Rutledge v. Turner

1972 OK CR 74, 495 P.2d 119
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedMarch 8, 1972
DocketA-17292
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 1972 OK CR 74 (Rutledge v. Turner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rutledge v. Turner, 1972 OK CR 74, 495 P.2d 119 (Okla. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

SIMMS, Judge:

Defendant was convicted upon plea of guilty to the offense of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor on November 30, 1971, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, and sentenced to a term of ninety (90) days in the Oklahoma County Jail and to pay a fine of $200.00, and the costs of the case. Defendant was also convicted of the offense of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under Suspension, arising from the same transaction, upon a plea of guilty and adjudged to pay a fine of $50.00 and costs of the case.

Defendant’s ninety day jail sentence was served to completion on January 31, 1972, but he was without funds to pay the fine imposed in either or both of the cases. Defendant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Oklahoma County and in the hearing on said writ, a transcript of which has been submitted as an exhibit to this Court, defendant clearly established that he was a pauper, unable to immediately pay the fines and costs, and petitioned the District Court in the habeas corpus proceeding to be released under a plan to pay the fine and costs in installments. Defendant testified he could pay the fines if permitted to return to his employment as a carpenter.

The application for writ of habeas corpus was denied by the trial court, and defendant returned to the custody of the Sheriff of Oklahoma County to complete serving the unpaid fines and costs at the statutory rate of $5.00 per day.

Defendant thereafter filed an original action in habeas corpus in this Court, a hearing was held, and the writ of habeas corpus conditionally granted; in that, it was the Order of this Court that the trial court conduct a hearing to determine the reasonable amount of installment payment to be made and the due dates of the installments, with the additional directive that if defendant refused or neglected to pay the installments upon the unpaid fine and costs when due, he was to be imprisoned. The Order in the habeas corpus proceedings in this Court recited that a formal opinion was to follow.

Because imprisonment for non-payment of fines by a person unable to pay same is a matter of first impression before this Court, we will attempt to treat it in depth and establish certain guidelines for the trial courts of this State, as well as the various municipal courts.

This issue was first called to the attention of the Supreme Court of the United States in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586, decided June 29, 1970, wherein it was held:

“A statute permitting a sentence of both imprisonment and fine cannot be parlayed into a longer term of imprisonment than is fixed by the statute since to do so would be to accomplish indirectly as to an indigent that which cannot be done directly. We have no occasion to reach the question whether a State is precluded in any other circumstances from holding an indigent accountable for a fine by use of a penal sanction. We hold only that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of their economic status.” 399 U.S., at 243, 244, 90 S.Ct., at 2023.

A close reading of Williams, supra, brings one to the conclusion that the Court was holding simply that the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense could not be extended beyond that term by reason of inability to pay fine and/or costs.

Also, on June 29, 1970, in Morris v. Schoonfield, Warden, 399 U.S. 508, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 26 L.Ed.2d 773, Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall concurred, wrote:

“However, I deem it appropriate to state my view that the same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres *122 in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing and able to pay a fine. In each case, the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full. As I understand it, Williams v. Illinois does not mean that a State cannot jail a person who has the means to pay a fine but refuses or neglects to do so. * * * * But Williams means, at minimum, that in imposing fines as punishment for criminal conduct more care must be taken to provide for those whose lack of funds would otherwise automatically convert a fine into a jail sentence.”

Following Morris, supra, on March 2, 1971, in Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130, Mr. Justice Brennan, in expressing the view of seven members of the Supreme Court, said:

“Although the instant case involves offenses punishable by fines only, petitioner’s imprisonment for nonpayment constitutes precisely the same unconstitutional discrimination since, like Williams, petitioner was subjected to imprisonment solely because of his indigency. In Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 26 L.Ed.2d 773 (1970), four members of the Court anticipated the problem of this case and stated the view, which we now adopt, that ‘ . . the same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing and able to pay a fine. * * * ’ ”

Mr. Justice Brennan further held in Tate, supra:

“We emphasize that our holding today does not suggest any constitutional infirmity in imprisonment of a defendant with the means to pay a fine who refuses or neglects to do so. Nor is our decision to be understood as precluding imprisonment as an enforcement method when alternative means are unsuccessful despite the defendant’s reasonable efforts to satisfy the fines by those means; the determination of the constitutionality of imprisonment in that circumstance must await the presentation of a concrete case.”

The Oklahoma Legislature, addressing itself to the question of imprisonment for non-payment of fine, enacted 22 O.S.1971, § 983, effective June 24, 1971. The statute provides as follows:

“A. Any defendant found guilty of an offense in any court of this state may be imprisoned for nonpayment of the fine and/or costs when the trial court finds that the defendant is financially able but refuses or neglects to pay the fine and/or costs. In no case may a sentence to pay a fine be converted into a jail sentence automatically, i.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1972 OK CR 74, 495 P.2d 119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rutledge-v-turner-oklacrimapp-1972.