Sales v. City of New York, New York

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 18, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-05440
StatusUnknown

This text of Sales v. City of New York, New York (Sales v. City of New York, New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sales v. City of New York, New York, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LAVIEN SALES, Plaintiff, 25-cv-5440 (LJL) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff LaVien Sales (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pro se asserting violations of his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under state law. He seeks damages and injunctive relief, and he sues: (1) the City of New York; (2) “41 Police Department,” which the Court understands to be the New York City Police Department’s (“NYPD”) 41st Precinct, located in the Bronx, New York; and (3) unidentified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” NYPD officers who are or were most likely assigned to the 41st Precinct.1 On July 9, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)— that is, without prepayment of fees. Dkt. No. 4. For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the 41st Precinct and his official-capacity claims under Section 1983 against the individual defendants as duplicative of his claims against the City of New York and for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court also requests that the City of New York waive service of a summons. The Court further directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York to provide to Plaintiff and to the Court the full identifies and badge numbers of the unidentified individual defendants specified in this Order.

1 Plaintiff sues these individual defendants in their official and individual capacities. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” owed to pro se parties, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has limits; to state a claim, pro se pleadings must still comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement demonstrating that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After

2 separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the 41st Precinct and His Official-Capacity Claims Against the Individual Defendants The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the 41st Precinct, a subsidiary of the NYPD (which is itself an agency of the City of New York), because it is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“All actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d

76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); Gordon v. Gordon, 2025 WL 1517961, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2025) (“As an initial matter, any claims against the 79th Precinct or the NYPD itself must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued.”); see also Edwards v. Arocho, 125 F.4th 336, 354 (2d Cir. 2024) (“A plaintiff cannot bring a claim against a municipal agency that does not have the capacity to be sued under its municipal charter.” (emphasis in original)); Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court notes that Plaintiff has also named the City of New York as a defendant in this action. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the 41st Precinct as duplicative of his claims against the City of New York and for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

3 To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under Section 1983 against the individual defendants in their official capacities as NYPD officers, the Court must also dismiss these claims as duplicative of Plaintiff’s claims against the City of New York and for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See id.; Coon v. Town of Springfield, Vt., 404 F.3d 683, 687

(2d Cir. 2005) (“[A Section] 1983 suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity is treated as an action against the municipality itself.”); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (“There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials . . . [because] local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.”). B. The City of New York The Court respectfully directs the Clerk of Court to electronically notify the NYPD and the New York City Law Department of this Order. The Court requests that the City of New York waive service of a summons. C. Unidentified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” Defendants Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court

in identifying an unidentified defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997).

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Sales v. City of New York, New York, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sales-v-city-of-new-york-new-york-nysd-2025.