OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This appeal is taken from a conviction for capital murder. Punishment was assessed at death by the court in accordance with [773]*773the jury’s affirmative answers to the two special issues submitted pursuant to Article 37.071(b)(1) and (2), Y.A.C.C.P.
Appellant advances sixteen grounds of error. This is a circumstantial evidence case. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at the guilt stage of the trial, to support the verdict, or to show that the murder was committed in the course of committing robbery. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s affirmative findings to special issues one and two at the penalty stage of the trial. In other grounds of error appellant contends the court erred in failing to quash the indictment as it did not name the victim of the robbery, that the court erred in admitting a blood sample taken from him by virtue of a search warrant, that the court erred in admitting an extraneous offense and prejudicial opinion testimony, that the court erred in refusing a special requested charge on “deliberate” at the penalty stage of the trial, and also erred in submitting special issues no. 2 as it is unconstitutionally vague.
We shall initially examine the evidence. The deceased, Hubert Otha Tobey, was an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration at the Abilene Municipal Airport. His working hours on Sunday, December 2, 1979 were from 4 p.m. until midnight. Rodney Tobey, deceased’s son, testified his father left home about 3:40 p.m. on that date to go to work. He was wearing a brown suede jacket, dark pants and Dan Post boots. The deceased was driving his wife’s 1974 Lincoln Continental Mark IV automobile bearing Texas license plates MXM 997. The car had a defective tail light. He was to fill the automobile with gas after work. His wife’s white Levi jacket was in the automobile. Rodney Tobey testified his father owned a pocket knife with two sharp blades and carried a wallet and a money clip.
Joe Boyle, air traffic control specialist with the .Federal Aviation Administration, relieved the deceased at the airport on December 2, 1979. He arrived at the airport about 20 minutes to midnight, was briefed by the deceased on operational conditions. According to Boyle the deceased left the F.A.A. facility at approximately 11:45 p.m.
The deceased had been issued three Save a $ club gasoline credit cards, nos. 13,181, 13,182 and 13,183, for use at unmanned self-service gas stations. Insertion of a card would activate the gas pump and then information concerning the transaction would be relayed via telephone wires to a computer which would record the details, including the date, time, place, amount of gasoline purchased and the number of the credit card.
Donald Manley, computer programmer for Western Marketing Company, testified from computer printouts concerning the transactions of December 2, 1979. The printouts reflected that at 11:56 p.m. someone using card no. 13,181 issued to H.O. Tobey inserted the card at a pump at the station on South Seventh and Treadway Streets in Abilene. The system was activated, but no gas was pumped. At 11:59 p.m. the same card was used at the same pump to complete a transaction, reflecting that 20 gallons of gas were pumped.
Abilene police officer, Bernard Kastner, testified that while on patrol at 12:50 a.m. on December 3, 1979 he stopped at the Minute Stop Grocery at East Highway 80 and Washington Boulevard. There he observed a silver or grey Lincoln Continental with Texas license no. MXM 997. Standing on the left side of the car was a white male with curly brown hair. Kastner identified appellant as being of the same height and build of the person he observed by the car. He saw a black male, muscular build and acne facial marks, come out of the store and get into the ear. The Continental then proceeded west on Highway 80.
James Miller, Abilene police officer, and his partner, David Gage, stopped at the Minute Stop about 12:50 a.m. on December 3. Miller saw Kastner’s vehicle and a silver Continental. One man was in the driver’s seat of the Continental and a black male came out of the store in a hurry, get in the car, and it proceeded west on Highway 80. Officer Gage described the driver [774]*774of the Continental as a white male. He saw a black male come out of the store at a fast pace and get into the passenger’s side of the car.
Both Gage and Miller noticed one of the tail lights on the Continental was not working. Gage stated a photograph of the To-bey Continental looked like the one he saw at the Minute Stop.
Between 9 and 9:30 a.m. on December 3 John Woods went to 526 Thomas Street in Abilene to pick up his stepdaughter’s husband for work. Upon arrival, he saw a padlock on the door, and then observed a lot of blood and brain matter. Woods went to get a friend and to call the police.
Abilene police officer, Jay Barbian, responded to the call and went to 526 Thomas Street. Barbian found the partially nude body of the deceased at the location. Investigation uncovered a large piece of concrete with fresh blood on it. A bloody white Levi jacket was found as well as a brown suede jacket.
Dr. Jarrett Williams, a pathologist, conducted the autopsy on the deceased’s body. He related Tobey had received a severe blow to his head, crushing his skull, which could have been from the bloody piece of concrete found at the scene. A large portion of the brain was missing. There were numerous knife wounds, one being to the juglar vein, which could have caused death.
Appellant was identified as one of two men entering the Big Tex Pawn Shop in Midland on December 3, 1979 between 9:30 and 10:30 a.m. John Dungan, the operator, also stated appellant was accompanied by a black male. They attempted to pawn a television set. When Dungan requested identification, the black male went to a silver Lincoln or Mercury, and then appellant presented Dungan with a driver’s license with the name Tobey or Tomey on it. The license photo did not resemble appellant and appellant gave Dungan a different birth date than that on the driver’s license. Dungan refused to accept the television set. When the two men left, Dungan took the license number of the car which he believed to be MXM 997.
Midland police officer, Ronnie Wilson, testified he saw a Lincoln bearing license plate number MXM 997 at the B & B Trading Post in Midland about 10 a.m. on December 3, 1979. Two men, one white, approximately appellant’s size, and a black male, were unloading a television set from the car and taking it into the trading post.
Michael Wicker was hitchhiking from Plains, Texas to Hobbs, New Mexico, on the afternoon of December 3, 1979. About 10 miles out of Hobbs he was picked up by a white male and a black male in a silver Lincoln. He identified appellant as the driver and William Battee, Jr., as the black male passenger. Battee told Wicker they got the car from appellant’s “old lady,” and when Wicker noticed blood in the car Bat-tee explained appellant had been punched in the nose when he had taken the car keys. After arriving in Hobbs, they went to a Mimi Mall to get something to eat. Appellant, who was apparently drunk, and Bat-tee began “grabbing” women in the mall, causing a disturbance. Wicker paid for their food and left. Appellant and Battee followed. Officers were near the Continental and all three men were arrested.
Hobbs police officer, Richard Baum, testified at approximately 2 p.m. on December 3 he went to the Mimi Mall and saw an illegally parked Lincoln Continental bearing Texas license MXM 997. Upon hearing yelling and cursing, he saw a black male and two white males. The black male was cursing and Baum arrested Battee, who gave his name as Willie Green. The two white males, identified as appellant and Wicker, crossed the street to calm Battee, but denied knowing him. Battee told officer Baum he was hitchhiking and had been picked up by appellant and Wicker. Appellant replied Battee had picked “them” up. Appellant gave his name, but it was different than the name he gave another officer. All three men were arrested with appellant being taken into custody for being intoxicated.
Baum learned the Continental was registered to the deceased. After a phone con[775]*775versation with Sgt. Casey Bradshaw of the Abilene Police Department, Baum removed Battee’s blood splattered tennis shoes. He removed appellant’s pants, underwear, shirt and shoes. All items save the shoes had what appeared to be fresh blood on them. There were no marks or lacerations on appellant’s body.
Sgt. James Murphy of the Hobbs Police Department locked and sealed the doors of the Lincoln Continental at a Hobbs garage on December 3, 1979. Inside the car he saw blood spots.
On December 3, Sgt. Casey Bradshaw of the Abilene Police Department talked with Officer Baum over the phone and later Bradshaw secured arrest warrants for appellant and Battee. In Hobbs the next day he inspected the Continental and found the deceased’s F.A.A. identification card, the deceased’s bank club card and a Save a $ credit card number 013181. He removed certain blood stained parts of the right front door and took blood scrapings from other parts of the car. He received items of clothing from the Hobbs police that had been taken from appellant and Battee.
The deceased’s Dan Post boots were found in a Midland cemetery.
Sarah Williams, forensic serologist, compared blood samples of the deceased with known blood samples from the appellant and Battee, as well as with blood samples removed from the Continental and from the clothing of appellant and Battee. As a result of various tests and comparisons, Williams was able to determine the blood on appellant’s clothing was not his nor that of Battee. The blood was compatible with that of the deceased. While appellant, Bat-tee and the deceased all had blood type 0, there were differences in the enzyme structure. Williams related that only .005% of the population had blood exactly like that of the deceased.
A footprint found at the Abilene gas station where the credit card was used matched a footprint found at 526 Thomas Street where the body was discovered, and matched the tennis shoes worn by Battee when arrested.
The State also called Jose Gonzales, who testified he came to Abilene on November 24, 1979, prior to the instant case. Near midnight he met appellant and Battee in a club. About an hour later the three left in Gonzales’ pickup truck, supposedly to look for women. Once out in the country, appellant and Battee began beating Gonzales. They took his clothes, his watch and wallet containing $140.00. They drove off in the pickup after telling Gonzales to run.
The appellant offered no evidence at the guilt stage of the trial.
Every circumstantial evidence case must necessarily be tested by its own facts to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, LeDuc v. State, 593 S.W.2d 678 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Earnhart v. State, 575 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Flores v. State, 551 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Carlisle v. State, 549 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Indo v. State, 502 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Ysasaga v. State, 444 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).
And it is well established that a conviction on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained if the circumstances proven do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused; and proof amounting only to a strong suspicion or mere probability is insufficient. Flores v. State, supra; Earnhart v. State, supra; Stogsdill v. State, 552 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Culmore v. State, 447 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).
In Moore v. State, 532 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), it was written:
“Ordinarily, the test on appeal is whether there was evidence from which the jurors (advised of the restrictions the law places upon them in condemning one on circumstantial evidence)1 might rea[776]*776sonably conclude that every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt was excluded. Ysasaga v. State, supra (444 S.W.2d 305).”
It has also been stated in 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 742, p. 424:
“In ascertaining whether the guilt of the accused has been established to a moral certainty, the appellate court will review the evidence in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent. The court will not presume any acts against the accused that are not shown to have been committed by him. Furthermore, a conviction will not be sustained on appeal if the evidence does not sufficiently establish all material elements of the offense charged.” Ysasaga v. State, supra; Flores v. State, supra; Nathan v. State, 611 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
In circumstantial evidence cases it is not necessary, however, that every fact point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt. It is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Flores v. State, supra; Mills v. State, 508 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Herndon v. State, 543 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). The rules of circumstantial evidence do not require that the circumstances should to a moral certainty actually exclude every hypothesis that the act may have been committed by another person, but the hypothesis intended is a reasonable one consistent with the circumstances and facts proved, and the supposition that the act may have been committed by another person must not be out of harmony with the evidence. Jones v. State, 442 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Taylor v. State, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 330, 221 S.W. 611, 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1920); Flores v. State, supra; Nathan v. State, supra at p. 75.
The record shows that the deceased left home for work on December 2, 1979 in his wife’s Continental automobile wearing Dan Post boots, with wallet and money clip. He was last seen alive leaving work about 11:45 p.m. His body was found the next morning about 9:30 a.m. at 526 Thomas Street, brutally beaten, one-third of his brain missing. His trousers were found on top of a shed with the pockets turned inside out. The Continental, boots, money, etc., were missing.
About an hour after the deceased left work a man meeting appellant’s description was seen in the deceased’s car, along with a black male companion at the Minute Shop in Abilene. About the time the body was discovered appellant was identified as being in Midland trying to pawn a television set using the deceased’s identification. He was with a black male and was seen in the deceased’s car. The deceased’s boots were found in Midland. Other evidence placed the appellant in New Mexico driving the deceased’s car. He was with William Bat-tee, a black male. When arrested, he first gave a different name. There was blood in the car and on his clothes. The blood on his clothes was shown not to be his or Battee’s and was shown to be compatible with that of the deceased.
The evidence was sufficient to show a murder committed in the course of a robbery (V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 29.02) as alleged. Appellant’s sufficiency of evidence (at the guilt stage) contentions are overruled.
Appellant also contends the trial court “erred in failing to quash the indictment as to count one therein for the reason that same fails to provide adequate notice in that said count fails to name the victim of the robbery appellant was allegedly in the course of committing.”
The conviction in the case was upon count one of the indictment drafted pursuant to V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 19.03(a)(2), which in pertinent part alleged the appellant:
“... did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, Hubert Otha To-bey, by beating and hitting him with a piece of concrete and by cutting and stabbing him with a knife; and the said Clifton Charles Russell a/k/a Clifton [777]*777Charles Lacy did then and there intentionally cause the death of the said Hubert Otha Tobey in the course of committing the offense of robbery.”
An examination of appellant’s motion to quash reflects it was directed to a claim of duplicitous pleading in that two means of causing death were alleged and that it failed to put the appellant on proper notice as to the manner of death. There was no claim therein of failure to name the victim of the robbery.
Appellant raises this ground for the first time on appeal since it was not contained in his motion to quash. Appellant relied upon Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), and King v. State, 594 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). See also Silguero v. State, 608 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Evans v. State, 601 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
The instant case can be distinguished from the above cases. In the instant case, unlike the cases above, no motion to quash was made upon the basis that the indictment failed to allege the victim of the underlying offensé. Absent an attempt to draw the trial court’s attention specifically to the failure to name the victim of the underlying transaction, nothing is presented for review. Kipperman v. State, 626 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Woolls v. State, 665 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
A jurisdictional defect in an indictment is a defect which renders the indictment insufficient in that it fails to allege the constituent elements of the offense. Terry v. State, 517 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The instant indictment does not suffer such defect. There is no fundamental error.
In two grounds of error appellant complains of the admission of testimony concerning a blood sample taken from him because it was obtained by virtue of an invalid search warrant, and argues if the warrant was facially valid then the procedure authorized by Article 18.02(10), V.A.C. C.P., as applied to him was an unreasonable legislative classification denying him equal protection of the law.
It is his initial argument that Article 18.02(10), supra, does not list blood as one of the grounds for the issuance of a search warrant, and that a search warrant issued for that reason was invalid. The appellant filed a motion to quash the warrant. In said motion he asked in the alternative for a motion to suppress the results in the event it was too late to prevent the taking of his blood. The motion was overruled. Whether there was a hearing does not appear from the record. The search warrant, if any, is not in the record. There is no transcription of the court reporter’s notes, if any, to be transcribed. We are unable to appraise the action of the trial court or to determine if appellant ever urged his motion to suppress.
Sgt. Bradshaw testified on January 29, 1980, he executed a search warrant on appellant and blood was taken. There was no objection to this testimony nor to the latter testimony of the forensic serologist as to her tests concerning such blood sample.
If it can be argued that appellant has preserved his contention for review, it is observed that this court has recently held that blood is an item for which a search warrant may issue under Article 18.02(10), V.A.C.C.P., as amended 1977. See Gentry v. State, 640 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Opinion on Discretionary Review Without Petition).
Appellant’s other argument as to the denial of the equal protection of the law is based on the fact that Article 18.01(e), V.A. C.C.P., prohibits the issuance of a search warrant under Article 18.02(10), supra, if the property or items are located in an office of a newspaper, news magazine, television station or radio station.
There was no objection on this basis in the trial court. Failure to object can even waive an error involving constitutional rights. Mendoza v. State, 552 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Hovila v. State, 562 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). [778]*778See also Watkins v. State, 572 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Shannon v. State, 567 S.W.2d 510 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Even if appellant had properly objected, his contention would still be without merit. In order to successfully claim denial of equal protection of the law on the basis of unreasonable classification, an accused must prove the existence of a class of which he is a part and unreasonable discrimination. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954). This appellant has failed to do.
Next, appellant urges the court erred, over objection, in admitting evidence obtained by an illegal warrantless search of his person. Hobbs Officer ^Baum testified that about 30 minutes after appellant was arrested, and after talking with Sgt. Bradshaw in Abilene, he took appellant’s trousers from him in the jail cell without a warrant therefor. There was no objection to this testimony. During the testimony of the forensic serologist when the trousers were offered, the only objection was that it was “a warrantless search.” The objection was overruled. It is questionable whether the contention is preserved for review in light of the general objection.
Further, we conclude the clothing was admissible under United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). Still further, it is observed that Baum and later Bradshaw testified as to the clothing and its condition without objection prior to the forensic ser-ologist’s testimony. It would appear the failure to timely object waived any right to complain on appeal. Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). See also Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Shumake v. State, 502 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
Appellant additionally contends the trial court committed error in admitting evidence of the prior extraneous robbery of Jose Gonzales on November 25, 1979.
This was a circumstantial evidence case. There was no direct evidence placing appellant at the scene of the murder. Extraneous offenses are admissible on the question of identity if the extraneous offense has sufficient common distinguishing characteristics to show that it was the handiwork of the accused, and the State’s case is entirely circumstantial on the question of identity. Hinkle v. State, 442 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Jones v. State, 568 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
Gonzales was robbed by appellant and Battee, a white male and a black male. It appears that the deceased Tobey was robbed by two men, one white, one black. Both robberies occurred near midnight, both involved a male victim who was alone, both victims were undressed or partially undressed. In each case a motor vehicle was taken. The robberies took place nine days apart in Abilene. There were sufficient common distinguishing characteristics or similarities to justify the admission of the extraneous offenses. See Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Hinkle v. State, supra.
Appellant’s contention is overruled.
In five grounds of error appellant complains the court erred in admitting prejudicial opinion testimony “amounting to a conclusion of law.” Reference is made to the testimony of Abilene police officers Melvin Martin, John Perry and Casey Bradshaw and Otis Wiley, investigator with the district attorney, as well as Robert Lee Boone, a convicted felon. All of these witnesses were permitted to testify as to the probability of appellant being violent in the future. The objection to their testimony was that they were not qualified to state their conclusion or opinion. The officers had all known appellant for several years, some having handled him as a juvenile. Boone was a Taylor County jail inmate when appellant had been incarcerated there. Appellant had beaten him because he had mumbled in his sleep. Based on this experience and his prior experience in the penitentiary, he expressed opinion appellant would be violent in the future.
[779]*779The trial objection to each witness’ testimony went to the weight to be given and not the admissibility of the testimony. On appeal appellant argues the witnesses were permitted to state a conclusion of law. The ground of error does not comport with the trial objection, and nothing is presented for review. Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Cain v. State, 549 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
Further, we have previously held that a properly qualified lay witness could state an opinion concerning the probability that a capital murder defendant would continue to commit criminal acts of violence. Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Simmons v. State, 594 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Each of the witnesses here involved knew the appellant and were in a position to express the opinions they did.
Further, Article 37.071(a), V.A.C.C.P., provides in part:
“... In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence
Appellant’s contentions are overruled.
Appellant complains the court failed to respond to his objection to the inclusion of Special Issue No. 2 in the charge on punishment since the provision relating to said special issue is unconstitutionally vague. The contention is overruled. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). See also Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
No error is shown.
Still further, appellant contends the court “erred in failing to respond to appellant’s timely requested charge, and instruction to the jury at the punishment phase defining ‘deliberate.’ ” Reference is made to Special Issue No. 1.
Article 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P., provides in part:
“(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
“(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;_” (Emphasis supplied.)
The court submitted the following charge:
“Special Issue No. 1
“Was the conduct of the defendant, Clifton Charles Russell, Jr., that caused the death of the deceased, Hubert Otha Tobey, committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result?”
Appellant’s special requested charge was as follows:
“Now comes Clifton Charles Russell, Defendant in the above-styled and numbered cause, by and through his attorneys of record, and requests that the following be included in the Court’s charge to the jury herein:
“I.
“The word ‘deliberate’ means formed or arrived at or determined upon a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action. The word ‘premeditated’ means considered beforehand.
“If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of Defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is then deliberate.
“The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with [780]*780different individuals and under varying circumstances. The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and a decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not such deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as deliberate murder. To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, he decided to and does kill.
“WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that the above requested charge be made a part of the Court's charge to the jury herein.”
This was the special requested charge which was denied by the trial court.
The words “deliberate” or “deliberately” are not statutorily defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure or Penal Code.
It is not error, in a prosecution for violating a statute, to refuse to define a word used in the statute, when such word is used in its ordinary sense, and it is easily comprehended by everyone. Humphreys v. State, 34 Tex.Cr.R. 434, 30 S.W. 1066 (Tex.Cr.App.1895).
Where there is no statutory definition of a term, the question of trial court’s obligation to define the term depends on whether the term has such a common and ordinary meaning that jurors can be fairly presumed to know and apply such meaning. Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
Where terms used are words simple in themselves and are used in their ordinary meaning, jurors are supposed to know such common meaning and terms, and under such circumstances such common words are not necessarily to be defined in the charge to the jury. Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 862, 94 S.Ct. 81, 38 L.Ed.2d 112; Joubert v. State, 136 Tex. Cr.R. 219, 124 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.Cr.App.1938).
In King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), this court held the trial court need not define “deliberately” as used in Article 37.071, supra, in its charge at the penalty stage of a capital murder trial. See also Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Heckert v. State, 612 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
Further, the appellant has made no showing that he was entitled to the special requested charge set out above, and upon which he relies.
In Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 123 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), this court wrote:
“The statutory requirements that appellant’s conduct be committed deliberately does not mean that it must be a premeditated act.”
In Fearance v. State, 620 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), this court wrote:
“On the other hand, resort to other determinations of evidentiary sufficiency for special issue one is instructive for we know that ‘deliberately,’ as used in that question of the charge on punishment, is not the linguistic equivalent of ‘intentionally,’ as used in the charge on guilt-innocence, Heckert v. State, 612 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); rather, it is the thought process which embraces more than a will to engage in conduct and activates the intentional conduct.”
Footnote # 6 of Fearance reiterates that “deliberately” need not be “premeditated.”
Under these authorities the requested charge would not have been proper.
We do not understand that appellant contends that this court should now devise a definition of “deliberately,” set it forth, and reverse the conviction for the failure of the trial judge to have the foresight not to give the same definition in his instructions to the jury.
Appellant’s ground of error is overruled.
[781]*781Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s affirmative answer to special issue number one. That issue as submitted under Article 37.071(b)(1), V.A.C.C.P., has already been set out. Taking into consideration the evidence at both stages of the trial, we conclude, without reiterating the testimony, that it was sufficient to support the jury’s “yes” answer to special issue number one. See Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 122-123 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
Appellant makes claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the affirmative finding at the penalty stage of the trial as to Special Issue No. 2 as to the probability of future criminal acts of violence.
It is well established that the circumstances of the offense itself can sustain an affirmative answer to the second special issue under Article 37.071, supra, if they are severe enough. Mitchell v. State, 650 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Brooks v. State, 599 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Muniz v. State, 573 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The jury, at the penalty stage of the trial, may consider all of the evidence adduced at the guilt stage of the trial. Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); O’Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Duffy v. State, 567 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Felder v. State, 564 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Brock v. State, 556 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Indeed, the circumstances of the offense and the facts surrounding it may furnish greater probative evidence than any other evidence regarding the second special issue submitted at the penalty stage of a capital murder case. Duffy v. State, supra, and cases there cited; Crawford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925, 933 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
The facts in the instant case reveal a brutal murder committed during the course of a robbery. In addition to numerous knife wounds to the body, including one to the jugular vein, the deceased’s skull was crushed by a piece of concrete. The deceased’s money and automobile were taken. Jose Gonzales, nine days earlier, had also been attacked and beaten, and his truck taken. There was also testimony that after being confined in the Taylor County jail appellant beat another inmate. There was testimony from several witnesses that appellant’s general reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen was bad, and that in their opinion he would continue to commit acts of violence in the future.
There was no psychiatric testimony, but it is not essential to support an affirmative finding to the special issue in a capital murder case. Brooks v. State, supra; Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
When the facts of the instant offense are considered with the additional evidence of the extraneous robbery, the beating in jail and appellant’s reputation, we conclude the evidence is clearly sufficient to support the jury’s finding of “yes” to the second special issue. See Mitchell v. State, supra; Earvin v. State, 582 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); cert. den. 444 U.S. 985, 100 S.Ct. 492, 62 L.Ed.2d 414; Brooks v. State, supra.
The judgment is affirmed.