Ruffins v. Din

District Court, S.D. California·Decided February 24, 2025·No. 3:25-cv-00267·Unknown

Opinion

TYREE RAYBON RUFFINS, Case No.: 25-cv-00267-AJB-SBC CDCR #BJ-6459, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS v. AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE R. DIN, Lieutenant, Defendant. (Doc. No. 2) Plaintiff Tyree Raybon Ruffins (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) in Ione, California proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”)), together with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2 (“IFP”)). Plaintiff alleges Lieutenant R. Din violated his constitutional rights at Centinela State Prison in November 2021, by failing to follow “marriage chrono” protocol after Plaintiff and another prisoner named Wilson engaged in a fight.1 (See Compl. at 3; see also Doc. No. 1-2 at 1‒3.)

1 A “marriage chrono” is prison lingo for documentation signed by a prisoner attesting to his compatibility or “non-enemy concern” regarding another inmate and indicating the two can safely “program” at the same facility. Jordan v. Vargas, No. 17-CV-03706-HSG, 2019 WL 4751864, at *2 n.2 I. Motion to Proceed IFP All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay the entire fee at the time of filing only if the court grants the plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”). To proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)–(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Using this financial information, the court “assess[es] and when funds exist, collect[s], … an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). In short, while prisoners may qualify to proceed IFP without having to pay the full statutory filing upfront, they remain obligated to pay the full amount due in monthly payments. See Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). ///

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