Rudelson v. United States

431 F. Supp. 1101, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16780
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMarch 22, 1977
Docket73-566-HP, 73-642-HP and 76-1008-HP
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 431 F. Supp. 1101 (Rudelson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rudelson v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1101, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16780 (C.D. Cal. 1977).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PREGERSON, District Judge.

The above captioned cases, filed in the Central District of California, were consolidated for a court trial on the issue of liability. The trial took place on December 8, 9, and 10,1976. As part of the proceedings, at the request of counsel, the Court visited the Santa Monica Airport Control Tower and while there, viewed the airfield, the flight traffic pattern, and the flight traffic area from the local air traffic controller’s station.

Having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having studied the documentary evidence, having perused the opening and closing post-trial briefs of counsel, having given the matter due consideration the Court, being fully advised in the premises, makes its findings of fact as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

It is true that:

1. These are consolidated actions for wrongful death and for property damage arising out of a mid-air collision between two airplanes, a Cessna 150, registration No. N60003, (Cessna 003) and a Piper Colt, registration No. N4928Z, (Piper).

2. The collision occurred in the sky over Santa Monica, California, on the morning of September 9, 1971, about 9:07:00, about a mile south of the Santa Monica Control Tower (Tower), and about 1,000 feet above the airfield, on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for Runway 21 of the Santa Monica Airport.

3. Runway 21, which is about 5,000 feet long, lies in a general northeast-southwest direction. The Tower is located about 1,000 feet southwest of the northernmost corner of the runway. Aircraft landing on or tak *1104 ing off from Runway 21 fly a left hand traffic pattern as follows: (a) an aircraft taking off flies in a southwest direction along the upwind leg and turns about 90° to its left on the crosswind leg and then departs the area from the crosswind leg which intersects the downwind leg at about 90°; (b) an aircraft landing enters the traffic pattern at about 45° to the downwind leg, establishes itself in the downwind leg, turns about 90° to its left on the base leg and then turns about 90° to its left on the final approach to the runway. See Appendix A.

4. The Tower was staffed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel. Through its FAA personnel, the United States Government undertook the responsibility of operating an air traffic control system, involving the safety of aircraft and occupants of aircraft, at the Santa Monica Airport.

5. During the morning of the collision the weather was clear, visibility was 12 miles, wind was from 200° at 6 knots, and traffic over the. Santa Monica Airport was light to moderate.

6. At the time of the collision, weather conditions permitted aircraft to operate under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and both aircraft were flying under VFR rules. These VFR rules require pilots to operate aircraft under conditions of “see and be seen” or “see and avoid” — i. e., aircraft avoid collisions by seeing and avoiding one another.

7. Jerrold Rudelson, occupying the left seat, and Thomas Duval, occupying the right seat of the Cessna 003, were killed as a result of the collision and ensuing crash of the aircraft.

8. Prior to the collision, Duval, a licensed flight instructor, was giving flying lessons to Rudelson, a licensed student pilot. The Cessna 003, equipped with dual controls, was being operated as a student-pilot trainer.

9. Prior to the collision, Duval held a commercial pilot’s certificate with ratings for single-engine land and flight instructor, and had accumulated 960.5 flying hours. Rudelson held a student pilot’s certificate and had accumulated 21.4 flying hours, of which 3.0 hours were for supervised solo flights.

10. The pilot and sole occupant of the Piper, Marvin Aardema, was killed as a result of the collision and ensuing crash of his aircraft. At the time of the collision, Aardema held a private pilot’s certificate, airplane single-engine land, and had accumulated 440.1 total flying hours.

11. On the date of the collision, National Indemnity Company was the insurer of Aviation Unlimited, Inc., the operator of Cessna 003, and Melvin Miller, the owner of the aircraft. On that date Duval was employed as a flight instructor by Aviation Unlimited, Inc., and by reason of such employment became an insured under National Indemnity’s insurance policy. As a result of the mid-air collision, National Indemnity paid money to the Rudelson heirs and other persons or business entities for property damage. By reason of such payments, National Indemnity is subrogated to the rights of its insured against third parties.

12. At 8:52:05, prior to the collision on the morning of September 9, 1971, Cessna 003 radioed the Tower and requested permission for student pilot Rudelson to “work the pattern,” i. e., fly the entire pattern, in order to practice touch and go landings with his instructor Duval.

13. At 8:58:35, Cessna 003 was cleared for take-off by Jon Middleton, the local FAA controller on duty in the Tower.

14. At 9:01:55, Cessna 003 was cleared to make a touch and go landing by Middle *1105 ton after the aircraft advised that it was on the downwind leg for Runway 21, abeam the Tower.

15. At about 9:04:00, Cessna 003 executed a touch and go landing on Runway 21 and climbed out on the upwind leg of the traffic pattern.

16. At 9:04:40, while Cessna 003 was climbing out on the upwind leg, Middleton instructed the aircraft to angle left 10° for noise abatement purposes.

17. At 9:04:55, observing that Cessna 003 was not complying with his previous request, Middleton again instructed it to angle left 10° and further advised it that another aircraft, Cessna 32Q, was climbing out behind Cessna 003.

18. Middleton then observed Cessna 003 angle left 10°; it was never seen by him again.

19. After climbing out on the upwind leg, Cessna 003, which had been cleared to practice touch and go landings, turned left about 90° onto the crosswind leg, and later turned left about 90° onto the downwind leg.

20. After Cessna 003 was established on the downwind leg for about 6 to 8 seconds, the fatal mid-air collision with the Piper occurred.

21. Prior to the mid-air collision, the Piper had departed from Compton Airport, Compton, California enroute in a generally northerly direction to Santa Monica Airport.

22. Although equipped with a two-way radio, the Piper entered the Santa Monica Airport traffic area and the Santa Monica Airport traffic pattern without establishing two-way radio communications with the Tower, as required by 14 C.F.R. § 91.87. It is reasonable to assume that the Piper suffered an in-flight radio failure which prevented it from communicating with the Tower prior to entering the traffic pattern,

23. Even though the Piper’s radio was inoperative, it could have communicated with the Tower by dipping its wings and then receiving directional light signals beamed from the Tower’s light gun pursuant to Federal Air Regulations 14 C.F.R.

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431 F. Supp. 1101, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16780, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rudelson-v-united-states-cacd-1977.