SCH. DIST. NO. 351 ONEIDA CTY v. Oneida Ed. Ass'n

567 P.2d 830, 98 Idaho 486, 1977 Ida. LEXIS 413

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: July 22, 1977
• Docket: 12154, 12213
• Status: Published

Opinions

SHEPARD, Justice.

This case is a consolidated appeal of two orders of the lower court each involving the same parties, the same factual circumstances and essentially the same issues of law. One appeal is from the issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants-appellants Oneida Education Association and its president Carol Dawn Willie from striking or picketing any of the schools of plaintiff-respondent School District No. 351, Oneida County, Idaho. The second appeal is from the order of the lower court making that preliminary injunction permanent. The questions presented are whether there is a right in public employees and particularly teachers to strike against a governmental employer; whether such a strike for any purpose is illegal; whether or not the provisions of Idaho statutes prohibiting the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes are applicable to situations involving teacher-public employees; whether or not the issuance of the preliminary injunction constituted an abuse of discretion in that the traditional statutory and common law standards were not complied with prior to the issuance of the injunction; and whether the permanent injunction was likewise an abuse of discretion and whether it was overly broad.

The Oneida Education Association is a “local education association” with the meaning of Idaho’s Professional Negotiations Act, I.C. §§ 33-1271-76 and was the representative of the teacher employees of School District No. 351. On February 6, 1975, representatives of the Association met with the Board of the School District to initiate negotiations, but the Board stated that it would not negotiate until after the then sitting legislature had recessed. Although thereafter the legislature recessed, no further negotiations took place and the Association during May 1975 served formal notice on the school district of its desire to enter negotiations for the school year 1975-76 and pursuant to the provisions of the Professional Negotiations Act.

The Association and the district negotiated the terms of the procedural agreement which was ratified by both parties on October 1, 1975. That procedural agreement only set forth agreement on procedures to be utilized in seeking to reach later agreement on substantive issues such as wages and conditions of employment. The parties then attempted but failed to reach any agreement on the substantive issues. The Association then notified the school district that members of the Association would be going on strike and refusing to report for work on or about October 15, 1975.

Thereupon the school district filed its complaint alleging that the threatened action of the Association would be a breach of the procedural agreement and the contracts of the individual members of the Association theretofore entered into with the district and that the threatened strike would cause irreparable harm and damage. The district prayed for injunctive relief to prevent the striking and picketing of the school district’s system and schools. The Association answered and on October 24, 1975, a hearing was held to consider issuance of the injunction sought by the school district.

At that hearing, no testimony was required or permitted either in support of or opposition to the issuance of the injunction and the court ruled as a matter of law that the injunction should issue. The Association then made an offer of proof of the testimony and evidence that it would offer in resistance to the issuance of the injunction. That offer was made a portion of the record and is before us. The court issued the preliminary injunction and following an additional non-evidentiary hearing on January 7, 1976, the court “permanently enjoined” the Association, its members and president from striking against or picketing the operation of the school district. Appeal is taken both from the issuance of the temporary injunction and the issuance of the permanent injunction.

At the outset the respondent school district asserts that this appeal should be dismissed inasmuch as the controversy has become moot. It argues that the school year in which the strike occurred has ended and the members of the appellant Association have executed and worked under a new contract for the subsequent school year. We disagree. While in a sense the major controversy has been resolved by the passage of time, the permanent injunction remains in effect and forbids members of the Association to strike and the terms of that injunction are not restricted as to time. We note further that the legal questions presented are of first impression in this state, are of substantial public interest and there are almost yearly disputes between some of the 115 school districts in the state of Idaho and organizations similar to appellant’s. Also we note that appellant has alleged the failure of the respondent to comply with Idaho’s Professional Negotiations Act (I.C. § 33-1271 et seq.) and the effect of said refusal by the respondent on the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue injunctive relief. That question also is of substantial public moment and interest. For all of the above reasons we reject the invitation of respondent school district to dismiss for mootness. Nelson v. Marshall, 94 Idaho 726, 497 P.2d 47 (1972); Robinson v. Bodily, 97 Idaho 199, 541 P.2d 623 (1975). See also, School Committee v. Westerly Teachers Assoc., 111 R.I. 96, 299 A.2d 441 (1973); Nat'l Electric Contractors Assoc. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wash.2d 14, 400 P.2d 778 (1965).

I.

Appellants argue first that as public employees they have a right to strike which is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be abridged. They also argue that any attempt to deny them the right to strike as contrasted with the right to strike by employees in the private sector would be a deprivation of equal protection. We disagree. School Dist. of Town of Westerly v. Westerly Teachers Assoc., 111 R.I. 96, 299 A.2d 441 (1973). See also, cases collected in Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1147 (1971). For a contra view, see Anderson Fed. of Teachers v. Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969) (dissent by DeBruler).

II.

Appellants next argue that the Idaho Professional Negotiations Act, I.C. § 33-1271 et. seq., inferentially grants public school teachers in the state of Idaho the right to strike since the right to strike is not expressly prohibited in that Act. We disagree. As previously noted, we find no constitutionally guaranteed right to strike in public employees and no such right existed at common law. The common law is in effect in Idaho unless otherwise expressly abrogated by statute. I.C. § 73-116; Industrial Indem. Co. v. Columbia Basin Steel & Iron, Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 471 P.2d 574 (1970); Kelly v. Easton, 35 Idaho 340, 207 P.2d 129 (1922).

Appellants assert that the legislature has expressly prohibited strikes by firefighters, I.C. § 44-1811 and argue therefrom that the legislature must have intended to permit strikes by teacher-public employees, otherwise it would have prohibited those strikes as it prohibited strikes by firefighters. We do not agree. School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Assoc., supra. The legislature may well have believed that the substantial difference between the duties performed by firefighters vis a vis teachers required the express legislative prohibition against strikes by firefighters and that the common law remedies available against strikes by teachers were adequate and that strikes by teachers could be prohibited but only following adequate hearings.

III.

Appellants next assert that the trial court erred in not giving effect to Idaho statutes governing the issuance of injunctive relief in labor disputes, I.C. § 44-701-712 and conforming its actions to the legislative restraints set forth by those statutes together with decisions of this Court, such as Twin Falls Constr. Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 370, 95 Idaho 370, 509 P.2d 788 (1973). This Court has held that general statutes dealing with labor controversies and the duties of public officials thereunder are “insufficient to indicate a legislative intent that the government should fall within the statutory coverage. Legislative acts are normally directed to activities in the private sector of society and effect a modification, limitation, or extension of the private individual’s rights and duties.” Local Union 283 Intn’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. Robison, 91 Idaho 445, 423 P.2d 999 (1967). See also, School Committee v. Westerly Teachers Assoc., supra; Board of Education v. Redding, 32 Ill.2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); City of Minot v. General Drivers, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D.1966); Anderson Fed. of Teachers v. Anderson, supra; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947).

IV.

We come then to the essence of the case as stated by appellants, “assuming arguendo, that teacher strikes are illegal and further, that the anti-injunction act does not apply to such strikes, an injunction still should not issue unless the traditional prerequisites for the granting of such equitable relief exists.”

In 1971 the Idaho legislature enacted the Professional Negotiations Act authorizing negotiation agreements between school boards and their professional employees, I.C. § 33-1271, and providing for mediation and fact finding procedures for resolution of impasse situations. It is strenuously argued by appellants, that the respondent school board has failed, neglected and refused to engage in those requisite statutory procedures. Appellants assert that they sought utilization of the statutory impasse procedures and that the respondent school board acted in bad faith in their abrupt termination of the statutory proceedings and resort to court action which resulted in the injunctive orders of the court. They argue that such lack of good faith is apparent from the Board’s early attitude in the proceedings, that there were absolutely no financial resources available to grant the teachers a raise in pay, but following the intervention of a mediator, the sudden discovery of enough money to grant each teacher a $400-500 per year raise; the insistance of the Board that the teachers were governed by the salary conditions set forth in contracts between each individual teacher and the Board as contrasted with the ruling of the trial court that those individual contracts were conditional only since the later procedural agreement entered into between the Board and the appellants indicated that the individual contracts of the teachers were deemed supplemented by the terms of the procedural agreement; that the Board refused a meeting with the appellants almost on the eve of the threatened strike action; that following the issuance of the initial injunction, the Board continued to refuse compliance with the statutory impasse proceedings until upon motion of the appellants they were ordered to so comply by the district court.

As to heretofore indicated, the trial court permitted the appellants to introduce no testimony in support of any defense they might have to the issuance of the injunction. Hence, the above assertions of the appellant are before us only by way of its offer of proof made before the trial court and preserved in the record here. Those assertions and allegations were not proven and we express no opinion as to their validity except to note the later issuance of the order by the trial court requiring the school district to engage in the mediation and fact finding procedures.

The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the injunction should issue and we must assume, in the absence of any evidentiary record, that he concluded that a strike by teachers is illegal in Idaho. Assuming without deciding that he was correct in this conclusion, nevertheless, mere illegality of an act does not require the automatic issuance of an injunction. Anderson v. Trimble, 519 P.2d 1352 (Okl.1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995, 95 S.Ct. 308, 42 L.Ed.2d 269; Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 47 Cal.2d 11, 300 P.2d 831 (1956); State v. Davis, 65 N.M. 128, 333 P.2d 613 (1958); Eckdahl v. Hurwitz, 103 P.2d 161 (Wyo.1940). Contra, Kleinjans v. Lombardi, 478 P.2d 320 (Hawaii 1970). See, Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Ann, 393 U.S. 175, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968).

That logic has been expressly applied to situations involving teacher strikes and the automatic issuance of an injunction has been refused and condemned. School Dist. for City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Assoc., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968); School Com. v. Westerly Teachers Assoc., supra; Timberlane School Dist. v. Timberlane Educ. Assoc., 114 N.H. 245, 317 A.2d 555 (1974).

In the private sector the right to strike is viewed as an integral and necessary part of the collective bargaining process. However, in the public sector the denial of the right to strike has the effect of weighing the scales heavily in favor of the government during the collective bargaining process. In Idaho our legislature has made the policy judgment as to the merits of not providing public employees with the right to strike. Rather, it has developed statutory alternative processes to resolve labor disputes between teachers and school boards. It would not be an appropriate judicial function to fault the legislature in those determinations.

We cannot ignore an alleged refusal to abide by and engage in those legislatively authorized procedures for resolution of impasse situations. While neither we nor the trial court should condone or approve the calling of an illegal strike by appellants (although the record does not appear to demonstrate actual engagement in strike and picketing procedures), neither should we or a trial court condone or approve the failure to abide by and utilize the statutorily prescribed procedures for possible resolution of the problem. It has long been a basic maxim of equity that one who seeks equitable relief must enter the court with clean hands.

We hold that the trial court erred in issuing the orders complained of here in what was effectively an ex parte proceeding. If testimony had been permitted and required and the trial court had accepted as correct the allegations of the appellant regarding the bad faith of the school board, he might have issued the injunction, but also as a corollary thereof required the school board to engage in the statutorily mandated impasse procedure. Such order did issue but not for some months following the issuance of the preliminary injunction.

Since the dispute between the parties and the threatened strike which resulted from non-resolution of that dispute has ended we see no necessity for a remand for further proceedings. We reverse the orders of the trial court, remand the cause and order that the temporary and permanent injunctions be dissolved. No costs allowed.

McFADDEN, C. J, and DONALDSON, J., concur.