Rosario v. City of New York Comptroller

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 30, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-01775
StatusUnknown

This text of Rosario v. City of New York Comptroller (Rosario v. City of New York Comptroller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rosario v. City of New York Comptroller, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CARLOS ROSARIO, JR., Plaintiff, 23-CV-1775 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL CITY OF NEW YORK COMPTROLLER, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667. He alleges that his car was immobilized due to unpaid fines arising from traffic and parking violations, which he describes as “unauthorized” charges. By order dated March 1, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint but grants him leave to replead, if he wishes to do so, within 30 days. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff Carlos Rosario’s complaint. In or about October 2022, Plaintiff’s “vehicle was immobilized [and] then booted . . . due to ‘a nonpayment.’” (ECF 1 at 5.) He argues that he has been “abused and harassed” and seeks damages from Defendant New York City Comptroller based on alleged violations of the FDCPA. Plaintiff also contends that, in violation of TILA, his “credit card was used without [his] authorization.” (Id.) Plaintiff attaches to his complaint a copy of a document title “PHTO SCHOOL ZN SPEED VIOLATION,” which indicates that a car with plate details “HOD4105 OH PAS” was charged $77.52, apparently for a speeding violation in a school zone. In the

margin next to this ticket, Plaintiff draws an arrow next to his license plate details and writes, “15 USC 1602(I) The term ‘credit card’ means any . . . plate . . . .” (ECF 1-1 at 12.)1 Plaintiff also writes in the margin of this ticket, “15 USC 1602(3) ‘Unauthorized use’ . . . means a use of a credit card by a person other than the card holder who does not have actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and for which the cardholder receives no benefit.” (Id.)2 He thus seems to

1 Plaintiff invokes the definition set forth in the TILA, which provides in full: “The term ‘credit card’ means any card, plate, coupon book or other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(l). 2 This definition in the TILA provides in full: “The term ‘unauthorized use,’ as used in section 1643 of this title, means a use of a credit card by a person other than the cardholder who suggest that his license plate is a credit card within the meaning of the TILA, and that the New York City agency engaged in unauthorized use of his credit card – that is, his license plate – when it imposed a fine on him, without his authorization, for speeding. DISCUSSION A. FDCPA Claim The FDCPA prohibits harassing, deceptive, and misleading practices by “debt collectors.”

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e. A debt collector is defined in Section 1692a(6) as: (1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own, as if it were a debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6); see also Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 582 U.S. 79 (2017) (the FDCPA “defines debt collectors to include those who regularly seek to collect debts ‘owed . . . another’”). The Supreme Court has construed the term “debt collectors” in the FDCPA as “focus[ing] our attention on third party collection agents working for a debt owner—not on a debt owner seeking to collect debts for itself.” Id. at 83. Section 1692d of the FDCPA provides that “[a] debt collector may not engage in any

conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Conduct in violation of the statute includes, among other examples and without limitation, using violence or the threat of violence or other criminal means; using obscene or profane language “the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader”; publishing a list of consumers who refuse to pay debts; or

does not have actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the cardholder receives no benefit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(p). “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass” the person called. Id. First, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant City of New York Comptroller has engaged in conduct that violates the FDCPA. While having his car immobilized as a result of judgments

against him was no doubt unwelcome and inconvenient for Plaintiff, this conduct is not similar in kind to the examples of prohibited conduct set forth in Section 1692d. As other courts have noted, “[a]ny attempt to collect a defaulted debt will be unwanted by a debtor,” but this does not mean that the conduct qualifies as “an abusive tactic under the FDCPA.” Lane v. Fein, Such & Crane, LLP, 767 F. Supp. 2d 382, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted).

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Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Lane v. Fein, Such and Crane, LLP
767 F. Supp. 2d 382 (E.D. New York, 2011)
Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.
582 U.S. 79 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Rosario v. City of New York Comptroller, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosario-v-city-of-new-york-comptroller-nysd-2023.