Saha Thai Steel Pipe Pub. Co. Ltd. v. United States

2026 CIT 09

• Court: United States Court of International Trade
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 21-00049
• Status: Published

Opinion

Slip Op. 26-

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES, Before: Gary S. Katzmann, Judge Court No. 21-00049 Defendant,

and

WHEATLAND TUBE COMPANY,

Defendant-Intervenor.

OPINION AND ORDER

[Commerce’s Remand Results are sustained.]

Dated: February 4, 2026

Daniel L. Porter, James P. Durling, and Gina M. Colarusso, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, of Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff Saha Thai Steel Pipe Public Company Limited.

Claudia Burke, Deputy Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, D.C., for Defendant the United States. With her on the briefs were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director. Of counsel on the briefs was JonZachary Forbes, Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, D.C.

Luke A. Meisner and Roger B. Schagrin, Schagrin Associates, of Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Intervenor Wheatland Tube Company.

Katzmann, Judge: Before the court is a challenge to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s

(“Commerce”) redetermination in the 2018–2019 administrative review of the antidumping duty

order on circular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from Thailand, following remand by this Court No. 21-00049 Page 2

court. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (Dep’t Com. July 31,

2025), July 31, 2025, ECF No. 80 (“Remand Results”); Saha Thai Steel Pipe Pub. Co. v. United

States, 46 CIT __, 605 F. Supp. 3d 1348 (2022) (“Remand Order”). Defendant-Intervenor

Wheatland Tube Company (“Wheatland”)—a U.S. producer of circular welded carbon steel pipes

and tubes—raises the only issues now before the court. See Def.-Inter.’s Reply in Opp’n to the

Remand Redetermination at 1, Nov. 17, 2025, ECF No. 86 (“Def.-Inter.’s Reply.”); see also Def.-

Inter.’s Mot. to Intervene, Mar. 3, 2021, ECF No. 12. Wheatland seeks another remand for

Commerce to reconsider its determination not to apply adverse facts available in light of

intervening decisions that Wheatland claims establish that Saha Thai intentionally misreported

sales such that the reasoning of the prior Remand Order has “no foundation.” Def.-Inter.’s Reply.

at 2; see also id. at 2–3 (first citing Saha Thai Steel Pipe Pub. Co. v. United States, 101 F.4th 1310

(Fed. Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Saha Thai Steel Pipe Pub. Co. v. Wheatland Tube Co., 145

S. Ct. 1309 (2025) (mem.) (“Scope Appeal”); and then citing Blue Pipe Steel Ctr. Co. v. United

States, 49 CIT __, __, 2025 WL 2731541, at *1 (2025)). Plaintiff Saha Thai Steel Pipe Public

Company Limited (“Saha Thai”)—a Thai company that produces subject merchandise—and

Defendant the United States (the “Government”) ask the court to sustain the Remand Results. See

Pl.’s Cmts. on Remand Redetermination at 1, Sept. 3, 2025, ECF No. 82 (“Pl.’s Cmts.”); Def.’s

Reply to Cmts. on Remand Redetermination and Resp. to Ct.’s Order at 1, Nov. 17, 2025, ECF

No. 85 (“Gov’t Reply”).

The court first evaluates whether Wheatland’s arguments are barred by Wheatland’s failure

to exhaust its arguments before Commerce and concludes that the futility exception applies such

that failure to exhaust does not bar Wheatland’s claims. For the reasons set forth below, the court Court No. 21-00049 Page 3

sustains Commerce’s Remand Results.

BACKGROUND

The facts, legal framework, and administrative history of this case have been set out in the

previous Remand Order and are recounted here to extent they are relevant. See Remand Order,

605 F. Supp. 3d at 1352–60.

I. Legal and Regulatory Framework

“Dumping occurs when a foreign company sells a product in the United States at a lower

price than” the company charges for the “same product in its home market.” Sioux Honey Ass'n

v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 1041, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This practice constitutes unfair

competition because it permits foreign producers to undercut domestic companies by selling

products below reasonable fair market value. Id. To address the impact of such unfair competition,

Congress enacted the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which empowers Commerce to investigate

potential dumping and, if necessary, to issue orders instituting duties on subject merchandise. Id.

at 1046–47. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1673, Commerce imposes antidumping duties on foreign

goods if they are being or are likely to be sold in the United States at less than fair value and the

U.S. International Trade Commission (the “Commission”) “determines that the sale of the

merchandise at less than fair value materially injures, threatens, or impedes the establishment of

an industry in the United States.” See Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, 866 F.3d

1304, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

“Sales at less than fair value are those sales for which the ‘normal value’ (the price a

producer charges in its home market) exceeds the ‘export price’ (the price of the product in the

United States).” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting

19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A)). Commerce imposes antidumping duties equal to the dumping margin, Court No. 21-00049 Page 4

or the “amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export

price) for the merchandise.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1673; see also id. § 1677(35)(A); Shandong Rongxin

Imp. & Exp. Co. v. United States, 42 CIT __, __, 331 F. Supp. 3d 1390, 1394 (2018). The statute

provides for administrative review of antidumping duties at least once every twelve months, upon

the request of an interested party. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1); see also Goodluck India Ltd. v. United

States, 47 CIT __, __, 670 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1363 (2023).

A. Adverse Facts Available

In an administrative review of antidumping duty orders, Commerce “obtains most of its

factual information . . . from submissions made by interested parties during the course of the

proceeding.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(a); see also QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318,

1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Although Commerce has authority to place documents in the

administrative record that it deems relevant, the burden of creating an adequate record lies with

interested parties and not with Commerce.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Commerce relies on facts otherwise available to reach the applicable determination if

necessary information is not available on the record, or . . . an interested party or any other person—(A) withholds information that has been requested by [Commerce] under this subtitle, (B) fails to provide such information by the deadlines for submission of the information or in the form and manner requested, subject to [19 U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(1) and (e)], (C) significantly impedes a proceeding under this subtitle, or (D) provides such information but the information cannot be verified as provided in [§] 1677m(i).

19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). “Commerce can only use facts otherwise available to fill a gap in the

record.” Zhejiang DunAn Hetian Metal Co. v. United States, 652 F.3d 1333, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

If Commerce also finds that an interested party has “failed to cooperate by not acting to the best

of its ability to comply with a request for information,” Commerce “may use an inference that is

adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available.” 19 Court No. 21-00049 Page 5

U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1); see also Remand Order, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 1361. Additionally, “[i]f

[Commerce] determines that a response to a request for information . . . does not comply with the

request, [Commerce] shall promptly inform the person submitting the response of the nature of the

deficiency and shall, to the extent practicable, provide that person with an opportunity to remedy

or explain the deficiency . . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d); see also Remand Order, 605 F. Supp. 3d at

1362.

B. Exhaustion

Before challenging a determination by Commerce before the U.S. Court of International

Trade (“USCIT”), a party must exhaust its arguments by first presenting those arguments to

Commerce. See 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d); Luoyang Bearing Corp. v. United States, 44 CIT __, __,

450 F. Supp. 3d 1402, 1406 (2020), aff'd, 844 F. App'x 368 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Qingdao Sea-Line

Trading Co. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1378, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To exhaust an argument,

Commerce’s regulations instruct that parties must “present all arguments” in a case brief following

publication of the agency’s preliminary determination, 19 C.F.R. § 351.309(c)(2); see also Dorbest

Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The exhaustion requirement serves

the purposes of promoting procedural fairness, fostering judicial efficiency, and protecting the

agency’s interest in being the initial decisionmaker. See Dorbest Ltd., 604 F.3d at 1375; Luoyang

Bearing Corp., 450 F. Supp. 3d at 1409. The exhaustion requirement applies in remand

proceedings. See Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d 1375, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir.

2008); see also Prime Time Com., LLC v. United States, No. 2021-1783, 2022 WL 2313968, at

*4 (Fed. Cir. June 28, 2022).

Courts may lift the exhaustion requirement in “circumstances in which institutional

interests are not sufficiently weighty or application of the doctrine would otherwise be unjust.” Court No. 21-00049 Page 6

Itochu Bldg. Prods. v. United States, 733 F.3d 1140, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Luoyang

Bearing Factory v. United States, 26 CIT 1156, 1186 n.26, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1297 n.26 (2002)

(listing exceptions as (1) futility, (2) a subsequent court decision that may impact the agency's

decision, (3) a pure question of law, or (4) when plaintiff had no reason to believe the agency

would not follow established precedent). This court “generally takes a strict view of the

requirement that parties exhaust their administrative remedies before [Commerce] in trade cases.”

Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

II. Factual Background

Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from

Thailand in 1986, covering imports of “ ‘standard pipe’ or ‘structural tubing,’ which includes pipe

and tube with an outside diameter of 0.375 inch or more but not over 16 inches, of any wall

thickness.” Antidumping Duty Order; Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from

Thailand, 51 Fed. Reg. 8341, 8341 (Dep’t Com. Mar. 11, 1986) (“Antidumping Duty Order”).

Three types of pipe are relevant to this case: standard pipe, line pipe, and dual-stenciled

pipe. Standard pipe is used in “plumbing and heating systems, air for low-pressure conveyance of

air, steam, natural gas, water, oil, or other liquids and gases.” Certain Circular Welded Pipe and

Tube from Brazil, India, Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-253

and 731-TA-132, 252, 271, 273, 532-534, and 536 (Fourth Review) at 6, USITC Pub. 4754 (Jan.

2018) (“2018 Injury Determination”); see also Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from

Turkey and Thailand (Final) at I-1–2, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-253 and 731-TA-252, USITC Pub. 1810

(Feb. 1986). Standard pipe is manufactured to American Society for Testing and Material

(“ASTM”) specifications. 2018 Injury Determination at 6. In contrast, “[l]ine pipe is used for Court No. 21-00049 Page 7

transportation of gas, oil, or water generally in a pipeline or utility distribution system,” and is

produced to American Petroleum Institute (“API”) and American Water Works Association

(“AWWA”) specifications. Id. at I-15. A third category, “dual-stenciled pipe,” is pipe that has

received both an ASTM and an API stencil, indicating that it complies with both standards. Id. at

6.

During the administrative review at issue in this case, two related developments took place.

First, Commerce initiated a scope inquiry into whether line pipe or dual-stenciled pipe produced

by Saha Thai is included in the scope of the Antidumping Duty Order. See Mem. from L. Ayala

to J. Maeder, re: Antidumping Duty Order on Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from

Thailand: Self Initiation of Scope Inquiry on Line Pipe and Dual-Stenciled Standard Line Pipe at

1, Case No. A-549-502, Bar Code: 3914022-01 (Dep’t Com. Nov. 22, 2019). Commerce

determined, in a scope ruling published June 9, 2020, that line pipe is not covered by the

Antidumping Duty Order, but that “products that are dual-stenciled as standard and line pipe are

covered by the order.” Notice of Scope Rulings, 85 Fed. Reg. 35261, 35262 (Dep’t Com. June 9,

2020) (“Scope Ruling”). This court initially remanded that Scope Ruling to Commerce, holding

that Commerce lacked substantial evidence for its position that dual-stenciled pipe was included

within the scope of the Antidumping Duty Order. See Saha Thai Steel Pipe Pub. Co. v. United

States, 45 CIT __, __, 547 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1281 (2021) (“Scope Review I”); see also Saha Thai

Steel Pipe Pub. Co. v. United States, 46 CIT __, 592 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1301 (2022) (“Scope

Review II”) (sustaining Commerce’s redetermination under protest that dual-stenciled pipe was

not included in the scope). On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the

“Federal Circuit”) reversed and reinstated Commerce’s Scope Ruling, concluding that the Court No. 21-00049 Page 8

language of the Antidumping Duty Order covers dual-stenciled pipe and that additional factors

that Commerce must consider by statute support that interpretation. Scope Appeal, 101 F.4th at

1331.

Second, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) initiated an investigation under

the Enforce and Protect Act (“EAPA”) into whether Blue Pipe Steel Center Company Limited

(“Blue Pipe”), an importer of merchandise produced by Saha Thai, evaded the Antidumping Duty

Order by misclassifying standard pipe as line pipe; Customs concluded that Blue Pipe had evaded

the Antidumping Duty Order. See Letter from L. Meisner to W. Ross, re: New Factual Information

at Ex. 1 (Sept. 18, 2020), P.R. 199 (“Wheatland’s New Factual Information”) (submitting Letter

from B. Hoxie to Y. Lomloy, re: Notice of Final Determination as to Evasion, EAPA Case No.

7401 (Sept. 11, 2020) (“Evasion Determination”)). This court sustained Customs’ determination.

Blue Pipe, 2025 WL 2731541, at *1.

III. History of Relevant Administrative Proceedings

Commerce initiated the 2018–2019 administrative review of the Antidumping Duty Order

on May 29, 2019, covering a period of review from March 1, 2018 to February 28, 2019. Initiation

of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 84 Fed. Reg. 24743 (Dep’t

Com. May 29, 2019), P.R. 21. 1 Commerce selected Saha Thai as the sole mandatory respondent.2

See Mem. from S. Presing to T. Page, re: Respondent Selection at 1, (Oct. 18, 2019), P.R. 35.

1 “P.R.” refers to the index numbers of public documents in the joint appendix for the underlying proceeding that resulted in the Remand Order. “P.R.2d” refers to the public document numbers in the joint appendix for the remand proceeding. 2 In antidumping duty administrative reviews, Commerce is charged with “determin[ing] the individual . . . dumping margin for each known exporter and producer of the subject merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1). However, where determining individual margins is “not practicable” due to the “large number of exporters” involved in the review, Commerce may limit its Court No. 21-00049 Page 9

Commerce preliminarily calculated a dumping margin of 0.00 percent. Circular Welded

Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes From Thailand: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review and Preliminary Determination of No Shipments; 2018-2019, 85 Fed. Reg.

18552, 18553 (Dep’t Com. Apr. 2, 2020), P.R. 136. Wheatland later submitted new factual

information that included the Customs EAPA determination that Blue Pipe, an importer of pipe

produced by Saha Thai, had evaded the Antidumping Duty Order by not declaring entries of dual-

stenciled pipe as subject merchandise. Wheatland’s New Factual Information at Ex. 1. Following

Wheatland’s submission, Commerce concluded that “Saha Thai did not provide requested

information with respect to a substantial portion of its U.S. sales,” that information necessary to

calculate an accurate dumping margin was therefore missing from the record, and that Saha Thai

had failed to cooperate to the best of its ability. Mem. from J. Maeder to J. Kessler, re: Issues and

Decisions Memorandum for the Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and

Final No Shipment Determination, In Part; 20182019 at 4 (Dept Com. Jan. 19, 2021), P.R. 214

(“IDM”). In the final determination, Commerce applied adverse facts available to calculate a

dumping margin of 37.55 percent. Id. at 4–6; Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from

Thailand: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Final Determination of

No Shipments, In Part; 2018-2019, 86 Fed. Reg. 7259, 7260 (Dep’t Com. Jan. 27, 2021) (“Final

Determination”). Commerce referenced the Evasion Determination to justify its application of

adverse facts available, noting that Saha Thai produced the merchandise at issue in the Evasion

Determination and concluding that “Saha Thai was therefore aware that sales of dual-stenciled

examination to a “reasonable number” of exporters, referred to as mandatory respondents. Id. § 1677f-1(c)(2); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.109. Court No. 21-00049 Page 10

standard pipe and line pipe should be reported to Commerce for purposes of this administrative

review.” IDM at 5; see also Mem. from T. Page to M. Skinner, re: 2018-2019 Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review of Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand:

Application of Adverse Facts Available at 2–5 (Dep’t Com. Jan. 19, 2021), P.R. 215, C.R. 96.

IV. Procedural History

Saha Thai originally challenged Commerce’s application of adverse facts available. Pl.’s

Mot. for J. on Agency R. at 4–5. This court remanded the Final Determination, finding that

Commerce (1) failed to comply with the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d) to notify and

provide Saha Thai with an opportunity to cure deficiencies in its submission and (2) “failed to

explain adequately in the record the reason it chose to draw an adverse inference,” such that the

Final Determination was “not supported by substantial evidence nor in accordance with the law.”

Remand Order, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 1371. 3 The court “state[d] no position whether on remand

Commerce may draw adverse inferences or use facts otherwise available.” Id.

The Remand Order discussed both the concurrent scope inquiry case and the Evasion

Determination by Customs regarding Blue Pipe. Id. at 1353–59. The court noted that the scope

review involved the same parties and “intertwined” facts, id. at 1352 (citing Scope Review I, 547

F. Supp. 3d 1278 and Scope Review II, 592 F. Supp. 3d 1299), but the court stated that its

“consideration of this case [was] wholly independent of the results in the related scope inquiry

case.” Id. at 1361. The court stayed the remand redetermination during the appeal of the scope

3 Saha Thai separately challenged Commerce’s 2019–2020 administrative review of the Antidumping Duty Order, in a case that is pending before this court. See Saha Thai Steel Pipe Pub. Co. v. United States, No. 21-00627 (U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade filed Dec. 20, 2021). Court No. 21-00049 Page 11

inquiry case. See id. at 1371; Order Staying Case, Oct. 11, 2024, ECF No. 69. 4

On remand, Commerce reopened the record and solicited a revised questionnaire response

from Saha Thai that “include[d] all details of sales of dual-stenciled pipe,” pursuant to the Federal

Circuit’s decision upholding Commerce’s Scope Ruling. Remand Results at 1 (citing Scope

Appeal, 101 F.4th 1310); see also Letter from T. Gilgunn to D. Porter, re: Administrative Review

of the Antidumping Duty Order on Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand:

Request for Information at 1, Aug. 30, 2024, P.R.2d 1. Saha Thai timely responded to Commerce’s

requests for information and supplemental questionnaires. See, e.g., Letter from D. Porter to H.

Lutnick, re: Saha Thai’s Section A Questionnaire Response (Mar. 12, 2025), P.R.2d 12, C.R.2d 1;

Letter from D. Porter to H. Lutnick, re: Saha Thai’s Supplemental Questionnaire Response (June

5, 2025), P.R.2d 34, C.R.2d 46. Commerce published its preliminary remand redetermination on

July 8, 2025, in which Commerce used Saha Thai’s new responses to calculate a revised dumping

margin of 0.00 percent. See Draft Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand at 12,

Case No: A-549-502, Bar Code: 4789103-01 (Dep’t Com. July 8, 2025), (“Draft Remand

Results”). No interested parties commented on the Draft Remand Results. See Remand Results

at 3. Commerce filed its final Remand Results with the court on July 31, 2025, in which Commerce

continued to determine the dumping margin to be 0.00 percent. See id. at 2.

Saha Thai filed comments on September 3, 2025, asking the court to sustain the Remand

Results. 5 See Pl.’s Cmts. at 1. On November 17, 2025, the Government filed its reply to Saha

4 On July 7, 2025, this case was reassigned from the Honorable Stephen Alexander Vaden to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 253(c) and USCIT Rule 77(e)(4). Reassignment Order, July 7, 2025, ECF No. 78. 5 In the Remand Results, Commerce concluded that “the prices of domestically sourced and imported [input materials] in Thailand were distorted during the [period of review], such that the Court No. 21-00049 Page 12

Thai’s comments, asking the court to sustain the Remand Results, Gov’t Reply at 1, and Wheatland

filed a reply arguing that the Remand Order was based on faulty reasoning and asking the court to

again remand to Commerce for reconsideration, Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 2–3. The court on

November 18, 2025, directed Saha Thai and the Government to respond to Wheatland’s

arguments, and the parties timely responded. See Order, Nov. 18, 2025, ECF No. 90; Def.’s Suppl.

Reply to Cmts. on Remand Redetermination, Dec. 2, 2025, ECF No. 94 (“Gov’t Suppl. Reply”);

Pl.’s Suppl. Reply to Cmts. on Remand Redetermination, Dec. 2, 2025, ECF No. 95 (“Pl.’s Suppl.

Reply”).

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Jurisdiction remains proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2). The

standard of review is provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i): “[t]he court will sustain

Commerce's redetermination on remand if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record

and is otherwise in accordance with law . . . , which includes compliance with the court's remand

order.” SMA Surfaces, Inc. v. United States, 47 CIT __, __, 658 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1328 (2023)

(internal citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Wheatland challenges the Remand Results based on alleged flaws in the court’s previous

Remand Order. Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 2–3. Wheatland argues that “this [c]ourt made several

costs of producing subject merchandise in Thailand were outside the ordinary course of trade,” and that this constituted a particular market situation consistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e). Remand Results at 10. In its comments, Saha Thai notes that it “does not agree with Commerce’s reasoning or conclusion” that a particular market situation existed, but Saha Thai does not seek remand on these grounds. Pl.’s Cmts. at 3. Additionally, the particular market situation determination did not alter the calculated dumping margin. See Remand Results at 12. Because no party seeks remand on these grounds, the court need not reach the issue of whether Commerce erred in concluding that a particular market situation existed. Court No. 21-00049 Page 13

cascading errors” in cases involving Saha Thai, id. at 1, and that subsequent decisions have

undermined the court’s reasoning in the Remand Order that Commerce failed to comply with its

obligation under 19 U.S.C § 1677m(d) to provide Saha Thai with notice and an opportunity to cure

a deficiency in its submission. Id. at 2–3. Specifically, Wheatland argues that the court’s

conclusion that Saha Thai did not intentionally fail to report sales of dual-stenciled pipe was

“predicated on the [USCIT’s] erroneous and overturned decision in [Scope Review I]” that dual-

stenciled pipe was not included in the scope of the Antidumping Duty Order. Id. at 9. Wheatland

also contends that the court “incorrectly distinguished the facts of this case” from a case in which

the Federal Circuit held that Commerce may refuse to provide notice under 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d)

when a respondent acts fraudulently. Id. at 9 (citing Papierfabrik August Koehler SE v. United

States, 843 F.3d 1373, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Wheatland argues that this court’s subsequent

decision in Blue Pipe, sustaining an evasion determination by Customs, indicates that

“Papierfabrik . . . control[s] the outcome of this case, meaning the requirements of § 1677m(d) do

not apply to Saha Thai, because it engaged in a scheme to intentionally evade reporting data to

Commerce.” Id. at 11.

Wheatland takes issue with the Remand Results on the basis that they “are the fruit of this

poisonous tree,” id. at 11, not based on any alleged flaws in Commerce’s reasoning or procedure

on remand. See id. at 3 (“[T]here is no foundation for the Remand Order’s finding that Saha Thai’s

failure to report its dual-stenciled pipe was a simple misunderstanding rather than intentional

conduct. Accordingly, the [c]ourt should remand this proceeding.”). Wheatland argues that

remand would allow Commerce to “reconsider its decision in light of” the Scope Appeal and Blue

Pipe decisions. Id. at 3. Court No. 21-00049 Page 14

This case raises three issues: (1) whether Wheatland’s arguments are barred because

Wheatland did not exhaust its arguments; (2) whether the court should again remand to Commerce

based on alleged flaws in the prior Remand Order; and (3) whether Commerce’s Remand Results

are unsupported by substantial evidence and not in accordance with law. The court sustains the

Remand Results, concluding (1) that the futility exception applies to Wheatland’s arguments such

that failure to exhaust does not bar Wheatlands claims, (2) that alleged flaws in the Remand Order

do not provide grounds for remand, and (3) that the Remand Results are supported by substantial

evidence and in accordance with law.

I. The Exhaustion Requirement Does Not Bar Wheatland’s Claims

The court first turns to the question of whether Wheatland’s claims are barred because

Wheatland failed to exhaust its arguments before Commerce. See Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 5–6; Gov’t

Suppl. Reply at 5. Recall that, prior to challenging a determination by Commerce before the

USCIT, parties must “present all arguments” to Commerce in a case brief following publication

of the agency’s preliminary determination, 19 C.F.R. § 351.309(c)(2); Dorbest Ltd., 604 F.3d at

1375, in this case the Draft Remand Results. Wheatland did not file a case brief in response to

Commerce’s Draft Remand Results, Remand Results at 3, and therefore failed to exhaust its

arguments before Commerce. See Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 12. Wheatland argues that its challenge

to the Remand Results falls within an exception to the exhaustion doctrine. Id. (citing Gov’t of

Argentina v. United States, 45 CIT __, __, 542 F. Supp. 3d 1380, 1397 (2021)).

A. The Futility Exception Applies to Wheatland’s Arguments

Wheatland argues that the futility exception applies to its arguments for remand in this

case. Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 14–15. Specifically, Wheatland argues that the exhaustion doctrine

does not bar its claims because “Commerce had no discretion to overrule the Remand Order.” Id. Court No. 21-00049 Page 15

at 15. Saha Thai and the Government do not respond to Wheatland’s argument regarding the

futility of raising these claims before Commerce; Saha Thai merely states that “[a]ll of

[Wheatland’s] defenses against exhaustion fail.” Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 1; see also id. at 6; Gov’t

Suppl. Reply at 5–6 (not addressing futility).

A “well-settled exception to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine” exists in

cases where “invoking [administrative] remedies would be futile.” Asociacion Colombiana de

Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 916 F.2d 1571, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The Federal Circuit

has described the futility exception as “a narrow one.” Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1379. The

exception applies in “situations where plaintiffs would be required to go through obviously useless

motions in order to preserve their rights,” Bendure v. United States, 554 F.2d 427, 431 (Ct. Cl.

1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and “when the administrative agency has no

discretion to grant the requested relief,” Biafora v. United States, 773 F.3d 1326, 1330 (Fed. Cir.

2014).

Commerce is obligated to comply with this court’s remand orders. See Vertex Int'l, Inc. v.

United States, 30 CIT 281, 281 (2006). Indeed, failure to comply with the court’s order would be

grounds for this court to remand to Commerce again. See Icdas Celik Enerji Tersane Ve Ulasim

Sanayi, A.S. v. United States, 44 CIT __, __, 475 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1304 (2020) (remanding after

finding Commerce’s methodology to be unlawful because it did not comply with the court’s

remand instructions). If Commerce disagrees with a remand order from this court, it “may file

remand results under protest.” Tai-Ao Aluminium (Taishan) Co. v. United States, 43 CIT __, __,

415 F. Supp. 3d 1391, 1395 (2019), aff'd, 983 F.3d 487 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Commerce may not,

however, reject the reasoning underlying the court’s order. Cf. id. (sustaining remand results filed Court No. 21-00049 Page 16

under protest and holding the results to be “consistent with the remand order”).

At its core, Wheatland’s challenge to the Remand Results is a challenge to this court’s

previous Remand Order. See Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 11. Wheatland asks the court to turn back the

clock on these proceedings by issuing a second remand that would, in effect, serve to “overrule

the Remand Order.” See id. at 15. The agency has no discretion to grant the relief that Wheatland

seeks. See Biafora, 773 F.3d at 1330. Furthermore, Wheatland does not challenge independent

determinations Commerce made in the remand proceedings. 6 See Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 11. The

court concludes that, because it would have been futile to challenge the basis of the Remand Order

before Commerce, Wheatland’s failure to exhaust its arguments does not bar it from raising these

arguments before this court. 7

6 Wheatland argues that Commerce issued a supplemental questionnaire to Saha Thai because it was “bound to follow the instructions in the [c]ourt’s Remand Order.” Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 11. While Wheatland is correct that Commerce must follow the court’s instructions, the previous Remand Order did not require Commerce to reopen the record. See Remand Order, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 1371 (stating that “Commerce may draw adverse inferences or use facts otherwise available” so long as it “provide[s] an adequate explanation in the record supported by substantial evidence and ensure[s] that it properly complies with the notice requirement of § 1677m(d)”). 7 Wheatland also argues that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply because (1) a subsequent court decision in Blue Pipe “materially affects this case,” and (2) the question of whether the court’s prior application of 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d) “has been rendered erroneous is a pure question of law.” Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 12. Saha Thai and the Government contest the applicability of these exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, arguing: (1) that Blue Pipe merely affirmed the underlying Customs determination, which Commerce and the court already considered, and therefore does not present any change in the facts before the court, Gov’t Suppl. Reply at 6; Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 7; and (2) that the court’s analysis of § 1677m(d) is not a pure question of law, as it requires application to the facts of the case, Gov’t Suppl. Reply at 5 n.1; Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 1, 6. Because the court concludes that the futility exception applies, it need not evaluate the merits of Wheatland’s other arguments that exhaustion does not bar its claims. Court No. 21-00049 Page 17

II. Wheatland’s Challenge to the Prior Remand Order Does Not Provide Grounds for Remand

The court now turns to Wheatland’s argument for remand. As described above, Wheatland

asks this court to remand based on alleged flaws in the court’s previous Remand Order, which

Wheatland argues “was predicated on the [c]ourt’s erroneous and overturned decision” regarding

the Scope Ruling. Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 9 (citing Scope Review I, 547 F. Supp. 3d 1278). For the

reasons set forth below, Wheatland’s argument does not provide a basis for remand.

A. This Court Reviews Commerce’s Remand Results, Not the Prior Remand Order

The Federal Circuit held in Tung Mung Dev. Co. v. United States that alleged errors in a

remand order from the USCIT “d[o] not survive Commerce’s decisions on remand” where the

remand order “did not compel Commerce to adopt a new policy.” 354 F.3d 1371, 1378–79 (Fed.

Cir. 2004). 8 Under such circumstances, “alleged errors in earlier interim decisions by the [USCIT],

setting aside Commerce’s initial determination . . . and remanding for further proceedings, provide

no ground for setting aside Commerce's most recent decisions.” Id. at 1373; see also id. at 1379

(“[A]ny error in the remand orders is irrelevant because Commerce's redetermination decisions

represent new, independent agency interpretations.”). Furthermore, this court has previously

concluded that a party’s “disagreement with the court's interpretation of the law set forth in [a prior

remand order] . . . is extraneous” to the court’s assessment of whether the remand results are in in

8 By contrast, where the change in the agency’s policy following remand is not independent, alleged errors in the remand order may be reviewed on appeal by the Federal Circuit. See Nippon Steel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 494 F.3d 1371, 1376–78 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that the change in a vote by the U.S. International Trade Commission due to the departure of a single commissioner was “not . . . an independent change in agency policy” where the remaining commissioners did not change their votes); see also Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1119 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Court No. 21-00049 Page 18

accordance with law. Hosiden Corp. v. United States, 18 CIT 287, 291, 852 F. Supp. 1050, 1054

(1994), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Hosiden Corp. v. Advanced Display Mfrs. of Am., 85

F.3d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

As in Hosiden, “[a]t this point in the proceedings, the court is concerned solely with” the

validity of Commerce’s remand redetermination. See id. at 291, 1055; see also Pl.’s Suppl. Reply

at 5 (“[T]he question now before the [c]ourt is whether Commerce’s Remand Results are supported

by substantial evidence, are in accordance with law, and comply with the [c]ourt’s Remand

Order.”) The Remand Order did not compel a policy change; instead, it “state[d] no position

whether on remand Commerce may draw adverse inferences or use facts otherwise available,” and

required only that—if Commerce does so—it “provide an adequate explanation in the record

supported by substantial evidence and ensure that it properly complies with the notice requirement

of § 1677m(d).” Remand Order, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 1371. While Commerce was obligated to

comply with the Remand Order, that order did not require Commerce to reopen the record or

determine not to apply adverse facts available. Under Tung Mung, alleged errors in the Remand

Order “[do] not survive” Commerce’s independent determinations in the remand proceedings. See

Tung Mung, 354 F.3d at 1378.

B. Subsequent Decisions Do Not Invalidate the Previous Remand Order

In addition, the court finds Wheatland’s argument that remand is warranted because

subsequent decisions undermine the Remand Order to be without merit. First, Wheatland argues

that the Remand Order was “predicated on” this court’s earlier Remand Order remanding the Scope

Ruling, which was later reversed by the Federal Circuit in Scope Appeal, 101 F.4th at 1310. Def.-

Inter.’s Reply at 9. While the Remand Order discussed the scope inquiry case at length, the court

stated that its “consideration of this case [was] wholly independent of the results in the related Court No. 21-00049 Page 19

scope inquiry case.” Remand Order, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 1361; see also id. at 1354–55.

Furthermore, Commerce referenced the Federal Circuit’s ruling in the Scope Appeal when issuing

its revised questionnaire on remand. See Remand Results at 1. No purpose would be served by

remanding to Commerce to “reconsider its decision not to apply [adverse facts available] to Saha

Thai in light of the Federal Circuit’s decision” in that case, as Wheatland suggests. See Def.-

Inter.’s Reply at 16.

Second, Wheatland asserts that the Remand Order “incorrectly found that Saha Thai did

not act intentionally when it concealed its sales of dual-stenciled pipe,” such that Commerce was

required to provide an opportunity for Saha Thai to remedy its submission under 19 U.S.C.

§ 1677m(d). Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 11. Wheatland suggests that this result is inconsistent with the

USCIT’s subsequent decision in Blue Pipe, 2025 WL 2731541, at *1, sustaining Customs’

determination that Blue Pipe evaded the Antidumping Duty Order. Id. The Remand Order,

however, discussed the Evasion Determination sustained in Blue Pipe, including Customs’

findings regarding Saha Thai’s involvement. Remand Order, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 1357. The court

nonetheless concluded that Commerce made “no finding of fraud in this case.” Id. at 1367; see

generally IDM. The court held that, “[b]ecause Commerce did not find Saha Thai acted

fraudulently, Commerce violated § 1677m(d) when it did not provide notice and an opportunity to

cure before applying an adverse inference to the facts available.” Remand Order, 605 F. Supp. 3d

at 1366. The subsequent Blue Pipe decision sustaining Customs’ Evasion Determination does not

invalidate this court’s conclusion, based on the record in this case, that Commerce had failed to

meet its obligations under § 1677m(d). See id. at 1369, see also Gov’t Suppl. Reply at 6

(“[Wheatland] has not sufficiently explained how the [c]ourt’s decision in Blue Pipe confirming Court No. 21-00049 Page 20

[Custom’s] affirmative determination presents any change in the set of facts that were before this

[c]ourt when issuing the Remand Opinion.”). The court concludes that subsequent decisions in

the Scope Appeal and Blue Pipe do not provide a basis for remanding the Remand Results to

Commerce for further consideration.

III. The Remand Results Are Supported by Substantial Evidence and in Accordance With Law

Recall that remand is warranted if the Remand Results are “unsupported by substantial

evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” See 19 U.S.C.

§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i); SMA Surfaces, 658 F. Supp. 3d at 1328. Saha Thai and the Government

argue that the Remand Results comply with the court’s Remand Order, are supported by substantial

evidence, and should be sustained. Pl.’s Cmts. at 3; Gov’t Reply at 4. The Government further

notes that Commerce’s decision on remand to reopen the record “was consistent with 19 U.S.C.

§ 1677m(d) because Commerce explicitly allowed Saha Thai the chance to remedy a deficiency”

in its prior submission. Gov’t Reply at 4.

Wheatland, as discussed previously, argues that the court should remand the Remand

Results due to alleged errors in the underlying Remand Order. Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 9. Wheatland

does not develop additional arguments based on Commerce’s redetermination itself to support its

claim that the Remand Results are unsupported by substantial evidence or not in accordance with

law. See id. at 16, 11–12. Furthermore, no party now claims that there is a gap on the record

regarding Saha Thai’s sales of dual-stenciled pipe. See Def.-Inter.’s Reply at 11 (“Commerce

issued a questionnaire to Saha Thai that allowed it to report all the relevant details of its sales of

dual-stenciled pipe.”); Gov’t Reply at 3 (“Saha Thai timely filed the requested response and

supplemental response.”); see also Pl.’s Cmts. at 2 (arguing that, with the Saha Thai’s revised Court No. 21-00049 Page 21

questionnaire responses on the record, Commerce correctly “properly calculated Saha Thai’s

dumping margin, based on the company’s reported data”). Given that Commerce has now

calculated the dumping margin based on a complete record, there would be no basis for Commerce

to apply facts available or an adverse inference on remand, as Wheatland suggests. See id. at 12;

see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a); Zhejiang, 652 F.3d at 1348.

CONCLUSION

Commerce’s decision to reopen the record on remand and its redetermination of the

dumping margin for Saha Thai are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law.

Commerce’s Remand Results are sustained.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Gary S. Katzmann Gary S. Katzmann, Judge Dated: February 4, 2026 New York, New York