Savage & Associates, P.C. Ex Rel. Teligent, Inc. v. BLR Services SAS (In Re Teligent, Inc.)

307 B.R. 744, 51 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1908, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 447, 42 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 269, 2004 WL 782887
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 13, 2004
Docket19-22434
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 307 B.R. 744 (Savage & Associates, P.C. Ex Rel. Teligent, Inc. v. BLR Services SAS (In Re Teligent, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Savage & Associates, P.C. Ex Rel. Teligent, Inc. v. BLR Services SAS (In Re Teligent, Inc.), 307 B.R. 744, 51 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1908, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 447, 42 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 269, 2004 WL 782887 (N.Y. 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION DISMISSING COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT ALEX MANDL

STUART M. BERNSTEIN, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, the Unsecured Claims Estate Representative for Teligent, Inc., commenced this adversary proceeding to avoid and recover several alleged fraudulent transfers. Her complaint also included a common law damage claim against Alex Mandl, a former officer and director of Teligent, sounding in breach of fiduciary duty, as well as a turnover claim. Mandl moved to dismiss the claims under fed. r. civ. p. 12(b)(6).

In light of the limitations imposed on her authority under Teligent’s confirmed plan, the Court directed the plaintiff to show cause why the breach of fiduciary duty claim should not be dismissed for lack of standing. Having considered the submissions of the parties on this issue, I conclude that the claims asserted against Mandl should be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges, and I accept as true, that in or about September 2000, the defendant, BLR Services, SAS (“BLR”), entered into a joint venture with non-party TGNT France SA (“TGNT”), a foreign subsidiary and insider of Teligent, and the defendant, Louis Dreyfus Communications, S.A. (“Dreyfus”). (Complaint, ¶¶ 7-8.) At all relevant times, Mandl served as Teligent’s chairman, president and chief executive officer, and also sat on Dreyfus’s board of directors, (see id., ¶¶ 34, 40.)

The focus of the complaint is three transfers (the “Transfers”) by Teligent to BLR, made between December 22, 2000 and March 1, 2001, in the aggregate sum of $7,743,981.14. (See id., Sch. “A.”) The complaint states, at various points, that the Transfers were made for the benefit of TGNT, (id., ¶¶ 14, 19, 20, 21, 27, 28), or for the benefit of BLR and Dreyfus. (Id., ¶¶31, 32, 33, 36, 39, 41,42.)

The complaint does not allege that the Transfers were made to or for the benefit of Mandl. Instead, the fifth claim for relief alleges, in substance, that Mandl orchestrated the Transfers in breach of his fiduciary duty to Teligent with the goal of bolstering Dreyfus’s interest in BLR. Specifically, Mandl, a Dreyfus director, breached his fiduciary duties to Teligent by (a) putting “himself in a position where his individual interests were in clashed [sic ] with his duties to the Debtors,” (id., ¶ 47), utilizing “his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors,” (id., ¶ 48), and manipulating “the affairs of the Debtors to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors and in disregard of the standards of common decency and honesty.” (Id., ¶ 49.) The ad damnum clause demands *747 the entry of a money judgment against Mandl in the amount of the Transfers.

Mandl filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under fed. r. civ. p. 12(b)(6). He argued that the plaintiff failed to plead a legally sufficient claim of breach of fiduciary duty or self-dealing under Virginia law. In addition, the seventh claim for relief demanded a turnover of the Transfers, and Mandl did not hold the Transfers.

At the January 22, 2004 hearing on Mandl’s motion, the Court raised a threshold issue that neither party had addressed: the plaintiffs standing to sue Mandl for breach of fiduciary duty and seek money damages. As the complaint acknowledged, the Plan granted the plaintiff the authority to pursue avoidance actions under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Complaint, ¶ 4.) All other rights, including other causes of action, vested in Reorganized Teligent. As stated in a previous decision dealing with this issue

[t]he Plan substantively consolidated the affiliated debtors into a single entity (“Reorganized Teligent”). Upon confirmation, all of the property of the estate revested in Reorganized Teligent with two exceptions. The “Chapter 5 Causes of Action” and the “Unsecured Claim Fund” were transferred to a newly formed legal entity, the “Unsecured Claim Estate Representative” (hereinafter, the “Representative”). (Plan, Art. III, ¶ B.5(b).) ... The “Chapter 5 Causes of Action” included “[a]ny and all of any Debtor’s rights, claims, or causes under sections 542, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 550 and 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, whether known or unknown, in law, equity or otherwise, except to the extent waived or retained by the Debtors during the Chapter 11 Cases or pursuant to the Plan.” (Plan, Art. I, ¶ B.15.)

In re Teligent, Inc., 306 B.R. 752, 755 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2004).

Thus, unless the fifth claim fell under chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, which did not appear to be the case, it belonged to Reorganized Teligent, and not the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court directed the plaintiff to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed as against Mandl, (Transcript of hearing, held Jan. 22, 2004 (“Tr.”) at 7), and set a briefing schedule which is now complete.

DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

We begin with a self-evident proposition. The plaintiffs authority is no greater than her assignor’s, the debtor in possession, who, in turn, enjoys the rights and powers of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). A trustee’s standing to pursue litigation comes from three sources — the debtor, the creditors and the Bankruptcy Code. First, with certain exceptions, the debtor’s interests in property at the time of the commencement of the case become property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541. As statutory successor to the debtor, the trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor, and may bring any suit that the debtor could have brought before bankruptcy. Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir.1995); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir.1991); Goldin v. Primavera Familienstiftung (In re Granite Partners, L.P.), 194 B.R. 318, 324-25 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996).

Second, under section 544, 1 the trustee also stands in the “overshoes” of *748 the creditors. In re Granite Partners, L.P., 194 B.R. at 324; see Podell & Podell v. Feldman (In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.), 592 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir.1979)(decided under the former Bankruptcy Act). Subject to certain limitations, § 544(b) authorizes the trustee to avoid any transfer that an actual creditor holding an allowable claim could have avoided under applicable law.

Third, chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code grants the trustee certain powers that neither the debtor nor the creditors enjoyed prior to bankruptcy.

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307 B.R. 744, 51 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1908, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 447, 42 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 269, 2004 WL 782887, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/savage-associates-pc-ex-rel-teligent-inc-v-blr-services-sas-in-re-nysb-2004.