Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice McReynolds,
announced by the Chief Justice.
This cause is properly here upon appeal. The petition for certiorari is therefore denied.
May 4th, 1920, Lucius J. Kellam, then domiciled and residing in Accomac County, Virginia, transferred and delivered to the Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, Maryland, stocks and bonds of sundry corporations valued at fifty thousand dollars, with power to change the investments, upon the following terms— “ ... to collect the income arising therefrom'• and after paying such taxes as may be chargeable thereon and its 5% commissions on the gross income, to accumulate the net income for the benefit of the two sons of myself, that is to say, Lucius J. Kellam, Jr., who attained the age of eight years on September 25, 1919, and Emerson Polk Kellam, who attained the age of five years on February 5, 1920, and when the said Lucius J. Kellam, Jr., arrives at twenty-five years of age, to deliver to him one-half of the principal of the estate hereby conveyed and one-half‘of the said accumulations of income — the other half of the [90]*90said principal and accumulations of income shall be retained by said Trustee and all income therefrom shall continue to be accumulated until the said Emerson Polk Kellam arrives at twenty-five years of age when he-shall become entitled to the said one-half of the principal and accumulations so retained together with all further accumulations thereon. If either of said two sons shall die before receiving his share of said principal and accumulations, then the same shall be paid over arid delivered to his children living at his death; and if either shall die before receiving his share without issue, then such share shall be added to the share of the survivor and be held for his use and benefit in the same manner precisely as his original share is held.”
The deed made no provision for the event of death of both sons under twenty-five without issue. The donor reserved to himself power of revocation, but without exercising it, died in 1920. Administration on his estate was had in Accomac County, Virginia, and his two sons are domiciled there.
Except as changed by reinvestment, the Trust Company has continued to hold the original securities in Baltimore, Maryland, and has paid the taxes regularly demanded by that City and State on account of them.
An assessment for taxation in Accomac County, Virginia, for the years 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1925 upon the whole corpus of the trust estate was sustained by the court below — the highest State tribunal to which the matter could be submitted. It declared Sec. 2307, Virginia Code (1919), as amended in 1920, 1922 and 1923
Appellant maintains that, so interpreted and applied, the statute lays a tax upon property wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the State and consequently offends the Fourteenth Amendment.
Manifestly, the securities are subject to taxation in Maryland where they are in the actual possession of the Trust Company — holder of the legal title. That they are property within Maryland is not questioned. De Ganay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376, 382. Also, nobody within Virginia has present right to their control or possession, or to. receive income therefrom, or to cause them to be' brought physically within her borders. They have no legal situs for taxation in Virginia unless the legal fiction mobilia sequuntur personam is applicable and controlling. The court below, recognizing this, held the two sons, in conjunction with the administrator of the father’s estate — all domiciled in Virginia — really owned the fund [92]*92and that by reason of the fiction its taxable situs followed them.
We need not make any nice inquiry concerning the ultimate or equitable ownership of the securities or the exact nature of the interest held by the sons. In the disclosed circumstances, we think that is not a matter of controlling importance.
Ordinarily this Court recognizes that the fiction of mobilia seqúuntur personam may be applied in order to determine the situs of intangible personal property for taxation. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1. But the general rule must yield to established fact of legal ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere, and ought not to be applied if so to do would result in inescapable and patent injustice, whether through double taxation or otherwise. State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National d’Escompte, 191 U. S. 388, 404; Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 408. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 354; Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 17. Here, where the possessor of the legal title holds the securities in Maryland, thus giving them a permanent situs for lawful taxation there, and no person in Virginia has present right to their enjoyment or power to remove •them, the fiction must be disregarded. It plainly con-, flicts with fact; the securities did not and could not follow any person domiciled in Virginia. Their actual situs "is in Maryland and can not be changed by the cestuis que trustent.
The power of Virginia to lay a tax upon the fair value of any interest in the securities actually owned by one of her resident citizens is not now presented for consideration. See Maguire v. Trefry, supra.
A statute of a State which undertakes to tax things wholly.beyond her jurisdiction or control conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 204: Buck v. Beach, 206 [93]*93U. S. 392, 402, 408, 409; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 575.
Tangible personal property permanently located beyond the owner’s domicile may not be taxed at the latter place. Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra. Intangible personal property may acquire a taxable situs where permanently located, employed and protected. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National d’Escompte, 191 U. S. 388; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors,
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Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice McReynolds,
announced by the Chief Justice.
This cause is properly here upon appeal. The petition for certiorari is therefore denied.
May 4th, 1920, Lucius J. Kellam, then domiciled and residing in Accomac County, Virginia, transferred and delivered to the Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, Maryland, stocks and bonds of sundry corporations valued at fifty thousand dollars, with power to change the investments, upon the following terms— “ ... to collect the income arising therefrom'• and after paying such taxes as may be chargeable thereon and its 5% commissions on the gross income, to accumulate the net income for the benefit of the two sons of myself, that is to say, Lucius J. Kellam, Jr., who attained the age of eight years on September 25, 1919, and Emerson Polk Kellam, who attained the age of five years on February 5, 1920, and when the said Lucius J. Kellam, Jr., arrives at twenty-five years of age, to deliver to him one-half of the principal of the estate hereby conveyed and one-half‘of the said accumulations of income — the other half of the [90]*90said principal and accumulations of income shall be retained by said Trustee and all income therefrom shall continue to be accumulated until the said Emerson Polk Kellam arrives at twenty-five years of age when he-shall become entitled to the said one-half of the principal and accumulations so retained together with all further accumulations thereon. If either of said two sons shall die before receiving his share of said principal and accumulations, then the same shall be paid over arid delivered to his children living at his death; and if either shall die before receiving his share without issue, then such share shall be added to the share of the survivor and be held for his use and benefit in the same manner precisely as his original share is held.”
The deed made no provision for the event of death of both sons under twenty-five without issue. The donor reserved to himself power of revocation, but without exercising it, died in 1920. Administration on his estate was had in Accomac County, Virginia, and his two sons are domiciled there.
Except as changed by reinvestment, the Trust Company has continued to hold the original securities in Baltimore, Maryland, and has paid the taxes regularly demanded by that City and State on account of them.
An assessment for taxation in Accomac County, Virginia, for the years 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1925 upon the whole corpus of the trust estate was sustained by the court below — the highest State tribunal to which the matter could be submitted. It declared Sec. 2307, Virginia Code (1919), as amended in 1920, 1922 and 1923
Appellant maintains that, so interpreted and applied, the statute lays a tax upon property wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the State and consequently offends the Fourteenth Amendment.
Manifestly, the securities are subject to taxation in Maryland where they are in the actual possession of the Trust Company — holder of the legal title. That they are property within Maryland is not questioned. De Ganay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376, 382. Also, nobody within Virginia has present right to their control or possession, or to. receive income therefrom, or to cause them to be' brought physically within her borders. They have no legal situs for taxation in Virginia unless the legal fiction mobilia sequuntur personam is applicable and controlling. The court below, recognizing this, held the two sons, in conjunction with the administrator of the father’s estate — all domiciled in Virginia — really owned the fund [92]*92and that by reason of the fiction its taxable situs followed them.
We need not make any nice inquiry concerning the ultimate or equitable ownership of the securities or the exact nature of the interest held by the sons. In the disclosed circumstances, we think that is not a matter of controlling importance.
Ordinarily this Court recognizes that the fiction of mobilia seqúuntur personam may be applied in order to determine the situs of intangible personal property for taxation. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1. But the general rule must yield to established fact of legal ownership, actual presence and control elsewhere, and ought not to be applied if so to do would result in inescapable and patent injustice, whether through double taxation or otherwise. State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National d’Escompte, 191 U. S. 388, 404; Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 408. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 354; Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12, 17. Here, where the possessor of the legal title holds the securities in Maryland, thus giving them a permanent situs for lawful taxation there, and no person in Virginia has present right to their enjoyment or power to remove •them, the fiction must be disregarded. It plainly con-, flicts with fact; the securities did not and could not follow any person domiciled in Virginia. Their actual situs "is in Maryland and can not be changed by the cestuis que trustent.
The power of Virginia to lay a tax upon the fair value of any interest in the securities actually owned by one of her resident citizens is not now presented for consideration. See Maguire v. Trefry, supra.
A statute of a State which undertakes to tax things wholly.beyond her jurisdiction or control conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 204: Buck v. Beach, 206 [93]*93U. S. 392, 402, 408, 409; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 575.
Tangible personal property permanently located beyond the owner’s domicile may not be taxed at the latter place. Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra. Intangible personal property may acquire a taxable situs where permanently located, employed and protected. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National d’Escompte, 191 U. S. 388; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S. 346.
Here we must decide whether intangibles — stocks, bonds — 4n the hands of the holder of the legal title with definite taxable situs at its residence, not subject to change by the equitable owner, may be taxed at the latter’s domicile in another State. We think not. The reasons which led this Court in Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, and Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, to deny application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam to tangibles apply to the intangibles in appellant’s possession. They have acquired a situs separate from that of the beneficial owners. The adoption of a contrary rule would “ involve possibilities of an extremely serious character ” by permitting double taxation, both unjust and oppressive. And the fiction of mobilia sequuntur personam “ was intended for convenience, and not to be controlling where justice does not demand it.”
No opinion of this Court seems definitely to rule the exact point now presented. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, sustained an assessment of tax by New York upon the transfer of credits, declared to have taxable situs within her borders, under the will of a citizen of Illinois. [94]*94In Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, the tax was not laid at the owner’s domicile, but by the State wherein the securities were deposited. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, involved an inheritance tax; the creator of the trust resided in Wisconsin at his death and an Illinois Company with legal title then held possession of the property in Chicago; but the creator had retained full power to revoke the trust and regain control. Fidelity & Columbia Tr. Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, sustained a tax laid at the domicile of the legal owner. He had full power to control the deposits in St. Louis banks and might have brought the entire fund within Kentucky’s jurisdiction. In Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, the decedent — a resident of Connecticut — had control and present right to all benefits arising from the property. The legal title was not held by another with the duty .to retain possession, as in the present cause. Moreover, this Court did not thére determine that the property had a taxable situs in New York.
Any general statement in the above opinions which may seem to interfere with the conclusion here announced must be limited and confined to the precise situation then under consideration.
It would be unfortunate, perhaps amazing, if a legal fiction originally invented to prevent personalty from escaping just taxation, should compel us to accept the irrational view that the same securities were within two States at the same instant and because of this to uphold a double and oppressive assessment.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
See. 2307, Va. Code 1919 (as amended). By whom property is to be listed; to whom taxed — If property be owned by a person sui juris, it shall be listed by and taxed to him. If property be owned by a minor, it shall be listed by and taxed to his guardian or trustee, if any he has; if he has no guardian or trustee it shall be listed by and taxed to his father, if any he has; if he has no father, [91]*91then it shall be listed by and taxed to his mother, if any he has; and if he has no guardian, nor trustee, father nor mother, it shall be listed by and taxed to the person in possession. If the property is the separate property of a person over twenty-one years of age or a married woman, it shall be listed by and taxed to the trustee, if any they have in this State; and if they have no trustee in this State, it shall be listed by and taxed to themselves. In either ease, it shall be listed and taxed in the county or city where they reside; but if they be non-residents of Virginia, the property shall be listed and taxed in the county or city wherein such trustee resides. If the property be the estate of a deceased person, it shall be listed by the personal representative or person in possession, and taxed to the estate of such deceased person. If the property be owned- by an idiot or lunatic, it shall be listed by and taxed to his committee, if any; if none has been appointed, then such property shall be listed by and taxed to the person in possession. If the property is held in trust for the benefit of another, it shall be listed by and taxed to the trustee in the county or city of his residence (except as hereinbefore provided).