McInturff, J.
Mr. Sargent appeals his discharge as a teacher in the Selah School District.
Mr. Sargent has been a teacher with the Selah School District (the District) for the past 12 years. On April 18, 1978, he received a notice of probable cause for his discharge. This action was precipitated by an incident in which Mr. Sargent tipped or kicked the leg of a student's chair, resulting in the student falling backwards and hitting his head on a table. The student suffered minor injuries. Mr. Sargent took similar action against another student during the same class period, but a desk behind the student's chair prevented the fall. The notice of probable cause for discharge also referred to Mr. Sargent's past record which established previous instances of improper disciplinary techniques and notice by the District to Mr. Sargent of the possible consequences of repeated violations of the District's rules and regulations. Mr. Sargent's continued disregard for school policy demonstrated to the District a lack of necessary self-control and professional judgment, thus justifying his discharge.
Following his discharge, Mr. Sargent requested a hearing to determine if there was sufficient cause for the action taken by the District. The hearing officer entered findings of fact and conclusions of law affirming the discharge. An appeal was then taken to the superior court. On review, the court held the hearing officer's findings were supported by substantial evidence and found the decision neither arbitrary nor capricious nor clearly erroneous.
Initially, we must address the question of the appropriate standard of review in teacher discharge cases. Mr. Sargent contends the trial court erred in reviewing the decision of the hearing officer under the arbitrary or capricious or clearly erroneous standard of review. He contends the court should have conducted an independent, de novo review of the decision of the hearing officer. In addition, Mr. Sargent assigns error to the court's consideration of the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law, which it found were supported by substantial evidence.
RCW 28A.58.480 sets forth the various standards of review to be employed in teacher discharge cases:
The court may affirm the decision of the board or hearing officer or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the employee may have been prejudiced because the decision was:
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious.
As originally enacted, this statute contemplated a de novo review in any appeal by a discharged teacher.
As amended, however, there are no Washington cases which indicate the particular test to be applied when reviewing the question of sufficient cause for a teacher's discharge. RCW 34.04.130(6) (a)-(f), relating to judicial review of administrative agency decisions, contains language identical to that contained in RCW 28A.58.480; and the cases construing the above statute are therefore applicable by analogy.
In determining the appropriate scope of review, an appellate court must begin by ascertaining the nature of the ruling it is being asked to review,
i.e.,
is it a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of fact and law? Here, Mr. Sargent disputes the findings of fact entered by the hearing officer as well as the legal determination that sufficient cause was shown for his discharge. Under these circumstances, the decision of the hearing officer is reviewable under the error of law standards set forth in section 4 of RCW 28A.58.480 because the question of sufficient cause for discharge raises a question of mixed law and fact,
i.e.,
there is a dispute both as to the propriety of the inferences drawn by the hearing officer from the raw facts and as to the meaning of the statutory term, sufficient cause.
See
Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n,
84 Wn.2d 271, 283, 525 P.2d 774 (1974).
Thus, Mr. Sargent's argument is well taken. The court erred in applying the arbitrary or capricious and clearly erroneous standards of review. In this vein, the court also erred in evaluating the hearing officer's findings in terms of the substantial evidence test. However, the fact that the court articulated its decision under a more narrow standard of review does not mean the decision cannot be sustained under the broader error of law standard. Having before us the same evidence considered by the trial court, we will conduct our own de novo review, independent of the decision of the hearing officer, to determine if there was sufficient cause for Mr. Sargent's discharge.
See Ancheta v. Daly,
77 Wn.2d 255, 260, 461 P.2d 531 (1969).
RCW 28A.58.100 requires sufficient cause for the discharge of a teacher.
The District has the burden of proving the charges specified in the notice of probable cause to be sufficient cause for discharge by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 28A.58.450. Sufficient cause has been variously defined as conduct which adversely affects a teacher's efficiency,
Barnes v. Seattle School Dist. 1,
88 Wn.2d 483, 487, 563 P.2d 199 (1977);
Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. 10, 85
Wn.2d 348, 349, 535 P.2d 804 (1975);
Browne v. Gear,
21 Wash. 147, 152-53, 57 P. 359 (1899); or conduct which adversely affects performance.
Gaylord v.
Tacoma School Dist. 10,
88 Wn.2d 286, 290, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977). The basic inquiry is whether the teacher has so materially breached his promise to teach as to excuse the school district in its promise to employ.
Barnes v.
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McInturff, J.
Mr. Sargent appeals his discharge as a teacher in the Selah School District.
Mr. Sargent has been a teacher with the Selah School District (the District) for the past 12 years. On April 18, 1978, he received a notice of probable cause for his discharge. This action was precipitated by an incident in which Mr. Sargent tipped or kicked the leg of a student's chair, resulting in the student falling backwards and hitting his head on a table. The student suffered minor injuries. Mr. Sargent took similar action against another student during the same class period, but a desk behind the student's chair prevented the fall. The notice of probable cause for discharge also referred to Mr. Sargent's past record which established previous instances of improper disciplinary techniques and notice by the District to Mr. Sargent of the possible consequences of repeated violations of the District's rules and regulations. Mr. Sargent's continued disregard for school policy demonstrated to the District a lack of necessary self-control and professional judgment, thus justifying his discharge.
Following his discharge, Mr. Sargent requested a hearing to determine if there was sufficient cause for the action taken by the District. The hearing officer entered findings of fact and conclusions of law affirming the discharge. An appeal was then taken to the superior court. On review, the court held the hearing officer's findings were supported by substantial evidence and found the decision neither arbitrary nor capricious nor clearly erroneous.
Initially, we must address the question of the appropriate standard of review in teacher discharge cases. Mr. Sargent contends the trial court erred in reviewing the decision of the hearing officer under the arbitrary or capricious or clearly erroneous standard of review. He contends the court should have conducted an independent, de novo review of the decision of the hearing officer. In addition, Mr. Sargent assigns error to the court's consideration of the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law, which it found were supported by substantial evidence.
RCW 28A.58.480 sets forth the various standards of review to be employed in teacher discharge cases:
The court may affirm the decision of the board or hearing officer or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the employee may have been prejudiced because the decision was:
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious.
As originally enacted, this statute contemplated a de novo review in any appeal by a discharged teacher.
As amended, however, there are no Washington cases which indicate the particular test to be applied when reviewing the question of sufficient cause for a teacher's discharge. RCW 34.04.130(6) (a)-(f), relating to judicial review of administrative agency decisions, contains language identical to that contained in RCW 28A.58.480; and the cases construing the above statute are therefore applicable by analogy.
In determining the appropriate scope of review, an appellate court must begin by ascertaining the nature of the ruling it is being asked to review,
i.e.,
is it a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of fact and law? Here, Mr. Sargent disputes the findings of fact entered by the hearing officer as well as the legal determination that sufficient cause was shown for his discharge. Under these circumstances, the decision of the hearing officer is reviewable under the error of law standards set forth in section 4 of RCW 28A.58.480 because the question of sufficient cause for discharge raises a question of mixed law and fact,
i.e.,
there is a dispute both as to the propriety of the inferences drawn by the hearing officer from the raw facts and as to the meaning of the statutory term, sufficient cause.
See
Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n,
84 Wn.2d 271, 283, 525 P.2d 774 (1974).
Thus, Mr. Sargent's argument is well taken. The court erred in applying the arbitrary or capricious and clearly erroneous standards of review. In this vein, the court also erred in evaluating the hearing officer's findings in terms of the substantial evidence test. However, the fact that the court articulated its decision under a more narrow standard of review does not mean the decision cannot be sustained under the broader error of law standard. Having before us the same evidence considered by the trial court, we will conduct our own de novo review, independent of the decision of the hearing officer, to determine if there was sufficient cause for Mr. Sargent's discharge.
See Ancheta v. Daly,
77 Wn.2d 255, 260, 461 P.2d 531 (1969).
RCW 28A.58.100 requires sufficient cause for the discharge of a teacher.
The District has the burden of proving the charges specified in the notice of probable cause to be sufficient cause for discharge by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 28A.58.450. Sufficient cause has been variously defined as conduct which adversely affects a teacher's efficiency,
Barnes v. Seattle School Dist. 1,
88 Wn.2d 483, 487, 563 P.2d 199 (1977);
Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. 10, 85
Wn.2d 348, 349, 535 P.2d 804 (1975);
Browne v. Gear,
21 Wash. 147, 152-53, 57 P. 359 (1899); or conduct which adversely affects performance.
Gaylord v.
Tacoma School Dist. 10,
88 Wn.2d 286, 290, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977). The basic inquiry is whether the teacher has so materially breached his promise to teach as to excuse the school district in its promise to employ.
Barnes v. Seattle School Dist. 1, supra.
As mentioned above, the District's decision to discharge Mr. Sargent was precipitated by a classroom incident in which he intentionally tipped or kicked the leg of a student's chair, causing the student to fall backward and hit his head. The student suffered minor, if any, injuries, but was allowed to remain on the floor for approximately 10 minutes, crying. During the same class period, Mr. Sargent intentionally tipped another student's chair in the same manner, but the student did not fall.
Mr. Sargent stands on his record as an excellent teacher and argues the chair-tipping incident does not constitute sufficient cause for his discharge. Furthermore, he contends it was error to consider prior instances in which he employed improper discipline against students. We disagree.
Although there is a general agreement that Mr. Sargent is a good teacher, academically, the record here confirms a pattern of unacceptable disciplinary practices by Mr. Sargent. In 1972, a teacher evaluation report contained a notation by the principal of a reported incident in which Mr. Sargent struck a student with a ruler.
In 1973, Mr.
Sargent was reprimanded for striking another student with a yardstick and making a humiliating statement to him.
Again, in 1975, Mr. Sargent struck a student with a yardstick in disobedience to prior warnings by the District. As a result, Mr. Sargent was placed on probation for the 1975-76 school year.
Up until the chair-tipping episode in 1978,
Mr. Sargent continued teaching without incident; however, in a 1976 teacher evaluation report, the principal noted concern regarding Mr. Sargent's relationship with his students and the school administration.
Based on these facts, the District, with the concurrence of the hearing officer and the trial court, could reasonably conclude that Mr. Sargent's teaching efficiency was adversely affected by his continued disregard for school policy and the practice of disciplinary techniques which threatened the physical and mental well-being of his students.
Mr. Sargent's argument, which would preclude consideration of prior incidents of improper discipline, is not well taken in light of
Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. 49,
9 Wn. App. 857, 863, 516 P.2d 1099 (1973), where the court considered the teacher's
aggregate
conduct as evidencing a pattern of deficiency. A similar argument was rejected in
Potter v. Richland School Dist. 400,
13 Wn. App. 316, 322, 534 P.2d 577 (1975). A single act of teacher misconduct may not give rise to sufficient cause for discharge. On the other hand, the fact of misconduct does not lose its relevancy with respect to teacher efficiency and performance
merely because it was not sufficiently flagrant to justify immediate dismissal. Thus, the better rule would permit consideration of prior acts of teacher misconduct extending back for a reasonable length of time.
See
Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1090, 1097 (1965). In this way, sufficient cause for discharge may be evaluated in light of the teacher's record as a whole, which may be said to demonstrate a continuing pattern of unacceptable teaching practices.
Next, Mr. Sargent contends his conduct is more properly characterized as a remediable shortcoming, calling for probation, rather than discharge, as the appropriate remedy.
Where a teacher is discharged because of classroom deficiencies, the consequences are severe. Chances of other employment in the profession are diminished, if not eliminated. Much time, effort, and money has been expended by the teacher in obtaining the requisite credentials. It would be manifestly unfair to allow a discharge for a teaching or classroom deficiency which is
reasonably correctable. . . .
It necessarily follows that conduct, practices, or methods which can fairly be characterized as
remediable teaching deficiencies
fall within the purview of the statute [RCW 28A.67.065
], and cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for discharge unless its notice and probationary procedures are complied with.
(Some italics ours.)
Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. 49, supra
at 862.
Here, Mr. Sargent has persisted in employing his own brand of discipline, despite repeated warnings from the District. The District gave Mr. Sargent an opportunity to correct this deficiency in 1975-76. While Mr. Sargent successfully completed the probationáry period, the District noted continuing concern over his relationship with his students and the school administration. The chair-tipping incident in 1978 is indicative of a recurrent problem that does not appear to be reasonably correctable. More importantly, the disciplinary practices employed by Mr. Sargent have placed the students in a position of potential harm. Under these circumstances, we think the District adequately complied with the mandate of
Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. 49, supra,
and we find sufficient cause for his discharge.
Judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Green, C.J., and Munson, J., concur.
Reconsideration denied August 31, 1979.
Review denied by Supreme Court November 30, 1979.