Rywelski v. Biden

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: May 1, 2024
• Docket: 23-5099
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 23-5099 Document: 010111041417 Date Filed: 05/01/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 1, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court JOSEPH MARION RYWELSKI,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 23-5099 (D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00217-CVE-SH) JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., President; (N.D. Okla.) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MERRICK GARLAND, United States Attorney General; BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

The district court dismissed a complaint against President Biden, the

Department of Justice, Attorney General Garland, and the Bureau of

* Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the briefing and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 23-5099 Document: 010111041417 Date Filed: 05/01/2024 Page: 2

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. The plaintiff, Mr. Joseph

Marion Rywelski, appeals; and we affirm.

I. Mr. Rywelski bases his claim on the Declaration of Independence.

In the complaint, Mr. Rywelski challenged the validity of an

administrative rule addressing registration requirements on firearms. For

this challenge, he relied on the Declaration of Independence. The district

court sua sponte concluded that subject-matter jurisdiction didn’t exist. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

II. Standard of Review

We conduct de novo review of the dismissal. Blue Valley Hosp., Inc.

v. Azar, 919 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019).

If a district court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-

matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any

party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). So the district

court appropriately considered whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed

even though no one had questioned it. 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds &

Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006).

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “it is to be

presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Becker v. Ute

Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 770 F.3d 944, 946–47

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(10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). As the

party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, Mr. Rywelski had to establish

jurisdiction. See id. at 947. So Mr. Rywelski needed to allege a basis for

 diversity jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1332) or

 federal-question jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).

See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1743,

1746 (2019). 1

In determining whether Mr. Rywelski met this burden, we credit all

“well-pled factual allegations.” Blue Valley Hosp., 919 F.3d at 1283.

Conclusory allegations of jurisdiction are not enough. Peterson v.

Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir. 2013).

III. Diversity Jurisdiction

Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction if (1) the parties are

citizens of different states or a foreign country and (2) the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The United States

is not a citizen for diversity purposes, and federal agencies and

administrators cannot be sued in diversity. See Texas v. Interstate Comm.

1 In the complaint, Mr. Rywelski also invoked supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But supplemental jurisdiction exists only when the district court has diversity or federal-question jurisdiction over at least one claim. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Because the district court correctly determined that it lacked both diversity and federal-question jurisdiction, no basis existed for supplemental jurisdiction. See id. at 726–27.

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Comm’n, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922) (concluding that diversity jurisdiction

didn’t exist over the ICC and Railroad Labor Board because they “are not

citizens of any State”); Gen. Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700,

703–05 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that no diversity jurisdiction existed

over the United States, a federal agency, and an agency administrator);

Com. Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581, 584–85 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (concluding that the Secret Service lacks citizenship for purposes of

diversity jurisdiction).

Because the defendants are not citizens of a state for diversity

purposes, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked diversity

jurisdiction.

IV. Federal-Question Jurisdiction

A plaintiff properly invokes federal-question jurisdiction when he

pleads “a colorable claim arising under the Constitution or laws of the

United States.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship

& Immigration Servs., Dist. Dir., 761 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2014)

(“[J]urisdiction under § 1331 exists only where there is a colorable claim

arising under federal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Mr. Rywelski alleged that the rule violates the Declaration of

Independence. The district court concluded that these allegations did not

confer federal-question jurisdiction because “the Declaration of

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Independence does not create a private right of action enforceable against

the federal government.” R. at 48–49.

Mr. Rywelski disagrees, arguing that the Declaration of

Independence is the foremost of the country’s “Organic Laws,” Appellant’s

Opening Br. at 2, and that “[n]o other founding document, or federal law,

of the United States [can] amend, repeal, or replace the Declaration or the

rights recited therein,” id. at 3; see also id. at 6. He insists that

 the Declaration of Independence is “substantive law” creating “a legal basis for relief” and

 any “judicial opinions denying the Declaration as law should be made null and void.”

Id. at 6, 15. But his arguments reflect a misunderstanding of the purpose of

the Declaration of Independence.

The Declaration of Independence states the principles on which our

government was founded. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,

553 (1875). The purpose was to guarantee the right of American colonies

to seek independence from England, not to establish a government.

See Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 158–59 (1830).

The Declaration of Independence is thus a statement of principles and

ideas, not of law, and does not grant enforceable rights. See Schifanelli v.

U.S. Gov’t, 865 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished; per curiam) (“The

Declaration of Independence is a statement of ideals, not law.”); see also

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 680 (1838) (“[U]nder the

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constitution [the court] is bound by events subsequent to the declaration of

independence . . . .”). Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded

that Mr. Rywelski’s allegations didn’t confer federal-question jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge