WILKINS, Justice:
T1 Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of sixteen of the eighteen defendants named in plaintiff's complaint. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
¶ 2 Plaintiff Ricky Lee Sanders seeks damages for himself and on behalf of his nine-month-old daughter Breanna Marie Loveless, who died tragically from pneumonia. Plaintiff asserts that Bobbie Dawn Wid-dison, Breanna's mother, and Travis Widdi-son contributed to Breanna's death because they physically abused her and failed to provide her with adequate medical care. Plaintiff further contends that several state government officials, state government entities, and attorneys involved in the class action lawsuit of David C. v. Michael O. Leavitt, No. 93-C-206W (D. Utah filed Feb. 25, 1998), of which he contends Breanna was a member, are somehow responsible for, at least in part, Breanna's death.
1 3 Plaintiff's complaint lists several causes of action against eighteen defendants. Plaintiff named eight "state defendants." Of these eight state defendants, plaintiff first named six state officials: Michael O. Leavitt, in his capacity as Governor of the State of Utah; Kerry D. Steadman, in his capacity as Executive Director of the Department of Human Services of the State of Utah; Mary T. Noonan, in her capacity as Director of the Division of Child and Family Services of the State of Utah; Jan Graham, in her capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah; Carol Clawson, in her capacity as Solicitor [1054]*1054General of the State of Utah; and Linda Luinstra, in her capacity as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah. He then named two State agencies: The Utah State Department of Human Services and the Division of Family Services2 Plaintiff further named four "attorney defendants": two individual attorneys, William Lee Grimm and Michael Patrick O'Brien, and two organizations that provide legal services, the National Center for Youth Law, and the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook, and MeDon-ough, all of whom represented the plaintiffs' class in David C. Plaintiff also named as defendants the monitoring panel created pursuant to the settlement agreement 3 in David C.; including Pamela Atkinson, in her eapacity as Chair of the monitoring panel, and Sherianne Cotterell and Larry Lunt, both members of the monitoring panel (collectively the "monitoring panel defendants").
14 Plaintiff alleged several legal theories against these cighteen defendants. Against the eight state defendants, he alleged wrongful death, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Against the four monitoring panel defendants, he alleged negligence. Against the four attorney defendants he alleged breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence. Against Bobbie Dawn and Travis Widdison he alleged wrongful death.
T5 The gravamen of plaintiff's argument is that defendants somehow failed to meet their duty of care to Breanna. Plaintiff professes that the state defendants, attorney defendants, and monitoring panel defendants assumed some sort of duty to care for Breanna when they entered into the settlement agreement in the case of David C., that they breached this assumed duty by allowing the Widdisons to physically abuse and fail to adequately care for Breanna, and that the breach of this duty caused or contributed to, at least in part, Breanna's death.
T6 All of the defendants except Bobbie Dawn and Travis Widdison filed motions to dismiss.4 The eight state defendants and the four monitoring panel defendants, all represented by the Utah Attorney General's Office, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on March 19, 1998. The four attorney defendants filed their motion to dismiss on April 1, 1998. On July 15, 1998, the district court granted both motions, resulting in the dismissal of all of the defendants except for the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) and the Widdisons.
17 Regarding the attorney defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court did not indicate on what basis it granted the motion. We are thus left to assume it was based upon the contention that the attorney defendants did not owe a duty to protect Breanna from physical harm, an argument placed before the court in the attorney defendants' memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's opposition, and the attorney defendants' reply.5
T8 In granting the motion to dismiss filed by the state defendants and the monitoring panel defendants, the district court provided reasoning. In sum, the district court dismissed all of the monitoring panel defendants and all of the state defendants, except for DCFS, for one of three reasons: (1) plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim required by section 63-80-12 of the Utah Code, (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the feder[1055]*1055al consent decree in David C. as a state court, or (8) the defendants did not owe a duty of care to Breanna. The district court dismissed "[clount I of plaintiffs complaint," the wrongful death action against the state defendants, for "failure to file a notice of claim as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12" as to all of the state defendants, except for DCFS.6 The monitoring panel defendants were also dismissed because plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim. The district court dismissed "[clount II of plaintiff's complaint," the breach of contract claim against the state defendants, as to the eight state defendants and the four monitoring panel defendants for lack of jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree in David C. The district court dismissed "[clJount III of plaintiff's complaint," the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as to the same eight state defendants and the same four monitoring panel defendants, again for lack of jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree in David C. Finally, the district court dismissed "[clount IV," the negli-genee claim against the monitoring panel defendants, because "they did not owe a duty of care to Breanna Loveless."
T 9 Inasmuch as DCFS was not dismissed, DCFS filed a motion for summary judgment on November 4, 1998. DCFS argued that it was immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act based upon the three-step approach in Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1998). DCFS reasoned (1) that its alleged negligence, failure to protect Breanna from assault and battery, was a governmental function, (2) that immunity was waived because the injury was proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the DFS employees assigned to Breanna's case, but (8) that the assault and battery exception to the waiver of immunity applied. The State offered the testimony of Dr. Robert Kir-schner, an expert who testified in the Widdi-son's criminal trial, to support its contention that Breanna's death arose out of assault or battery.
10 Interestingly, two motions in opposition to DCFS's motion for summary judgment were filed by different attorneys for plaintiff On December 4, 1998, plaintiffs first lawyer filed a memorandum in opposition. In this first opposition to the motion, plaintiff offered the testimony of Dr. Edward Leis to contradict Dr. Kirschner's testimony. DCFS filed a reply on December 15, 1998. The court heard argument on December 20, 1998, and the court's minutes reflect that defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. However, on August 3, 1999, the district court granted plaintiffs motion to strike evidence offered by DCFS in support of its motion for summary judgment, and the court further granted plaintiff time to file another opposition to DCFS's motion for summary judgment.
111 Plaintiff's second attorney, D. Kevin DeGraw, entered his appearance and filed the second opposition to DCFS's motion for summary judgment. This second opposition contains the autopsy report of Dr. Leis and an affidavit of Dr. Martin J. Nygaard, both of which plaintiff contends rebut Dr. Kir-schner's conclusion that Breanna's death arose from assault and battery because her pneumonia was caused by the physical abuse she suffered. DCFS subsequently filed its reply, advocating that plaintiff failed to dispute that Breanna's death arose out of assault or battery.
112 The district court granted DCFS's motion for summary judgment. The district court declared that "[the testimony of Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, M.D., was accepted into the record" and "established that Brean-na Loveless was a physically abused child, . and that she developed pneumonia as a direct result of being an abused child." The district court further declared that Dr. Leis "testified that he didn't believe Breanna would have died of pneumonia in the absence of the effect of the physical trauma she also suffered." The district court then concluded that "[pllaintiff's expert, Martin J. Nygaard, M.D., does not go far enough to refute the existence of a causal connection between the pneumonia which caused Breanna's death [1056]*1056and the physical abuse she suffered." Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint against DCFS was dismissed.
113 Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of all sixteen defendants dismissed by the trial court.
ANALYSIS
€ 14 Plaintiff frankly fails to make clear his argument. That said, it appears to us that plaintiff argues that the state defendants should not have been dismissed because the existing law regarding governmental immunity should be overturned, or, that this court should somehow clarify Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City School District, 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996). With respect to the other defendants, the monitoring panel defendants and the attorney defendants, plaintiff appears to insist that the attorney defendants should not have been dismissed because the attorneys representing the class in David C. owed Breanna a duty, and the monitoring panel defendants also owed Breanna some type of duty. Plaintiff has not made clear, however, either in the briefs or after being invited to do so at oral argument, the nature of the duty owed by these defendants to Breanna.
{15 The state defendants and the monitoring panel defendants argue that all but DCFS are immune because plaintiff failed to provide them with notice of his claim. In other words, because DCFS was the only state defendant to be notified of plaintiff's claim against it, as is required by section 63-30-12 of the Utah Code, DCFS is the only state defendant or monitoring panel defendant against whom plaintiff's complaint was not barred. The state defendants further contend, however, that even though it received a notice of claim, DCFS is also immune from suit in this case because Brean-na's death arose out of an assault and battery. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-80-10(2) (1997).
116 The attorney defendants argue they were properly dismissed because, as counsel for the plaintiff class in the case of David C., they never assumed a duty to protect Brean-na and other members of the plaintiff class from physical harm caused by third parties. The attorney defendants further insist that plaintiff's appeal is frivolous and that damages and attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A. All Defendants but the Division of Child and Family Services
117 All of the defendants except for DCFS were dismissed following motions to dismiss. "Because the propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of law, we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court." Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ¶ 2, 20 P.3d 895, 897 (citing St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)).
118 First, we conclude that all of the state defendants, except DCFS, were appropriately dismissed because plaintiff failed to provide them with notice of his claim as required by section 63-30-12 of the Utah Code. Plaintiff does not contest that he failed to do so. Consequently, plaintiff's claim against the state defendants is barred. See Utah Code Ann § 68-80-12 (1997).
$19 Second, plaintiff's complaint against the monitoring panel defendants is also barred. It is well settled that judicial officers are absolutely immune from liability for damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities and committed within their judicial jurisdiction. Seq, eg., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-29, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). This absolute judicial immunity has been extended to others who perform functions closely related to the judicial process. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985). Because absolute immunity flows not from the status of the official, but from the nature of the responsibilities of the official, the United States Supreme Court has listed several factors, among others, as guidance for consideration in determining absolute as contrasted with qualified immunity:
(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of [1057]*1057safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal.
Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202, 106 S.Ct. 496.
1 20 We conclude that the monitoring panel acts in a judicial role and is therefore immune from suit for the negligence alleged by plaintiff, The monitoring panel was devised as part of the settlement agreement between the State of Utah and the plaintiff class in the case of David C. The monitoring panel's purpose is to act on behalf of the federal district court to monitor compliance with the settlement agreement and report on whether the parties, particularly the defendants, comply with the settlement agreement. Specifically, the role of the monitoring panel is to determine "overall, systematic patterns of compliance or non-compliance, not on{ly] isolated instances. . . ." The panel's findings are published as a public document. Before they are published, however, the findings are provided to counsel for both sides for suggestions regarding the redaction of privileged information. If the monitoring panel determines that the defendants are not in compliance, the decision is reviewable by the federal district court.
«[ 21 The monitoring panel must be able to perform its function of ensuring compliance without harassment or intimidation. The oversight by the federal district court, a safeguard, reduces the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct, and sufficiently insulates the panel from political influence. The monitoring panel is controlled by the settlement agreement, and its responsibility to oversee compliance is the oversight of an adversarial situation. Finally, review by the district court of any decisions made by the monitoring panel ensures the correctability of error on appeal. In sum, the monitoring panel assists a judicial official, the federal district court, and acts under the court's direction and authority in performing functions closely tied to the judicial process.
122 As far as we can tell, plaintiff is requesting damages from the monitoring panel for negligence committed in its official quasi-judicial role. Furthermore, there is nothing in the complaint suggesting that the monitoring panel acted outside of its authority or quasi-judicial capacity. As a result, we conclude that the monitoring panel is entitled to judicial immunity from suit in this case.
T23 Third, the trial court did not err in dismissing the attorney defendants. We find no compelling reason to conclude that the attorney defendants assumed, by virtue of representing the plaintiff class in the case of David C., a duty to ensure Breanna's physical well-being, either to protect her and the other members of the class from physical abuse inflicted by third parties such as the Widdisons, or to ensure that she received proper medical care. Counsel did not assume a role in loco parentis. Moreover, plaintiff did not provide, nor are we aware of, any authority which imposes a duty upon counsel for a plaintiff's class to protect members of the class from abuse from third parties and care for their personal needs. Even further, when invited by the court to clarify the nature of the duty owed by the attorney defendants, plaintiff failed to articulate one. Accordingly, the attorney defendants were properly dismissed.
B. The Division of Child and Family Services
{24 The only defendant not yet accounted for, the Division of Child and Family Services, was also appropriately dismissed. We review the trial court's order granting summary judgment for correctness. See, eg., Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, ¶ 9, 995 P.2d 1237, 1242. We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting DCFS's motion for summary judgment.
125 The district court concluded that DCFS was immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 68-80-1 to -88 (1997). In Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 19983), we explained the analytical framework for determining whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under [1058]*1058the Act. The Ledfors framework suggests a three-step inquiry:
First, was the activity the entity performed a governmental function and therefore immunized from suit by the general grant of immunity contained in section 63-30-37? Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-38 (1989) [now codified at section 63-30-3(1) 1. Second, if the activity was a governmental function, has some other section of the Act waived that blanket immunity? Third, if the blanket immunity has been waived, does the Act also contain an exception to that waiver which results in a retention of immunity against the particular claim asserted in this case?
Id. at 1164.
126 The district court, using Ledfors as a guide, properly applied the Act to the facts of this case in granting the motion for summary judgment. First, DCFS's actions or alleged failure to act through the individuals assigned to Breanna's case, Ms. Pamela Goodrich and her assistant, constitute a governmental function. The Act defines "governmental function" as:
any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-80-2(4)(a) (1997). Given this broad definition, the alleged actions or omissions of DCFS and its employees regarding Breanna in this case fall within the definition of a governmental function.
{27 We next look to whether some section of the Act has waived that blanket immunity, and if so, whether an exception to that waiver exists, thereby retaining immunity. The version of section 63-30-10 in effect at the time of Breanna's death read, in relevant part:
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:
[[Image here]]
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights;
Utah Code Ann. § 63-80-10 (1989); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-80-10 amendment notes (1997) (stating "[the 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective July 1, 1996, added 'in connection with, or results from' to the end of the introductory paragraph").
$28 Defendants argue immunity is retained because Breanna's death arose out of abuse inflicted by the Widdisons. Plaintiff argues that section 63-80-10(2) can be interpreted in two different ways. One interpretation is that immunity is retained regardless of who commits the battery. The other interpretation, the one proposed by plaintiff, is that immunity should be retained only if the battery is committed by the employee within the scope of employment.
129 We have previously held in several cases that immunity is retained under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act if an assault or battery is involved, regardless of who the tortfeasor is, and even if the assault or battery occurs as the result of the negligence .of the state or state agent. See, eg., Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1165-67 (explaining that if the injury arises out of an assault or battery, immunity is retained, because the Act focuses on the cause of the injury or conduct out of which the injury arose, not on the status of the tortfeasor or on the plaintiff's theory of liability or the type of negligence alleged); see also Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993) ("When we have considered claims that the state's negligence permitted an assault by a person who was not a state employee, we have held uniformly that the state is immune.") (citing, inter alia, Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1165-67); S.H. ex rel. R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1864-65 (Utah 19983) (explaining that the Act focuses on the conduct or situa[1059]*1059tion out of which the injury arose, not on the status of the party inflicting the injury); Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 168-64 (Utah 1996) (explaining that the statutory language places no importance on the status of the assailant and that nothing suggests that the one committing the assault need be a governmental employee). Inasmuch as the status of the assailant who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant under our long-accepted interpretation of the Act, the question now is whether Breanna's death arose out of an assault or battery.
130 Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads, in relevant part,
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, DCFS presented specific facts that Breanna's death arose from assault or battery. Specifically, DCFS presented testimony from Dr. Robert Kirschner that Breanna suffered physical injuries that caused the pneumonia from which she ultimately died. The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that plaintiff did not offer sufficient evidence to place at issue the evidence offered by DCFS that Breanna's death arose out of physical abuse.
181 DCFS's witness, Dr. Kirschner reviewed Breanna's autopsy records, medical records, and various documents relating to the investigation of her death. Dr. Kir-schner concluded that Breanna was physically abused, that she suffered multiple blunt trauma injuries inflicted over a period of time, and that Breanna's physical injuries in fact caused the pneumonia from which she ultimately died. In an attempt to counter Dr. Kirschner's conclusion in its opposition to DCFS's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff offered testimony from Dr. Leis and an affidavit from Dr. Nygaard. Dr. Leis performed the autopsy on Breanna and, having also considered her medical records, concluded that Breanna died from pneumonia. However, Dr. Leis further testified that it was his opinion that physical trauma contributed to the pneumonia and death. Indeed, he stated that while it was possible that Breanna could have died of pneumonia absent physical abuse, he did not believe that was the case. Dr. Nygaard addressed the injuries present when Breanna died and de-seribed in Breanna's autopsy report, but he did not address prior abuse, the abuse that purportedly contributed to the pneumonia or myocarditis. Dr. Nygaard's affidavit concludes that "it is [his] medical opinion that it is more likely than not that Breanna would have died of pneumonia or myocarditis even if she did not have the blunt force trauma injuries that were described in Breanna's autopsy report." He states that Breanna's death was caused by pneumonia, not the physical injuries described in the autopsy report. He reasons that pneumonia is caused by a viral or bacterial infection, and not by blunt force trauma, and therefore the pneumonia was not caused by the specific blunt force and skeletal injuries noted in the autopsy report. However, while he states that Breanna likely would have died of pneumonia even if she was not abused, he does not address whether abuse did or did not contribute to the pneumonia. He never discusses whether the pneumonia could have been caused or aggravated by physical abuse.
132 Plaintiff argues that the jury could have found that Breanna's death was simply the result of pneumonia or myocarditis and did not arise out of an assault or battery and therefore summary judgment was improper. However, plaintiff failed to proffer, evidence to contest the evidence offered by DCFS that Breanna's contraction of pneumonia, the cause of her death, was the result of physical abuse. As a result, summary judgment in favor of DCFS was proper.
C. Damages for Frivolous Appeal
133 Finally, the attorney defendants contend that plaintiff's appeal of the district court's decision to dismiss them from the lawsuit has no support in the law or basis in [1060]*1060the facts alleged and is therefore frivolous. We agree.
{34 Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure reads, in relevant part:
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Exeept in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. ...
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion.
135 Plaintiffs appeal of the dismissal of the attorney defendants was not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, nor based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Plaintiff's brief offers only a general conclusory statement that attorneys owe a duty to their clients, accompanied by two cases cited as authority. Neither case, however, is of any help in delineating the duty an attorney owes to members of a class he or she represents.7 Plaintiff offers no authority or argument that the attorney defendants, in representing the class of which Breanna was a member, assumed a duty to ensure she received protection from battery by third persons and personal medical care. Even further, when invited to articulate a duty or at least a theory at argument, counsel was unable to do so. In short, plaintiffs appeal of the dismissal of the attorney defendants was a waste of time and resources of all concerned.
136 For these reasons we award reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal to the attorney defendants. These shall be paid by plaintiffs attorney, not plaintiff. See Utah R.App. P. 38(a). We remand to the district court solely for a determination of the proper amount.
37 Affirmed.
1 38 Chief Justice HOWE and Associate Chief Justice RUSSON concur in Justice WILKINS opinion.
{ 39 Having disqualified himself, Justice DURRANT does not participate herein; Second District Judge W. BRENT WEST sat.