S. v. District of Columbia Public Schools

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 30, 2016
DocketCivil Action No. 2015-0851
StatusPublished

This text of S. v. District of Columbia Public Schools (S. v. District of Columbia Public Schools) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
S. v. District of Columbia Public Schools, (D.D.C. 2016).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) DAMARCUS S., by and through his ) Parent, K.S., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 15-851 (ESH) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Damarcus S. and his mother, K.S., have moved for attorney’s fees and costs

pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.,

which grants the Court discretion to award reasonable fees to a prevailing party. See id.

§ 1415(i)(3)(B). (Pl.’s Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [ECF No. 25] (“Pls.’ Mot.”).) The

District of Columbia (the “District”) does not dispute that plaintiffs are entitled to fees, but it

argues that plaintiffs’ request of $212,081.51 in fees and $4,097.60 in costs is unreasonable and

should be denied in part. (See Def.’s Opp’n Br. [ECF No. 27] at 3.) The Court agrees that

plaintiffs are not entitled to the full amount requested, though they are entitled to more than the

District proposes to pay. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The background of this case has been laid out in great detail in the Court’s previous

Memorandum Opinion. See Damarcus S. v. Dist. of Columbia, 2016 WL 2993158, at *1-*2

(D.D.C. May 23, 2016). As is relevant here, plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint with the District in December 2014, alleging that numerous deficiencies in the District’s educational

plans for Damarcus denied him a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”), to which he is

entitled under IDEA.1 Id. at *2. After an administrative Due Process Hearing in March 2015,

the Hearing Officer determined that plaintiffs were time-barred from pursuing any claims

involving conduct prior to December 16, 2012, and rejected all but one of plaintiffs’ remaining

claims on the merits. Id. As a result of the District’s failure to conduct a behavioral assessment

and put in place an intervention plan for Damarcus in 2013 and 2014, plaintiffs were awarded

(1) reimbursement for an independent behavioral evaluation of Damarcus, and (2) fifty hours of

behavioral support services. Id. But without explanation, the Hearing Officer ruled that those

behavioral-support hours would be forfeited if plaintiffs did not use them before June 30, 2016.

Id.

Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court to challenge the Hearing Officer’s adverse

determinations, and the parties then cross-moved for summary judgment. The Court found for

plaintiffs on many claims: (1) that the Hearing Officer erred in her blanket dismissal of all claims

arising out of pre-December 2012 conduct, rather than conducting an individualized analysis of

when plaintiffs knew or should have known about each claim, id. at *6; (2) that the District

denied Damarcus a FAPE in 2013 and 2014 by dramatically cutting his speech-language services

and failing to adjust his Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) in response to his

demonstrated lack of progress, id. at *12; (3) that the Hearing Officer’s compensatory award was

improperly limited as to both subject (behavioral support services) and time (the June 2016

forfeiture provision), id. at *14; (4) that the compensatory award of fifty hours was insufficient

1 Plaintiffs also filed two previous complaints that involved similar claims, but they were withdrawn prior to being adjudicated. Damarcus S., 2016 WL 2993158, at *2.

by failing to reflect the pervasive effect of Damarcus’s behavior on all aspects of his education,

id. at *14-*15; and (5) that plaintiffs were entitled to reimbursement for an independent

neuropsychological evaluation of Damarcus, id. at *15. In light of deficiencies in the record, the

Court remanded to the Hearing Officer to allow the parties to more fully brief the issue of an

appropriate award of compensatory education. Id. at *12, *15.

On the other hand, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ remaining claims: (1) that Damarcus’s

2013 and 2014 IEPs were necessarily deficient because they relied on deficient

neuropsychological and speech-language evaluations, id. at *8; (2) that Damarcus was denied a

FAPE because his IEPs failed to set out measureable baselines, failed to specify that he would

receive research-based, peer-reviewed instruction, and set inappropriately low benchmarks, id. at

*9-*10; (3) that the District failed to place Damarcus in the least restrictive environment, id. at

*12; (4) that the District inappropriately implemented Damarcus’s IEPs, id. at *13; (5) that the

District’s treatment of Damarcus violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, id. at *16; and

(6) that the District should be required to immediately develop an appropriate IEP, id. at *17.

ANALYSIS

The District does not dispute plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney’s fees, given the many

claims on which plaintiffs have prevailed. However, the District argues that the award requested

by plaintiffs is unreasonable on several grounds, which the Court will now turn to.

I. UNREASONABLE BILLING RATES

The District first argues that the hourly rates sought by plaintiffs’ attorneys and

paralegals are unreasonable. (Def.’s Opp’n Br. at 4–11.) In determining a reasonable fee award,

the Court must ensure that it is “based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action

or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C).

Plaintiffs bear the burden on this issue, as with all other aspects of their fee request. See

Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A] fee applicant bears

the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and

justifying the reasonableness of the rates[.]”).

In addition to offering their own attorneys’ affidavits, fee applicants may also “submit

attorneys’ fee matrices as one type of evidence that ‘provide[s] a useful starting point’ in

calculating the prevailing market rate.” Eley v. Dist. of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (quoting Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109). These matrices set out the hourly fees charged by

attorneys at various levels of experience in a particular community for the same type of work,

which offer a “somewhat crude” approximation of prevailing market rates. Snead v. Dist. of

Columbia, 139 F. Supp. 3d 375, 378 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Eley, 793 F.3d at 101). The most

commonly used fee matrix was the “Laffey Matrix,” which was compiled by the District United

States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) and updated annually to adjust for inflation. Eley, 793 F.3d

at 100-01. However, beginning on June 1, 2015, the USAO discontinued the Laffey Matrix in

favor of a matrix that uses a new methodology, which the Court will refer to as the “USAO

Matrix.” See USAO Attorney’s Fees Matrix – 2015 – 2016, https://www.justice.gov/usao-

dc/file/796471/download.2

Here, plaintiffs’ counsel submit an affidavit from Dennis C. McAndrews, the Managing

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Role Models Amer Inc v. White, Thomas
353 F.3d 962 (D.C. Circuit, 2004)
In Re Theodore B. OLSON
884 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Circuit, 1989)
Kevin West v. John Potter
717 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Circuit, 2013)
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics v. U.S. Department of Justice
825 F. Supp. 2d 226 (District of Columbia, 2011)
Blackman v. District of Columbia
59 F. Supp. 2d 37 (District of Columbia, 1999)
A.C. Ex Rel. Clark v. District of Columbia
674 F. Supp. 2d 149 (District of Columbia, 2009)
In Re InPhonic, Inc.
674 F. Supp. 2d 273 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Fitts v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America
680 F. Supp. 2d 38 (District of Columbia, 2010)
Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.
134 S. Ct. 870 (Supreme Court, 2014)
McAllister v. District of Columbia
21 F. Supp. 3d 94 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Bennett v. Donovan
74 F. Supp. 3d 382 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Eley v. District of Columbia
793 F.3d 97 (D.C. Circuit, 2015)
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District Authority
802 F.3d 601 (Third Circuit, 2015)
Reed v. District of Columbia
134 F. Supp. 3d 122 (District of Columbia, 2015)
Snead Ex Rel. C.S. v. District of Columbia
139 F. Supp. 3d 375 (District of Columbia, 2015)
Platt v. District of Columbia
168 F. Supp. 3d 253 (District of Columbia, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
S. v. District of Columbia Public Schools, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/s-v-district-of-columbia-public-schools-dcd-2016.