Ryerson v. United States

28 F. Supp. 265, 23 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 585, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2550, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9485
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJune 29, 1939
Docket47078
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 28 F. Supp. 265 (Ryerson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ryerson v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 265, 23 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 585, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2550, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9485 (N.D. Ill. 1939).

Opinions

SULLIVAN, District Judge.

This suit is brought under the Tucker Act, United States Code, title 28, Sec. 41 (20), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(20), for the recovery of gift taxes for the years 1934 and 1935. The tax was assessed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pursuant to the Gift Tax Act of 1932 as amended, 26 U.S.C.A. § 550 et seq. Plaintiff paid the tax and now alleges that it was wrongfully exacted. The total amount for both years is $3,764.24 plus interest.

Only issues of law are involved and they may be stated as follows :

1. Where a gift is made of a fully paid life insurance policy, is the cash surrender value on the date the gift is made determinative of the fair market value for gift tax purposes, and

2. Where a gift is made in trust are the the beneficiaries, rather than the trust, the donees of the gift for the purpose of determining the number of exclusions of $5,000 allowable under Sec. 504(b) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A. § 553 (b) ?

• Prior to 1934 plaintiff had purchased two insurance policies on her own life in the face amount of $100,000 each and in 1934 she had each of these policies split up into two fully paid single premium policies, each in the amount of $50,000. For the purpose of clarity 1 shall desígnale the policies as policies A, B, C, and D.

In December of 1934, plaintiff assigned policies A and B to her two sons. The cash surrender values of the policies on the [266]*266date of assignment were $40,696.50 each. A few days later she assigned policies C and D when the cash surrender values of these two policies were $40,286.00 each.

It is stipulated that no greater amount could have been realized on the four policies by surrendering, or borrowing on them, or otherwise, than their cash surrender value. Plaintiff paid her gift tax on the basis of the this cash surrender value, but the Commissioner refused to accept this as their true value. He chose instead to value them at the price the same insurance company would have charged for similar policies on the date of the assignment on the life of a person of the same age, sex, and condition of health as the plaintiff was at that time. This value he found to be $42,856.50. Upon this basis, the Commissioner assessed and plaintiff paid, the additional tax which is in suit.

With'respect to policies A and B no controversy exists except as to their valuation. Regarding policies C and D, however there is also a controversy concerning the number of exclusions to be allowed under Sec. 504(b) of the Gift Tax Act of 1932.

Considering the first issue, we find that Sec. 506 of the Gift Tax Act of 1932 provides: “If the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift.” U.S.C.A. Title 26, Sec. 555.

Article 19 of Treasury Regulation 79, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1932, reads: “The value of property is the price at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell.”

Plaintiff maintains that the values here, with a willing buyer and a willing seller, could be no higher than those set forth in the cash surrender values. The defendant contends that this is merely an arbitrary figure set by the insurance company, and that if a policy holder wishes to surrender his policy he is forced to accept this' predetermined price. This, defendant says, is merely its forced sale value and cannot be regarded as a reliable criterion of real value.

The Board of Tax Appeals has consistently held that the cash surrender value of a policy is the valuation to be considered for taxation purposes: Ernest A. Cronin v. Commissioner, 1938, 37 B.T.A. 914; Mary M. Haines v. Commissioner, 1938, 37 B.T.A. 1013; Charles Lockhart et al., Executor, v. Commissioner, C.C.H. 1938, Par. 7301 B, C.C.H. Dec. No. 10101-B (1938); Madeline D. Powers v. Commissioner, C.C.H. Dec. No. 10, 562-E; ’39, Vol. 3, p. 8586 (Jan. 9, 1939) Henry W. Corning v. Commissioner, C.C.H. Dec. No. 10, 551-G; ’39, Vol. 3, p. 8576, (Dec. 8, 1938). Opposed to these cases we have Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 49 S.Ct. 426, 73 L.Ed. 851, 61 A.L.R. 906, where it was necessary for the court to determine the value of a policy on March, 1913, in order to arrive at the taxable gain accruing since that date. The court said, 279 U.S. at page 579, 49 S.Ct. at page 428, 73 L.Ed. 851, 61 A.L.R. 906: “Under the statute, market price of the taxpayers property on that date, where ascertainable, may be resorted to as generally a sufficiently definite and trustworthy gauge of the gain which has later accrued. But, where the property has no market value, the statute must be interpreted in the light of its purpose to ascertain taxable gains accruing since March 1, 1913. Hence, in such a case, its fair value on the critical date is not necessarily what might then have been realized upon it by a forced liquidation by accepting the unfavorable loan or cash surrender val-^0 ^

It is my belief that the cash surrender value is not the actual value of a policy but is purely an arbitrary figure fixed by the insurance company. Vance on Insurance on pp. 55, 56 states: “ * * * but, inasmuch as insurance companies desire to discourage the surrender of policies so far as they can equitably do so, the surrender value fixed upon a policy is usually set at a considerably lower figure than that which would be'established by its reserve value. It seems that, in the absence of a specified promise so to do, the insurer is under no obligation to pay any portion of the reserve value of a policy upon its surrender.”

Here the value of the gift made by the plaintiff should not be computed by a portion of its paid-in premiums, as the cash surrender value is determined, but rather by what it would cost to duplicate such a gift as of the date of the assignment.

The cash surrender value is the market value only of a surrendered policy, one in which the investment upon life has been terminated. It is the value of a policy computed by subtracting the insurance already received and other expenses from the [267]*267amount of the premiums paid in. It does not place any value upon the investment in the insured’s life expectancy.

In the case at bar the donor did not make a gift of paid-in premiums. She made a gift of an investment. The market value of that investment is what it would cost to duplicate the gift upon the day it was made. Had the donor considered she was making a gift of paid-in premiums she could have obviated the necessity of buying the policies and have made a direct transfer of the initial premium to the trust. Or she could have surrendered the policies herself and made a transfer of the cash surrender value. But she did not do this because she believed that she was making a gift of something more. She was giving the sum total of the paid-in premiums, after the insurance received had been deducted, plus an investment in her life expectancy. That additional feature, the investment in her life expectancy, which is not valued in the cash surrender of a policy, must be determined to obtain the true value of this policy. The true value of a life insurance policy still in force can be ascertained only by the cost of duplicating that policy on the date of the gift.

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108 F.2d 967 (Third Circuit, 1939)
Ryerson v. United States
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105 F.2d 642 (Eighth Circuit, 1939)

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Bluebook (online)
28 F. Supp. 265, 23 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 585, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2550, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9485, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ryerson-v-united-states-ilnd-1939.