Roseman v. Roseman

890 S.W.2d 27, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 333
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 21, 1994
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 890 S.W.2d 27 (Roseman v. Roseman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roseman v. Roseman, 890 S.W.2d 27, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 333 (Tenn. 1994).

Opinion

OPINION

BIRCH, Justice.

This case presents an issue heretofore not decided in Tennessee, and it concerns the interpretation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-601 et seq.1 regarding an income withholding order. We accepted the case in order to determine whether the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County had subject-matter jurisdiction to modify its income withholding order without a concomitant modification of the underlying order by the foreign court from which it emanated.

We find that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the statute. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that an income withholding order entered to enforce a foreign support order cannot be modified by the enforcing court unless the underlying order is first modified by the court in which it originated. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County.

I

Carolyn and Garry Roseman were divorced in Maryland in 1991. The decree granted custody of two of their three children to Ms. Roseman and ordered Mr. Rose-man to pay child support of $850 per month. In October 1991, the child support division of the Baltimore County Circuit Court initiated an Interstate Income Withholding action against Mr. Roseman under Md.Fam.Law Code Ann. §§ 10-120 to 10-134 (Supp.1991)2 by sending to Tennessee a certified copy of the divorce decree between the parties, an affidavit of arrearage in the amount of $2,459.02, a portion of the court’s payment records, and a copy of the Maryland statute authorizing income withholding for the payment of child support.

On January 14, 1992, the State of Tennessee, on Ms. Roseman’s behalf, filed pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-601 et seq. a petition in the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County to enforce the Maryland decree through income withholding. Mr. Rose-man, proceeding pro se, answered and denied the material allegations of the petition. He asserted that the Maryland support order should be modified because of an alleged change of circumstances. (This “change of circumstance” did not include his later and more significant assertion that one of the minor children had reached the age of majority).

On February 21, 1992, the referee heard the case and recommended that the Maryland support order be entered for the sole purpose of enforcement and “that the arrear-age in this cause be taken under advisement.” The juvenile court affirmed the recommendation of the referee and on February 25, 1992, ordered that $892.50 per month for child support be withheld from Mr. Rose-man’s wages. He promptly sought a rehearing, but rehearing was denied.

On May 20, 1992, Mr. Roseman petitioned the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County to reduce the amount of his payments under the income withholding order on the grounds that one of the two children in Ms. Roseman’s custody had reached majority. Mr. Roseman based his contention on the provisions in Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-5-607, -503(a)(2), and —405. Responding, Ms. Roseman insisted that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to modify an Interstate Wage Withholding Order under Tenn.Code [29]*29Ann. § 36-5-601 et seq. absent a modification of the foreign support order.3 As a result of the hearing before a referee, the juvenile court entered an order modifying the previously entered income withholding order by halving the amount of income to be withheld: that is, from $892.50 per month to $446.25 per month.

In the Court of Appeals, Ms. Roseman again insisted that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to modify the order, but the Court of Appeals rejected her insistence. Instead, the court reasoned that Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-503(a)(2), as incorporated into Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-605(d), authorizes the modification of income withholding orders by specifically providing that a “payor ... may seek modification of a support order....”4

II

As stated, the issue we here consider is whether under Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-601 et seq. the responding court had subject-matter jurisdiction to modify an income withholding order though the underlying support order had not been modified. Construction of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo. The Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn.1993); Comdata Network, Inc. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 852 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn.1993).5

Our role in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope. State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn.1993). We must determine the legisla-five intent, whenever possible, from the plain language of the statute “read in the context of the entire statute, without any forced or subtle construction which would extend or limit its meaning.” National Gas Distribs. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tenn.1991). Moreover, statutes “in pari material” — those relating to the same subject or having a common purpose — are to be construed together, and the construction of one such statute, if doubtful, may be aided by considering the words and legislative intent indicated by the language of another statute. Belle-Aire Village, Inc. v. Ghorley, 574 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tenn.1978); Spence v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 810 F.Supp. 952, 960 (E.D.Tenn.1992).

The purpose of Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-601 et seq. is “to enhance the enforcement of support obligations by providing a quick and effective procedure for the withholding of income derived in this jurisdiction to enforce support orders of other jurisdic-tions_” TenmCode Ann. § 36-5-601(a). In order to effectuate this purpose, the legislature gave Tennessee courts the power to enter the foreign support order as the first step toward enforcement. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-605. However, the legislature specifically instructed that “[e]ntry of the order [pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-605

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Related

Roseman v. Roseman
890 S.W.2d 27 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
890 S.W.2d 27, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roseman-v-roseman-tenn-1994.