Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.

764 F. Supp. 1543, 1991 WL 97214
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedJune 4, 1991
DocketCiv. No. 86-048-ALB/AMER(DF)
StatusPublished

This text of 764 F. Supp. 1543 (Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 764 F. Supp. 1543, 1991 WL 97214 (M.D. Ga. 1991).

Opinion

764 F.Supp. 1543 (1991)

Issiah ROSS, Jr., William Morgan Porter, Johnnie Lee Palms, James C. Homer, John W. Taylor, Vernon Alexander Putman, Hosey J. White, Jr., Franklin Roosevelt Scott, Gerry Plant, Tabitha Herring, Eddie Slaughter, Plaintiffs,
v.
BUCKEYE CELLULOSE CORP., Defendant.

Civ. No. 86-048-ALB/AMER(DF).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Albany/Americus Division.

June 4, 1991.

*1544 *1545 *1546 James Finkelstein, Albany, Ga., for plaintiffs.

John G. Skinner, Robert N. Godfrey, Smith, Currie & Hancock, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

FITZPATRICK, District Judge.

In an order issued by the court in the above styled case on August 11, 1989, 733 F.Supp. 344 (hereinafter referred to as Buckeye I), the court determined that defendant's Pay and Progression System was a discriminatory employment practice that had a ongoing disparate impact on blacks employed at Buckeye Cellulose Corporation (Buckeye). On April 2, 1990, 733 F.Supp. 363, the court concluded the second phase of this case, (hereinafter referred to as Buckeye II), by rendering its individual findings of facts and conclusions of law concerning defendant's liability to the individual plaintiffs arising from their disparate impact claim. The court will now complete the final phase of this action by determining herein the damage award each prevailing plaintiff in this case is entitled to receive and by ruling on plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees. Defendant would also have the court revisit the issue of whether or not plaintiffs' filed their charges against the defendant in a timely manner. The court, however, will not reexamine that issue and instead stands by its earlier ruling rendered in Buckeye I.

I. DAMAGES

In awarding damages to the prevailing plaintiffs (hereinafter plaintiffs), the court must attempt to place each one in the position he or she would have been in absent defendant's discriminatory practices. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). The means of accomplishing that goal in this case is to award back pay and other equitable relief, which the plaintiffs in this case are entitled to receive based on the court's finding that they are victims of defendant's discriminatory Pay and Progression System. Id. at 418-19, 95 S.Ct. at 2372. Interest, overtime, shift differentials, and fringe benefits such as vacation pay, sick pay and profit sharing are all components of back pay that are to be included in the computation of such an award, if applicable. See Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1562 (11th Cir.1986). The back pay awarded should equal the amount the party would have received had there been no discrimination less the pay he or she actually collected as a result of the defendant's discriminatory actions. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-19, 95 S.Ct. at 2372.

An award of back pay damages also entitled the recipient to receive prejudgment interest on the damage award computed in accordance with the prevailing IRS prime rates. See EEOC v. Guardian Pools, Inc., 828 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th Cir. 1987); Smith v. American Service Co. of Atlanta, Inc., 796 F.2d 1430, 1432 (11th Cir.1986). All plaintiffs receiving back pay damages in this action will therefore be granted prejudgment interest on the amount of back pay awarded each year as computed by the clerk of court based on the prevailing IRS prime rates. Further *1547 equitable relief appropriate in this case is the placement of plaintiffs currently employed at Buckeye on the same pay scale they would have been on but for the discriminatory practices of Buckeye. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1869, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).

Determining the amount of back pay that should be awarded to the plaintiffs in this case will require the court to "recreate the employment history of the individual victims and hypothesize the time and place of each employee's advancement absent the unlawful practice." Myers v. Gilman Paper Co., 527 F.Supp. 647, 649-50 (S.D.Ga.1981) (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 372, 97 S.Ct. at 1873). In doing so, "unrealistic exactitude is not required, [and] uncertainties in determining what an employee would have earned but for the discrimination, should be resolved against the discriminating employer." Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260-61 (5th Cir.1974). The court will engage in an imprecise process that will necessarily require a certain amount of estimation. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 372, 97 S.Ct. at 1873. A process made even more difficult by the fact that the very nature of defendant's discriminatory practice was the systematic, ongoing failure of Buckeye to fairly appraise, examine, qualify, and reward the plaintiffs. The calculation of back pay damages in this case, however, is by no means an impossible task that will force the court to engage in mere speculation.

The court heard months of testimony in this case which has allowed it to piece together an accurate picture of the competence, intelligence, and skill of each of the plaintiffs in comparison with their fellow workers and to determine how those attributes would have resulted in their advancement in a work place such as Buckeye's absent discriminatory practices. Mindful of those findings and aided by thousands of pages of records, transcripts, and exhibits, the court will determine the damages each plaintiff is entitled to receive based on its finding that they were injured by Buckeye's discriminatory Pay and Progression System.

In computing back pay damages in this case, the court first determined each plaintiff's actual average annual hourly rate and the actual hours that plaintiff worked each year. The court then determined the average annual hourly pay rate of a similarly situated white technician. Using that data, the court projected the annual salary plaintiff would have earned absent defendant's discriminatory practices by multiplying the average annual hourly pay rate of the similarly situated white technician times the actual hours the plaintiff worked each year. The resulting figure, minus the plaintiff's actual annual salary, equals the amount of back pay damages awarded.

The period of the comparisons used to determine the extent of each plaintiff's injury began on the date two years prior to the filing of the particular plaintiff's EEOC complaint and ended when either he or she began receiving the same compensation as the person he or she is being compared with or when the particular plaintiff resigned or was terminated; whichever came first.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody
422 U.S. 405 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Blum v. Stenson
465 U.S. 886 (Supreme Court, 1984)
City of Riverside v. Rivera
477 U.S. 561 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc.
482 U.S. 437 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Missouri v. Jenkins Ex Rel. Agyei
491 U.S. 274 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.
733 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Georgia, 1990)
Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.
733 F. Supp. 344 (M.D. Georgia, 1989)
Myers v. Gilman Paper Co.
527 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Georgia, 1981)
Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.
764 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Georgia, 1991)
Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.
784 F.2d 1546 (Eleventh Circuit, 1986)
Perkins v. Mobile Housing Board
847 F.2d 735 (Eleventh Circuit, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
764 F. Supp. 1543, 1991 WL 97214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ross-v-buckeye-cellulose-corp-gamd-1991.