UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROXANA SABERI,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 19-cv-1081 (DLF) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2009,
United States citizen, and held her hostage for 100 days. Saberi brings this action against Iran
under the state sponsor of terrorism exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
( FSIA ), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. See generally Compl., Dkt. 1.
Motion for Default Judgment. Dkt. 19. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the
motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Findings of Fact1
Roxana Saberi is a U.S. citizen who was born in Belleville, New Jersey in 1977. See
Roxana Saberi Decl. ¶ 1, Dkt. 18-2. Her parents are naturalized U.S. citizens her father
immigrated from Iran and her mother from Japan. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. Saberi was raised in Fargo, North
1 declarations submitted in support of her motion for default judgment. See Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d 204, Dakota, id., and in 1997, earned a
College. Id. ¶ 9. from Northwestern
University in 1999, and ernational relations from the University of
Cambridge in 2000. Id. ¶ 10. Thereafter, Saberi began working as a television reporter in her
hometown of Fargo, and she later accepted a position in Houston, Texas. See id. ¶ 11;
Melnicove Decl. ¶¶ 1, 6, Dkt. 18-4.
1. Life in Iran
In 2003, Saberi accepted an offer from Feature Story News to move to Tehran, Iran and
set up a news bureau -
fulfill her dream of being a foreign news correspondent while also learning more about her
Saberi Decl. ¶¶ 11, 14 15. Originally, she planned
but Saberi found that she loved living and working in Iran. Id. ¶ 17. Her press
credentials, issued by
Id. ¶¶ 14 15. And she enjoyed learning more about her Iranian heritage
through her new friends in Iran, her Persian courses at the Dehkoda International Center for
Persian Studies, and her graduate courses in Iranian studies and international relations at the
School of International Relations in Tehran. Id. ¶¶ 15 16.
But things in Iran began to take a turn for Saberi in 2006, when Iranian authorities
unexpectedly revoked her official press credentials with no explanation. Id. ¶ 18. This meant
overnment meetings which had been a
critical part of her work. Id. ¶ 19. Devastated, Saberi considered leaving Iran, id. ¶ 20, but
ultimately decided to stay and work on a book about life in the country through the eyes of
2 everyday Iranians, id. ¶ 21. By 2009, she had completed most of her interviews and research,
and she began making plans to return to the United States and find a publisher for her
manuscript. Id. ¶ 22.
2.
Then, everything changed. On January 31, 2009, four Iranian intelligence agents raided
Id. ¶ 23. After seizing many of her belongings, the agents forced her
into a nearby vehicle and took her to an unmarked building, where she was interrogated for hours
in a windowless room. Id. ¶ 25. The agents focused primarily on her book, insisting that it was
CIA intelligence-gathering efforts. Id. Saberi stressed that she was not a spy and
had received no payments for her book, but the agents insisted that she was lying. Id. ¶ 26.
At the end of the interrogation, the agents took Saberi to Evin Prison, where she was
blindfolded, strip-searched, and then placed in solitary confinement. Id. ¶¶ 27 28. The next
morning, Saberi was brought before
Id. ¶ 32. There, the presiding magistrate informed Saberi that she
could speak with an attorney only at the end of her interrogation, which could last for months,
and which would end only once Id. ¶
33.
Saberi then returned to solitary confinement in Evin Prison. See id. ¶ 34. Her seven-foot
by nine-foot concrete cell was filthy and ant-infested. Id. ¶¶ 28, 34; see also Expert Report of
8, Dkt. 18-6. The only window to the outside world was
small and mesh-covered. Saberi Decl. ¶ 36.
- furnishings. Id. ¶ 34. And prison guards kept a bright
light on twenty-four hours a day. See id. ¶ 28; see also Grassian Report at 7 8.
3 d her for hours on end. Saberi Decl.
¶ 40. During these inquisitions, four or five interrogators would force Saberi to sit in a room
as they lobbed an array of questions and
accusations at her. See id. ¶¶ 40 41. They accused her, falsely, of having classified documents
in her possession, citing an article on Iran-Iraq relations that was discovered in her apartment.
See id. ¶ 47. They book which her captors alleged was a
and her journalistic work. See id. ¶ 43. Her
interrogators also ran through lengthy lists of various people with whom Saberi had come into
contact with while she was in Iran and ordered her to provide information about each of them,
including their views about the Iranian government. See id. ¶ 45.
During these sessions, frequently threatened both her and her family.
See id. They over the in
the United States, see id. ¶ 41, and they insisted that Saberi
, see id. ¶ 42. They repeatedly
threatened to kill her and deny having ever seen her, confirming fears that she might be
killed without anyone ever knowing what had happened to her. See id. ¶¶ 30, 41 42, 49.
captors also took great joy in humiliating her. For instance, they repeatedly taunted her
See id.
¶ 44.
, the interrogation and
detention would end and she would be released. See id. ¶ 42. And eventually, Saberi could no
Id. ¶
49. In the hopes that she would be released as promised, Saberi falsely confessed to spying for
4 the United States. Id. ¶¶ 49 50 forced her to put her
and repeat it on camera multiple times. See id. ¶ 50. They then required Saberi to promise that,
following her release, she would work as an Iranian spy though she had no intention of ever
keeping this promise. Id. ¶ 51. They also warned that if she told anyone about what had
happened to her, Id.
After her false confession, Saberi her to call her parents, but they
instructed her to tell them she did not know where she was and that she had been arrested for
purchasing alcohol. See id. ¶ 52. Following Saberi also warned her
parents not to tell anyone, including the media, about her arrest. Id.; Akiko Saberi Decl. ¶ 10,
Dkt. 18-3. relieved to hear from their daughter, they grew anxious
in the weeks that followed, as they had no way of contacting her or even confirming that she was
still alive. See Akiko Saberi Decl. ¶ 11; Reza Saberi Decl. ¶ 8, Dkt. 18-5. In late February,
parents decided to go public with her arrest, which quickly led to global media attention.
Reza Saberi Decl. ¶ 8; Akiko Saberi Decl. ¶ 11.
Meanwhile, Saberi was moved out of solitary confinement and into a larger cell that she
shared with a few other female prisoners. Saberi Decl. ¶ 53. After learning that her cellmates
had refused to make false confessions, Saberi vowed to recant her own as soon as possible,
regardless of the consequences. See id. ¶¶ 53, 56. In early March, Saberi was again brought
before the magistrate in See id. ¶ 55. When asked to repeat her
Id.
¶ 56. That evening in Evin Prison, Saberi informed her chief interrogator that she had recanted
her confession
was a lie. Id. ¶ 58. The next day, Saberi was taken back to Revolutionary Court to meet with the
5 deputy prosecutor for security affairs. Id. ¶ 59. After she again recanted her false confession,
the prosecutor informed Saberi that, while he had initially planned to free her, she would now
W their daughter
was being held at Evin Prison, and they flew to Iran to attempt to secure her release. See Akiko
Saberi Decl. ¶ 12; Reza Saberi Decl. ¶¶ 10, 13. In early April
her at Evin Prison she appeared. See Akiko
Saberi Decl. ¶ 13.
Saberi never had a chance to discuss her case with her
attorney in advance of her April 13, 2009 trial. See Saberi Decl. ¶ 64. In fact, Saberi was given
no advance notice of the trial at all, and her attorney who
Iranian authorities hardly spoke a word throughout the entire proceeding. See id. No evidence
See id. ¶ 65. The trial itself lasted only about
thirty minutes. Id. ¶ 66. It
consular officials.2 Id. Five days later, the judge convicted Saberi of espionage and sentenced
her to eight years in prison. See id. ¶ 67.
Saberi appealed. See id. ¶ 77. Her appellate trial took place on May 10, 2009, and it
lasted around four hours. See id. As with her trial, Saberi was not allowed to discuss her case
with her attorney until just a few minutes before the proceedings began. See id. ¶ 78. Saberi and
2 Swiss consular officials re See Saberi Decl. ¶ 66.
6 The next day, Saberi was freed after receiving a two-year suspended sentence that
included a ban from any journalism work in Iran for five years. See id. ¶ 79. Within days,
Saberi and her parents flew out of the country. See id. ¶ 82.
3. Purpose of Detention
According to Dr. Mehdi Khalaji,
part of a policy and practice of the Iranian government to seek political 3 advantage through the mistreatment of Iranian- Expert Report of Mehdi
-8. More s
continued
. Id. at 15.
4. Post-Release Suffering
After release, her experience at Evin Prison continued to haunt her. Before her
confinement, Saberi had been an
¶¶ 3 4; see also Melnicove Decl. ¶ 4 (noting
enthusiasm and optimism never flagged.
returning from Iran, Saberi was a different person. See Akiko Saberi Decl. ¶ 21; Melnicove
Decl. ¶ 14.
Akiko Saberi Decl. ¶ 21.
3 Dr. Khalaji is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and holds a
doctoral degree in Shiite Theology and exegesis from the University of Sorbonne. Khalaji Report at 1 -American nationals and has testified and submitted expert reports in a number of similar FSIA cases in this district. See id. at 3.
7 In t
See Saberi Decl. ¶ 98; id. Ex. A; see also Grassian Report at 11. According to Dr.
Stuart Grassian, M.D., an expert retained by S
she 4 Id. at 1, 16 17.
See
Saberi Decl. ¶ 94.
See id. ¶ 84; Akiko Saberi Decl. ¶ 12. She
supported herself by doing freelance projects and speaking engagements. See Melnicove Decl.
¶ 25. In 2013, four years after her release, Saberi returned to full-time journalism when she
started reporting for Al-Jazeera America. See Saberi Decl. ¶ 95. In 2018, she accepted a full-
time correspondent role with CBS News in London. See id. ¶ 96.
4 Dr. Grassian -certified psychiatrist, licensed to practice medicine in the involved continuously since 1974 in evaluating and treating patients with psychiatric disorders extensive experience in evaluating the psychiatric effects of stringent conditions of confinement, especially solitary confinement. Id. regarding four American citizens who had been confined in Evin Id. Grassian prepared his expert report in this case after interviewing Saberi for over seven hours in early 2020 and reviewing a number of relevant documents, all of which are identified in the report. See id. at 1, 33.
8 B. Procedural Background
Saberi filed this action on April 17, 2019. See Compl. She seeks money damages for
torture, hostage taking, assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false
imprisonment under § against state sponsors of terrorism. Id.
¶¶ 45 67.
Iran was properly served on February 12, 2020. 5 See Summons Returned Executed, Dkt.
12. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d), Iran had sixty days until April 12, 2020 to respond. Iran
failed to appear or respond plaint, and the Clerk of the Court entered a
default on May 5, 2020. 15. Saberi subsequently filed the instant
motion, see ., and the Court held a hearing on the motion on February 23,
2021.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the FSIA, a [er] claim or
1608(e). This standard
5 As discussed infra Part III.B, consistent with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4), the
ervice to be effected through diplomatic channels. Request for Service of Process, Dkt. 9-1; Certificate of Mailing, Dkt. 11; see also Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278 F. Supp. 3d 145, 156 (D.D.C. 2017).
9 U.S. government. Owens v. Republic of Sudan (Owens I), 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
reaches default judgment, Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations
Warmbier v. Democratic People s Republic of Korea, 356 F. Supp. 3d 30, 42
(D.D.C. 2018); see also Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 424 F. Supp. 2d 74, 82 (D.D.C.
2006). Saberi did not request an evidentiary hearing, and default judgments under § 1608(e)
may rely on affidavits and declarations. Owens I, 864 F.3d at 788 89.
must still determine that an exemption to immunity applies and that the plaintiff has a sufficient
Abedini v. Gov t of Islamic Republic of Iran, 422 F.
Supp. 3d 118, 128 (D.D.C. 2019).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has
nonjury civil action against a foreign state . . . as to any claim for relief in personam with respect
to which the 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
All four of those conditions are present here. To start, this is a nonjury civil action, as
e considered the issue . . . have held that jury trials are not
Universal Consol. Cos. v. Bank of China, 35 F.3d
243, 245 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 65
(D.D.C. 2010). Second, Iran is a foreign state. Third, this action is in personam because the
10 Id. Fourth, and finally, the exception to sovereign immunity for state-sponsored
terrorism applies.
Although t Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2013); 28
U.S.C. § 1604, the state sponsor of terrorism exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)
e money damages are sought, (2) against a foreign
state was caused by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
resources . . . for such an act. Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 79
(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)).
All five of those conditions are present here. Saberi seeks money damages for personal
injury under § 1605A(c). See Compl. at 15. This action
are against Iran . See fault;
28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1608. To establish causation, Saberi must make
Kilburn v.
376 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Saberi has made such a showing here, as the connections between
and her injuries are both reasonable and clear: Iranian agents unlawfully
detained and abused Saberi for 100 days in Evin Prison for the purpose of increasing its leverage
in negotiations with the United States. See supra Part I.A.2 3. Finally, Saberi seeks money
-taking, and she has shown t of
11 hostage
42; see also id. ¶¶ 45 56.
-
the Taking of Hostages, which itself defines the act
threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person . . . to compel a third
party . . . to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of
7, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
The
any act, directed against an individual in the offender s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering . . . whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7) (citing Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 , Pub. L. No.
102-256, § 3(b)(1), 106 Stat. 73, (1992), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note). To establish torture
un
Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
home and held her hostage in Evin Prison for 100 days. See Saberi Decl. ¶¶ 25, 28, 34. Her
Grassian Report at 7.
Id. at 10; see
Saberi Decl. ¶¶ 25, 28, 34 er to frequent interrogations. Saberi
12 Decl. ¶¶ 40 41. Saberi sat blindfolded for hours on end while they taunted and routinely
threatened to kill or harm her or her family if she did not provide a false confession. Id. ¶¶ 40
41. For a significant portion of her time at Evin Prison, Saberi
; id. at 7 (describing Evin Prison as a
. This terrifying experience had profound and
immediate effects on Saberi. For example, throughout her time in custody she suffered
uncontrollable panic attacks, and after some interrogation sessions, she was so shaken that she
could barely walk. Id. at 9, 11. W parents finally were able to visit her, roughly two
Akiko Saberi Decl. ¶ 13.
busive treatment of Saberi was without question cruel and inhumane. But courts
the TVPA. Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 80
(D.D.C. 2018). In Price Aram Jamahiriya, the D.C. Circuit
explained that torture is a label that is usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually
cruel practices, for example, sustained systematic beating, application of electric currents to
sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in positions that cause extreme pain. 294
F.3d 82, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 14 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). [T]orture does not automatically result whenever individuals in official
custody are subjected even to direct physical assault Id. at 92. Because the plaintiffs in Price
suffered, no way to determine the severity of plaintiffs alleged beatings
including their frequency, duration, the parts of the body at which they were aimed, and the
13 weapons used to carry them out in order to ensure that they satisfy the TVPA s rigorous
definition of torture. Id. at 93 (emphasis added). More recently, in Simpson v. Socialist
was threatened with death if she moved from the
quarters where she was held, and forcibly separated from her husband and unable to learn of his
welfare or his whereabouts 326 F.3d 230, 234
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). While the allegations
[we]re not . . . so unusually cruel or
sufficiently extreme and outrageous as to constitute torture
Since Price and Simpson, however, at least one other court in this district has found
abusive conduct similar to that alleged here sufficiently severe to warrant universal
condemnation torture . Rezaian v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
422 F. Supp. 3d 164, 177 (D.D.C. 2019). In Rezaian, the court found that actions
agents arrested an individual at gunpoint, held him hostage in
unsanitary conditions and solitary confinement, threatened him with death and dismemberment
while trying to elicit a confession, and provided inadequate food and medical care. Id.
ed an act of
hostage taking. Iran unlawfully detained Saberi and repeatedly threatened to kill or extend her
detention to increase its leverage in negotiations with the United States. See Frost v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 383 F. Supp. 3d 33, 46 (D.D.C. 2019)
country s relationship with the United States is a sufficiently coercive purpose to establish
14 hostage- ; supra Part I.A.2 3. As Dr. Khalaji has explained, part of
a policy and practice to seek political advantage through the mistreatment of Iranian-American
Khalaji Report at 4; see also Khosravi , 16-cv-
2066, 2020 WL 4923495, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2020) (noting that a detention
-documented pattern and practice of behavior towards Iranian-
American dual citizens, in which illegal actions were directed against such dual citizens for
political purposes of the Iranian regime. ation marks omitted). Because Iran
committed an act of hostage taking as defined by the FSIA, the state-sponsored terrorism
exception applies, and the Court has jurisdiction to decide this case.
Not only does the Court have subject matter jurisdiction, it must exercise that
was designated a
; plaintiff
was a U.S. national, serviceman, employee or contractor for the U.S. government; and (3) the
plaintiff afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claims. 28 U.S.C.
§1605A(a)(2).
All three requirements are satisfied here. Iran
Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 131; see State Sponsors
of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
Saberi is a U.S. citizen by birth and thus has standing to bring a cause of action under the FSIA.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c); Saberi Decl. ¶ 1. And Saberi afforded a reasonable opportunity
to arbitrate, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii), by including an arbitration offer in the documents
that were served on Iran, see Dkt. 12; Simpson, 326 F.3d at 233 34. The Court therefore has
15 B. Personal Jurisdiction
The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Iran. To have personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state under the FSIA, a court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and
the foreign state must have been properly served. See 28 U.S.C § 1330(b). As explained above,
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over . Iran was also properly served.
in descending order of
preference Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 69; see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). The first two methods are
and Iran, 28 U.S.C. § nal convention
id. § sending a copy of the summons and
complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the
foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by
the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned
Id. §
summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official
language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and
rvice can be effected through
diplomatic channels. Id. § persons
protected by the Fifth Amendment, leaving no need to conduct a minimum contacts analysis.
Price, 294 F.3d at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Saberi first attempted in October 2019 to serve Iran
28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3); see Dkt. 7, but those efforts were ultimately
unsuccessful, see Proposed Findings o at 18,
16 Dkt. 18-1; Request for Service of Process, Dkt. 9-1. Saberi then requested that the Clerk of
into Farsi to the U.S. Department of State for service to be effected through
diplomatic channels. See id.; Certificate of Mailing, Dkt. 11. Service was effected through those
channels on February 12, 2020. See Dkt. 12. This method of service satisfies § 1608(a)(4). See
Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278 F. Supp. 3d 145, 156 (D.D.C. 2017).
C. Liability
The FSIA by its terms gives Saberi, a U.S. national, standing to bring a cause of action
against Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, for damages resulting from specific acts, including
-taking and . 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1); see id. § 1605A(c). For the reasons
stated supra Part III.A, Saberi has shown that Iran committed an act of hostage taking as defined
by the FSIA. Iran is therefore liable for the injuries Saberi incurred as a result of this hostage
taking. See Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 77 F. Supp. 3d 57, 69 (D.D.C. 2015).
Although the FSIA provides a private right of action, it heory
-established principles of law, such as those found in the Restatement
Worley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 F. Supp. 3d 311, 334 35 (D.D.C.
2014) (internal citations omitted). Saberi asserts four separate theories of liability: false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery. Compl. ¶¶ 57 67.
False imprisonment occurs
other . . . within boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such
a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
Stansell v. Republic of Cuba, 217 F. Supp. 3d 320, 342 43 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 35). Applying this standard to the facts laid out above, the Court has no
17 trouble concluding that Iran falsely imprisoned Saberi for 100 days. See Abedini, 422 F. Supp.
3d at 133.
theory, reme and reckless conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26
(D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
Torts § 46 cmt. j. There can be no doubt that Iran intentionally detained and abused Saberi for
100 days, and the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Saberi has suffered and continues to
suffer from severe emotional distress as a result. See generally Grassian Report.
Consequently, Iran is liable to Saberi for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
contact with the person of the other . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) the other is thereby Stansell, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 343
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
Id. at 342
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 15). Saberi has attested that her captors routinely
threatened her with death and physical harm, which caused her imminent apprehension that she
would be seriously injured or killed. See Saberi Decl. ¶¶ 30, 35, 41. Iran is thus liable to Saberi
for these acts of assault.
with . . . [another person], or an imminent apprehension of such a contact,
18 Id. § 19.
Iranian captors forced her out of her apartment, strip-searched her, and repeatedly moved her
around the prison each time against her will. See Saberi Decl. ¶¶ 25, 40. Each offensive
contact was an act of battery. See Rezaian, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 179.
D. Damages
Having established her claims by satisfactory evidence, the FSIA allows Saberi to
Id. To recover
for past losses Samaritan
Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia
amount of damages, Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 328 F.3d 680, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2003). To
Id. at 681. These standards mean that a default winner under the
Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 243 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal
quotation marks om
Hill, 328 F.3d at 685.
1. Pain and Suffering
Saberi seeks damages for the pain and suffering that she endured during her captivity and
following her release. This district has developed a
of terrorist attacks held for prolonged periods. Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F. Supp.
2d 260, 268 (D.D.C. 2002). Under this formula, courts award roughly $10,0
19 Regier v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 100 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d at
164 (collecting cases). Abedini, 422 F. Supp.
3d at 137, the Court will award $1 million for the pain and suffering Saberi experienced during
her 100 days in captivity.
While this award represents a reasonable estimate of pain and suffering damages for
it
experienced following her release. See Stansell, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 346. Thus, Saberi may
receive an id., which accounts for the trauma that Saberi has endured
and will continue to experience as a result of her confinement. See, e.g., Hekmati, 278 F. Supp.
3d at 165 (awarding -release Price v. Socialist
byan Arab Jamahiriya, 384 F. Supp. 2d 120, 134 (D.D.C. 2005) (awarding $7 million
.
When calculating post-captivity awards, courts routinely consider
and mental injuries;
number of years that the plain Azadeh v.
of Islamic Republic of Iran, 16-cv-1467, 2018 WL 4232913, at *19 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2018); see
also Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 164. Recent awards in similar FSIA cases
Co Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 137, given the importance of
ensuring that Moradi, 77 F. Supp. 3d
at 70 (internal quotation marks omitted). With these considerations in mind, courts in this
district have applied Hekmati $10 million post-captivity pain and suffering award, 278 F. Supp.
20 3d at 163 64, as a baseline in comparable FSIA hostage taking cases, making appropriate
adjustments based on these factors. See, e.g., Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 127, 137 (awarding
$9,630,000 to a plaintiff who was 32 years of age at the time of release and endured 1,268 days
PTSD and clinical depression);
Azadeh, 2018 WL 4232913, at *19 20 (awarding $8,888,889 to plaintiff who was 42 years old at
time of release and subjected to permanent and severe physical and psychological injuries as a
consequence of her 114 days of captivity and torture in Evin Prison).
Hekmati and Abedini involved significantly longer
periods of detention. See Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (1,602 days); Abedini, 422 F. Supp.
3d at 126, 137 (1,268 days); see also Rezaian, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 180 (544 days). And though
Saberi was subjected to similarly appalling conditions of confinement and psychological abuse in
Evin Prison, she did not experience the same degree of physical abuse. See Abedini, 422 F.
Supp. 3d at 127 (plaintiff was beaten, whipped, socked using a taser gun on his kidneys, and
hung from handcuffs from the ceiling); Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 151, 164 (plaintiff was
repeatedly beaten with batons, struck in his kidneys with an electric taser, and handcuffed in
; see also Azadeh, 2018 WL 4232913, at *11 12 (plaintiff
received inadequate medical care, was forced to take mood-altering drugs, and was subjected to
mock executions). But at the time of her release, Saberi was only 32 years of age and had a
longer life expectancy of 50 years. em. at 50; see Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 126, 137
(35 years old at release and 43.2-year life expectancy); Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 164 (32
years old at release and 45-year life expectancy); Azadeh, 2018 WL 4232913, at *11 12 (42
years old at release and 40-year life expectancy). And like other Evin Prison captives,
Grassian Report at
21 12, 16; ; see also Supp.
Saberi Decl. ¶¶ 5 6.
Recognizing the
Moradi, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 70 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court will adopt the
Hekmati award as a baseline and adjust it to account for these differences. See Doe v.
Korea, No. 18-cv-252, 2021 WL 723257, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb.
24, 2021) at *12 13, 14 n.6 (adopting Hekmati baseline and awarding plaintiffs between
$200,000 and $17,400,000 in post-release damages based on relevant factors, including the
nature and extent of injuries and the actual and anticipated years of suffering). Considering the
relevant factors and post-captivity awards rendered in similar cases, the Court will award Saberi
$9 million to compensate her for the psychological pain and suffering she has endured and likely
will continue to endure for the next four decades.
2. Economic Damages & Medical Expenses
In FSIA cases, past and future are compensable economic damages
Moradi, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 71 (internal citation st
may provide a reasonable basis for determining the amount of economic damages, Reed v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (D.D.C. 2012); see Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d
at 164 (collecting cases). This Court should, however, take account of the reasonableness and
foundation of the assumptions relied upon by the expert[s] Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 138
(internal quotation marks omitted).
To support her claim for economic damages, Saberi relies on the report of Dr. Stuart
Grassian who evaluated her psychiatric injuries, see Grassian Report; see also supra at 8 n.4, as
22 6 well as letters from s
see also Supp. Saberi Decl. ¶¶ 5
at 17.
Saberi also submitted two earning capacity evaluations prepared by Robert Taylor, 7 see
7; Earning Capacity Evaluation and Assessment of Future Care Needs - Supp.
-5, and a forensic economic report prepared by Dr. Frank Slesnik,
Ph.D.,8 see -8. Taylor
concluded that it is Saberi
Letter at 1. 7 Taylor, the Director Emeritus of Vocational Diagnostics, Inc., is a rehabilitation counselor who specializes in assessi 4. He has published a number of peer-reviewed papers in this area, id., and has submitted earning capacity evaluations in similar FSIA cases in this district. See, e.g., Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 165. 8 Slesnick, Professor Emeritus of Economics at Bellarmine University, see Slesnick Report at 1, id. at 26, and has submitted expert reports in other FSIA cases in this district, see, e.g., Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 165 66.
23 will
Taylor Report at 13, 21 23; see also Slesnick Report at 10
Taylor further concluded
Taylor Report at 13, 21 23
see also Saberi Decl. ¶ 100. Taking into account Saberi s experience and qualifications, and
salary ranges for network correspondents with varying levels of experience, Slesnick estimates
Slesnick
Report at 8 11.9
The salary calculations in the Slesnick report are based on salary ranges provided by
Olivia Metzger, a news and media industry agent who has negotiated
that form a subset of her
roughly 100 clients. See Metzger Decl., Dkt. 18-9; Supp. Metzger Decl. ¶¶ 5 6, Dkt. 25-1.
Metzger attests that, in her experience, l salaries at national networks range from
for entry-level correspondents (0-3 years of network experience);
for mid-level correspondents (3-6 years of experience); and
for highly experienced correspondents (6+ years of experience). Supp. Metzger
9 To calculate the net present value d that the net discount rate the difference between the rate of increase in earnings and the discount rate is a negative
lesnick assumed that
Id. at 5 6.
24 Decl. ¶ 7. Metzger admits that salaries vary
expertise, and other factors, id. ¶¶ 7 8, but for client confidentiality reasons, she provides no
details about the number or the distribution of correspondents within these broad ranges,
including the median salaries. Nor does Metzger provide any specific information about
individual news correspondents and their respective experience levels, geographical work
locations, or salaries.
Although the Court accepts the methodologies, it does not accept the salary
assumptions on which they relied.
. Metzger Decl. ¶ 9, and therefore it is
difficult to obtain more detailed or representative salary data for their correspondents, see
, Dkt. 25. But
-level, mid-level, and
high-level correspondents, Metzger Decl. ¶ 3, do not provide a reasonable estimate of
lost wages, particularly here, where they are not consistent salary history.
n Prison in 2009,10 her annual income has ranged from
.11 See Slesnick Report at 2. And since January 2018, when Saberi joined
CBS News as a full-time correspondent, her salary has remained constant .
10 Saberi
engagem
25 will instead use current salary as a baseline to calculate her lost wages. Cf.
Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 138 (awarding reduced damages award of five years in lost wages
where the would never
-wage
. Recognizing the substantial ,
had on her ability to work
the Court will award Saberi $763,484 in lost past
wages the cumulative difference between her annual income during this period and
. For the same reasons, there is a reasonable
basis to conclude that
. See Taylor Report at 23; Slesnick Report at 10. Thus, consistent with
the analysis set forth in the expert reports, the Court will award Saberi an additional $1,341,250
in lost future wages. See Taylor Report at 10, 24; Slesnick Report at 7.
Saberi also seeks to recover for her ongoing medical expenses. See
. See Grassian Report at 17. Both Taylor and Slesnick
estimate that the total lifetime costs for treatment will range from $26,882.88 to
$65,810.74.15 Taylor Report at 32; Slesnick Report at 13. The Court concludes that these expert
estimates that the average salary for news analysts, reporters, and journalists in the United States is $62,400, and the median salary is $46,270. See Dkt. 25-2. Given that these estimates are current salary, this report is a less reliable basis on which to estimate her lost earnings. 15 Because these medical costs are projected to rise at a higher rate than the net discount rate, both the Slesnick and Taylor reports assumed that the rate of increase in medical care prices and the discount rate were equal. See Slesnick Report at 13.
27 reports provide a reasonable basis for awarding Saberi $46,346.81 the midpoint of this range
for her past and future medical treatment. See Khosravi, 2020 WL 4923495, at *7 (awarding
3. Punitive Damages
Finally, Saberi seeks an award of punitive damages. Compl. at 15
damages, made available under the revised FSIA terrorism exception, serve to punish and deter
Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44,
amount of money that will punish outrageous behavior and deter such outrageous conduct in the
Id. es brought under the
terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Frost v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 419 F. Supp. 3d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2020).
To determine the appropriate amount of punitive damages to award, courts consider
the chara
defendants caused or intended to cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the
Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted)
to calculating punitive
damages in state-sponsored terrorism cases. See id. at 59 60 (discussing each approach and
collecting cases). The first approach, often used in exceptionally deadly attacks, is to multiply
Id. A
second approach ties punitive damages to the compensatory damages award, using a ratio set
28 forth in earlier cases involving similar conduct. Id. And the final approach awards $150 million
to each affected family. Id.
The first approach is not appropriate here because this case does not involve an
. Frost, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 117. Saberi encourages the Court to
adopt the third approach and award her $150 million in punitive damages, see em. at 34,
but
Frost, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 117.
Like other courts in this district, the Court will adopt the second approach and tie punitive
damages to compensatory damages. See Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 142 (collecting cases).
O
approach. Id. Therefore, the Court will award Saberi punitive damages equal to her
compensatory damages award.
CONCLUSION
separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.
________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH March 30, 2021 United States District Judge