Sandmann v. Petron

404 N.W.2d 800, 1987 Minn. LEXIS 758
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedMay 8, 1987
DocketC0-87-23
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 404 N.W.2d 800 (Sandmann v. Petron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sandmann v. Petron, 404 N.W.2d 800, 1987 Minn. LEXIS 758 (Mich. 1987).

Opinions

SCOTT, Justice.

Stephen T. Petron (Petron), a chiropractor, petitioned for a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a district court order subjecting him to a deposition prior to the commencement of a medical malpractice complaint. The writ will issue.

Douglas Sandmann (Sandmann) brought a special proceeding in the Brown County District Court seeking an order under Rule 27 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to enable him to depose Petron in order to obtain information Sandmann believed necessary to enable a medical consultant to ascertain whether or not Petron was professionally negligent in his treatment of Sandmann. The district court ordered that depositions of both Sandmann and Petron be taken at the same time. Petron petitioned the Minnesota Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals requested certification of this matter pursuant to Rule 118, subd. 3, of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure and Minnesota Statutes § 480A. 10, subd. 2(b)(i) (1986). This court granted certification.

In his verified petition, Sandmann alleges that he suffered a stroke as a direct result of chiropractic treatment administered by Petron, and that he has been disabled from returning to his regular employment as a New Ulm police officer. He further alleges that Minn.Stat. § 145.682 (1986)1 requires an affidavit of expert review to be served with the summons and complaint in a malpractice case and that the expert he consulted needed to know about the physical examination, chiropractic treatment, and type of adjustment performed in order to form an opinion regarding the propriety of Petron’s treatment of him. Sandmann’s records have already been turned over to him.

The issue for decision is whether a trial court may subject a health care provider to being deposed prior to the commencement [802]*802of an action, when the purpose of the deposition is the discovery of information to obtain the certification required under section 145.682.

Sandmann is not seeking to perpetuate testimony. Rather, he seeks discovery of information necessary for his complaint. The trial court recognized this, but nevertheless granted the petition because without this discovery “[pjetitioner’s possibly meritorious claim would be defeated.” This court, however, when construing Rule 27.01,2 has stated that: “Under the guise of liberal construction, we should not emasculate the rules by permitting something which was never intended or is not within the declared objects for which they were adopted.” Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 562, 68 N.W.2d 649, 658 (1955).

Rule 27 allows perpetuation of testimony to prevent a failure or delay of justice. See Minn.R.Civ.P. 27.01(3). Perpetuating testimony means “preserving the testimony of witness, which might otherwise be lost before the trial in which it is intended to be used.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1027 (5th ed. 1979). Reasons for perpetuating testimony include: The witness is aged, the witness is ill, or the witness is preparing to leave the country for a lengthy or indefinite period of time. See In re Boland, 79 F.R.D. 665, 667 (D.D.C.1978) (petition denied because no evidence that testimony would be unavailable after complaint was filed). Sandmann, however, has made no allegation that Petron’s testimony would not be available after Sandmann commenced an action.

Minnesota’s Rule 27.01 is substantially identical to federal Rule 27(a). Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 27(a) with Minn.R.Civ.P. 27.-01. Federal courts considering this rule have held that it is not a device for discovering information to enable plaintiff to draw a proper complaint. See, e.g., In re Gary Constr., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 432 (D.Colo.1983); In re Boland, 79 F.R.D. 665 (D.D.C.1978); In re North Carolina, 68 F.R.D. 410 (S.D.N.Y.1975); In re Gurnsey, 223 F.Supp. 359 (D.D.C.1963); see also, Annotation, Right to Perpetuation of Testimony under Rule 27 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 A.L.R.Fed. 924, 937-39 (1982) (relief unavailable for purpose of obtaining discovery to frame complaint). Several state courts have also denied discovery to obtain information to frame a complaint. See, e.g., Worley v. Worley, 161 Ga.App. 44, 45, 288 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1982) (rule regarding perpetuating testimony is not a method to determine whether a cause of action exists); In re Vermilion Parish School Bd., 357 So.2d 1295, 1298 (La.Ct.App.1978) (allegation that petitioner is unable to bring action for lack of sufficient information is not enough for rule regarding perpetuating testimony). This court has also, in a slightly different context, stated that Rule 27.01, “relating to perpetuation of evidence^] * * * is not intended as a discovery procedure.” Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 557, 68 N.W.2d 649, 655 (1955); see also Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 Minn.L.Rev. 633, 655 n. 63 (1952) (“Rule 27 pertains to perpetuation, rather than discovery as such * * (emphasis in original)).

Sandmann argued in his petition to take Petron’s deposition that:

[803]*803The legislature, had it intended to do so, could have provided that the taking of a deposition before action in a malpractice situation was prohibited. That was not done, and we respectfully urge that it is untenable to argue that such a prohibition should be implied. * * * There is no reason to presume or assume that the legislature intended a greater restriction than is set forth in the statute.

Sandmann was arguing that Rule 27.01 applied to medical malpractice actions, not that the statute, section 145.682, created a right to depose the health care provider before commencing an action. He does not come within this rule, however. We therefore reiterate that we will not emasculate the rule and permit something that was never intended.

Let the writ issue.

YETKA and KELLEY, JJ., dissent.

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Bluebook (online)
404 N.W.2d 800, 1987 Minn. LEXIS 758, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sandmann-v-petron-minn-1987.