Ruth v. State
This text of 522 S.W.2d 517 (Ruth v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
OPINION
The appellant was convicted of murder; punishment was assessed at fifteen years.
Several grounds of error are raised pertaining to placing the appellant’s juvenile offenses before the jury. The record is replete with questions by the prosecutor both stating and eliciting the specific nature of offenses allegedly committed by the appellant as a juvenile and the arrests and dispositions in those cases.
At the guilt-innocence stage of the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony that the appellant had been charged as a juvenile at [518]*518age 14 with assault on a police officer.1 The evidence of malice and intent to kill was extremely weak. The obvious string of inferences he sought to draw from the introduction of this evidence was that since the appellant had been charged with assault on a police officer, he was a violent person, and therefore probably shot the deceased with malice aforethought.
At the punishment stage the prosecutor continued discussing juvenile offenses and dispositions. Appellant took the stand and testified essentially that he had never been convicted of a felony and would abide by the terms of probation, if granted. him. The cross-examination by the State began as follows:
“Q. Let me ask you this, David, you have been given at least five probations so to speak, have you not?
“A. No sir, that is not true.”
The prosecutor then elicited admissions by the appellant of at least three juvenile arrests for specific crimes. It was established that the appellant had been arrested for aggravated assault on a police officer and being drunk, for “failure to move on,” and for possession of narcotics.2
In Rivas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 501 S.W.2d 918, we held that a witness’ juvenile delinquency record may not be used to impeach him. Dispositions under proceedings against juveniles are never convictions for crime. Article 51.13(a), V.T.C.A. Family Code. This Court said in Rivas, supra, at p. 919, “An adjudication of juvenile delinquency may be based upon proof of acts which would constitute felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude if committed by an adult, but such an adjudication does not constitute conviction for a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”
Article 51.13(b) of the Family Code provides :
“The adjudication or disposition of a child or evidence adduced in a hearing under this title may be used only in subsequent proceedings under this title in which the child is a party or in subsequent sentencing proceedings in criminal court against the child to the extent per[519]*519mitted by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965.”
With regard to the predecessor 3 of Article 51.13, supra, this Court stated that the terms of the article were “intended to protect the accused from the odium and stigma attached to any act of youthful indiscretion which had eventuated in a prosecution.” Smith v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 124, 18 S.W.2d 1070.
The prosecutor’s presentation of the appellant’s juvenile offenses and the dispositions of those cases to the jury was serious error designed to prejudice the jury and to deny appellant a fair and impartial trial. Although there were not proper objections in some instances, this egregious action by the prosecutor was highly inflammatory and calculated to prejudice the defendant.
“Our Bill of Rights, Art. I, § 10, Texas Const., guarantees to every person a fair and impartial trial. This guarantee is one of the fundamentals upon which rests the perpetuity of this government. It is the duty of the courts to preserve and to maintain that right, and this regardless of how heinous or revolting the crime committed may be.
“If there exists in the mind of this court any doubt as to the fairness or impartiality of the trial, it becomes our duty to award a new trial. Without sin-gularizing any one particular fact, but considering all the facts and circumstances shown by this record, there does exist that doubt.” Judge Davidson writing for this Court in Williams v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 536, 170 S.W.2d 482, 489 (1943).
We think it clear from the record that the repeated improper questions of the prosecutor denied appellant a fair trial.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
522 S.W.2d 517, 1975 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 947, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ruth-v-state-texcrimapp-1975.