Rosemary Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner

9 T.C. 851, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedOctober 30, 1947
DocketDocket Nos. 8201, 9109, 9110
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 9 T.C. 851 (Rosemary Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosemary Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 851, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45 (tax 1947).

Opinion

OPINION.

Kern, Judge:

A question has been raised with respect to the jurisdiction of this Court to consider questions incident to overassessments of taxes found by respondent in 1945 as follows:

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The overassessments so found resulted from the application by respondent, as to the asserted tax liability of each petitioner, of amounts previously paid by each petitioner in connection with a tentative settlement proposed in 1943 but rejected by the Commissioner. It is thus petitioners’ contention that, in reality, respondent determined a deficiency in those taxes so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court and that applying the payments made in connection with the proposed settlement does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. They point out that in each case respondent, in effect, determined a liability for the tax in question in excess of the amount shown on petitioners’ original returns, and that the only payments which have been made by petitioners, other than payments made on the original returns, were those made in connection with the proposed, but rejected, tentative settlements.

Since the “deficiency,” from the determination of which our jurisdiction stems, is a statutory term, it is necessary to inquire exactly what the statute definition provides. Section 271 of the Internal Revenue Code provides :

(a) In General. — As used in this chapter in respect of a tax imposed by this chapter, “deficiency” means the amount by which the tax imposed by this chapter exceeds the excess of—
(1) the sum of (A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return, if a return was made by the taxpayer and an amount was shown as the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus (B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, over—
(2) the amount of rebates, as defined in subsection (b) (2), made.
* ⅜ * * * * ⅜

It is stipulated that the petitioners, in February 1944, made such additional payments as were made (in addition to those made with original returns) as deficiencies assessed pursuant to waivers of restriction on assessment executed by petitioners in 1943. Section 272 (d), set out in the margin,1 made it possible to collect these payments as deficiencies even though no formal notices of deficiency were mailed to petitioners pursuant to section 272 (a) (1). It therefore appears in these cases that the respondent did not in 1945 determine deficiencies, within the meaning of the statute, with regard to or as an incident to his finding of an overassessment of the taxes above referred to, since the taxes imposed by chapters 1 and 2 for each year were not in excess of the tax shown on the returns for the year plus the amounts later assessed as deficiencies, and we are without jurisdiction in the particular issues involved in these findings of overassessment.2

The remaining issues having to do with depreciation are greatly simplified by reason of the agreement of the parties with regard to most of the basic facts.

The petitioners make alternative contentions. Their primary contention is that section 734 of the Internal Revenue Code is applicable to the situation before us.

They urge that their incomes subject to taxation in 1940 and 1941, and particularly their incomes for those years subject to the excess profits tax, were computed by deducting from gross income an allow-anee for depreciation considerably less than the allowances for depreciation on the same assets deducted from gross income during the base period years 1936-1939, that consequently their excess profits credits (in effect, their average net incomes during the base period) were less and their excess profits taxes correspondingly greater than if the same rate of depreciation had been used in the taxable years and in the base period years, that equity and fairness demand a consistent treatment of similar items of deduction in both the base period and the subsequent taxable years (a treatment given in the proposed settlement referred to in our findings), and that such a consistent treatment is contemplated by chapter 2, subchapter E, of the Internal Revenue Code, and particularly by section 734.

This question, thus posed, requires us to examine with care the various provisions of chapter 2, subchapter E of the code.

Section 710 (a) (1), Internal Revenue Code, imposes a tax upon “the adjusted excess-profits net income, as defined in subsection (b), of every corporation.” Subsection (b) provides that “adjusted excess-profits tax income” means the excess profits tax income (as defined in section 711) minus (among other things) “the amount of the excess profits 'credit under section 712.” Section 712 provides that “the excess profits credit * * * shall be an amount computed under section 713 or section 714 * * *.” Section 713 (which is pertinent to the instant proceedings) provides that “the excess profits credit * * * shall be * * * 95 per centum of the average base period net income as defined in subsection (d).” Subsection (d) provides that “for the purposes of this section the average base period net income of the taxpayer shall be the amount determined under subsection (e) * * Subsection (e) provides that the average base period net income shall be computed by averaging the excess profits net income for each of the taxable years of the taxpayer in the base period. Section 711 (b), (1) provides that “The excess profits net income for any taxable year subject to the Revenue Act of 1936 shall be the normal-tax net income, as defined in section 13 (a) of such Act; and for any other taxable year beginning after December 31, 1937, and before January 1, 1940, shall be the special-class net income, as defined by section 14 (a) of the applicable revenue law,” subj ect to adj ustments not here relevant. Normal tax net income and special class net income are both defined as net income subject to certain adjustments which are not in question in these cases.

In the instant cases the general question has to do with what amounts are to be used as the net income of each petitioner for each of the taxable years in its base period. Stated more specifically, the question is whether the net income of each petitioner for each of the taxable years in the base period should be computed by allowing as a deduction from gross income an allowance on account of depreciation which was reasonable on the basis of facts known in each of those years, or an allowance which was reasonable on the basis of facts known, not in the taxable years of the base period, but' in the first years in which the excess profits tax was imposed.

It is well established that for the purpose of computing net income subject to taxation under chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, .depreciation is to be calculated on the basis of facts known or reasonably to be anticipated during the taxable year and not upon facts subsequently discovered. Lake Charles Naval Stores, 25 B. T. A. 173; see Regulations 103, sec. 19.23 (l)-5. Our question is whether the same rule applies in computing the net income of petitioners during their base periods for the purpose of ascertaining their excess profits credits under subchapter E of chapter 2 of the Internal Revenue Code.

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Rosemary Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner
9 T.C. 851 (U.S. Tax Court, 1947)

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Bluebook (online)
9 T.C. 851, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosemary-mfg-co-v-commissioner-tax-1947.