LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
Ryan A. Silvey appeals the judgment denying his petition to challenge the qualifications of J. Ranen Bechthold to run for the position of state senator in Missouri Senate District 17. Silvey contends the circuit court had no authority to extend the deadline for Bechthold to file an answer to Silvey’s election contest petition and that Bechthold’s failure to file an answer within the statutory time required a default judgment or judgment on the pleadings in Sil-vey’s favor. For reasons explained herein, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
On August 15, 2016, Silvey, the Republican nominee for election to Missouri Senate District 17, filed a petition seeking to have Bechthold, the Democratic nominee for the same senate seat, disqualified on the basis of residency.
Three days later, on August 18, Silvey filed an amended petition that added additional facts regarding Bechthold’s alleged residency.
On August 22, the court held a preliminary hearing. Counsel for Silvey and the Clay County Board of Election Commissioners appeared.
Bechthold appeared without counsel. No transcript of this preliminary hearing appears in the record on appeal. The court set the case for trial on August 29.
On August 23, counsel for Bechthold entered his appearance. On August 24, Sil-vey and Bechthold were each deposed. Also on that day, Silvey filed a motion for default judgment or, in the alternative, judgment on the pleadings. In the motion, Silvey argued that, during the August '22 preliminary hearing, the court informed Bechthold that he would be in default if he did not file an answer by August 23. Because Bechthold did not file an answer by August 23, Silvey asserted that Bechthold was in default and that Silvey was entitled to either a default judgment or a judgment on the pleadings.
Bechthold filed an answer on August 26. In his answer, Bechthold responded to the allegations in the amended petition and set forth several facts supporting his defense that he satisfied the residency requirements.
Bechthold also filed a motion to file his answer out of time.
On August 29, before the trial on Sil-vey’s amended petition to disqualify Becht-hold, the court heard arguments on Becht-hold’s motion to file his answer out of time and Silvey’s motion for default judgment or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted Bechthold’s motion to file his answer out of time. The court denied Silvey’s motion for default judgment or judgment on the pleadings after finding that the filing of an answer in response to an election contest petition is permissive and not mandatory.
A bench trial was held on Silvey’s amended petition to disqualify Bechthold. The court subsequently entered a judgment in favor of Bechthold. The court found that the “overwhelming majority of the evidence demonstrates that Bechthold has always intended to be, has always maintained,' and but for his service as a soldier in the US Army, has always been physically a resident within Missouri Senate District 17.”” Silvey appeals.
Standard op Review
Appellate review of an election contest petition is under the standard of
Murphy v. Carron,
536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.banc 1976).
In re Contest of Primary Election Candidacy of Fletcher,
337 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Mo.App.W.D.2011). Therefore, we will affirm the circuit court’s judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.
Id.
at 139-140. We review issues of law, including questions of statutory interpretation,
de novo. Chastain v. Kansas City Missouri City Clerk,
337 S.W.3d 149, 164 (Mo.App.W.D.2011).
Analysis
Silvey’s points on appeal challenge the circuit court’s handling of Bechthold’s failure to file his answer within the tirrie frame provided by statute. In Point I, Sil-vey contends the court erred in allowing Bechthold to file his answer out of time and in allowing him to submit evidence relating to the defense set forth in his answer. In Point II, Silvey asserts the court erred in denying his motion for. default judgment or judgment on the pleadings based on Bechthold’s failure to file a timely answer.
The legislature established specific rules for election contests in Chapter 115.
Foster v. Evert,
751 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo.banc 1988). These “statutory requirements are clear and unambiguous.”
Id.
The election contest procedures, set forth in Chapter 115 “.‘are exclusive and must be strictly followed as substantive law.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
Hockemeier v. Berra,
641 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Mo.banc 1982)).
Silvey filed his amended petition to disqualify Bechthold on the basis of residency under Section 115.526. This statute allows any candidate for election to an office, at a general election to challenge the qualifications of any other candidate for election to the same office to seek or hold such office or to have his name printed on the ballot. § 115.526.1. Section 115.526.2 states that “[a]nswers to the .petition may be filed at the time and as provided in sections 115.527 to 115.601, specifying the qualifications of the candidate for holding the office for which he is a candidate for election or for nomination.” Section 115.533,3 provides that, “[n]ot later than four days after the petition is filed, the contestee may file an answer to the petition, specifying reasons
why his nomination should not be contested.” Silvey argues that this provision
required,
Bechthold to file an answer to the election contest petition within four days. He contends the court had no authority to extend this deadline and was required to enter a default judgment or judgment on the pleadings in his favor.
Silvey’s argument ignores the statutes’ plain language. “The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as' reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.”
Crawford v. Div. of Emp’t Sec.,
376 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Mo.banc 2012). Section 115.526.2 provides that “[ajnswers to the petition
may
be filed at the time and as provided in sections 115.527 to 115.601,” while Section 115.533.3 provides that “the contestee
may
file an answer” within four days. (Emphasis added.) “ ‘It is the general rule that in statutes the word “may” is permissive only, and the word “shall” is mandatory.’ ”
Wolf v. Midwest Nephrology Consultants, PC.,
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LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE
Ryan A. Silvey appeals the judgment denying his petition to challenge the qualifications of J. Ranen Bechthold to run for the position of state senator in Missouri Senate District 17. Silvey contends the circuit court had no authority to extend the deadline for Bechthold to file an answer to Silvey’s election contest petition and that Bechthold’s failure to file an answer within the statutory time required a default judgment or judgment on the pleadings in Sil-vey’s favor. For reasons explained herein, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
On August 15, 2016, Silvey, the Republican nominee for election to Missouri Senate District 17, filed a petition seeking to have Bechthold, the Democratic nominee for the same senate seat, disqualified on the basis of residency.
Three days later, on August 18, Silvey filed an amended petition that added additional facts regarding Bechthold’s alleged residency.
On August 22, the court held a preliminary hearing. Counsel for Silvey and the Clay County Board of Election Commissioners appeared.
Bechthold appeared without counsel. No transcript of this preliminary hearing appears in the record on appeal. The court set the case for trial on August 29.
On August 23, counsel for Bechthold entered his appearance. On August 24, Sil-vey and Bechthold were each deposed. Also on that day, Silvey filed a motion for default judgment or, in the alternative, judgment on the pleadings. In the motion, Silvey argued that, during the August '22 preliminary hearing, the court informed Bechthold that he would be in default if he did not file an answer by August 23. Because Bechthold did not file an answer by August 23, Silvey asserted that Bechthold was in default and that Silvey was entitled to either a default judgment or a judgment on the pleadings.
Bechthold filed an answer on August 26. In his answer, Bechthold responded to the allegations in the amended petition and set forth several facts supporting his defense that he satisfied the residency requirements.
Bechthold also filed a motion to file his answer out of time.
On August 29, before the trial on Sil-vey’s amended petition to disqualify Becht-hold, the court heard arguments on Becht-hold’s motion to file his answer out of time and Silvey’s motion for default judgment or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted Bechthold’s motion to file his answer out of time. The court denied Silvey’s motion for default judgment or judgment on the pleadings after finding that the filing of an answer in response to an election contest petition is permissive and not mandatory.
A bench trial was held on Silvey’s amended petition to disqualify Bechthold. The court subsequently entered a judgment in favor of Bechthold. The court found that the “overwhelming majority of the evidence demonstrates that Bechthold has always intended to be, has always maintained,' and but for his service as a soldier in the US Army, has always been physically a resident within Missouri Senate District 17.”” Silvey appeals.
Standard op Review
Appellate review of an election contest petition is under the standard of
Murphy v. Carron,
536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.banc 1976).
In re Contest of Primary Election Candidacy of Fletcher,
337 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Mo.App.W.D.2011). Therefore, we will affirm the circuit court’s judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.
Id.
at 139-140. We review issues of law, including questions of statutory interpretation,
de novo. Chastain v. Kansas City Missouri City Clerk,
337 S.W.3d 149, 164 (Mo.App.W.D.2011).
Analysis
Silvey’s points on appeal challenge the circuit court’s handling of Bechthold’s failure to file his answer within the tirrie frame provided by statute. In Point I, Sil-vey contends the court erred in allowing Bechthold to file his answer out of time and in allowing him to submit evidence relating to the defense set forth in his answer. In Point II, Silvey asserts the court erred in denying his motion for. default judgment or judgment on the pleadings based on Bechthold’s failure to file a timely answer.
The legislature established specific rules for election contests in Chapter 115.
Foster v. Evert,
751 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Mo.banc 1988). These “statutory requirements are clear and unambiguous.”
Id.
The election contest procedures, set forth in Chapter 115 “.‘are exclusive and must be strictly followed as substantive law.’ ”
Id.
(quoting
Hockemeier v. Berra,
641 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Mo.banc 1982)).
Silvey filed his amended petition to disqualify Bechthold on the basis of residency under Section 115.526. This statute allows any candidate for election to an office, at a general election to challenge the qualifications of any other candidate for election to the same office to seek or hold such office or to have his name printed on the ballot. § 115.526.1. Section 115.526.2 states that “[a]nswers to the .petition may be filed at the time and as provided in sections 115.527 to 115.601, specifying the qualifications of the candidate for holding the office for which he is a candidate for election or for nomination.” Section 115.533,3 provides that, “[n]ot later than four days after the petition is filed, the contestee may file an answer to the petition, specifying reasons
why his nomination should not be contested.” Silvey argues that this provision
required,
Bechthold to file an answer to the election contest petition within four days. He contends the court had no authority to extend this deadline and was required to enter a default judgment or judgment on the pleadings in his favor.
Silvey’s argument ignores the statutes’ plain language. “The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as' reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.”
Crawford v. Div. of Emp’t Sec.,
376 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Mo.banc 2012). Section 115.526.2 provides that “[ajnswers to the petition
may
be filed at the time and as provided in sections 115.527 to 115.601,” while Section 115.533.3 provides that “the contestee
may
file an answer” within four days. (Emphasis added.) “ ‘It is the general rule that in statutes the word “may” is permissive only, and the word “shall” is mandatory.’ ”
Wolf v. Midwest Nephrology Consultants, PC.,
487 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Mo.App.W.D.2016) (quoting
State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore,
343 Mo. 98, 119 S.W.2d 941, 944 (1938)). “We have no authority to read ‘shall’ into [Section 115.533.3] unless its insertion is plainly indicated.”
Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Section 115.526.2’s and Section 115.533.3’s use of the word “may” clearly and unambiguously indicates that the legislature intended for the contestee’s filing of an answer to be permissive rather than mandatory.
•'
In interpreting similar language in Section 115.579.3, which is virtually identical to Section 115.533.3,
the Supreme Court in
Foster
found that “[n]o answer is required of the contestee,” 751 S.W.2d at 44. The Court explained that the reason no answer is. required is because an election contest is not merely an adversarial legal proceeding pitting one candidate against another candidate; rather, “[a]n election contest challenges.the
conduct
of the election itself,”
Id.
“If as a result of election irregularities the wrong candidate is declared the winner, more is at stake than the losing candidate’s disappointment; the people have lost the ability to impose their will through the electoral process.”
Id.
at 43, “In bringing an election contest, the contestant speaks for the entire electorate, seeking to assure all that the democratic process has functioned properly and that the voters’ will is done.”
Id.
at 44. The legislature recognizes this by requiring the circuit clerk to serve a copy of the petition on the election authority responsible for conducting the election where the alleged irregularity occurred. .
Id.
(citing § 115.579.2); § 115.533.2. The election contest petition in
Foster
sought to assure that the democratic process had functioned properly with regard to the votes counted.
Id
at 43. In this case, Silvey’s election contest petition seeks to assure that the democratic process is functioning properly with regard to the constitutional residency requirement.
By not requiring a contestee to file an answer, the election contest statutes “do not permit the entry of a default judgment upon failure to answer.”
Id.
at 44. In other words, the court must try the case on its merits. Indeed, the statute requiring that an election contest be tried expressly provides for the possibility that an answer •will
not
be filed. Section 115.581 states; in pertinent part, “Immediately upon the filing of a petition and answer,
if there is any,
the court
shall proceed to try the case.”
(Emphasis added.) Nothing in Sections 115.526, 115.533, or 115.581 prohibits the contestee from presenting his defense to the election contest at trial if he does not file an answer.
Because no answer was required and no default judgment or judgment on the pleadings was permitted, the court’s allowing Bechthold to file an answer out of time was inconsequential. Regardless of whether Bechthold filed an answer out of time or at all, Section 1Í5.526.1 still required Sil-vey to “produce his proof’ to support his challenge to Bechthold’s qualifications during the required trial. 'Likewise, regardless of whether Bechthold filed an answer out of time or at all, he was permitted to present a défense to Silvey’s challenge to his qualifications during the required trial. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in allowing Bechthold to file his answer out of time, and it did not err in denying Silvey’s motion for default judgment or judgment on the pleadings. Points I and II are denied.
Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
All Concur.