Sandra W. v. Dreyer CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 9/10/26 Sandra W. v. Dreyer CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

SANDRA W., B340601

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

v. 24CHRO00679)

RANDOLPH EUGENE DREYER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Amanda S. Park, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Shulman Bastian Friedman Bui & O’Dea and Franklin J.

Contreras, Jr. for Defendant and Appellant.

Sandra W., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

Randolph Eugene Dreyer (Dreyer) appeals from a civil harassment restraining order (restraining order) issued against him to protect Sandra W. (Sandra).1 Dreyer contends that substantial evidence does not support the restraining order, and that Sandra did not establish a reasonable likelihood the purported harassment would recur or clear and convincing evidence of her emotional distress. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts Dreyer hired Sandra as a personal organizer in 2017.

Sandra handled many aspects of Dreyer’s life, including his shopping. Dreyer “came to trust [Sandra] more than anyone else[.]”

In December 2022, Dreyer transferred $10,000 into an account for Sandra. Sandra contends this was a gift, but Dreyer claims it was a loan.

By August 2023, Sandra had stopped working for Dreyer.

Sandra alleged that “when [she] quit[,] [Dreyer] called [her] over and over for days/hours[.]” Sandra alleged that Dreyer “persistently contact[ed] [her] friends/family” and “began to email threats to [her].”

In one email sent at 2:39 a.m. on April 2, 2024, Dreyer wrote: “I am reporting you to the authorities . . . . All of your clients should beware of your manipulative, seductive behavior. You stole from me. You interfered with my personal life. You are

1 Per California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(5), we initially refer to the person protected in this civil harassment proceeding by her first name and last initial, and thereafter by her first name only. No disrespect is intended.

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a menace. I will not let you get away with what you have done.” Dreyer also wrote that Sandra “conned [him] out of $10,000” and “participated in a horrifying assault on [his] life and financial well-being[.]”

On April 17, 2024, Dreyer left Sandra a voicemail saying “[y]ou stole from me.” Five days later, he left another voicemail saying, “[d]o you really want to fuck with me? Sandra, I’m putting you in prison.”

Sandra further alleged that Dreyer threatened her livelihood by contacting her clients via email. For example, Sandra alleged that Dreyer forwarded his email of April 2, 2024, at 2:39 a.m. to one of her clients.

Sandra alleged that as a result of Dreyer’s harassment campaign, she suffered emotional distress. She was also “concerned” that Dreyer’s “extremely disparaging comments” would “cost [her] [her] professional career[.]” II. Procedural History On April 9, 2024, Sandra sought a restraining order against Dreyer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.2 Dreyer filed two oppositions, including a declaration that he “ha[d] not [engaged] and will not engage in . . . a course of conduct . . . intended to . . . harass[]” Sandra. Dreyer also averred that he would “refrain from attempting to contact or communicate with [Sandra] directly or indirectly through third parties.”

2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

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On July 9, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Sandra’s petition.3 The court heard testimony from Sandra, who presented the court with a packet of evidence, including the April 17 and 22 voicemails from Dreyer, which were played in court. Dreyer did not attend the hearing due to his health. His counsel, who did attend, cross-examined Sandra and presented argument on Dreyer’s behalf.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued a one-year restraining order against Dreyer. The court explained that “the tone of the words used [by Dreyer] and the e-mails sent is not just asking for money that was loaned or stolen from him to be returned, they are words designed to alarm, annoy, and harass” Sandra. The court concluded that Sandra “ha[d] met the burden of proof and good cause exists to issue the restraining order[.]” The restraining order expired on July 9, 2025.4 Dreyer timely appealed.

3 The hearing was twice continued, once at Sandra’s request and once on the trial court’s own motion. 4 We exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this arguably moot appeal because “[a]pplying a strict standard of mootness . . . would effectively deprive persons affected by injunctions of limited duration from obtaining any judicial review.” (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 728; see also In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute”].)

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DISCUSSION

I. Relevant Law Section 527.6 “provid[es] expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment. [Citation.]” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412.) A person who has suffered harassment may obtain a restraining order if, after a hearing, a trial court finds clear and convincing evidence of unlawful harassment. (§ 527.6, subds. (a)(1), (i).) “The ‘ “ ‘[c]lear and convincing’ ” ’ standard ‘ “requires a finding of high probability” ’ of unlawful harassment. [Citation.]” (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 688, 698 (E.G.).)

The statutory definition of harassment includes “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, . . . that serves no legitimate purpose[,] . . . . would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and . . . actually cause[s] substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A course of conduct can include “making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including . . . email[.]” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) II. Standards of Review We review the trial court’s factual findings (express and implied) in granting a civil harassment restraining order for substantial evidence. (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.) Because the trial court must make its finding of unlawful harassment under the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof (§ 527.6, subd. (i)), “the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly

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probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011 (O.B.).)

“When conducting our review, we must ‘not reweigh the evidence itself’ [citation], but must instead ‘view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ [Citation.] Whether the facts, supported by substantial evidence and construed most favorably in the petitioner’s favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under section 527.6 is a ‘ “question[ ] of law subject to de novo review.” ’ [Citations.]” (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.) III. Analysis Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Sandra needed protection from Dreyer’s harassment. Sandra presented evidence that Dreyer sent her several harassing emails and voicemails over a three-week period in April 2024. And she testified that this was not the first time Dreyer had behaved this way; when Sandra quit working for him eight months earlier, he “called [her] over and over for days/hours[.]” These incidents constitute “a knowing and willful course of conduct” directed at Sandra which “seriously alarm[ed], annoy[ed], or harasse[d]” her, warranting a restraining order. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)

Dreyer raises four arguments against this conclusion.

First, he contends that his emails and voicemails do not constitute harassment because they served a legitimate purpose—namely, the recovery of money and property he believed Sandra was improperly withholding. But after listening

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to Dreyer’s voicemails and evaluating their tone, the trial court found that he went beyond “just asking for money that was loaned or stolen from him to be returned” and used “words designed to alarm, annoy, and harass” Sandra. On appeal, we must “give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699; see also Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1163 [“[t]he trial judge, having heard the evidence, observed the witnesses, their demeanor, attitude, [and] candor or lack of candor, is best qualified to pass upon and determine the factual issues presented by their testimony”].) Regardless, we cannot review the voicemails because they are not part of the record.5 We thus defer to the trial court’s characterization of Dreyer’s voicemails, and we independently conclude that his communications rose to the level of harassment. (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.)

5 These voicemails were not admitted into evidence. Dreyer’s trial counsel did not raise the issue at the restraining order hearing. Dreyer’s trial counsel requested a second hearing, in part to ensure that evidence had been properly admitted so he would have a clear record for this appeal. Although counsel asked the trial court to mark and receive several exhibits, he again failed to raise any issue with the voicemails. And Dreyer does not challenge the voicemails on appeal. Therefore, he has forfeited any evidentiary challenge to the voicemails. (Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 184, 197, fn. 6 [“an appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure”]; Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 200, fn. 10 [“an appellant’s failure to raise an issue in its opening brief waives the issue on appeal”].)

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Second, Dreyer argues that the restraining order falls outside the bounds of the civil harassment statute, as Sandra’s petition primarily sought to protect her professional reputation and stop Dreyer from speaking to her other clients. Section 527.6 “focuses ‘narrowly’ on ‘interpersonal conflict’ ” between the petitioner and the harassing party (Luo v. Volokh (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1312, 1323); the statute should not be used as a proxy vehicle for other tort claims. But while Sandra’s petition may have been overbroad, it also contained a valid harassment claim. The trial court appropriately focused on the narrow issue of the parties’ interpersonal conflict, denied Sandra’s request to enjoin Dreyer from speaking publicly or personally to Sandra’s other clients, and tailored the restraining order to the aims of the civil harassment statute.

Third, Dreyer contends that Sandra failed to establish a reasonable probability that he “would repeat or continue any of his [harassing] conduct[,]” especially in light of his declaration testimony that he would no longer attempt “ ‘to contact or communicate with’ ” Sandra.

A restraining order, like other injunctions, “is authorized only when it appears that wrongful acts are likely to recur.” (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 402.) A party’s express representation that he will abstain from future contact can provide evidence that harassing conduct is unlikely to recur. (Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 336 (Scripps Health).) However, we infer from the trial court’s findings that it did not credit Dreyer’s declaration.6 (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 699 [we must “give appropriate deference to

6 Dreyer did not testify at the hearing, so the trial court had no opportunity to evaluate his credibility directly.

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how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses”].) Here, Dreyer’s promise to stop harassing Sandra was preceded by his conviction that he “ha[d] not . . . engage[d] [in] a course of conduct that was intended to or had the purpose of harassing” Sandra. The trial court could well have concluded that Dreyer’s inability or unwillingness to recognize that he had crossed the line in the past made it unlikely that he would be able to recognize and abstain from harassing conduct in the future. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].)

The trial court’s determination is also supported by other facts in the record suggesting the likelihood of recurrent harassment, including Dreyer’s prior history of harassing Sandra via phone, the ongoing dispute between them regarding the $10,000 gift or loan, and the tone of the voicemails. (Contra Scripps Health, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 336 [no evidence of likely recurrence when, among other things, there had been no prior acts of harassment and circumstances made it unlikely that the parties would have future contact].) Because the voicemails are not part of the record, we defer to the trial court’s characterization of their tone.

Finally, Dreyer argues that Sandra did not prove she suffered substantial emotional distress by clear and convincing evidence. Not so. A trial court may infer substantial emotional distress from the nature of the harassing conduct. (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1110–1111, disapproved of on another ground by O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1010, fn. 7.) More important, after receiving Sandra’s in-person testimony and evaluating her credibility, the trial court concluded that she had suffered “emotional harm” and “stress” sufficient to issue the

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restraining order. “Inferences may be drawn . . . from the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying.” (E.G., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 704–705; see also In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 119 [“ ‘The testimony of one witness, even that of a party, may constitute substantial evidence’ ”].) We will not second guess that determination on appeal. (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1008 [we “may not insert [our] own views regarding the credibility of witnesses in place of the assessments conveyed by the judgment”].)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondent Sandra W. is entitled to her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

GOORVITCH, J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.