S. M. v. Chichester School District

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 23, 2024
• Docket: 22-1612
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 22-1612 ____________

S.M., by and through his parents, Michael C. and Danielle C.; MICHAEL CIAVARELLI; DANIELLE CIAVARELLI

v.

CHICHESTER SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-21-cv-04266) District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody ____________

Argued September 4, 2024

Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and PORTER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 23, 2024)

Gabrielle C. Sereni [Argued] Sereni Law Group 32 Regency Plaza Glen Mills, PA 19342 Counsel for Appellant

Nancy Ryan Lorrie McKinley [Argued] McKinley & Ryan 238 W. Miner Street West Chester, PA 19382 Counsel for Appellees ____________

OPINION* ____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Chichester School District appeals from the District Court’s order entering a

preliminary injunction that requires it to place a student, S.M., in a residential educational

facility. We will affirm.

I1

S.M. is a seventeen-year-old boy with severe autism and intellectual disabilities.

His parents filed an administrative complaint against Chichester School District with the

Pennsylvania Office for Dispute Resolution, asserting claims under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The parents alleged that Chichester denied S.M. a

free appropriate public education (FAPE) by failing to offer him an individualized

education program (IEP) that would, upon his release from a residential treatment

facility, place him in a residential educational facility. This type of IEP is sometimes

called a “contingent IEP.”

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

2 The special education administrative Hearing Officer dismissed the complaint. He

reasoned that because Chichester was the “resident district” and not the “host district”

under 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1306, it had no duty to provide S.M. with an IEP unless his

release from his residential treatment facility was imminent. S.M. v. Chichester Sch.

Dist., 2022 WL 875232, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2022). The Hearing Officer

alternatively concluded that if Chichester had to provide S.M. with an IEP, it had to offer

to place him in a residential educational facility.

The parents sued Chichester in the District Court, arguing that the Hearing

Officer’s legal conclusions were erroneous. They moved for a preliminary injunction

requiring Chichester to place S.M. in a residential educational facility. The District Court

rejected the Hearing Officer’s legal conclusions and held: (1) Chichester had assumed the

responsibilities of a host district; and (2) there was no imminency requirement in the

IDEA. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering Chichester to arrange

for S.M. to move to a mutually agreeable residential educational placement.

II

Contrary to Chichester’s arguments, the District Court had subject-matter

jurisdiction. The parents exhausted their claims under the IDEA by filing an

administrative complaint with the Pennsylvania Office for Dispute Resolution that raised

the relevant issues. After the Hearing Officer rendered his final decision, the parents were

entitled to file a civil action in the District Court seeking review of the decision and

presenting their additional claims for damages under the Rehabilitation Act and 42

3 U.S.C. § 1983. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (allowing parties to seek judicial review of

decisions made by State educational agencies); see also Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Sch.,

598 U.S. 142, 147–48 (2023) (holding that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not

apply to claims brought “under another federal law for compensatory damages”). The

parents’ claims were ripe because they alleged that they would accept a residential

educational placement for S.M. and that he has been languishing in facilities unable to

meet his needs.

As the District Court held, Chichester had to provide S.M. with a FAPE because it

assumed that responsibility by entering “Local Educational Agency Responsibility

Agreement[s]” with Central Bucks School District and Rose Tree Media School District.

App. 191, 193. Nor did the District Court clearly err by finding that the parents are likely

to establish that S.M. is entitled to placement in a residential educational facility when

this matter is adjudicated on the merits. See K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch.

Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court’s decision was based on its independent

examination of the record, with due weight given to the Hearing Officer’s findings of

fact. The record supports its finding that placement at a residential educational facility is

necessary for S.M. to receive a FAPE. Apart from its factual findings, the District Court

did not commit any error of law. So it did not abuse its discretion by entering the

preliminary injunction. See id. at 112–14.

4 III

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s order issuing the

preliminary injunction.