Royals v. Massey (In Re Denton)

370 B.R. 441, 58 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 226, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2014, 2007 WL 1701921
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 12, 2007
Docket19-40136
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 370 B.R. 441 (Royals v. Massey (In Re Denton)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Royals v. Massey (In Re Denton), 370 B.R. 441, 58 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 226, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2014, 2007 WL 1701921 (Ga. 2007).

Opinion

*443 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN S. DALIS, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before me on the Motion for Contempt (“Motion”) filed by Clyde W. Royals, counsel for the Debtor (“Debtor’s Counsel”), against M. Elaina Massey, the chapter 13 trustee (“Trustee”). The Motion is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).

The impetus for the Motion was a series of disbursement errors, acknowledged by the Trustee, that resulted in a shortfall of money available to pay attorney’s fees under the Debtor’s chapter 13 plan, so that Debtor’s Counsel received no money toward fees in this case for two months in a row.

I dismiss the Motion because the Trustee is shielded from suit by derived judicial immunity. I thus do not reach the merits of the Motion, but I do consider issues the Motion raises.

The first issue is the meaning of “periodic payments ... in equal monthly amounts” under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I). This language encompasses all regularly-recurring post-confirmation payments on allowed secured claims. These payments must be in equal monthly amounts beginning with the Trustee’s first disbursement following confirmation.

The second issue is the requirement of adequate protection for secured creditors — its application pre-confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)(C) and its meaning post-confirmation “during the period of the plan” under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II). Adequate protection payments pre-confirmation are applied to principal only. Adequate protection post-confirmation is provided at least in part by payment in full of the allowed secured claim over the life of the plan at an interest rate that provides the creditor the value of the allowed secured claim as of the date of the filing of the petition.

In addition, I address the related issue of the accrual and payment of interest required for a creditor to receive present value on allowed secured claims. This interest begins to accrue at the date of confirmation. Moreover, the interest that accrues over the amortization period must be paid in arrears, so that a disbursement to a secured creditor properly includes only the interest that accrued on the claim during the immediately-preceding month, not the interest that will accrue in the coming month.

I. Motion for Contempt

Debtor’s Counsel alleges that the Trustee’s disbursements violate the General Order that establishes the distribution scheme for attorney’s fees to counsel representing chapter 13 debtors. 1 Debtor’s Counsel also alleges that the Trustee’s dis *444 bursements conflict with the provisions of the Debtor’s confirmed chapter 13 plan (“Plan”) and that the Trustee has failed to execute her duties under 11 U.S.C. § 1326. 2 Debtor’s Counsel does not seek damages for the alleged contempt, but rather requests entry of an order directing the Trustee to correct the payments according to the Plan in this case and to continue to disburse correctly in this case as well as all others administered by the Trustee.

I first note that because Debtor’s Counsel does not seek money damages, he should more appropriately have requested an affirmative or mandatory injunction requiring the Trustee to perform certain acts instead of seeking an order holding the Trustee in contempt. However, the type of relief sought is a distinction without a difference, because the Trustee is immune both from damages and from injunctive relief for the disbursement errors at issue here.

Just as judges are absolutely immune from suit in the exercise of their judicial authority, so also are non-judicial officers absolutely immune when they exercise discretionary judgments that are functionally comparable to those of judges. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 436, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993). This derived judicial immunity is not limited to actions for damages, but also extends to requests for injunctive relief. Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir.1987). “[Ajbsolute immunity bars a suit at the outset and frees the defendant official of any obligation to justi fy his actions.” Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 495-96 (D.C.Cir.1983).

Here, the Trustee’s disbursement errors occurred during her administration of the estate under the Bankruptcy Code as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”). The Trustee inadvertently overpaid secured creditors when she attempted to conform her computerized disbursement calculations in this case to the Plan and to the BAPCPA disbursement scheme set out in an order entered in another case. 3 Because of the overpay-ments, no money was disbursed for attorney’s fees for a period of two months.

The Trustee’s exercise of discretionary judgment in attempting to reconcile conflicting disbursement schemes with the debtor’s Plan is functionally comparable to the discretion exercised by judges. The Trustee thus cannot be sued for her disbursement errors.

II. Payments in Equal Monthly Amounts on Secured Claims

The Motion, although itself ill-conceived, has as its backdrop the legitimate question of how chapter 13 plans can be structured under BAPCPA to ensure that money is available to pay the debtor’s lawyer. I do not answer this question, because it is not before me. However, in addressing the disbursement errors made by the Trustee, I do foreclose an answer that other courts have endorsed.

The BAPCPA amendments to the Bankruptcy Code reduce the ready availability of funds to pay attorney’s fees in at *445 least two ways. First, BAPCPA requires a confirmation hearing within 45 days after the event commonly referred to as the “341 meeting.” See 11 U.S.C. § 1324(b). 4 Second, BAPCPA requires that the plan provide for “periodic payments ... in equal monthly amounts” to secured creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I). 5

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Bluebook (online)
370 B.R. 441, 58 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 226, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2014, 2007 WL 1701921, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/royals-v-massey-in-re-denton-gasb-2007.