Sanitary District v. . Prudden

143 S.E. 530, 195 N.C. 722, 1928 N.C. LEXIS 197
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJune 6, 1928
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 143 S.E. 530 (Sanitary District v. . Prudden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanitary District v. . Prudden, 143 S.E. 530, 195 N.C. 722, 1928 N.C. LEXIS 197 (N.C. 1928).

Opinion

Clarkson, J.

Although the agreed statement of facts is rather prolix, an analysis presents practically only two material questions:

The first material question: Is chapter 229, Private Laws 1927, a local, private or special act in violation of section 29, Article II, Constitution North Carolina, and therefore void? We think so.

Private Laws 1927, chap. 29, the caption is: “An act to create in Henderson County a special sanitary and maintenance district to be known as the Druid Hills Sanitary and Maintenance District.”

Section 1 designates the particular locality or territory, by metes and bounds. Section 5, is as follows: “To negotiate and enter into agreement with the owners of existing water supplies, sewerage system, electric light and power service, street equipment, or other such utilities as may be necessary to carry into effect the intent of this act.”

*727 Section 6: “To repair and generally to maintain in good and satisfactory working condition a sewer system, to repair and maintain the system of electric lighting installed for the lighting of said streets; to improve and maintain and beautify the parks and spaces of ground within said district dedicated to public use; to make contracts for the proper execution of the powers herein conferred, and to do everything necessary and incident to the execution of the powers herein conferred and authorized, and to pay for the same out of the district funds.”

Const. of N. C., Art. II, sec. 29, is as follows: “The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or special act or resolution, relating to the establishment of courts inferior to the Superior Court, relating to the appointment of justices of the peace; relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances; changing the names of cities, towns and townships; authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing of highways, streets or alleys; relating to ferries of bridges; relating to nonnavigable streams; relating to cemeteries; relating to the pay of jurors; erecting new townships, or changing township lines, or establishing or changing the lines of school districts; remitting fines, penalties, and forfeitures, or refunding moneys legally paid into the public treasury; regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing; extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes or otherwise relieving any collector of taxes from the due performance of his official duties or his sureties from liability; giving effect to informal wills and deeds; nor shall the General Assembly enact any such local, private or special act by the partial repeal of a general law, but the General Assembly may at any time repeal local, private or special laws enacted by it. Any local, private or special act or resolution passed in violation of the provisions of this section shall be void. The General Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating matters set out in this section.”

We think Day v. Comrs., 191 N. C., 780 decisive of the first proposition. At pp. 783-4, it is said: “The first section of the act before us commands the commissioners of Surry and Yadkin counties to construct one bridge across the Yadkin River at a place which is pointed out and particularly defined; it is direct legislation addressed to the accomplishment of a single designated purpose at a ‘specific spot’; it is therefore a local and special act, and as such is expressly prohibited by Art. II, sec. 29, of the Constitution. In further elucidation of this provision the following additional cases may be consulted: Trustees v. Trust Co., 181 N. C., 306; Sechrist v. Comrs., ibid., 511; Robinson v. Comrs., 182 N. C., 590; Galloway v. Board of Education, 184 N. C., 245.”

Reed v. Engineering Co., 188 N. C., p. 39, is distinguishable from the Day case, supra. In the Reed case, this Court sustained chapter 341, *728 Public-Local Laws 1923, entitled “An act to create sanitary districts in Buncombe County, and describing their purposes and powers,” against the objection that it violated section 29, Art. II. In that case the act applied generally to the entire county of Buncombe. It was there said (at p. 44) : “Nor do we think the law is subject to the objection that it is local or special. A law which applies generally to a particular class of cases is not a local or special law. Hymes v. Aydolott, 26 Ind., 431; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind., 329; 15 L. R. A., 508.” Davis v. Lenoir, 178 N. C., 668.

It will be noted that the powers conferred by this local, private or special act in controversy, which we think void, are far more extensive than in the Reed case, supra.

The second material question: “Druid Hills Sanitary District was created pursuant to the provisions of a general act entitled £An act to enable the creation, government, maintenance and operation of sanitary districts and prescribing the powers of such districts,’ ratified 4 March, 1927, constituting chapter 100, Public Laws 1927; and every requirement of the said general act for the creation of the said district and the issuance of the bonds hereinafter mentioned has been complied with,” etc. Is this act constitutional and the bonds valid? We think so.

The act seems to be carefully drawn. Section 1, is as follows: “For the purpose of preserving and promoting the public health and welfare the State Board of Health may, as hereinafter provided, create sanitary districts without regard for county, township or municipal lines: Provided, however, that no municipal corporation or any part of the territory in a municipal corporation shall he included in a sanitary district except at the reguest of the governing body of such municipal corporation.”

Fifty-one per cent or more of the resident freeholders within the proposed sanitary district may petition the board or boards of county commissioners, in which the land is situate, setting forth the boundaries of the proposed district. Public hearing is had after notice. If approved by the hoard or boards of county commissioners, petition transmitted to State Board of Health, to hold public hearing after notice. If State Board of Health shall deem it advisable to comply with the request, district shall be created and established, declaring the territory within such boundaries to be a sanitary district.

Section 5. “If, after hearing, the State Board of Health shall deem it advisable to comply with the request of said petition and that a district for the purpose or purposes therein stated should he created and established, the State Board of Health shall adopt a resolution to that effect, defining the boundaries of such district and declaring the territory within such boundaries to be -a sanitary district: (Italics ours) Pro *729 vided, however,

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Bluebook (online)
143 S.E. 530, 195 N.C. 722, 1928 N.C. LEXIS 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanitary-district-v-prudden-nc-1928.