Saad Aljabri v. Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud

106 F.4th 1157
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJuly 9, 2024
Docket22-7150
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 106 F.4th 1157 (Saad Aljabri v. Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Saad Aljabri v. Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, 106 F.4th 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 2024 Decided July 9, 2024

No. 22-7150

SAAD ALJABRI, DR., APPELLANT

v.

MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN BIN ABDULAZIZ AL SAUD, ET AL., APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:20-cv-02146)

Lindsay Harrison argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Jason P. Hipp and Andrianna Kastanek.

Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were William W. Taylor, III, Margarita K. O=Donnell, Gregory G. Rapawy, Barry J. Pollack, Jessica N. Carmichael, Mitchell R. Berger, Benjamin D. Wood, and Alex- andra E. Chopin.

Before: RAO and CHILDS, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge. 2 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS.

CHILDS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Dr. Saad Aljabri (“Plaintiff”) served in the government of Saudi Arabia for thirty-nine years primarily as an expert in national security and counterterrorism. Because of his close contacts with U.S. intelligence officials and his role as a trusted advisor to former Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of the Interior Mohammed bin Nayef (“bin Nayef”), Plaintiff alleges that a group of individuals led by current Saudi Prime Minister and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud (“bin Salman”) plotted to kill Plaintiff after he relocated to Canada. In response to various motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, the district court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over most of the defendants, and Plaintiff had failed to state a claim against two others, Mohammed Alhamed and Layla Abuljadayel (together the “U.S.-based students”).1 Aljabri v. al Saud, Civ. A. No. 20-2146, 2022 WL 4598519, at *17–19 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2022). Plaintiff appeals. Upon de novo review, we affirm dismissal of the claims against bin Salman and the U.S.-based students; vacate the district court’s dismissal of claims against Bader Alasaker and Saud Alqahtani (together the “top aides”); and remand for jurisdictional discovery.

I.

As alleged in his amended complaint, Plaintiff began working for the Saudi government in 1976, rising to become a senior official of the Saudi Ministry of Interior and an advisor

1 In a separate order, the district court dismissed Bijad Alharbi for Plaintiff’s failure to timely effect service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 3 to bin Nayef.2 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Plaintiff helped Saudi Arabia become a key counterterrorism partner to the United States while developing close cooperative relationships with U.S. intelligence officials. In 2015, Plaintiff was terminated from his government position partly due to this relationship.

The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia is first in the line of succession to replace the king. On June 20, 2017, bin Salman usurped the position of Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia from bin Nayef, who was placed under house arrest. Bin Salman believed he needed the support of the United States to ascend to the Saudi throne and bin Nayef was an impediment to that happening based on his relationships with U.S. officials.

During the month preceding this change in the Saudi power structure, Plaintiff became concerned for his well-being because of his relationships with bin Nayef and the U.S. intelligence community, and prior conflicts with bin Salman. So, on May 17, 2017, Plaintiff fled from Saudi Arabia to Turkey. Upon learning about Plaintiff’s departure from the country, bin Salman used various measures to lure Plaintiff back to Saudi Arabia. These efforts included sending text messages demanding Plaintiff’s return, prohibiting his son and daughter from leaving the country to attend school, ending another son’s scholarship payments, initiating a Red Notice request with INTERPOL for Plaintiff’s arrest, and other threatening behavior. When Plaintiff learned bin Salman was pressuring Turkey to return him to Saudi Arabia, Plaintiff fled to Toronto, Canada, on September 12, 2017, but Plaintiff told bin Salman he was traveling to Boston, Massachusetts.

2 At the pleading stage, we accept all facts stated in the applicable amended complaint as true. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 4 When Plaintiff did not return to Saudi Arabia, bin Salman set out to find him. Bin Salman activated a network of Saudi students in the United States through bin Salman’s self-funded Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Foundation (“MiSK”). Importantly, Alasaker was the executive director of MiSK and Saud Alqahtani was a member of MiSK’s board of directors.3 The top aides used MiSK to cultivate a network of Saudi students in the United States by coordinating with student clubs and hosting leadership events and/or cultural programs. Plaintiff claimed that the top aides used MiSK to recruit spies from its student clubs. Bin Salman and Alasaker activated three student spies, Youssef Alrajhi, and the U.S.- based students, to find Plaintiff. These students allegedly gained information regarding Plaintiff’s location by speaking with his family living in the United States.

By December 2017, bin Salman knew Plaintiff was in Canada. Bijad Alharbi, an acquaintance of Plaintiff through their connection to bin Nayef, traveled to Toronto to persuade Plaintiff to return to Turkey, where he would be less lonely and could visit his family.

Almost a year later, on October 15, 2018, bin Salman devised a plan to kill Plaintiff because he refused to return to Saudi Arabia. Bin Salman activated the “Tiger Squad,” a private death squad made up of about fifty intelligence, military, and forensic operatives from different branches of the

3 Plaintiff identified Bader Alasaker as “one of . . . bin Salman’s clos- est aides” and said Alasaker “is known as . . . bin Salman’s ‘invisible hand.’” Amend. Compl. ¶ 40 (JA.45) (note omitted). Plaintiff called Saud Alqahtani bin Salman’s “top aide,” “chief propagandist,” “one of his chief enforcers,” and “right-hand man.” Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 49 (JA.50), 55 (JA.53). 5 Saudi government.4 The Tiger Squad first tried to enter Canada individually, acting as tourists, but were stopped when customs found forensic tools in their luggage and group photos proving that the individuals knew each other. Ultimately, only one member could enter Canada, thereby foiling the plot.

Bin Salman did not give up. In May 2020, he obtained a fatwa—a ruling by religious authorities—endorsing the killing of Plaintiff. To execute the fatwa, bin Salman planned to send agents by land through the United States to Canada. In fact, a Canadian security agency warned Plaintiff about credible and imminent threats to his life that same year. Canadian Law Enforcement considered the threat so concrete that an “Emergency Response Team” was stationed outside Plaintiff’s house, and he was instructed to cancel all meetings. Other sources also warned Plaintiff of credible attempts on his life and the continued existence of a high level of threat.

After surviving the failed attempts on his life, Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 6, 2020, against bin Salman, other Saudi officials, several U.S.-based individuals, MiSK, both known Tiger Squad members, and eleven unknown John Doe members of the Tiger Squad. He alleged claims for: (1) attempted extrajudicial killing in violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
106 F.4th 1157, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/saad-aljabri-v-mohammed-bin-salman-bin-abdulaziz-al-saud-cadc-2024.