Scales v. Design Nortex

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 2, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-06442
StatusUnknown

This text of Scales v. Design Nortex (Scales v. Design Nortex) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scales v. Design Nortex, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK WILLIAM SCALES, Plaintiff, 23-CV-6442 (LTS) -against- DESIGN NORTEX; THE BRANDED ORDER TO AMEND PROFESSIONALS, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants Design Nortex and The Branded Professionals violated his rights.1 By order dated July 27, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

1 Plaintiff names both Design Nortex and The Branded Professionals as defendants, but throughout the complaint, he only refers to a singular defendant. 2 Plaintiff submitted the complaint and IFP application without signatures. By order dated September 22, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to submit signed copies of the signature pages of the complaint and IFP application. (ECF 3.) Plaintiff submitted the signed documents on October 22 and October 23, 2023. (ECF 4, 5.) dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings his claims using the court’s general complaint form. He invokes both the court’s federal question jurisdiction and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. In the space on the form where he is asked which of his federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, Plaintiff writes, The defendant has deliberately sabotaged my company preventing the hiring of new web developer company in order to complete hired services in order to officially launch. The defendant’s actions has left the corporation(s) business layouts vulnerable. (ECF 1, at 2.)3 Plaintiff further provides the following in his statement of claim, The defendant is being sued for breach of contract and negligence. The defendant’s actions has prevented the official launch of corporation(s), which has resulted in damages in many forms. The defendant’s actions has resulted in loss of revenue, depleted company investments, missed business opportunities, and has left the company’s business layouts vulnerable. The damages are estimated in the amounts of millions of dollar, possibly accumulating in the billions of dollars. The defendant’s actions effects multiple companies, preventing the flagship company(s) from launching. Additionally, the defendant refuses to provide a refund, preventing the hiring of a new web developer company in order to complete the company’s website and mobile application. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff states that “[m]oney damages are pending, but the defendant is being sued for the amount of millions of dollars.” (Id. at 6.) DISCUSSION A. Claims on behalf of other entities The complaint is unclear as to whether Plaintiff is asserting claims on behalf of himself or on behalf of his business, which he refers to as a corporation. (See ECF 1, at 5.) To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of a corporation or other artificial entity, the Court must dismiss those claims. The statute governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, “allow[s] two types of representation: ‘that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.’” Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305,

3 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the motion. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. 1308 (2d Cir. 1991)). A nonlawyer cannot bring suit on behalf of another entity. See United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998). While “some courts allow sole proprietorships to proceed pro se [because] a sole proprietorship has no legal existence apart from its owner,” Lattanzio, 481 F.3d

at 140 (citation omitted), courts generally do not allow corporations, partnerships, associations, and other artificial entities to appear in court without an attorney, Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1993). Plaintiff does not allege that he is an attorney, and he does not state that his business is a sole proprietorship. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of entities (other than any that are his sole proprietorships), the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to allege facts showing that he is asserting claims on his own behalf and not on behalf of another entity. B.

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Scales v. Design Nortex, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scales-v-design-nortex-nysd-2024.