Samuel MOPKINS, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS DIE CASTING CORP., Appellee

Eighth Circuit

Samuel MOPKINS, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS DIE CASTING CORP., Appellee

569 F.2d 454

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 2, 1978

Docket77-1157

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 569 F.2d 454 (Samuel MOPKINS, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS DIE CASTING CORP., Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Samuel MOPKINS, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS DIE CASTING CORP., Appellee, 569 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1978).

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PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellant Samuel Mopkins, a black male, was hired as a porter on a probationary basis by defendant-appellee St. Louis Die Casting Corp., and was subsequently discharged during his 30-day probationary period. The manner in which Mop-kins carried out his duties as a porter disturbed some of the female employees with whom he worked and was the occasion for their comments to a supervisor on this matter. This factor, coupled with disagreements Mopkins had with his supervisor, resulted in the termination of his probationary employment. His supervisor testified that she did not consider that Mopkins would make a good permanent employee, even though his work was satisfactory. Mopkins himself chose not to testify on his own behalf, and failed to controvert any of the legitimate reasons for his discharge presented by his ex-employer. Mopkins’ only evidence of racial discrimination was the testimony of a psychologist who testified as an expert on ethnic expressions. The relevance of this testimony in the factual context of this case appears tenuous, for it did not pertain, in any fashion, to Mopkins’ controversy with his supervisor over his failure to follow instructions. Moreover, opinions testified to by an expert are certainly not binding on the court.

In the trial to the court, the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility; he found that the “decision to discharge plaintiff was not based, in whole or in part, upon plaintiff’s race.” Our review of the record convinces us that this finding is amply supported by the evidence and is certainly not clearly erroneous. Plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence to establish racial discrimination in his discharge. The District Court, properly, declined to make a finding of racial discrimination where the record indicated that there was none. We find neither factual nor legal error in his disposition of this case. An opinion by this court would have no precedential value and we affirm on the basis of Judge Nangle’s memorandum opinion, which is reported at 423 F.Supp. 132 (E.D.Mo.1977).

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PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellant Samuel Mopkins, a black male, was hired as a porter on a probationary basis by defendant-appellee St. Louis Die Casting Corp., and was subsequently discharged during his 30-day probationary period. The manner in which Mop-kins carried out his duties as a porter disturbed some of the female employees with whom he worked and was the occasion for their comments to a supervisor on this matter. This factor, coupled with disagreements Mopkins had with his supervisor, resulted in the termination of his probationary employment. His supervisor testified that she did not consider that Mopkins would make a good permanent employee, even though his work was satisfactory. Mopkins himself chose not to testify on his own behalf, and failed to controvert any of the legitimate reasons for his discharge presented by his ex-employer. Mopkins’ only evidence of racial discrimination was the testimony of a psychologist who testified as an expert on ethnic expressions. The relevance of this testimony in the factual context of this case appears tenuous, for it did not pertain, in any fashion, to Mopkins’ controversy with his supervisor over his failure to follow instructions. Moreover, opinions testified to by an expert are certainly not binding on the court.

In the trial to the court, the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility; he found that the “decision to discharge plaintiff was not based, in whole or in part, upon plaintiff’s race.” Our review of the record convinces us that this finding is amply supported by the evidence and is certainly not clearly erroneous. Plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence to establish racial discrimination in his discharge. The District Court, properly, declined to make a finding of racial discrimination where the record indicated that there was none. We find neither factual nor legal error in his disposition of this case. An opinion by this court would have no precedential value and we affirm on the basis of Judge Nangle’s memorandum opinion, which is reported at 423 F.Supp. 132 (E.D.Mo.1977).

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569 F.2d 454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/samuel-mopkins-appellant-v-st-louis-die-casting-corp-appellee-ca8-1978.

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