See also State of Ohio v. Clifford, 162 Ohio 370, 123 N.E. 2d 8, certiorari denied, 349 U. S. 929.
The defendants also violated the rules of court of Westmoreland County, which were made to insure the right of privacy of the defendant. There can be no question that American jurisprudence recognizes the right of privacy; the only question being its limits. See “The Bight to Privacy,” by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandéis, 4 Harvard Law Beview, 193. As stated in 77 C.J.S., Bight of Privacy, at page 397, in some, but not in all jurisdictions the existence of such right has been recognized, even in the absence of statutory regulation. In this jurisdiction we find no basis for denying the existence of such right or its enforceability. See the excellent opinion of Judge Alessandroni in Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 D. & C. 543, and cf. Harlow v. Buno Co., Inc., 36 D. & C. 101. See also Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631, and particularly the concurring opinion of Justice Maxey appearing at page 456; and Be-statement, Torts, §867.
The court below, as are all courts, was charged with a duty to protect the right of privacy of the prisoner. It cannot be doubted that the prisoner was powerless to do so by any means within his control; and in such case the court has an inherent duty to use all reasonable means to safeguard that right. It is true that, in [260]*260a sense, the prisoner has been set apart from the general public and has become a “public figure.” Yet he is the. involuntary subject of court restraint and entitled to the safeguard of his individual right of privacy, just as the court is charged with securing to him his right of a fair trial and other rights too numerous to mention. In this case the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree by verdict of the jury, but at the same time he was a ward of the court who must be protected against the invasion of his rights by the press as well as the public. All reasonable rules looking to the establishment of such safeguards must be sustained. It needs no citation of cases to prove that many innocent persons have been found guilty and sentenced upon criminal charges, and later released when their freedom from guilt has been established. See Commonwealth v. Zampogna, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 74, and Commonwealth v. Fideli, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 79.
The able opinion of President Judge Richard D. Laird, writing for the court below, amply justifies the sustaining of these judgments. However, since these are “test” cases, we prefer to modify the sentences by striking therefrom the provision for imprisonment, leaving the sentence intact as to the imposition of fine and costs.
With the determination that the rules, so far as involved here, are reasonable, and not an abuse of the court’s discretion, the judgment and sentences, as so modified, are affirmed.