Ryland v. Liberty Lloyds Ins. Co.

630 So. 2d 1289, 1994 WL 17220
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 14, 1994
Docket93-C-1712
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 630 So. 2d 1289 (Ryland v. Liberty Lloyds Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ryland v. Liberty Lloyds Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 1289, 1994 WL 17220 (La. 1994).

Opinion

630 So.2d 1289 (1994)

J.B. RYLAND, Sr., Individually and as Natural Tutor of his Minor Daughters, Joy Belinda Ryland and Katie Sue Ryland
v.
LIBERTY LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

No. 93-C-1712.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

January 14, 1994.

*1291 Hon. Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., New Orleans, Raymond B. Landry, David P. Spence, Provosty, Sadler & deLaunay, Alexandria, for applicant.

Darrel D. Ryland, Joseph B. Treuting, Marksville, for respondent.

ORTIQUE, Justice.[1]

In this wrongful death case, the trial court found the roadway in a defective condition. Hence, it found the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), primarily at fault and held it primarily liable for the death of plaintiffs' wife and mother, Karen M. Ryland, whose northbound vehicle was struck by a southbound vehicle after it crossed the center line into Ryland's lane of travel. The trial court found the driver of the southbound vehicle 25% at fault for crossing the center line, and the DOTD 75% at fault for the defective condition of the roadway and for its deficient inspection and repair system. The court of appeal affirmed. On the DOTD's application, we granted writ to examine whether plaintiffs proved the automobile accident resulted from a roadway defect which presented an unreasonable risk of harm and, if so, whether its defective condition was a cause in fact of the accident. We conclude the evidence advanced at trial did not substantiate that the roadway traveled by the southbound vehicle, the segment of the southbound lane preceding the point of impact, was defective or unreasonably dangerous. Hence, the DOTD did not breach the duty it owed to both the south and northbound vehicles to maintain in a reasonably safe condition the portion of the roadway traveled by the southbound vehicle. Finding the DOTD not responsible for the accident, we reverse the allocation of fault assessed against it.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

J.B. Ryland, Sr., filed suit on his own behalf for the wrongful death of his wife, Karen M. Ryland, and as natural tutor for their minor daughters, Joy Belinda and Katie Sue. Henry W. Lucas, III; Henry W. Lucas, II; Rita Folse; Liberty Lloyds Insurance Company; the DOTD; General Motors Corporation and two unknown insurers were made defendants. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claim against General Motors. Folse, Lucas II, Lucas III and Liberty Lloyds settled with plaintiffs prior to trial.[2]

The factual circumstances surrounding the death of Karen Ryland are as follows: After working the 3:00 to 11:00 p.m. nursing shift at Humana Hospital in Marksville, Ryland was on her way home, driving north on Louisiana Highway 107 (LA 107) out of Marksville towards Effie in Avoyelles Parish. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on August 22, 1988, Ryland's northbound 1985 Chevrolet Blazer was in the curve near mile post 43 when a southbound 1984 Chevrolet Chevette driven by Debbie K. Flint approached the curve. Flint's vehicle crossed the center line and struck Ryland's vehicle one-third into the northbound lane. The collision was nearly head-on. The impact gouged the asphalt in the northbound lane. After the impact, Flint's vehicle continued southbound a short distance, veering back into the southbound lane, gouging it in spots. Flint's vehicle came to rest on the shoulder of the southbound *1292 lane just beyond an asphalt overlay patch which was several feet long, a few feet wide and located at the road's edge. The impact spun Ryland's vehicle around so that it also came to a stop south of the point of impact, approximately 20 feet from the road and in a ditch. Ryland's Blazer caught on fire and became engulfed in flames. Once the fire was extinguished and the vehicle towed onto the surface of the highway, the charred remains of Ryland were found inside.

Emergency personnel pronounced the eighteen year old driver of the southbound vehicle, Flint, dead upon their arrival to the scene. The Chevette Flint had been driving belonged to her fiancee, Henry W. Lucas, III. Flint had borrowed it from him a few weeks before the accident. She had moved to Marksville four to six weeks earlier and had driven that portion of LA 107 approximately 10 to 15 times after her move, but allegedly never at night. At the time of her death, Flint was enroute to her apartment in Marksville. She was a half hour late for her rendezvous with her fiancee. Her body was found slumped over the steering wheel, with her hands down toward her lap. A hair brush was near her hands.

The only defendant remaining in the suit at trial was the DOTD. At the close of the one day bench trial held on September 4, 1991, the trial court took the case under advisement. Thereafter, judgment was entered on January 29, 1992, in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $1,175,000.

The trial court's written reasons for judgment indicate it was not impressed by either the expert witness called by plaintiff or the one called by the DOTD, but it was impressed by the testimony of the lay witnesses and by the photographs of the accident site. The trial court noted these lay witnesses, local residents and plaintiffs' relatives, attested that the road was notorious for potholes and cracks and that all who travelled LA 107, were afraid of the stretch of the road near the accident site and experienced some difficulty in negotiating that stretch of the highway.

The road showed no signs of skid or yaw marks by either vehicle, indicating to the court that no evasive action was taken by Ryland's vehicle. Ryland's lack of attempt to avoid the accident led the court to,

the inescapable conclusion that the Flynt [sic] vehicle entered the Ryland lane of travel on an extremely sudden basis and entered the point of impact. A viewing of the photographs, as well as the testimony of the witnesses, convinces this Court that the road surface was so severe as to either throw the Flynt [sic] vehicle into the Ryland lane or so severe that, when confronted with imminent impact, Ms. Flynt [sic] attempted to avoid the road hazard and went into the Ryland lane. The cracks in the roadway at the center line were of such severity that, even if Ms. Flynt [sic] would have tried to drive around the hazard, when her tires reached the center line, her vehicle would have been pulled, somewhat, into the Ryland lane. The road's effect on the Flynt [sic] vehicle was made all the more dramatic by the vehicle's small size.

The trial court noted the State has an obligation to adequately insure the safety of drivers by maintaining a system to detect roadway deterioration and to repair such deterioration, but found such a system nonexistent in Avoyelles Parish.[3] Finding the roadway severely blemished, the trial court concluded the State had actual or constructive knowledge of its disrepair.[4] The court, *1293 therefore, held the roadway at the accident site was substandard and posed a danger to motorists; held the State was negligent in not having an adequate system for the allocation of repairs of this defective roadway; and held this defective roadway was the cause in fact of the accident. Nevertheless, concluding that Flint should perhaps have exercised more caution than she did, the trial court assessed her 25% fault and the DOTD 75% fault.

The DOTD suspensively appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed the damage award and the allocation of fault, with Stoker, J., dissenting with reasons. Ryland v. Liberty Lloyds Ins. Co., 617 So.2d 583 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Norman Fruge v. State of Louisiana, Dotd
Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2012
Vestal v. Kirkland
81 So. 3d 748 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2011)
Roger Vestal v. Cynthia D. Kirkland
Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2011
Clarkston v. LA. FARM BUREAU CAS. INS. CO.
989 So. 2d 164 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2008)
Clarkston v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance
989 So. 2d 164 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2008)
Everhardt v. LOUISIANA DOTD
978 So. 2d 1036 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2008)
Lockett v. STATE, DOTD
869 So. 2d 87 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2004)
Engles v. City of New Orleans
872 So. 2d 1166 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2004)
Cobb v. Delta Exports, Inc.
847 So. 2d 739 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2003)
Updegraff v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development
828 So. 2d 693 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2002)
Updegraff v. STATE EX REL. DOTD
828 So. 2d 693 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2002)
Petre v. State Ex Rel. DOTD
817 So. 2d 1107 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2002)
Petre v. State Ex Rel. DOTD
775 So. 2d 1252 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)
Mayfield v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development
770 So. 2d 519 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)
James v. Lister
500 S.E.2d 198 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1998)
Procell v. Williamette Industries, Inc.
710 So. 2d 267 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1998)
Bellard v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co.
702 So. 2d 695 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1997)
Tureaud v. Acadiana Nursing Home
696 So. 2d 15 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1997)
Tubre v. STATE, DOTD
693 So. 2d 1190 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
630 So. 2d 1289, 1994 WL 17220, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ryland-v-liberty-lloyds-ins-co-la-1994.