O'Hara v. Luckenbach Steamship Co.

269 U.S. 364, 46 S. Ct. 157, 70 L. Ed. 313, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 870
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 4, 1926
Docket224
StatusPublished
Cited by64 cases

This text of 269 U.S. 364 (O'Hara v. Luckenbach Steamship Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
O'Hara v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 269 U.S. 364, 46 S. Ct. 157, 70 L. Ed. 313, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 870 (1926).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Sutherland

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners, libellants below, quit the service' of the steamship company and sought to' recover their earned wages on the ground of a violation of § 2 of the Seamen’s Act of March 4, 1015, c. 153, 38 Stat. 1164, copied in the margin. 1 Omitting the various provisions with which we *366 are not here concerned, the pertinent requirement of that section is that “ the sailors shall, while at sea, be divided into at least two, and the firemen, oilers, and water tenders into at least three watches, which shall be kept on duty successively for the performance of ordinary work incident to the sailing and management of the vessel.” For a failure on the part of the master to comply with this, among other provisions of the section, the seamen are entitled to a discharge and to receive the wages earned. The failure complained of was that the sailors were not divided into watches of equal or approximately equal numbers, as, it was insisted, the statute contemplated.

The company was the owner of the steamship “ Lewis Luckenbach,” a vessel of 14,400 tons burden, upon which libellants were hired as sailors for a voyage from New York to Pacific ports and return to some port north of Cape Hatteras on the Atlantic. Altogether, there were thirteen sailors on board, three of whom, including libellants, were assigned as quartermasters. On the voyage and while at . sea, these sailors were not equally divided into watches. Three watches were on duty, each consisting of one quartermaster and one able seaman, the remaining seven sailors being kept at day work only. The district court dismissed the libel and this was affirmed by the court of appeals. 1 Fed. (2nd) 923. Both courts' were of opinion that the primary object of the statutory provision was to fix hours of service so as to prevent overwork, not to prescribe the number of seamen on each watch. The district court thought that this conception of the law was borne out by the consideration that, if one-half or one-third of the crew must be assigned to duty at night, a majority of them would have little or nothing •to do. The court of appeals seemed to think that the purpose of Congress to provide for the safety of the ship was satisfied rather in the selection of qualified quartermasters and men for the lookout than in the equality of the watches. With these views we are unable to agree.

*367 ■The general purpose of the Seamen’s Act is not only to safeguard the welfare pf the seamen as workmen, but,' as set forth in the title, also “to promote safety at sea.” The Act as a whole shows very clearly that, while hours of work and proper periods of rest were regarded as considerations of primary concern while the vessel is in a safe harbor, these considerations must yield, as they have always yielded, to the paramount necessity of safety while the ship is at sea. And, as indicating that the provision under review was not intended primarily as a regulation of working hours, it is significant that it does not apply to the entire crew, but requires a division into watches only of the sailors and the firemen, oilers and water tenders. It is natural to suppose that if the purpose of Congress was chiefly to regulate hours of work, something would have been said about the service, while at sea, of those employed in the steward’s department as well. And not only is the division confined to those of the crew engaged in the mechanics of conducting the ship on her voyage, but the imperative requirement is that the watches into which they are divided “shall be kept on duty successively,” that is to say by turns, so that one watch must come on as another goes off. The evident purpose was to compel a division of the men for duty on deck and in the fireroom and continuity of service, to the end that in those departments the ship should at all times be actively manned with equal efficiency. It probably is true, as said below, that to construe the statute as compelling numerical equality of the watches will result, so far as the sailors are concerned, in the performance of less work on deck at night. And it may-be noted, in that connection, that in the hearings before the House committee having charge of the bill, it was objected on behalf of the shipowners, obviously, as the context shows, upon the theory that such equality was in fact contemplated by the provision, that, “ on cargo steamers, it would *368 be an injustice to keep a lot of men on watch, all night, and have nothing for them to do.” House Hearings on S. 136, Yol. 104, pt. 2, p. 5, Eeb. 24, 1914. But the provision, fundamentally, is a measure of precaution against those perilous and often unexpected emergencies of the sea when only immediate and wakeful readiness for action may avert disaster or determine the issue between life and death; its effect as a regulator of working conditions is a matter of subordinate intent. A consideration of other safety provisions of the Act will help to make this clear.

Among them, the Act (§ 13, p. 1169) provides that not less than seventy-five per centum of the crew in each department .shall be able to understand any. order given by the officers of such vessel; and that a certain percentage of her deck crew shall be of a rating not less than able seaman — meaning, except. on the Great Lakes, a seaman nineteen years of age or upwards who has had at least three years’ service on deck at sea or on the Great-Lakes. It also contains elaborate provisions (§ 14, pp. 1170-1184) for the equipment of ocean-going vessels with . life-saving appliances, and, among other things, requires (p. 1180) that “At no moment on its voyage may any ocean-cargo steam vessel of the United States have on' board a total number of persons greater than that for whom accommodation is provided in • the lifeboats on board.” None of these provisions is of much if any concern except as a precaution against the unusual crises of the sea.

As a ship pursues her way in security, perhaps for many years, these requirements for safety appliances and for able seamen may seem over-exacting, and the language test, as well as a division of the watches into equal numbers, needlessly burdensome. But it is apparent from the. hearings and debates, that Congress looked forward to the possibility of other disasters like those of - the *369 Titanic and the Volturno, (the facts of which had been subjected to inquiry by its committees) where, in the one, the lack of lifeboats probably caused the loss of many lives, although in a quiet sea, and where, in the other, lifeboats lowered in a great storm were engulfed, it was thought by some, from the absence of the skill of able seamen in launching them; or like that of the City of Rio de Janeiro (In re Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 130 Fed. 76), which sank with many of its lifeboats unlaunched because the crew of Chinese sailors were unable to understand the language in which the orders of their officers were given. The following from the opinion in that case (pp. 82-83) is peculiarly apposite:

It is, as was said by Judge Hawley in Be Meyer (D. C.) 74 Fed.

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Bluebook (online)
269 U.S. 364, 46 S. Ct. 157, 70 L. Ed. 313, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 870, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ohara-v-luckenbach-steamship-co-scotus-1926.