Samuels v. Small Business Administration

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 30, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-08000·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JUSTIN SAMUELS, Plaintiff, 23-CV-8000 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently resides in Barreiro, Portugal, brings this pro se action under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, against the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) for “discriminatory practices against businesses based on sex.” (ECF 12, at 1.) He asserts that the Court has jurisdiction of his claims under the Tucker Act, which waives sovereign immunity for claims arising from government contracts. By order dated September 20, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the amended complaint,1 but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead his claims in a second amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

1 On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against the SBA for alleged discriminatory practices in violation of Section 1981. He asserts that he is a citizen of the United States with an unspecified business and that the SBA is “responsible for providing support to small businesses.” (ECF 12, at 1.) Plaintiff claims that because the SBA has programs that offer “loans and contracts exclusively to women-owned businesses,” the SBA is “discriminating against businesses owned by individuals of other sexes.” (Id. ¶ 3.1.) Plaintiff contends that such “preferential treatment,” which favors individuals based on their sex, is “in direct violation of Section 1981, which “mandates equal treatment for all citizens by the government, regardless of race or sex.” (Id.)

Plaintiff further asserts that the SBA’s “discriminatory programs and practices” have “precluded [him] from applying for loans and contracts due to [his] gender.” (Id. ¶ 7.) In support of his claims, Plaintiff cites to the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (hereinafter SFFA), in which that court held that race based collegiate admissions policies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff also cites to Ultima Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-CV-00041, 2023 WL 4633481 (E.D. Tenn. July 19, 2023), a decision from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee holding that, post SSFA, the SBA’s rebuttable

presumption that certain minorities are socially disadvantaged for purposes of its 8(a) program violated equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff also attaches to the amended complaint what appears to be information from the SBA’s website about programs available to women. (ECF 12-1.) Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the SBA’s actions are “unconstitutional and illegal” and am injunction prohibiting the SBA from continuing with the alleged discriminatory practices. (ECF 12 ¶ 5.1.) He also seeks unspecified damages. DISCUSSION A. Standing Plaintiff cannot proceed with his claims against the SBA because he does not have standing to assert such claims. The doctrine of standing “limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citations omitted). Standing is, therefore, “the threshold

question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To have standing to sue, a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 338 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)). At the pleading stage, “the plaintiff must ‘clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each element” of standing. Id. “[A] generalized grievance, no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing. A litigant . . . claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large . . . does not state an Article III

case or controversy.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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