Schaefer v. Koster

342 S.W.3d 299, 2011 Mo. LEXIS 153, 2011 WL 2347507

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: June 14, 2011
• Docket: SC 91130
• Status: Published

Opinions

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge.

Michelle Schaefer, Cindy Brandt and Dale Price (plaintiffs) were charged with intoxication-related driving offenses. Each plaintiff had prior convictions for intoxication-related driving offenses. Plaintiffs filed a consolidated petition for a declaratory judgment asserting that the enhanced penalty provisions of section 577.023, RSMo Supp.2008, violate article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The judgment is affirmed.

FACTS

Plaintiffs were convicted of intoxication-related offenses on multiple occasions. On July 3, 2008, House Bill 1715 became effective, repealing and reenacting section 577.023, which pertains to enhanced penalties for individuals with multiple prior convictions for intoxication-related driving offenses. Following the re-enactment of section 577.023 in HB 1715, each plaintiff again was arrested for a new intoxication-related driving offense.

While the new criminal charges were pending, plaintiffs filed a consolidated petition for a declaratory judgment that HB 1715 and section 577.023 are unconstitutional. The trial court entered a final judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ petition on grounds that the constitutional issues should be addressed in the course of each plaintiffs criminal case.

In this appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their declaratory judgment action and in overruling their motion for summary judgment.

ANALYSIS

The declaratory judgment act, section 527.010, RSMo 2000, vests trial courts with the power to “to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” A court may grant a declaratory judgment if presented with: (1) a justi-ciable controversy that presents a real, substantial, presently existing controversy admitting of specific relief, as distinguished from an advisory decree upon a purely hypothetical situation; (2) a plaintiff with a legally protectable interest at stake, consisting of a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief; (3) a controversy ripe for judicial determination; and (4) an inadequate remedy at law. Mo. Soybean Ass’n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm’n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 25 (Mo. banc 2003). The trial court is afforded wide discretion in administering the provisions of the declaratory judgment act. City of St. Louis v. Crowe, 376 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Mo.1964).

In this case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to dismiss plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment petition because each plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. When plaintiffs filed their declaratory judgment petition, each had the option of raising as a defense the alleged unconstitutionality of HB 1715 and section 577.023. “[W]here [the] alternative remedy is a pending suit, there is even greater justification to apply the rule against allowing declaratory judgment actions.” Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nigl, 123 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Mo.App. 2003). In other words, as stated in the trial court’s judgment, the “constitutional issues should be litigated (if at all) by each plaintiff in each separate criminal ease.”¹ The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ petition. Because the trial court properly dismissed the declaratory judgment petition, there is no need to address plaintiffs’ argument that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The judgment is affirmed.²

PRICE, C.J., RUSSELL, WOLFF, BRECKENRIDGE and STITH, JJ., concur. FISCHER, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.

1 . Section 516.500, which places a limit upon when an "action” can be "commenced, had or maintained” to challenge procedural irregularities in the enactment of a law, does not apply to a criminal defendant who raises a challenge to the statute as a defense in the criminal case.

2 . After the final judgment of dismissal was entered, and while this appeal was pending, plaintiffs Schaefer and Price pleaded guilty. The guilty pleas render Schaefer’s and Price’s claims moot as there is no presently existing controversy. Plaintiff Brandt’s criminal case still is pending and is not moot.