LAURA DENYIR STITH, Judge.
The Junior College District of St. Louis (the College) brought a negligence action against the city of St. Louis (the City) for damages arising out of a 1997 flood of part of the college campus caused by water escaping from the College’s fire suppression water pipe running between the College and the City’s water main. Under stipulated facts, the trial court found the City’s water division had a duty to keep water shut-off valves owned by the College accessible, that the water division was negligent in not marking or warning where the shut-off valves were located under the paved street, and that the water division employees were negligent in not shutting off the flow of water more quiddy.
[444]*444This Court holds that the City water division had no common law duty to keep the shut-off valve accessible, or to assist the College in locating the valve and stopping the flow of water, because the line, shut-off valve, and stop box were part of the College’s private property line rather than part of the City water line. Further, the stipulated facts do not show that the City contracted to maintain the valves or to keep them accessible, nor that the City otherwise undertook this duty. Judgment in favor of the College is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the City.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties tried this case to the trial court under a stipulation of facts. That stipulation shows that the College, a political subdivision of the State of Missouri, constructed its Forest Park campus in the early 1960s. The campus is located in the City, just south of Highway 40 and east of Hampton Avenue. During construction of the campus, the College installed two underground water service lines. The lines, which were wholly owned by the College, ran from the College to the City water main running down Oakland Avenue. One line was the main water supply line for the campus (“supply line”); the other, a fire suppression line (“fire line”), was located six feet away.
Then, as now, each line supplied water solely to the College. When the College installed the lines, it obtained a permit from the City to connect the two lines to the City’s main and to install a “stop box,” containing a shut-off valve, for each line. The shut-off valve, as its name implies, is used to shut off the flow of water to a water fine. Both stop boxes were located on the College’s water lines, not on the City’s main itself or at the junction of the main with the College’s water lines. In fact, when originally installed, the stop boxes were located under the right-of-way at the northern edge of the campus, rather than under the paved portion of the street. Access to the stop boxes, and the valves housed within them, was by means of a manhole and manhole cover set on the right-of-way. Since the completion of construction, the City, through its water division, has sold water to the College for profit and billed the College on a quarterly basis for water supplied to the College’s two lines. According to the stipulation, neither line received or needed maintenance from the time of installation until the time of the flood.
Sometime between construction and 1987, the City widened Oakland Avenue so that the stop boxes for the College’s two water lines were no longer located under the right-of-way next to Oakland Avenue but instead were located below a portion of the paved street area of Oakland Avenue itself. According to the stipulation, the parties do not know whether either of the manhole covers over the two stop boxes were raised and left visible at the time of the street widening or were paved over.
In 1987, when Oakland Avenue was repaved, its grade was slightly raised. Accordingly, the height of the manhole cover over the stop box covering the College’s supply line was raised to street level by affixing one or more steel collars to the top of the manhole. The parties do not know whether the College, the City, or a third party raised this manhole cover. But, for reasons unknown by the parties, the manhole cover over the College’s fire line — the line that later burst — was not raised. It was paved over.
The parties agree that neither the City street department nor the City water division gave the College any notice or warning that the fire line manhole had been [445]*445paved over, nor did the City mark the location of the paved-over manhole. Neither the City nor the College made any attempt from at least 1987 until 1997 to uncover the fire line manhole. It remained buried under Oakland Avenue, not visible from the street’s surface.
The manholes are located directly in front of the College. The water shut-off valves and the stop boxes to which they provide access belong to the College, and they were originally installed by the College. The location of the valves, stop boxes, and original manhole covers are shown on the College’s engineering drawings for the lines. In 1997, the College kept a copy of these engineering drawings in an office located in the College’s basement. No employees of the College in 1997 were immediately aware of the location of the shut-off valves or stop boxes.
On October 28, 1997, at 3:00 p.m., the College’s fire line ruptured, and water began flowing out of the line and flooding the campus. It is undisputed that the break occurred in the College-owned service line, not in the City’s water main to which the service line connected. Unlike the case with many residential customers, the City’s agreement to supply water to the College did not include an insurance provision to maintain this line. For this reason, the parties stipulated that the College was responsible for the initial break and for the first $1,005,506.00 in damages caused in the flooding that resulted from 3:00 p.m. to 3:20 p.m. due to the initial break in the College’s fire line.
At about 3:10 p.m., College maintenance employees discovered the flooding water, went to Oakland Avenue, opening the manhole covering the supply line and shut off the water flowing in that line. But, because the break was not in that line but rather in the fire line, the flooding continued. Although careful review of the College’s own engineering drawings would have shown that a separate fire suppression line was in place and had its own shutoff valve, College employees could not review those drawings because the basement office in which the drawings were kept was already flooded.
The College called the City’s water division and also called a private plumber to help. The City water division employees arrived at 3:25 p.m. The water division employees also had a copy of the engineering drawings, and these drawings, like those in the College’s basement, showed the existence of the fire line and the placement of the stop box and valve under what had become the paved area of Oakland Avenue. Neither the City water division employees nor College employees noticed these aspects of the drawings. They closed all other valves, but did not find or close the valve to the fire line. As a result, the fire line remained open, and water flooded the campus unabated.
At 5:00 p.m., with the fire line still open and the manhole cover and stop box still undiscovered, the City water division employees were called to respond to an unrelated water main break. They took their engineering drawings with them when they left to attend to this emergency. After fixing the broken main, they returned to the campus at 6:30 p.m. The College had still been unable to discover the source of the flooding.
At about 8:00 p.m., City employees located the fire line through the use of the drawings and a flow meter provided by the City and with the assistance of the private plumber. They broke through the pavement, uncovering the hidden manhole cover, and shut off the valve at 8:30 p.m., thus ending the flooding. In total, approximately 500,000 gallons of water flooded the College’s campus.
[446]*446The College filed a three-count petition against the City. It argued that the City is liable for $5,825,161.00 in additional damage to the campus that the parties stipulated occurred between the time the College shut off the main water supply line valve at 3:20 p.m. and when the plumber shut off the fire line at 8:30 p.m., because the negligence of the City’s water division caused those additional damages. The trial court found that the City had a duty to keep the shut-off valves or stop boxes accessible, or that it should have marked their location, and that it breached these duties. Further, it found no contributory fault on the part of the College, held the City liable for the full claimed $5,825,161.00 in damages, and awarded the College $2,434,596.30 in prejudgment interest from October 23, 1997, to June 14, 2002.1 The City appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which transferred the case to this Court, after opinion, due to the general interest and importance of the issues involved. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review of a court-tried case is generally governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976), which states, “the decree or judgment of the trial court will be sustained by the appellate court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.” Id. at 32. When, as here, a court-tried case is submitted on stipulated facts, however, then the only question before the Court “is whether the trial court drew the proper legal conclusions from the facts stipulated.” Sheldon v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Ret. Sys., 779 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo. banc 1989). See also, Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. banc 1979). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Endicott v. Display Technologies, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Mo. banc 2002); Baldwin v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Mo. banc 2001).
III. LIABILITY OF CITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN PERFORMANCE OF PROPRIETARY FUNCTION OF PROVIDING WATER
A. Proprietary Versus Governmental Functions.
The City argues that only the City street department knew that the manhole covering the stop boxes and shut-off valves had been paved over, and this knowledge cannot be imputed to the water division. Further, it argues that regardless of such knowledge, the water division had no duty to the College under the common law to keep the stop boxes or shut-off valves accessible, to warn about their location or to train its employees how to find privately-owned stop boxes and shut-off valves, nor did it assume such a duty by ordinance or contract. It argues that the City’s negligence, if any, was in paving over the manhole cover, not in any water division functions, and that the paving over of the manhole cover constitutes a condition of public property. As the College never claimed that any exception to sovereign [447]*447immunity applied to its paving under sections 537.600(2) and 537.610, RSMo 1994,2 the City argues it has no liability at all.
The College alleged that the trial court was correct in finding the City negligent because the City water division was acting in a proprietary capacity in selling water to its customers for profit; thus, sovereign immunity does not apply to it.
Under the common law, only the State and its entities were entitled to complete sovereign immunity from all tort liability. Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Mo. banc 1996). Municipal corporations traditionally have had immunity, however, for those actions they undertake as a part of the municipality’s governmental functions — actions benefiting the general public. Id. See also, State ex rel. St. Louis Hous. Auth. v. Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo. banc 1985). Municipal corporations do not enjoy sovereign immunity in tort while performing proprietary functions. Proprietary functions are those actions “performed for the special benefit or profit of the municipality acting as a corporate entity.” Jungerman, 925 S.W.2d at 204. See also, Dallas v. City of St. Louis, 338 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo.1960); State ex rel. City of Marston v. Mann, 921 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Mo.App. S.D.1996); Schulz Through Schulz v. City of Brentwood, 725 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo.App. E.D.1987).
In 1978, when the legislature reinstated sovereign immunity in tort as it existed at common law, sec. 537.600, it created two exceptions to sovereign immunity in tort for:
(1) Injuries directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions of public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles ...;
(2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity’s property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury,....
Sec. 537.600.1. In 1985, the legislature further clarified the application of this provision to municipalities by adding section 537.600.2, which states:
The express waiver of sovereign immunity in the instances specified in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this section are absolute waivers of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations whether or not the public entity was functioning in a governmental or proprietary capacity and whether or not the public entity is covered by a liability insurance for tort.
Sec. 537.600.2.
In Wollard v. City of Kansas City, 831 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. banc 1992), this Court held that if the conduct that forms the basis of the claim pertains to a dangerous condition of public property, and so comes within the terms of section 537.600, then the previous distinctions between proprietary and governmental functions are irrelevant. The statute provides for a complete waiver of sovereign immunity, regardless whether the conduct would previously have been considered proprietary or governmental, but recovery is limited to the amount prescribed by statute. See secs. 537.610; 537.615, RSMo 2000.
The College does not attack Wollard or address its potential application to the repaving of Oakland Avenue; therefore, there is no reason for this Court to reach the question whether such repaving created a dangerous condition of public property or whether the statutory limitation on damages applies to any negligence in repaving. Rather, the College asserts that [448]*448section 537.600 and any limitations on recovery for a dangerous condition of public property are irrelevant, for it is not suing for a dangerous condition of public property, nor has it alleged it is entitled to recover from the City for improperly paving over the stop box and shut-off valve. It instead asserts fault on the City’s part in its functions and capacity as a supplier of water.
The College argues that because the alleged negligence of the City as a supplier of water does not involve a condition of public property, section 537.600.2 is irrelevant, and the distinction between proprietary and governmental functions therefore applies to the City in its capacity as supplier of water. Therefore, the College argues, the City is liable if its supplying of water is a proprietary function and if the water division had and breached a duty either to: 1) maintain the accessibility of the fire line shut-off valve; 2) mark the location of the paved manhole cover or warn the College that it was paved over; or 3) properly train its water division employees so that they could locate the shutoff valve in a timely fashion.
The College alleged that these duties on the part of the City arose under the common law, or alternatively, that the City assumed these duties in 1993 when it passed an ordinance requiring the City to uncover paved-over manhole covers in certain circumstances, and that the City breached one or more of these duties.3
The College is correct that the limitations on liability set out in section 537.600.1 do not apply where the alleged tort does not involve a dangerous condition of public property or the operation of a motor vehicle, and that in such cases the distinction between whether a municipality is operating in a proprietary or governmental capacity is still important. Numerous cases have addressed whether a municipal water division is acting in a proprietary or governmental capacity in supplying water as a public utility. Where a city supplies water for use in putting out fires, it is performing a governmental function and is immune from liability. See Lober v. Kansas City, 74 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Mo.1934) (noting that “in the extinguishment of fires,” a municipality acts in its governmental capacity). See also, Theodoro v. City of Herculaneum, 879 S.W.2d 755, 761 (Mo.App. E.D.1994) (“The creation of a municipal fire department is for the benefit of the general public, and therefore, any act or omission of the municipality associated with the performance of this service is a governmental function for which the municipality ordinarily may not be held liable.”); O’Dell v. City of Breckenridge, 859 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Mo.App. W.D.1993) (accord). But, when a municipality is in the business of selling water to customers for profit or revenue, it is engaged in a proprietary function. Lober, 74 S.W.2d at 822.
Here, it is stipulated that “the City operates a Water Division which distributes and sells water to residential, commercial and industrial customers, including the College.” The water that flooded was not being used by it to fight a fire or for another public purpose. The water was being purchased by the College to run through lines solely owned by the College and intended for use solely on its property. In supplying this water, the City was engaged in a proprietary function, and its alleged fault in regard to supplying water [449]*449for use in this private line does not constitute a dangerous condition of public property, so that sovereign immunity principles do not apply.
B. No Duty of City Water Division to Provide Access to Shut-off Valve or Warn of Lack of Access.
As the College notes:
Whenever a city in its proprietary capacity operates a waterworks system for the purpose of supplying water to individuals, as is admitted in the present case, it must assume the same responsibility for its negligence as any other private supplier of water for profit, and the question of its liability for negligence must be so determined.
Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v. Kansas City, 316 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Mo. banc 1958).
The College poses the question, “If the City had been a private water company, would there be any question that it would be liable for the losses suffered by the College resulting from the City’s bungling?” In fact, if a private water company had acted as the City water division had done, the private water company would not be held liable to the College. The City is not either.
While the College asserts otherwise, the cases it cites do not support its arguments. In each of these cases, the water company’s own lines or other company property caused the injury. Here, however, the break did not occur in the City main, but in the College’s own line, an event for which the College admits it, not the City, is responsible. Yet, the College also owns the fire line shut-off valve and stop box. None of the cited cases hold that a water company has a duty to repair, make, or keep accessible property owned by the customer, in the absence of a contract so requiring. Adam Hat Stores, 316 S.W.2d at 594, Koch Brothers Bag Co. v. Kansas City, 315 S.W.2d 743 (Mo.1958), and Lamar v. City of St. Louis, 746 S.W.2d 160 (Mo.App. E.D.1988), merely hold that a water company has a duty not to let the company’s property cause injury to others, and, so, is responsible where a break in the water company’s lines caused damage to surrounding property. In Byrd v. Brown, 641 S.W.2d 163, 169 (Mo.App. S.D.1982), a duty was found only because the city itself damaged a neighbor’s water pipe, which ultimately resulted in the plaintiffs store being damaged by a fire.
In an attempt to avoid this difficulty, the College argues that a common law duty on the part of the water division can also be found in principles set out in Lopez v. Three Rivers Electric Cooperative, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. banc 2000), and Hoover’s Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc./Special Products, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. banc 1985). These cases, however, do not assist the College.
In Lopez, the representatives of two decedents sued defendant after a helicopter carrying the decedents crashed into defendant’s unmarked power lines. This Court found that defendant, which owned the power lines, should have foreseen a probability of injury if the lines went unmarked, and that it had a duty to tag them or make them visible in some way. Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 156. In that case, the duty arose because defendant owned the power lines and had a continuing duty to warn of danger resulting from their obscured location. Here, as noted, the City does not own the water line, stop box, or shut-off valve; the College owns them. Nothing in Lopez suggests that this Court would have held the power company liable if the injured party owned the power lines.
In Hoover’s Dairy, plaintiff claimed that defendant was negligent in the installation of a milking system. During installation, defendant failed to conduct a complete system analysis. A stray voltage problem went undetected, ultimately infecting forty [450]*450percent of plaintiffs herd. Hoover’s Dairy, 700 S.W.2d at 428-30. This Court found that defendant had a duty to warn plaintiff of the stray voltage problem at the time of installation. Id. at 432. Here, however, it was the College that installed the valve and stop box, not the City. Hoover’s Dairy is not on point. Moreover, here the College alleges a duty on the part of the City to warn of a danger that did not arise until years after the stop box and valve were installed; Hoover’s Dairy did not hold that the installers’ duty to warn continued as to defects arising after the installation was complete and ownership passed to the farmer.
The College cites to no other case providing a basis for finding a common law duty on the part of the City water division to maintain open access to customer-owned shut-off valves and stop boxes or to warn customers if another division blocks access to the valve or stop box. This is separate from the issue whether the City was negligent in paving Oakland Avenue. The City acknowledges that, at some point, it paved over the manhole giving access to the shutoff valve and stop box, and it is implicit in the trial court’s decision that it believed that the City was negligent in so doing. Certainly, a factual question for submission to the jury was raised by the evidence. And, the water division, as a division of the City, can be charged with knowledge of the fact that the City’s street department paved over the College’s stop box and shut-off valve.4
But, the College specifically disclaims that it is seeking damages based on the paving over of the manhole, thereby allowing it to bypass the issues whether the repaving created a dangerous condition of public property and whether the $100,0000 limitation on recovery set out in section 537.610 therefore applies. In order to do so, it attempted to plead a duty and breach on the part of the City water division separate and apart from any negligence in paving over the manhole. It was, then, required to demonstrate that such a separate duty existed, rather than merely posit that it did.
For these same reasons, the dissenting opinion is in error in suggesting that the water department somehow breached a duty to the College because of the paving over of the stop box, separate and apart from the duty of the City as a paver of the road. While the City may have had and breached a duty in paving the road, it was in its function as a paver of the road that it would have done so. If the College wishes to avoid the sovereign immunity issues thereby implicated, then it must identify a separate basis for an additional duty by the City in its capacity as a provider of water.
The cases the College and the dissent cite simply do not provide the authority for finding such a separate duty on the part of the water division, separate and apart from any liability that may have arisen from paving over the manhole. The trial court erred in finding such a common law duty on the part of the water division.
IV. DUTY OF WATER DIVISION EMPLOYEES TO ACCURATELY LOCATE STOP BOX AND SHUT-OFF VALVE
Plaintiff asserted an alternative claim that the City had a duty to properly train [451]*451its water division personnel to locate shutoff valves in a timely fashion and that it breached this duty. Again, the College fails to identify the source of this alleged duty. While the City has a duty to repair breaks in its own line, and the cases cited by the City will hold a municipality liable for damages caused by leaks from its own line, here, once again, all agree that the break occurred in the College’s line and that the College was the one responsible for keeping that line itself in repair.5 The College simply asserts that the City had a duty to help it find the leak and if it acted negligently in failing to do so, it can be found liable. "While the City has control over the public road itself, see section 82.190, there is no allegation that it failed to permit the College access to the stop box once the College located the leak, and the College cites no contract or common law authority that the City has a duty to train its employees to assist its customers in locating leaks in a timely fashion.
The City did send its engineers to the site of the leak when the College called, and the engineers did attempt to assist the College in' locating the leak, but they were unable to do so. The College asserts they were negligent in failing to notice the location of the hidden stop box and shut-off valve, which were marked on the engineering drawings.
As the College notes, there are situations in which a volunteer can be sued for negligence in offering assistance, for “[t]he law imposes an obligation upon everyone who attempts to do anything, even if gratuitously, for another, to exercise some degree of care and skill in the performance of what he has undertaken.” Hoover’s Dairy, 700 S.W.2d at 432, citing, 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence sec. 45 (1971). In Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Mo.1969), this Court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323 (1965), which states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.
Thus, to be held liable, a volunteer must increase the risk of harm or the harm must be suffered because the one being helped relied to his detriment on the voluntary undertaking. In the absence of such an increase in harm or detrimental reliance, the volunteer may abandon his or her assistance without liability, for the volunteer:
[I]s not required to continue [his services] indefinitely, or even until he has done everything in his power to aid and [452]*452protect the other. The actor may normally abandon his efforts at any time unless, by giving aid, he has put the other in a worse position than he was in before the actor attempted to aid him. His motives in discontinuing the services are immaterial.... He may without liability discontinue the services through mere caprice, or because of personal dislike or enmity toward the other.
Id., cmt. c.
Here, while the water division employees voluntarily responded to the College’s call for help, the College nowhere alleges facts showing that the City’s decision to respond or actions in responding left the College in a worse position than it would have been in had the City not responded or that the College was placed in a worse position by relying on the City. While the City employees left the flood scene with them copy of the engineering drawings from 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. to respond to an unrelated emergency call, this did not place the College in a worse position than it would have been in had the water division employees never responded to the initial call for help. The College had its own copy of the drawings, although they were inaccessible. In any event neither the College nor the City apparently knew how to use the drawings to identify the location of the stop box. See, e.g., Winn v. Pollard, 62 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Mo.App. W.D.2001) (no duty existed through a gratuitous undertaking because respondent did not increase the risk of harm when he followed appellant’s tractor on a highway but left before reaching the ultimate destination and appellant was rear-ended and injured by another vehicle).
Moreover, the stipulation shows that the City employees assisted the College employees and the private plumbing contractor in locating the leak and provided a flow meter. Nowhere in the stipulated facts does the College claim that it relinquished any of its options in reliance on the water division’s help in locating the shut-off valve or that it delayed calling a plumber because it had called the City and that this in turn delayed stoppage of the flooding. While Restatement of Torts section 323 could apply to a suit against a municipality in its proprietary capacity if a plaintiff were able to show detrimental reliance or an increase in harm, the College simply has not proved the elements of a claim under that section by showing that any negligence of the City increased the College’s harm or that its reliance on the City caused it to suffer harm it would not have suffered otherwise.
The dissenting opinion offers an alternative argument that because the water that flowed through the pipes onto College property belonged to the City, the City therefore had a duty to turn off the supply of water at the main, if not at the stop box. But, this argument proves too much, going far beyond even the College’s arguments.
Indeed, if the mere fact that the water that caused the damage initially came from the City were sufficient to make the City liable if it did not timely shut off the water supply to the property, then the City would be hable for every flooded basement and water-damaged ceiling in commercial or residential properties served by City water, as would be all private water suppliers to their customers. Further, it would be liable for the flood damage that occurred before the College shut off the main water supply line at 3:20 p.m. But, the College admits that the “$1,005,506 would have been suffered regardless of the City’s acts or omissions.... It was undisputed that the City bore no responsibility for this amount.” There is no basis for the suggested expansion of liability.
[453]*453
V DUTY AND STANDARD OF CARE CREATED BY ORDINANCE
Even if no common law duty existed, the College claims that ordinance 23.04.185 placed a duty on the City to make the shut-off valve accessible. It states:
Notwithstanding the provision of any other ordinance, the Water Division with funds from the Water Division, shall, by contract, or otherwise, expose, make street level, and make accessible stop boxes over shut off valves whenever the City of St. Louis, by contract or otherwise, is responsible for covering said stop boxes during street repair or resurfacing.
Ord. 62836 sec. 1, 1993. This ordinance was passed five years after the street department paved over the fire line manhole cover.
Here there is no question about whether the ordinance takes away some vested right of the City or imposes some external duty on it. It is the City’s own ordinance that is at issue. In the ordinance, the City voluntarily undertook to state that its water division would, by contract or otherwise, expose and make street level and accessible stop boxes over shut-off valves whenever the City is responsible for covering them during street repair or resurfacing. The issue is simply the meaning of the ordinance passed by the City. The question boils down to whether the City intended by this ordinance to assume this duty on the part of its water division only as to current and future street repair and maintenance, or whether it also intended by this ordinance to undertake a duty to locate and make accessible and street level all previously paved-over stop boxes in the City.
The ordinance does not expressly state that it is retrospective or prospective in application. Focusing on the ordinance’s use of the word “whenever,” the College argues that ordinance 23.04.185 was intended to apply retroactively. But, the word “whenever” can be either temporal or conditional in nature. Its use is not particularly enlightening.
Focusing on the use of the words “is responsible for covering said stop boxes” rather than “was responsible for covering said stop boxes,” the City argues that the ordinance clearly is applicable only to current or future repaving and repair and does not purport to require the City to examine all past repaving projects to determine whether stop boxes might have been paved over.
This Court finds the resolution of this dispute lies in considering the context in which the ordinance was passed. When the City enacted the ordinance in question, it also left in force chapter 23.12 of the St. Louis City Revised Code. That chapter contains two ordinances relating to shutoff valves. Ordinance 23.12.010 specifically places the burden on the owner to keep stop boxes accessible. Ordinance 23.12.020 states that the water commissioner has the power to excavate and shut off water if the owner does not make his or her stop box accessible or keep it in repair after notification. Ord. 48646 sec. 11 (part), 1958: 1948 C. Ch. 55 sec. 24 (part): 1960 C. sec. 551.020.
These two ordinances were last amended in 1960 and remain in effect. This suggests that an owner still has a duty to keep stop boxes and valves accessible and to pay for uncovering them when this duty is not fulfilled. Further, there is no evidence that, upon passage of the 1993 ordinance, the City undertook a program of locating and making accessible all shut-off valves and stop boxes that previously had been paved over. The City suggests that to do so would be a tremendous burden [454]*454and one it did not intend to undertake by voluntarily adopting this ordinance. While the College states that it would be good public policy for the City to make all such stop boxes and valves accessible, the issue is not what would be good public policy, but what the City in fact intended when it adopted the ordinance. Given the language used and the enormity of the undertaking that would be imposed under the College’s reading of the ordinance, and the meaning contemporaneously accorded the ordinance upon its passage, an intent to voluntarily adopt such a duty cannot be read into the use of the word “whenever” in the ordinance. The ordinance is intended to be prospective-only in application.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, the trial court erred in entering judgment for the College on the theory that the City in its role as provider of water breached a duty to the College. The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the City.6
WOLFF, PRICE and LIMBAUGH, JJ., concur.
WHITE, C.J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
TEITELMAN, J., concurs in opinion of WHITE, C.J.
RUSSELL, J., not participating.