Hyde v. Wellpinit School District No. 49

611 P.2d 1388, 26 Wash. App. 282, 1980 Wash. App. LEXIS 2072
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedMay 29, 1980
Docket3375-9-III
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 611 P.2d 1388 (Hyde v. Wellpinit School District No. 49) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hyde v. Wellpinit School District No. 49, 611 P.2d 1388, 26 Wash. App. 282, 1980 Wash. App. LEXIS 2072 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinions

McInturff, J.

—The appellant, C. Ed Hyde, appeals the dismissal of his action challenging the nonrenewal of his contract as a principal with the respondent, Wellpinit School District No. 49.

In June 1977, Mr. Hyde, a teacher and administrator for 18 years, was employed as a principal for the Wellpinit School District No. 49 (the District) for the 1977-78 school year. Initially, Mr. Hyde enjoyed the confidence of the district superintendent, Jess Cruzen, who reported in November 1977 that he was "working well in all areas." In mid-April 1978, Mr. Cruzen approached him about his salary for the next year and indicated he would recommend renewal of his contract to the District board of directors.

On April 26, a week and a half later, however, Mr. Hyde received a letter from Mr. Cruzen listing 15 "negative items" regarding his performance as principal. After listing some positive qualities, Mr. Cruzen concluded by asking for [284]*284his voluntary resignation, "otherwise, I will have no choice but to ask the board for a non-renewal of your contract for the above stated reasons.”1

[285]*285Believing Mr. Cruzen had acted on impulse, Mr. Hyde asked to talk with the District's board of directors. After discussion at the April 27 meeting, the question of the principal's position was tabled at his request until the next regularly scheduled meeting. That meeting, scheduled for May 9, was postponed for lack of a quorum; but on May 16 the board voted to nonrenew Mr. Hyde's contract.

This action was commenced for declaratory relief seeking a decree renewing his contract, or, in the alternative, granting him the right to a probable cause hearing. The trial court dismissed this action, finding Mr. Hyde had failed to make a timely request for a hearing upon receipt of Mn Cruzen's letter of April 26.

It is unnecessary to determine whether there was a timely request for a hearing because the determinative issue is whether evaluation criteria and their application to principals under RCW 28A.67.065(2) is a condition precedent to the nonrenewal of a principal's contract. We answer in the affirmative. Subsection (2) of RCW 28A.67.065 provides:

[286]*286(2) Every board of directors shall establish evaluative criteria and procedures for all superintendents, principals, and other administrators. It shall be the responsibility of the district superintendent or his or her designee to evaluate all administrators. Such evaluation shall be based on the administrative position job description. Such criteria, when applicable, shall include at least the following categories: Knowledge of, experience in, and training in recognizing good professional performance, capabilities and development; school administration and management; school finance; professional preparation and scholarship; effort toward improvement when needed; interest in pupils, employees, patrons and subjects taught , in school; leadership; and ability and performance of evaluation of school personnel.

(Italics ours.)

In Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. 49, 9 Wn. App. 857, 861-62, 516 P.2d 1099 (1973), the court held that the meaning of the term "sufficient cause" had been modified by the former RCW 28A.67.065 insofar as it contemplated the establishment of certain substantive and procedural rights concerning the evaluation of the work of certificated employees and the improvement of stated deficiencies. Noting the severe consequences that attend a teacher's discharge, the court concluded that, "the remediable teaching deficiencies" did not constitute sufficient cause for discharge prior to compliance with the evaluation and probationary procedures of RCW 28A.67.065. Accord, Van Horn v. Highline School Dist. 401, 17 Wn. App. 170, 177, 562 P.2d 641 (1977).

The former RCW 28A.67.065 has been expanded to include principals via subsection (2); therefore, the court's analysis in Wojt is applicable here. But, contrary to the contentions of Mr. Hyde, the newly enacted RCW 28A-.67.065 does not per se require a probationary period for principals. The probationary procedures appear to be specifically limited to certificated classroom teachers and [287]*287certificated support personnel. RCW 28A.67.065(1).2 Notwithstanding this, we find that compliance with the statutory evaluation requirements of RCW 28A.67.065(2) was a condition precedent to the nonrenewal of Mr. Hyde's contract as a principal. In the words of the court in Wojt at page 862:

To hold otherwise would be to ignore the effect and purpose of the new statute, and permit discharge [or in this case, nonrenewal] for acts or conduct within its scope without following the procedures which it prescribes.

The continuing contract law, RCW 28A.67.070, is designed to protect employees of the school district from arbitrary dismissals. See Foster v. Carson School Dist. 301, 63 Wn.2d 29, 31, 385 P.2d 367 (1963). To accomplish this purpose, RCW 28A.67.065(2) requires the promulgation of evaluative criteria and the consistent application of that criteria in evaluating the performance of the particular principal.

[288]*288Even though the statute does not require a probationary period for principals, we cannot assume the legislature intended the evaluation requirements to be of no effect. Indeed, its importance is evidenced by RCW 28A.67.065(4) which states failure to conduct evaluations shall be sufficient cause for nonrenewal of the responsible administrator's contract.3

In the absence of established evaluative criteria, the principal serves at the whim and pleasure of the superintendent. The principal has no guidelines against which to measure his or her performance and may thereby be deprived of a legitimate opportunity for improvement.

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Related

Odegaard v. Everett School District No. 2
797 P.2d 1152 (Washington Supreme Court, 1990)
Benson v. Bellevue School District No. 405
707 P.2d 137 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1985)
Hyde v. Wellpinit School District No. 49
611 P.2d 1388 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
611 P.2d 1388, 26 Wash. App. 282, 1980 Wash. App. LEXIS 2072, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hyde-v-wellpinit-school-district-no-49-washctapp-1980.