Sahil Singh v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAHIL SINGH, Case No. 1:26-cv-00330 (HC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER CONVERTING THE MATTER TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 13 v. GRANTING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION1; AND REFERRING THE 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., MATTER TO THE ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE 15 Respondents. (Doc. 2) 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Before the Court for decision is Sahil Singh’s request for a temporary restraining order 19 (Doc. 2), filed in conjunction with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 20 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing detention. (Doc. 1.) Having evaluated the TRO request, 21 Respondents’ opposition, (Doc. 10) and Petitioner’s reply (Doc. 11), the Court converts the 22 matter into a motion for preliminary injunction, GRANTS that motion, and REFERS the matter 23 to the assigned magistrate judge for a determination on the merits. 24 II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner is a citizen of India who entered the United States without inspection on May 26 27, 2024 at or near Mooers Forks, New York, at which time he was apprehended by the

27 1 Upon the agreement of the parties, the Court converts the motion for temporary restraining order into 28 one for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 20 at 1; Doc. 11 at 1.) The parties have also affirmatively declined 1 Department of Homeland Security. (Doc. 2 at 2.) Petitioner claimed asylum based upon a fear of 2 return to India due to political persecution and issued a Form I-862 Notice to Appear on May 28, 3 2024, charging him pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration Nationality Act, as an alien 4 present in the United States without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. (Id.) 5 On May 28, 2024, Petitioner was released from custody on his own recognizance. (Id.) After 6 entering the United States, Petitioner has applied for asylum and has a pending immigration 7 court date for his application. (Id. at 5.) 8 On or about December 11, 2025, Petitioner was arrested when he reported to a routine 9 Immigration and Customs Enforcement check-in at the ICE ERO Fresno Sub-Office. (Id.) 10 According to Petitioner, ICE did not present a warrant for his arrest at the time of his detention. 11 (Id.) He is currently being detained at California City Detention Facility in California City, 12 California. (Id.) 13 The government opposes the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief and maintains that 14 Petitioner’s detention is “mandatory” under expedited removal procedures set forth at 8 U.S.C. 15 § 1225(b)(2). (See generally Doc. 10.) 16 III. LEGAL STANDARD 17 The standard governing the issuing of a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard 18 for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 19 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) 20 they are “likely to succeed on the merits” of their claims, (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable 21 harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] 22 favor” and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 23 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Ctr. For Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) 24 (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in 25 order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”). 26 The party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden to “make a showing on all four 27 prongs” of the Winter test to obtain a preliminary injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 28 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) 1 (holding that the moving party has “the burden of persuasion”); see also Hecox v. Little, 104 2 F.4th 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court may weigh the request for a preliminary injunction 3 with a sliding-scale approach. Alliance, at 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a stronger showing 4 on the balance of hardships may support the issuance of a preliminary injunction where there are 5 “serious questions on the merits … so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of 6 irreparable injury, and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Finally, “a preliminary 7 injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. 8 IV. ANALYSIS 9 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 10 This first factor “is the most important” under Winter, and “is especially important when 11 a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and injury.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1041 (9th 12 Cir. 2023). Petitioner argues he is likely to succeed on his claim that Respondents violated his 13 Fifth Amendment Due Process rights when he was detained without notice or provided a custody 14 hearing before a neutral arbiter. (Doc. 2 at 7-14.) 15 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 16 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 17 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 18 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 19 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including 20 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 21 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. “Even when the 22 government has discretion to detain an individual, its subsequent decision to release the 23 individual creates ‘an implicit promise’ that she will be re-detained only if she violates the 24 conditions of her release.” Garro Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-CV-05632-PCP, --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 25 2025 WL 3691938, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 26 482 (1972)). Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly. J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 27 1:25-CV-01673-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (citing Doe v. 28 Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025)). 1 In analyzing procedural due process claims such as this one, courts must first determine 2 whether a protected liberty interest exists under the Due Process Clause. See Kentucky Dep’t of 3 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989.) If a protected liberty interest is found to 4 exist, the court then must examine whether the procedures necessary to ensure that any 5 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. (Id.) To the extent 6 that Respondents substantively address Petitioner’s due process argument, they deploy a blanket 7 assertion that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA and contend that Petitioner’s prior release at the discretion of 9 DHS pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “does not have the effect of having converted Petitioner’s 10 presence in the United States into an ‘admission.’” (Doc. 10 at 1.) Thus, Respondents maintain 11 that Petitioner is categorically ineligible for a bond hearing. (Id.) 12 Although Petitioner’s claim is ultimately constitutional in nature, it turns on whether 13 section 1225(b) or section 1226(a) justify Petitioner’s re-detention. Courts nationwide, including 14 this one, have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ new legal position and found the DHS 15 policy unlawful. See, e.g., Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut, 1:25-CV-01228-JLT, 2025 WL 2879514 at 16 *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); see also, M.R.R. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01517-JLT, 2025 WL 17 3265446 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025); Hortua v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 18 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 19 (LAK), ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) 20 (estimating over 350 cases ruled the DHS policy improper across 160 different judges sitting in 21 about 50 different courts nationwide); Mirley Adriana Bautista Pico, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al., 22 No. 25-CV-08002-JST, 2025 WL 3295382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases); 23 Armando Modesto Estrada-Samayoa v. Orestes Cruz, et al., No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB (HC), 24 2025 WL 3268280, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases). 25 Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the applicable detention 26 authority for all “applicants for admission,” Respondents fail to meaningfully contend with the 27 liberty interest created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance in 28 July of 2022, before the current manifestation of this interpretation. Thus, the Court must 1 evaluate the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), to 2 determine whether the procedures (or lack thereof) that have been applied to Petitioner are 3 sufficient to protect the liberty interest at issue. Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921at *3. In Mathews, the 4 Court determined the following: 5 [O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 6 distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 7 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 8 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 9 procedural requirement would entail.

10 During his more than three and a half years on parole, Petitioner built a life outside detention, 11 while under the terms of that parole. Petitioner has a substantial private interest in being out of 12 custody and his detention denies him that liberty interest. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 13 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 14 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). 15 Notably, Respondents offered little to rebut Petitioner’s due process claim and do not 16 provide any justification for detaining Petitioner. (Doc. 10 at 1.) As such, nothing in the record 17 suggests a change in circumstance material to the question of whether Petitioner is a danger to 18 public safety or a flight risk. It is clear to this Court, despite Respondents arguments otherwise, 19 that Petitioner established his liberty interest. 20 Finally, as to the third Mathews factor, this Court concludes that the government’s 21 interest in detaining Petitioner without proper process is slight. “Since respondents did not 22 engage with Petitioner’s due process arguments, they have not provided the court with any 23 information regarding the burden on the government.” Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606, at 24 *4. In sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 25 merits of his due process claim. 26 B. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors 27 The remaining preliminary injunction factors—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, 28 1 and the public interest—decidedly weigh in favor of Petitioner. “[I]t is well established that the 2 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. 3 Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); 4 see also Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Deprivation of physical 5 liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.”). By successfully demonstrating that 6 Respondents lack a basis to detain him, Petitioner has succeeded in showing irreparable harm. 7 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 8 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat'l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 9 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 10 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds there is no equitable reason that would tip the balance in 11 the Government's favor. Though the government has a compelling interest in enforcing the 12 immigration laws, granting relief to Petitioner will not seriously impinge its ability to do so. The 13 Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being 14 enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 15 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, “the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections 16 against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of 17 immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at 18 *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (quoting Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No, 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 19 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021)). In sum, the last two Winter factors also weigh in 20 Petitioner's favor. 21 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 22 1. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is converted to a 23 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and it is GRANTED. 24 2. Because the government has no evidence that Petitioner poses a risk of flight or 25 poses a danger to the community, Petitioner SHALL be released IMMEDIATELY from DHS 26 custody. DHS SHALL NOT impose any additional restrictions on her, such as electronic 27 monitoring, unless that is determined to be necessary at a later custody hearing. 28 3. Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from 1 | rearresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, which 2 || include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation notice? of at least seven days before a pre-deprivation 3 | hearing at which the government will bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 4 | evidence that he is likely to flee or pose a danger to the community if not arrested 5 4. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. See 6 | Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts regularly waive security in cases 7 | like this one. See, e.g., Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254, 2025 WL 2899220, at *8 (N.D. 8 | Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). 9 5. The parties are directed to meet and confer no later than 14 days from the date of 10 | the entry of this order, and, if possible, submit a joint proposed briefing schedule discussing the 11 | abeyance of further proceedings on the merits pending the 9" Circuit Appeal of Rodriguez 12 | Vazquez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). If the parties are unable to agree to 13 | a joint proposed briefing schedule, the Court will rule on the request. 14 6. The government may file a further brief on the merits of the habeas petition 15 | within 45 days. Alternatively, as soon as it can within that 30-day period, the government may 16 | file a notice that it does not intend to file further briefing. If the government files an additional 17 | brief, Petitioner may file a further brief within 30 days thereafter. 18 5. The matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge for consideration of the 19 | merits of the petition as quickly as possible. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 | Dated: _ January 30, 2026 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 * Tf legally sufficient circumstances justify arrest without notice in advance, a post-deprivation hearing consistent with the requirements set forth here, SHALL be provided within seven days of the arrest.