S. D. Rorem v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company

246 F.2d 427, 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 1489, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3580
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 28, 1957
Docket16567_1
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 246 F.2d 427 (S. D. Rorem v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
S. D. Rorem v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company, 246 F.2d 427, 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 1489, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3580 (5th Cir. 1957).

Opinion

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal from adverse judgment entered for Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company, the defendant, on a special issue verdict of the jury, the basic question is whether the conflict in the verdict is such as to require reversal either for remand and a new trial, or rendition here for Rorem, the plaintiff. Presented also is the question of the validity and the effect of the exculpatory work-order contract. The suit was for loss of Rorem’s wildcat oil well then being drilled in Bastrop County, Texas, caused by negligence of Halliburton during a squeeze 1 *428 job in (1) allowing cement to get above the packer and (2) giving false assuranees that cement had not gotten above the packer, so that the precautiona¡ry pro-endure of reversal of circulation was unn.ecessary.

By special issue verdict, Fed.RuIes Civ. Proc. rule 49, 28 U.S.C.A. the jury found that the cement got into the annular space (between tubing and casing) above the packer because Halliburton’s Cementer pumped in too much water 2 rather *429 than, as claimed by Halliburton, either through the process of equalization of the two columns of fluid (in the tubing and annular space), or malfunctioning of the packer during the squeeze.

The jury also answered that this negligence was the proximate cause of Rorem’s damage, although it found that the well would not have been a producer and had no market value prior to the commencement of the squeeze operation.

The jury, however, with respect to the second ground for recovery, did not return a clear-cut verdict. And it is here that the serious question presented on the appeal arises. For while the verdict on this phase would not itself support a judgment for the plaintiff and thus give him two strings to his bow, it would, if not mutually contradictory, destroy the plaintiff’s recovery as a finding of contributory negligence on Rorem’s part.

There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that, whether in one or two or more conversations, Rorem asked the Cementer whether in the spotting phase any cement had gotten above the packer in the annular space, and to which inquiries, the Cementer replied positively that none did, and because of that it was not necessary to reverse circulation. There was also evidence from which the jury could infer that the Cementer had said that he was personally of the opinion that no cement had gotten into the annular space, but that if there was any question about it, it would be well to reverse circulation.

The jury, by its answers 3 to Issues No. 10, 11, 12, 13, 13-A, 14 and 15, apparently found all these things.

But on this record, we do not think that there is actually any significant conflict. We conclude that the jury was en *430 titled to make the several finding's and they all add up to a determination by the jury that prudence called for a reversal of circulation which, not being done, then compelled the entry of the judgment for Halliburton.

In this analysis, we start with the jury finding that it was the negligent act of the Cementer in putting too much water in the tubing that caused the damage. This means that either in his calculations in checking the amount of water he then had in his tanks, the amount of fluid previously introduced, or the amount of water pumped in during the spotting stage, the Cementer made a mistake. But he did not think so. On the contrary, each time—twice during spotting and a third time after the squeeze—he was positive in his own mind that he had not put in too much water. Of course, we must look on “too much” in the light of that operation and not that of the needs of a drouth-scorched ranch, but it turns out that the excess was .between five and seven barrels of water at the most. '

The significant thing though is that the Cementer refused to believe he had made such a mistake and, with self-confidence, he repeatedly so said. And, in so saying, he conveyed all the while "the equally emphatic thought (and which Rorem attributed to him in so many words) that since he had not put in too much water, it was not necessary (i. e., required) to reverse circulation to remove cement then incapable of being there, even though, as he said, and the jury said he said, it might well be done as a precautionary measure.

The jury’s answer to Issue No. 10 was therefore a literal affirmation of what the Cementer, as a witness, had so many times sworn to.

Issue No. 11 stands no differently. For it asks whether he then kneiv that circulation should be reversed. Of course, he knew that for he had been telling Rorem to do that very thing. Indeed, the Issue (13-A), attacked so vigorously, was but a different expression of this same finding. Obviously if he told Rorem it would be well to reverse circulation, it would mean that the Cementer then knew what was reasonably to be done. To answer 13-A as the jury did, it could not have answered No. 11 any differently.

This all becomes quite clear when Issues 10 and 11 are read with No. 12 in which the jury finds the Cementer’s action was not negligent, and No. 14 (and No. 27) in which, to the contrary, the jury finds Rorem negligent in not reversing circulation.

Here the jury had to canvass more than the narrow controversy over what the Cementer said, or what he said he said, or what Rorem said the Cementer said, or what the driller said Rorem said the Cementer said. There was abundant evidence to support one of Halliburton’s primary contentions that amongst oil men engaged in the business of drilling and bringing in oil wells, that prudence called for a reversal of circulation after a squeeze was completed. Presumably accepting this testimony, this led the jury first to answer No. 11 that the Cementer, a man aware of industry practices, knew that circulation should be reversed.* More important, it was enough to permit the jury to conclude, as they presumably did, that while he was mistaken in his belief and his mistaken expression of confidence (Issue No. 10), the Cementer’s statements were not made for the purpose of misleading Rorem- or inducing him not to follow the accepted practice so that when he said both things (Issues No. 10 and 13-A), it was not a negligent act (Issue No. 12). The find *431 ing that the Cementer was not, but that Rorem was, negligent was the jury’s way 4 of concluding, as they had a right to do, that the obligation remained on the well owner to follow all accepted industry precautionary procedures and a failure to do so could not be excused because another (Cementer) might have made an error.

In the climate of this record, such a conclusion was a reasonable one for the jury. The question was twofold: (1) was this the industry practice and (2) did the circumstances (a part of which included the Cementer’s mistaken actions and statements) suggest full resort to it? Of major importance was the second.

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Bluebook (online)
246 F.2d 427, 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 1489, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/s-d-rorem-v-halliburton-oil-well-cementing-company-ca5-1957.