Safety Management and Related Training, Inc. a California Corporation doing business as Smart Safety Group v. Safety and Compliance Holdings LLC, Carr’s Hill Partners LLC, Solomon Group Holdings, LLC. et. al

• Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
• Decided: May 6, 2026
• Docket: 7:26-cv-00052
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND Case No. 25-cv-02625-BAS-MMP RELATED TRAINING, INC. a 14 California Corporation doing business as ORDER: 15 Smart Safety Group, (1) GRANTING WITHOUT PREJUDICE DEFENDANTS’ 16 Plaintiff, SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE 17 v. HOLDINGS LLC, CARR’S HILL PARTNERS LLC, 18 SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE SOLOMON GROUP HOLDINGS, LLC. et. al, 19 PRODUCTIONS LLC, AND Defendants. CARR’S HILL CAPITAL 20 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT 21 LP’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 22 JURISDICTION (ECF No. 39);

23 (2) GRANTING WITHOUT 24 PREJUDICE DEFENDANT SOLOMON GROUP 25 PRODUCTIONS, LLC’S 26 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 27 MOTION (ECF No. 40); 28 1 (3) VACATING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS CARR’S HILL 2 PARTNERS LLC’S AND 3 SMART PROFITABILITY SOLUTIONS LLC’S MOTION 4 TO TRANSFER (ECF No. 26); 5 AND

6 (4) VACATING AS MOOT DEFENDANT SOLOMON 7 GROUP PRODUCTIONS 8 LLC’S MOTION TO TRANSFER (ECF No. 27) 9

10 Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (“Motions”) 11 submitted by Defendants Safety and Compliance Holdings, LLC, Carr's Hill Partners, 12 LLC, Solomon Group Productions, LLC, and Carr's Hill Capital Partners Management, LP 13 (“Jurisdiction Defendants”). (ECF Nos. 26, 27, 39, 40.) For the reasons below, the Court 14 GRANTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Jurisdiction Defendants’ motions to dismiss. 15 (ECF Nos. 39, 40.) The Court also VACATES AS MOOT Jurisdiction Defendants’ 16 remaining two motions to transfer venue. (ECF Nos. 26, 27.) Plaintiff is granted leave to 17 amend its complaint (ECF No. 30) by no later than May 20, 2026. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff Safety Management and Related Training, Inc. filed 20 this action. (ECF No. 1.) On December 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint— 21 asserting that Jurisdiction Defendants used Plaintiff’s trademarks when advertising and 22 performing safety auditing services and bringing the following causes of action against all 23 Jurisdiction Defendants:1 24 (1) Declaratory relief that Defendants’ past, ongoing, and future use of Plaintiff’s 25 trademarks is not authorized by Plaintiff (Count 1) (ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 113–120); 26 27 1 Plaintiff also brought claims against Defendants Smart Profitability Solutions, LLC and Pala 28 1 (2) Unjust enrichment for financial benefit received from Defendants’ unauthorized use 2 of Plaintiff’s trademarks (Count 3) (id. ¶¶ 128–133); 3 (3) Common law trademark infringement (Count 5) (id. ¶¶ 143–161); 4 (4) Unfair competition, false designation of origin, passing off, and false advertising 5 under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (“Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act”) (Count 6) (id. ¶¶ 6 162–173); 7 (5) Unfair competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 17200 (Count 7) (id. ¶¶ 174–179); 8 (6) Trade dress infringement under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (Count 8) (id. ¶¶ 9 180–187); and 10 (7) Common law trade dress infringement (Count 9) (id. ¶¶ 188–195). 11 Jurisdiction Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint on grounds 12 of lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 39, 40.) Jurisdiction Defendants have also 13 previously moved to transfer venue to the Northern District of Texas regarding Plaintiff’s 14 original complaint—which the Court expressly stated it would consider in evaluating 15 Plaintiff’s amended complaint as well. (ECF Nos. 26, 27, 44.) 16 The Court finds it appropriate to rule on Jurisdiction Defendants’ motions (ECF Nos. 17 26, 27, 39, 40) on the papers and without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1.d.1. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 When raised as a defense by motion, Rule 12(b)(2) authorizes the dismissal of an 20 action for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). When a dispute 21 between the parties arises concerning whether personal jurisdiction over a defendant is 22 proper, “the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.” 23 Will Co. v. Lee, 47 F.4th 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2022). When the defendant’s motion is based 24 on written materials, and no evidentiary hearing is held, the court will evaluate only 25 whether the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction based on 26 the plaintiff’s pleadings and affidavits. Id. The court must take unchallenged allegations 27 in the complaint as true, and conflicts between the parties over statements within any 28 affidavits must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id. 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 The general rule provides personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper if it is 3 permitted by a long-arm statute and if the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate 4 federal due process. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). For 5 due process to be satisfied, a defendant must have “minimum contacts” within the forum 6 state such that asserting jurisdiction over the defendant would not “offend traditional 7 notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 1155 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. 8 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945)). Both California and federal long-arm statutes 9 require compliance with due process requirements. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 10 125 (2014). 11 There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Id. at 118. 12 General jurisdiction allows a court to hear cases unrelated to the defendant’s forum 13 activities and exists if the defendant has “substantial” or “continuous and systematic” 14 contacts with the forum state. Fields v. Sedgewick Assoc. Risk, Ltd., 769 F.2d 299, 301 15 (9th Cir. 1986). Specific jurisdiction permits the court to exercise jurisdiction over a 16 defendant who has availed itself through forum-related activities that gave rise to the action 17 before the court. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. August Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th 18 Cir. 2000). 19 A. General Jurisdiction 20 A court may exercise general jurisdiction “only when a defendant is ‘essentially at 21 home’ in the State.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 22 (2021) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 23 (2011)). For a corporate defendant, general jurisdiction is paradigmatically appropriate in 24 the state in which the entity is incorporated or where it maintains its principal place of 25 business (where the corporate defendant is “at home”). See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 26 U.S. 117, 137 (2014); see also Impossible Foods Inc. v. Impossible X LLC, 80 F.4th 1079, 27 1086 (9th Cir. 2023). 28 1 Jurisdiction Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that they are 2 not subject to general jurisdiction in California because their principal places of business 3 are elsewhere. Carr's Hill Partners, LLC is at home in Louisiana. (ECF Nos. 39, 39-1 at 4 11:11-15.) Carr’s Hill Capital Partners Management, LP is at home in Delaware. (Id. at 5 11:16-19.) Safety and Compliance Holdings, LLC is at home in Delaware. (Id. at 11:20- 6 23.) Solomon is at home in Louisiana. (ECF No. 40-1 at 9:12-13.) Carr's Hill Partners, 7 LLC, Carr’s Hill Capital Partners Management, LP, and Safety and Compliance Holdings, 8 LLC further state that they have “never registered in California, appointed an agent for 9 service, regularly transacted business, or had an office, employees, or property in 10 California.” (ECF No. 39-1 at 11:11-23.) Solomon also states that it has “no offices or 11 employees within the State of California.” (ECF No. 40-1 at 9:12-13.) 12 Plaintiff opposes Jurisdiction Defendants’ challenges to general jurisdiction on 13 grounds that Defendants should all be treated as alter egos; and thus, should all be subject 14 to general jurisdiction in California. (ECF No. 41 at 15:2–17:13, 17:20-21 (citing alter ego 15 test in Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1070–73 (9th Cir. 2015)).) However, Plaintiff’s 16 allegations do not support finding that any of the Jurisdiction Defendants in this action are 17 individually “at home” in California (see ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 20–30). In addition, as discussed 18 below, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish alter ego theory between 19 Jurisdiction Defendants and Defendants Smart Profitability Solutions, LLC (“Smart 20 Profitability”) or Pala Group, Inc. (“Pala”). Thus, even if the alter ego theory applied to 21 Jurisdiction Defendants, none of them would be subject to general jurisdiction. See In re 22 Packaged Seafood Prods. Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2018) 23 (“Daimler also makes clear that even if the Court determines that one entity is the alter ego 24 of the other, the[] foreign entity's activities in the forum jurisdiction must still meet the 25 general jurisdiction requirements of being essentially ‘at home’. ”). 26 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that 27 Jurisdiction Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in California. 28 B. Specific Jurisdiction 1 Second, Jurisdiction Defendants argue they are not subject to specific jurisdiction in 2 California. A defendant who is not subject to general jurisdiction can only be subject to a 3 state’s jurisdiction if the plaintiff’s claims are related to defendant’s activities in that state. 4 Walden v. Fiore, 571 US 277, 283 n. 6 (2014). The Ninth Circuit put forth a three-pronged 5 test for specific jurisdiction: 6 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform 7 some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 8 conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 9 (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s 10 forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial 11 justice, i.e., it must be reasonable. 12 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). The 13 plaintiff bears the burden of proving the first two prongs and, if successful, the burden 14 shifts to the defendant on the third prong to prove that jurisdiction is unreasonable. Id. If 15 any prong is not satisfied, then jurisdiction in the forum would deprive the defendant of 16 due process of law. AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2020). 17 1. Whether the Purposeful Direction or Purposeful Availment Test 18 Applies 19 Under the first prong of specific jurisdiction, purposeful availment and purposeful 20 direction are “two distinct concepts.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. “A purposeful 21 availment analysis is most often used in suits sounding in contract,” whereas “[a] 22 purposeful direction analysis . . . is most often used in suits sounding in tort.” Id. 23 Here, Plaintiffs’ claims against Jurisdiction Defendants arise from Jurisdiction 24 Defendants’ allegedly tortious misrepresentations and misuse of Plaintiff’s trademarks 25 (i.e., remedies for Jurisdiction Defendants’ alleged misuse of Plaintiff’s trademarks 26 (Counts 1 and 3), intentional misrepresentation (Count 4), common law trademark and 27 trade dress infringement (Counts 5 and 8), and claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 28 1 Act (Counts, 6, 8, and 9)) (see ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 113–204). See Friendly Family Prods. LLC 2 v. Little House on Prairie, Inc., No. 08-cv-06602-MMM-CW, 2009 WL 10669833, at *4 3 n.28 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009) (“It is well-settled that claims for trademark infringement 4 sound in tort.”); see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 5 1998) (noting that trademark infringement is “akin to a tort case” for purposes of 6 determining jurisdiction); see also Zhu v. Li, No. 19-CV-02534-JSW, 2023 WL 4770431, 7 at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2023) (“Plaintiff's claim[] for . . . intentional misrepresentation 8 sound[s] in tort.”). 9 Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims as relevant here “sound in tort” and the “purposeful 10 direction” test applies. 11 2. Whether Plaintiff Pled Purposeful Direction 12 To assess whether a defendant purposefully directed its activities at the forum state, 13 courts apply the “effects” test from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The defendant 14 must have “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) 15 causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” 16 Shawarma Stackz LLC v. Jwad, No. 21-CV-01263-BAS-BGS, 2021 WL 5827066, at *7 17 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2021) (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803). All three components 18 must be met for a defendant to have purposefully directed activities to the forum state. See 19 Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 577 (9th Cir. 2018). 20 i. Committed an Intentional Act 21 For the purposes of the Calder effects test, “an intentional act is an external 22 manifestation of the actor's intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world, not 23 including any of its actual or intended results.” Washington Shoe Co. v. A–Z Sporting 24 Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts within this district have found 25 intentional acts where defendants have conducted allegedly wrongful acts (e.g., 26 misappropriating funds) while conducting business. Crecero Techs., Inc. v. Steven 27 Hoffman et al. Additional Party Names: David Thompson, Valeria Raigorodskaia, No. 28 1 8:25-CV-00251-DOC-KESX, 2026 WL 712949, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2026) (finding 2 the same). 3 Here, Plaintiff claims that all Jurisdiction Defendants have used Plaintiff’s 4 trademarks while conducting business—including on Defendants’ websites or on incident 5 report forms. (ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 8–11, 32, 35–39.) Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff 6 sufficiently alleged that Jurisdiction Defendants committed intentional acts and met the 7 first prong of the Calder effects test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803. 8 ii. Expressly Aimed at the Forum State 9 The “express aiming” prong of the Calder effects test asks whether the defendant's 10 allegedly tortious action was “expressly aimed at the forum.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. 11 Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010). Originally, the United States 12 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit “struggled with the question whether tortious 13 conduct on a nationally accessible website is expressly aimed at any, or all, of the forums 14 in which the website can be viewed.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 15 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011). While this is still an expanding area of the law, the Ninth 16 Circuit has since established some parameters. 17 On one hand, “maintenance of a passive website alone cannot satisfy the express 18 aiming prong” of the Calder effects test. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Pebble 19 Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006); Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 20 130 F.3d 414, 418–20 (9th Cir. 1997). On the other hand, “operating even a passive 21 website in conjunction with ‘something more’—conduct directly targeting the forum—is 22 sufficient.” Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1229 (internal citations omitted). 23 In assessing whether a defendant has done “something more,” courts consider 24 several factors, including “the interactivity of the defendant's website, the geographic scope 25 of the defendant's commercial ambitions, and whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ 26 a plaintiff known to be a forum resident.” Id. (internal citations omitted). For example, 27 courts have found the “something more” requirement satisfied where, in addition to 28 maintaining websites featuring an allegedly infringing mark, defendants actively 1 advertised in the forum state or sent a letter to the plaintiff in the forum demanding money 2 to release defendant's registration of the domain name that included the plaintiff's 3 trademark. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2002) 4 (actively advertised in forum state); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 5 (9th Cir. 1998) (sent letter to plaintiff). 6 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations that Jurisdiction Defendants work in 7 California are insufficient for the “something more” in addition to the allegation that 8 Jurisdiction Defendants’ website is accessible for California. For, the express aiming test 9 examines whether the defendant's alleged intentional, tortious act was expressly aimed at 10 the forum. See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th 11 Cir. 2010); Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. 12 Here, Plaintiff claims Safety and Compliance Holdings, LLC, Carr's Hill Partners, 13 LLC, and Carr's Hill Capital Partners Management, LP allegedly used Plaintiff’s trademark 14 on their website. (ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 37, 79–82.) In addition, Plaintiff claims that on their 15 website, the aforementioned Defendants display that they work at jobsites in California. 16 (Id. ¶ 34.) However, conspicuously missing from Plaintiff’s complaint is any allegation 17 that the aforementioned Defendants used Plaintiff’s trademark while performing work in 18 California jobsites or that they specifically targeted California in advertising with 19 Plaintiff’s trademark on their website. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege “something 20 more” than actively maintaining the website, Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1229, the Court 21 finds Plaintiff has failed to allege that the allegedly tortious conduct (i.e., unauthorized use 22 of Plaintiff’s trademarks in providing services or advertising) by Safety and Compliance 23 Holdings, LLC, Carr's Hill Partners, LLC, and Carr's Hill Capital Partners Management, 24 LP is expressly aimed at California. 25 In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Solomon 26 has expressly aimed its allegedly tortious actions at California. Though Plaintiff states that 27 Solomon has used the other Defendants’ forms bearing Plaintiff’s trademarks without 28 authorization (ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 8–10, 88), Plaintiff has not alleged that Solomon had used 1 the allegedly infringing materials in California—or that Solomon even conducts business 2 in California. 3 Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that the Court has 4 personal specific jurisdiction over Jurisdiction Defendants. As such, the Court GRANTS 5 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Jurisdiction Defendants’ Motions. (ECF Nos. 39, 40.) 6 3. Whether the Alter Ego Test Applies to Personal Jurisdiction for 7 Jurisdiction Defendants 8 Personal jurisdiction may also be established through alter ego liability. Ranza, 793 9 F.3d at 1073. “In determining whether alter ego liability applies, [courts] apply the law of 10 the forum state.” In re Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010). “Under the alter 11 ego doctrine . . . when the corporate form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, 12 or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, the courts will ignore the 13 corporate entity and deem the corporation's acts to be those of the persons or organizations 14 actually controlling the corporation, in most instances the equitable owners.” Davidson v. 15 Barnhardt, No. CV 11-7298 FMO VBKX, 2013 WL 6388354, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 16 2013) (citing Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538 (2000)). 17 The Ninth Circuit explains that: 18 California recognizes alter ego liability where two conditions are met: First, ‘where there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the 19 individuality, or separateness, of the said person and corporation has 20 ceased;’ and, second, where ‘adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would . . . sanction a fraud or promote 21 injustice.’ 22 Id. at 1038 (quoting Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal.3d 353, 365 n. 9 (1977)). “The 23 ‘unity of interest and ownership’ prong requires ‘a showing that the parent controls the 24 subsidiary to such a degree as to render the latter the mere instrumentality of the former.’ 25 ” In re Boon Glob. Ltd., 923 F.3d 643, 653 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ranza, 793 F.3d at 26 1073). If the first prong is not met, the Court does not need to analyze the “fraud or 27 injustice” prong. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1075 n.9. 28 1 Here, Plaintiff appears to argue that Jurisdiction Defendants are alter egos of Smart 2 Profitability and Pala—both of whom Plaintiff has alleged engaged in activities in San 3 Diego relevant to the current action (e.g., signing a contract in San Diego and engaging in 4 other forms of business with Plaintiff in San Diego) (ECF No. 30 ¶ 35). 5 However, as an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged Solomon 6 is an alter ego of Smart Profitability and Pala—since Plaintiff alleges instead that Solomon 7 is Smart Profitability’s “customer” indicating a lack of unity of interest or ownership (see 8 ECF No. 30 ¶ 9). Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1073. 9 In addition, even if the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s allegations that all 10 Defendants share “unity of interest and ownership” (e.g., that Carr’s Hill Capital Partners 11 Management, LP owns and operates Smart Profitability and Pala) (ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 79–80, 12 102, 126), the Court does not find that Plaintiffs have pled facts supporting its allegation 13 that Defendants (including Jurisdiction Defendants) “use the corporate form to perpetuate 14 fraud by evading obligations under the Agreement while continuing to exploit Plaintiff’s 15 trademarks” (ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 43–44). Indeed, Plaintiff has not pled any specific facts 16 regarding how any of the Jurisdiction Defendants’ ownership or control over Smart 17 Profitability or Pala Group (or vice versa) has led to Jurisdiction Defendants’ purported 18 misuse of Plaintiff’s trademarks (or any illegal obfuscation thereof). See Davidson, 2013 19 WL 6388354, at *11 (emphasis added) (alter ego doctrine applies where “the corporate 20 form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful 21 or inequitable purpose.”). 22 As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s alter ego allegations are inadequate to 23 establish personal jurisdiction over Jurisdiction Defendants. 24 C. Vacating Remaining Motions to Dismiss as Moot 25 Although Jurisdiction Defendants also move to transfer their case to the Northern 26 District of Texas as an alternative remedy, the Court VACATES AS MOOT Jurisdiction 27 Defendants’ requests to transfer given that the Court grants their motions to dismiss in this 28 Order. (ECF Nos. 26, 27.) Regardless, the Court notes that transfer could be problematic 1 || because Plaintiff has neither alleged that Jurisdiction Defendants are at home in Texas nor 2 || alleged any actions taken by Jurisdiction Defendants in the state of Texas. See Echologics, 3 v. Orbis Intelligent Sys., Inc., No. 21-CV-01147-BAS-AHG, 2021 WL 5203283, at 4 ||*3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2021) (“A district court's broad discretion to transfer a case is subject 5 ||to the prohibition that an action cannot be transferred to a district in which venue would 6 || have been improper if the action were originally filed there.’’). 7 D. Leave to Amend 8 The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Safety and Compliance Holdings, 9 || LLC, Carr's Hill Partners, LLC, Carr's Hill Capital Partners Management, LP, and Solomon 10 || Group Productions, LLC (Counts 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) without prejudice, and GRANTS 11 || Plaintiff leave to amend to correct jurisdictional deficiencies pursuant to Federal Rule of 12 || Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE motions to 15 ||dismiss submitted by Safety and Compliance Holdings, LLC, Carr's Hill Partners, LLC, 16 |}Carr's Hill Capital Partners Management, LP, and Solomon Group Productions, LLC. 17 ||(ECF Nos. 39, 40.) Additionally, the Court VACATES AS MOOT Jurisdiction 18 || Defendants’ requests to transfer given that the Court grants their motions to dismiss in this 19 ||}Order. (ECF Nos. 26, 27.) 20 Further, Plaintiffis GRANTED leave to amend their first amended complaint. (ECF 21 ||No. 30.) Should Plaintiff wish to amend, any second amended complaint must be filed no 22 || later than May 20, 2026. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 || DATED: May 6, 2026 (yatta Bahar □□ %6 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 27 28