Schaefer v. Superior Offshore International, Inc.

591 F.3d 350, 2009 WL 4798851
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedDecember 15, 2009
Docket09-20213
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 591 F.3d 350 (Schaefer v. Superior Offshore International, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schaefer v. Superior Offshore International, Inc., 591 F.3d 350, 2009 WL 4798851 (5th Cir. 2009).

Opinion

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:

Louis E. Schaefer, Jr. and Schaefer Holdings, LP (collectively, the “Appellants”) appeal the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of Superior Offshore International, Inc.’s Chapter 11 liquidation plan. Because the plan satisfies the Bankruptcy Code provisions governing treatment of unliquidated securities suit claims, shareholder interests, and unsecured claims, the confirmation order is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

Before bankruptcy, Superior provided subsea design, construction, and commercial diving services to oil and gas industry entities. Initially, Superior was privately held by Schaefer Holdings. In 2007, Superior conducted an initial public offering and Schaefer sold a significant amount of his holdings. Within one year of the IPO, Superior filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The parties quickly agreed that a liquidation was the best course of action. Pursuant to the bankruptcy court’s orders, Superior sold all of its tangible assets for cash and subsequently filed a reorganization plan (the “Plan”). Superior retained intangible assets that were potentially valuable. It was and remains unclear how much money the estate will ultimately generate. 1 To account for the uncertainty, the Plan created a liquidation waterfall. After providing for priority claims, the Plan stated that unsecured claims (Class 5) would be paid first. If liquidating the intangible assets generated additional proceeds, then subordinated unsecured claims (Class 6) would receive value. If Class 6 received 100% of its claims, then equity interests (Classes 7 and 8) would receive any additional value.

Class 7 comprises securities litigation claims. Just before Superior filed for bankruptcy, several shareholders alleged that Superior’s IPO violated the Securities Act of 1933 due to misrepresentations made by the registration statement and Superior’s officers, including Mr. Schaefer. These cases were consolidated. 2 When Superior filed for bankruptcy, the consolidated lawsuit was stayed. The Plan allows shareholders to pursue their claims, establishing a Post-Confirmation Equity Subcommittee (“the Subcommittee”) to review, prosecute, and settle all the Class 7 claims. The Plan listed the Subcommittee’s duties, named the two members of the Subcommittee, and explained how members of the Subcommittee would be appointed and compensated.

Classes 7 and 8 have equal priority. Class 8 is composed of equity interests (common stock shares). Despite holding litigation claims, Class 7 is also equity-level priority. Unlike other litigation claims, the Bankruptcy Code does not treat securities claims as general unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). The Plan accordingly states that if all superior claims are satisfied, Classes 7 and 8 will share any surplus proceeds pro rata. However, the Plan expresses no formula for converting Class 7 claims to compara *353 ble units of Class 8 interests; Class 7 is denominated in dollars, while Class 8 is denominated in shares. 3 The Plan provides that a conversion mechanism will be determined only if proceeds are sufficient to satisfy all senior classes.

The Plan was unanimously accepted by all other classes of creditors casting votes and by a majority vote of the shareholders. Apparently, only the Appellants, who owned half of Superior’s stock, voted against the Plan. Their equity class (Class 8) became a non-consenting class. Appellants objected to the Plan on two grounds. First, because the Plan offered no method to convert Class 7 claims to Class 8 interests, it violated 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(3). Second, the Plan did not sufficiently reveal the affiliations of the Subcommittee members as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(5)(A)(i). After a confirmation hearing, the bankruptcy court overruled Appellants’ objections and confirmed the Plan pursuant to cramdown procedures. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Appellants appealed and the bankruptcy court certified its confirmation order for direct appeal to this court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). However, the bankruptcy court did not stay the confirmation order and the Plan became effective February 11, 2009.

II. EQUITABLE MOOTNESS

Before discussing the merits of the case, this court must first briefly address the issue of equitable mootness. “Equitable mootness is a kind of appellate abstention that favors the finality of reorganizations and protects the interrelated multi-party expectations on which they rest.” In re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir.2009). When determining whether a bankruptcy issue is equitably moot, the court considers “(1) whether a stay was obtained, (2) whether the plan has been ‘substantially consummated,’ and (3) whether the relief requested would affect either the rights of parties not before the court or the success of the plan.” In re Manges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir.1994). Here, the first and third factors predispose toward equitable mootness, but the doctrine does not prevent this court from addressing the issues on appeal. One important consideration is whether the court can fashion effective relief without interfering with the finality of a confirmed plan. Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 240. Although the Appellants seek reversal of the confirmation order, their complaints center on increased disclosure about the Subcommittee members *354 and on specificity about how Class 7 and Class 8 will share in any money available for equity-level interests. Remedies can be crafted for these deficiencies without completely undoing the Plan. 4 Under these circumstances, equitable mootness does not apply.

III. DISCUSSION

Appellants raise issues of law on appeal. This court reviews bankruptcy courts’ conclusions of law de novo. In re Berryman Prods. Inc., 159 F.3d 941, 943 (5th Cir.1998).

A. Failure to provide a conversion method

Several of Appellants’ objections to the Plan rest on a single alleged infirmity: the Plan does not express a method to convert Class 7 claims into Class 8 shareholder interests. Under § 1123(a)(3), a Plan must “specify the treatment of any class of claims or interests that is impaired under the plan” before it can be confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
591 F.3d 350, 2009 WL 4798851, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schaefer-v-superior-offshore-international-inc-ca5-2009.