Salazar 258054 v. Shinn

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided December 1, 2021·No. 2:21-cv-01465·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO JL 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Timothy J. Salazar, No. CV 21-01465-PHX-JAT (CDB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 David Shinn, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 On August 24, 2021, Plaintiff Timothy J. Salazar, who is confined in the Arizona 16 State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Eyman, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a September 29, 2021 18 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because 19 Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended 20 complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 21 On October 19, 2021, Plaintiff a Motion to Amend (Doc. 8) and lodged a proposed 22 First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9). The Court gave Plaintiff leave to amend in the 23 September 29, 2021 Order. The Court will therefore grant the Motion to Amend, direct 24 the Clerk of Court to file the lodged First Amended Complaint, and dismiss the First 25 Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 26 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 27 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 28 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 1 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 2 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 3 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 4 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 5 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 6 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 7 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 8 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 9 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 11 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 12 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 13 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 14 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 15 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 16 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 17 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 18 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 19 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 20 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 21 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 22 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 23 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 24 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 25 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 26 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 27 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 28 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but 1 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 2 to amend. 3 II. First Amended Complaint 4 In his two-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Arizona Department of 5 Corrections (ADC) Director David Shinn and Security Threat Group (STG) Officer 6 Uehling. Plaintiff asserts claims regarding his classification as a maximum custody 7 prisoner and his removal from the STG Step Down Program. He seeks monetary relief, as 8 well his court fees and costs for this case. 9 Plaintiff alleges the following: 10 On April 20, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Eyman Browning Unit for 11 various disciplinary violations and an investigation.1 In February 2018, presumably after 12 he was validated as an STG member, Plaintiff was reclassified and moved to Wing 4 at 13 Browning Unit, a maximum custody unit.2 Beginning in January 2020, Plaintiff 14 participated in the STG Step-Down Program. On July 16, 2020, Plaintiff was removed 15 from the STG Step-Down Program. 16 On April 4, 2021, Defendant Shinn implemented a new Department Order 806, 17 Security Threat Groups (STGs) Policy. According to Plaintiff, under the new DO 806, 18 Plaintiff’s validation as an STG member “is no longer an administrative decision.”3 19 On May 19, 2021, Correctional Officer (CO) III Harper “held a pre-determined

20 1 According to Plaintiff’s ADC record, on March 11, 2016, he was found guilty of 21 conspiracy to commit a Class A felony. See https://corrections.az.gov/public- resources/inmate-datasearch (search by inmate number 258054 in Active Inmates) (last 22 accessed Nov. 22, 2021). 23 2 Plaintiff’s ADC records indicates that his last movement was on December 27, 2017, when he was moved to ASPC-Eyman Browning STG. See 24 https://corrections.az.gov/public-resources/inmate-datasearch, supra n.1. 25 3 As relevant here, Department Order 806.5.3 provides, “To become eligible for custody reductions and housing status changes, a validated STG member or terrorist 26 classified as Maximum Custody shall complete one of the following conditions: . . . Qualify for custody reductions as outlined in Department Order #801, Inmate 27 Classification, after having successfully completed a 24 month period where they have not participated in any documented STG/Gang or terrorist activity.” See 28 https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/policies/800/0806_041521.pdf (emphasis added) (last visited Nov. 22, 2021). 1 review classification.” CO III Harper stated that Plaintiff’s “score” was 45/33, close/3; he 2 was a validated member of the Mexican Mafia, an STG; he had two major disciplinary 3 violations in the previous three years, the last of which was in 2018; and he had completed 4 all available programming. CO III Harper noted that, “per SSU,” Plaintiff was to remain 5 in maximum custody due to STG activity in the past 24 months. Plaintiff told CO III 6 Harper “that has to be a mistake,” because Plaintiff had not been involved in any STG 7 activity in the previous 24 months.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Salazar 258054 v. Shinn, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Salazar 258054 v. Shinn (Salazar 258054 v. Shinn) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Brooks v. Marbury
24 U.S. 78 (Supreme Court, 1826)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Sandin v. Conner
515 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Mortensen
606 F.3d 22 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Dennis Hamilton v. Roger v. Endell
981 F.2d 1062 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Wilkinson v. Austin
545 U.S. 209 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Jim Maxwell v. County of San Diego
708 F.3d 1075 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Cousins v. Lockyer
568 F.3d 1063 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Stewart v. Alameida
418 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (N.D. California, 2006)